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INTRODUCTION
The English Franciscan, William of Ockham, was a central
and transitional figure among fourteenth century thinkers.

By

the time he entered Oxford University, the academic world was
largely divided between Thomistic and Scotistic schools of
thought.

Building on the logical studies of William of Sherwood

(c. 1200-1271) and Peter of Spain (c. 1210-1277), Ockham developed
a linguistic stance to avoid issues which he considered false and
to remedy the embarrassment of parallel, yet contradictory, lines
~·

of explanation which had acquired a semi-official status among
the Dominican and Franciscan doctors.

Apparently, Ockham recog-

nized neither the novelty of his conceptual reorganization nor
the extremes it suggested.

Forced to defend the Catholic ortho-

doxy of his position and tangled in political-ecclesiastical
disputes, Ockham achieved only the outline of a philosophical
system.

Instead of unifying the Scholastic argument, he repre-

sented a third faction.

Now verbal fights erupted between

"realists" and "nominalists. 11
Despite the pivotal character of his thought, important
aspects of Ockham's teaching remain obscure.
moral theory.

This is true of his

An abbreviated academic career, a critical and

abrupt style, many unfinished and not critically edited writings
--these factors make a clear picture of his accomplishment in
ethics difficult.

His ancient and contemporary sources, and the
1

2

positive and negative reactions which they evoked, contributed to
his moral point of view yet are textually hard to identify.

This

study means to delineate the structure of Ockham's moral doctrine
and indicate the balance and organization of its elements and
sources.

It is precisely the internal consistency of Ockham's

theory of moral value which is so frequently questioned.
The Problem
Looking back on the generations of Scholasticism, Francis
Suarez attempted a seventeenth century classification of the
various themes and types of ethical theories developed.

In De

Legibus, he put William of Ockham in the group which attached the
force and nature of law to the divine will. 1 In both Ockham
studies and Histories of ethical systems, it is still commonplace
to read this judgment. 2 This interpretation, known as
1 De Legibus ac de deo legislatore, I, c. 2; Vol. V,
Suarez. Opera Omnia "'('ed. Carolus Berton; Paris, 1856), p. 18;
"Est ergo secunda opinio principalis, affirmans legem esse actum
voluntatis legislatoris ••.• ut Ockham ••• "
2 Typical studies of Ockham's ethics would be, for example,
Anita Garvens, "Die Grundlagen der Ethik Wilhelms von Ockham,"
Franziskanische Studien XXI (1934), p. 265; "Denn sittlich gut
und richtig ist in Ockhams Sinn schlechthin das, was der Wille
Gottes als gut bestimmt, und umgekehrt ist etwas deshalb schlect,
weil es Gott nicht will." Citing Professor Garvens with approval,
a Franciscan scholar, Father Elzearius Bonke, concludes that "nemo
neget Venerabilem Inceptorem revera docuisse characterem positivum
moralitatis." "Doctrina nominalistica de fundamento ordinis moralis apud Guilielmum de Ockham et Gabrielem Biel," Collectanea
Franciscana XIV (1944), p.60. Leon Baudry, whose textual and
doctrinal investigations of the Venerable Inceptor deserve close
attention, cautions his readers to consider Ockham's notion of
moral goodness "en rapport avec ce qu'on appel],e son volontarisme. 11
Lexigue Philosophigue de Guillaume d'Ockham. Etude des Notions
Fondamentales (Paris: P. Lethiellieux, 1958), p. 33.
And
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"voluntarism" or "positivism" or "authoritarianism," generally
holds that Ockham's ethic has no metaphysical basis, that moral

goodness means divine approval, and that the nature of ethical
behavior is obedience.

The recently published Encyclopedia of

Philosophy explains the meaning of "theological voluntarism" by
describing Ockham's ethic. 3

This classification should be con-

sidered the "majority opinion."
There is also a significant minority opinion.

Research

on Ockham, the political theorist, turns up an emphatic doctrine
of "natural right."

Attempting to balance the claims of papacy

and emperor, he indicated common limits to authority and
while searching for the origins of Reformation theology, Erwin
Iserloh joins the consensus: "Mit Recht konnen wir also vom
Voluntarismus und Aktualismus bei Ockham sprechen. 11 Gnade und
Eucharistie in der philosophischen Theologie des Wilhelm von
Ockham (Wiesbaden: F. Steiner, 1956), p. 1. General studies
maintain similar views. "Moral law is reduced to positive divine
law, obligation is contingent, and it is doubtful that a valid
ethics can be constructed apart from theology. Ockhamist ethics,
then, is truly authoritarian." Vernon J. Bourke, A History of
Ethics, Vol. I: Graeco-Roman to Early Modern Ethics (Garden City:
Doubleday, 1968), p. 155 .. The same judgment appears in Alasdair
Mac Intyre, A Short History of Ethics (New York: Macmillan, 1966),
p. 119; A. P. d'Entreves, Natural Law, An Historical Survey (New
York: Harper and Row, 1951), p. 69; and Jacques Maritain, Moral
Philosophy (New York: Scribner's, 1964), p. 91.
3Richa.rd Taylor, "Voluntarism," Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
ed. Paul Edwards, 8 (New York: Macmillan, 1967), p. 271; "Ockham
said that the divine will, and not human or divine reason, is the
ultimate standard of morality, that certain acts are sins because
they have been forbidden by God, and other acts are meritorious
only because they have been commanded by God. He denied that God
forbids certain things because they are sins or commands certain
things because they are virtues, for it seemed to him that this
would be a limitation upon God's free will .•• The moral law,
accordingly, was for Ockham simply a matter of God's free choice."
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jurisdiction in the natures of things--much like a Natural Law
moralist would.

Commenting on Ockham's political thought and its

corroborating ethic, Ewart Lewis concludes that "within the terms
set by the data of revelation, Occam's system was one of rationalism pushed to the bitter end. 114 Indeed, to enter the domain
of Ockham's moral theory through the politico-polemical works
fosters the impression that rational and immutable orders of
nature support morality. 5 When Ockham is called a "rationalist"
the category implies that human nature entails certain rights and
duties, that certain actions are intrinsical_ly good or evil for
men, and that valid moral laws must respect the "ethical facts"
of the governed agents.
The contrast between the majority and minority reports
is severe.

But this problem is historiographical; it shows the

4Medieval Political Ideas, Vol. II (London: Routledge
and Kegan, 1954), p. 551.

5Max A. Shepard, "William of Occam and the Higher Law,"
The American Political Science Review 26 (1932), p. 1009; "We
constantly find "jus naturale" and "ratio naturalis" linked together, which shows us that Occam held the time-honored, ancient
and medieval tradition of eternal, immutable principles of nature,
discoverable by the use of reason." A recognized Ockham scholar,
Rev. Philotheus Boehner, O.F.M., finds the position that "The only
restriction of the power of the Pope was imposed by the divine law
and the immutable and indispensable natural law. In other words,
things which were directly forbidden by God and the natural law to
all human beings without exception, because they are illicit in
themselves, could not be commanded by the Pope." Boehner, Collected Articles, ed. Eligius M. Buytaert (St. Bonaventure: The Franciscan Institute, 1958), p. 448. Also see the studies of Charles C.
Bayley, "Pivotal Concepts in the Political Philosophy of William of
Ockham," Journal of the History of Ideas X (1949), p. 200; and E.
F. Jacob, "Ockham as a Political Thinker," Essays in the Conciliar
Epoch (re. ed., Manchester: Univ. of Manchester Press, 1953), p. 94.

5
difficulties of historians more than those which confronted Ock-

ham.

The use of interpretive classifications such as voluntarism

and rationalism--and there is textual evidence for both--forces
an either/or conclusion.

to the Scholastic

6

The issue facing Ockham was fundamental

enterprise-~how

data be reconciled systematically?

can revealed and experiential
The problem of relating posi-

tive and "natural" law represents one tension among many faced
by the Medievals who used Aristotle to elucidate the gospels.
Ockham dramatized this perennial concern by his ambitious portrait
of God's moral authority and his enthusiasm for the Nicomachean
Ethics.

Like a voice from the patristic age, he seems to enlarge

the discretionary powers of the Almighty until the paradigm of
moral response is Abraham, climbing the mountain to sacrifice his
innocent son.

Aristotle would have frowned upon this task, yet

Ockham :q.ever repudiates "the Philosopher."

On

the contrary,

Aristotle remains "the" authority on moral doctrine.

The stark

contrast between God's moral omnipotence and the exigencies of
"Right Reason" have been noticed by many commentators; 7 some

6see my article, "Voluntarism and Rationalism in the
Ethics of Ockham," Franciscan Studies

31 (1971), pp. 72-87.

7For example, G. de Lagard says, "Ainsi la morale ockhamiste apparait-elle comme un jeu alterne ou le volontarisme et
le rationalisme se re'pondent curieusement. Au depart, lorsque
nous analyions la nature de la loi morale promulgu~e par Dieu,
tout nous paraissait arbitraire et irrationnel pur. En etudiant
la moralite naturelle et le jeu de l'agir humain, nous avons vu
la raison prendre une part de plus en plus importante dans la
definition et l'orientation de la vie morale." Naissance de
l'Esprit La1gue .?.2:.! Declin ~ Moyen Age, Vol. VI: Ockham, La
Morale et le Droit (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1946),
p.
Francis Oakley also finds "in intimate juxtapos.i tion, the

6
think that the contrasting elements are not contradictory. 8

Un-

fortunately, there is no published account of precisely how Ockham can allow God to tamper with concrete obligations without
·jeopardizing the rational requirements for an ethical "science."
How can the theologian's belief in an absolute and absolutely free
norm of good and evil permit any philosophical credibility for
unchanging principles of morality?

Because Ockham magnifies the

legislative powers of God without excluding the presence of nonrevealed ethical certainties, and because scholars have made
Ockham the forerunner of the Reformation's theological positivism
and the Renaissance's "natural" morality, the coherence of his
moral viewpoint is questionable.
rationalist and voluntarist theories, and no peace can be found
to grow between ·these antinomies. 11 "Medieval Theories of Natural
Law: William of Ockham and the Significance of the Voluntarist
Tradition," Natural Law Forum VI (1961), p. 70. Certain textbooks
such as Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, Vol. III,
Part I: Ockham to the Speculative Mystics (Garden City: Doubleday,
1963), p. 120; and Arthur Hyman and James J. Walsh, Philosophy
in the Middle Ages: The Christian, Islamic and Jewish Traditions
"'(New York: Harper and Row, 1967), pp. 608-609, also speak of
Ockham's "dualism" in ethical theory.
8
For example, Paul Vignaux in his article, "Nominalisme,"
Dictionnaire de Theologie Catholique, Vol. XI (Paris, 1931), C.
771, cautions that neither Ockham nor the nominalists in general
obviate a non-theological ethic. "Une premiere conclusion s'impose: pour le nominalisme, toute morale n'est pas necessaurement
d'autorite et de revelation; il peut y avoir une ~thique naturelle
et rationelle. 11 It is the thesis of Father Lucan Freppert, O.F.M.
that "there is a dual viewpoint to be found in Ockham's ethical
theory." "The Basis of Morality According to William Ockham,"
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Philosophy, St.
Bonaventure University, 1966), p. 241. Father Freppert divides
the elements which belong to the "divine will" and "right reason"
viewpoints. But the interpretive problem is not so much in
identifying Ockham's various perspectives as in showing their
conceptual harmony or inconsistency.
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Ockham was not unaware of the problem.

Translating the

scriptural injunctions to "love God and love your neighbor as
yourself" into theologically useful information was a common
Medieval concern.

After Aquinas' Summa Theologica, the Scholas-

tics show a marked sensitivity to the nature and frontiers of
revealed and natural laws.

As prima facie evidence that Ockham

appreciated the difference between revealed and evident moral
rules, and that he satisfied his own mind at least regarding the
systematic compatibility of religious beliefs and philosophical
principles in determining moral duty consider his second Quodlibet,
question fourteen.
Whether there can be demonstrative science about morals?
[Negative] There cannot be since demonstrative science
cannot pertain to those things subject to the will; but
morals are such things, therefore, etc.
[Affirmative] On the contrary, morals are knowable;
therefore, etc.
In this question, I shall first clarify one of the
terms used; secondly, I shall assert one distinction;
and thirdly, I shall-answer the question.
Regarding the first point: I claim that "moral" is
applied loosely to human acts which are controlled by
the will absolutely and the term is used in this manner
in the Decretum [of Gratian], distinction one, chapter
"Mos" - as is clear from the gloss. Otherwise, it is
applied more strictly to customs or actions subject to
the power of the will according to the natural dictate
of reason and the other circumstances.
Regarding the second: it should be known that moral
doctrine has many parts of which one is positive and
the other non-positive. Human positive science is that
which contains human and divine laws which oblige us to
accomplish or avoid those actions which are good or evil
only because they are prohibited or commanded by a
superior able to establish and decide laws. Non-positive

8

moral science is that which directs human actions with· out any command of a superior. As principles known per
se or known through experience, they direct thus, namely,
'that "everything honest ought to be done," and "everything dishonest ought to be avoided," etc., about which
Aristotle speaks in moral philosophy.
Regarding the third: I claim that positive moral
science is not demonstrative. Thus, legal science is
non-demonstrative, although it might be governed by
demonstrative science in many instances, because the
arguments of lawyers are based upon human positive laws
which do not include propositions known evidently. However, the non-positive moral discipline is a demonstrative science. I prove this assertion because a cognition
deducing conclusions syllogistically from principles known
per ~ or through experience is demonstrative; moral
discipline is this kind of thing; therefore, etc. The
major premise is obvious. The minor is proved since there
are many principles known per ~ in moral science, for
example, that "the will ought to be conformed to right
reason," "all blameworthy evil should be avoided," and
others like this. Likewise, many principles are known
through experience as is manifestly clear to one considering experience. And furthermore, I claim that this
science is more certain than many others inasmuch as one
can have a more certain experience about his own actions
than about the acts of others. Hence, it is clear that
this science is very subtle, useful and evident.
To the principal argument I respond that propositions,
which are true and known per se and which can demonstrate many conclusions, can be formed about those things
controlled by the will.9
9ouodl., II, q. 14 (quoted from Vaticana Lat., 3075, f.
20vb); Utrum de moralibus potest esse scientiam demonstrativam?
Quod non: quia de illis quae subjacent voluntati non
posset esse scientiam demonstrativam; sed moralia sunt huiusmodi,
ergo, etc ..
Contra: moralia sunt scibilia, ergo, etc ••
In ista quaestione, primo exponam unum terminum positum;
secundo, ponam unam distinctionem; tertio, ad quaestionem.
Circa primum: dico quod "morale" accipitur largiter pro
actibus humanis quae subjacent voluntati absolute, et sic accipi tur in Decretis, distinctio prima, c. "Mos, 11 ut patet in glossa.
Aliter accipitur stricte magis pro moribus sive actibus subjectis
postestati voluntatis secundum naturale dictamen rationis et
secundum alias circumstantias.
Circa secundum: sciendum quod moralis doctrina habet
plures partes, quarum una est positiva, alia est non-positiva.

9
The Texts
Doctrinal studies of William of Ockham suffer collectively
10
from the sparse information about his life,
and the condition

of his extant writings.

Ockham changed his mind about the nature

Scientia humana positiva est illa quae continent leges humanas
et divinas quae obligant ad prosequendum vel fugiendum illa quae
nee sunt bona nee mala nisi quia sunt prohibita vel imperata a
superiore cuius est leges condere seu statuere. Scientia moralis
non-positiva est quae, sine omni praecepto superioris, dirigit
actus humanos sicut principia per se nota vel nota per experientiam; sic dirigunt, scilicet, quod "omne honestum est faciendum,"
et "omne inhonestum est fugiendum," etc., de quibus loquitur
Aristoteles in morali philosophia.
Circa tertium: dico quod moralis scientia positiva,
cuiusmodi est scientia juristarum, non est demonstrativa, quamvis
sit a scientia demonstrativa ut in pluribus regulata, quia rationes juristarum fundantur super leges positivas humanas quae
non accipiunt propositiones evidenter notas. Sed disciplina
moralis non-positiva est scientia demonstrativa. Probo, quia
notitia deducens conclusiones syllogistice ex principiis per se
notis vel per experientiam scitis, est demonstrativa; huiusmodi
est disciplina moralis, ergo, etc •. Major est manifesta. Minor
probatur, quia multa sunt principia per se nota in morali scientia; puta, quod "voluntas debet se conformare rectae rationi,"
"omne malum vituperabile est fugiendum," et huiusmodi. Similiter,
per experientiam sciuntur multa principia sicut manefeste patet
sequenti experientiam. Et ultra, dico quod illa scientia est
certior multis aliis, per quanto quilibet posset habere majorem
experientiam de actibus suis quam de aliis. Ex quo patet, quod
illa scientia est multum subtilis, utilis et evidens.
Ad principale, dico quod de illis quae subjacent voluntati
possunt formari propositiones verae et per se notae, quae multas
conclusiones possunt demonstrare. 11
1 °For what little documentation there is about Ockham's
life, see F. Federhofen, "Ein Beitrag zur Bibliographie und
Biographie des Wilhelm von Ockham," Philosophisches Jahrbuck 38
(1925), pp.26-42]Leon Baudry, Guillaume d'Occam. Sa vie, ~
oeuvres, ~ idees sociales et politigues, Vol. I, L'Homme et les
Oeuvres (Paris: J. Vrin, 1950J; and Philotheus Boehner, The
"Tractatus de Successivis" Attributed to William Ockham (St.
Bonaventure-,-New York: The Franciscan Institute, 1944), pp. 1-15.
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of universal concepts, 11 and in moral theory, about the question
of divine commands to hate God. 12 The order of composition thus
becomes critical in determining his mature position.

Yet the

biographical data is simply lacking for a chronological listing
of publication dates which marked his academic career.

Literary

evidence, mostly in the form of cross references, makes the following order probable:

the Reportatio or unrevised commentary on

books II-IV of Peter Lombard's Sentences, the Ordinatio or revised commentary on book I of the Sentences, the Summa Logicae
and the Quodlibeta Septem. 13 These works contain Ockham's major
treatment of ethical questions; they are the principal sources
for this research.
11
ockham first held that a universal was a "fictum" or
mental contruct having the ideal being (~ objectivum) of
thought objects. Later, he considered universals as acts of the
intellect possessing "subjective being" (~ subjectivum)--the
existential status of real accidents which adhere in a subject.
For the importance of this doctrinal development in dating Ockham' s works, see Boehner, Collected Articles •.. , pp. 99-107; and
Gedeon Gal, "Gualteri de Chatten et Guillelmi de Ockham Controversia de Natura Conceptus Universalis," Franciscan Studies XXVII
(1967), pp. 191-212.
12
Erich Hochstetter noticed this change in "Viator Mundi.
Einige Bemerkungen zur Situation des Menschen bei Wilhelm von
Ockham," Franziskanische Studien 32 (1950), pp. 1-20.
13we follow the proposals of Father Boehner, Ockham:
Philosophical Writings, ed. and trans. by Philotheus Boehner (New
York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1964), pp. lii-lvii. C. K. Brampton
corroborates this order of composition in "The Probable Order of
Ockham's non-polemical Works," Traditio 19 (1963), pp. 469-483.
Chapter one of Leon Baudry's Guillaume d'Occam .•. , gives a different sequence to the academic writings but not one which affects
the relationships between the four works on which our study
depends.

\
11
The absence of a reliable "life" is not a problem peculiar

to Ockham studies.

Judging by the literary remains of the 13th

and 14th centuries, the Schoolmen seem to be disembodied intel-

lects; their personalities are fabricated from their styles in

philosophy and theology; their formative years are conformed to
the institutional history of the university which they attended.

In determining his final and definitive position, Ockham presents
a special problem only because his career falls into two parts-the academic and the polemical periods.

Arguments with the popes

--often about morals--form a considerable portion of Ockham's
publishing and postdate his university life.

But the ethical

viewpoints advanced by Ockham to refute his opponents are not
always his own.

This study, consequently, looks to the political

works for certain definitions and examples of applied moral
theory only when the context shows that the Venerable Inceptor is
"asserting" rather than "reciting" opinions.
The scribes who copied and circulated Ockham's work also
transmitted numerous mistakes.

Scholars must live with these

corruptions, additions and subtractions until the Franciscan
Institute of St. Bonaventure University completes its critical
edition of Guillelmi de Ockham, Opera Philosophica et Theologica.
For the present, it is necessary to use the texts readily available in modern photostats of the fifteenth century incunabula,
namely, Guillelmus de Occam. Opera Plurima, Vol. III-IV (Lyons,·
1494-1496)--reprint in London: Gregg Press, 1962;
§eptem ..£!::!!!!

~

and Quodlibeta

Tractatu de Sacramento Altaris (Strasbourg, 1491)--

12
~ep~int at Heverlee-Louvain:
~961·

Editions de la biblioth~que S. J.,

The Lyons edition of Ockham's Scriptum super Sententias

has a fair text of the Ordinatio; the important questions on
ethics from the Ordinatio and the major part of the Summa Logicae
are critically edited by the Franciscan Institute.

The incuna-

bula give a poor text, however, of the Reportatio and Quodlibetal
Questions.

This is most unfortunate because the Scholastic in-

ventory of moral questions, as proposed by Peter Lombard, occurs
mainly within book three of the Sentences.

And the random or

"guodlibetal'' questions which Ockham handled often concern ethics.
The problem involves not only those subtle changes of doctrine
worked by careless scribes, but whole questions added to or
extracted from Ockham's original.copy.

To give a precise warning,

it should be known that the following questions will be quoted
frequently as part of Ockham's Reportatio yet they apparently did
not belong to the original inventory of this work:

Scriptum in

Sententias, book II, question 3; book III, questions 12-15; and
book IV, Dubitationes Addititiae. 14 These questions were probably
\

Ockham's--since

no serious objections to their authenticity have

been raised--and later inserted into his questions on the Sentences by some secretary.

For example, question twelve of book

three (Are the virtues interdependent?) is called a "question on
the Bible" by Walter of Chatton, a contemporary who pursued
14Father Boehner indicates that these texts are absent
from the oldest manuscripts. Collected Articles ... , pp. 293-300.

13
Ockham's publications with a critical interest. 15 -This would
imply that the text had origins other than the lectures on Peter
Lombard.

The dubious policies of Medieval scribes and editors,

however, have seen this same question printed as part of the
Lyons edition of the Reportatio and the Strasbourg edition of the
Quodlibeta Septem.

All these textual difficulties cannot be

eliminated; our modest hope is to minimize the problems by com· paring key texts from the Reportatio on the notion of "right
reason" with codex 16398 of the Biblioth~que Nationale at Paris
and important Quodlibetal Questions on the "scientific" nature of
ethics with Vaticana Lat., 3075.
The following sources and abbreviations will be standard:
Text Quoted
A) from the prologue and
distinctions I-III of the
Ordinatio

Printed Source
A) G. de Ockham Opera Philosoph!.£§:. et Theologica, Vols. I-II,

Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum: Ordinatio, ed. Gedeon
G~l et Stephen Brown (St. Bonaventure, New York: The Franciscan
Institute, 1967-71).

15 The editors of the Ordinatio call attention to codex
Paris. Nat. lat. 15,887, f. 13lva, in which Chatton refers to
this questio'ii"""and, in the margin, the scribe identifies it as
"Quaestio super Bibliam." This may represent one of Ockham's
earliest writings since at the time Chatten composed his lectures, he knew only the unrevised and initial "commentary" of
Ockham. In the normal course of study at Oxford, Ockham would
have studied the Bible before Lombard. See G. de Ockham Opera
Philosophica et Theologica, Vol. I, Scriptum in librum primum
Sententiarum: Ordinatio, ed. Gedeon Gal et Stephen Brown (St.
Bonaventure, New York: The Franciscan Institute, 1967), pp. 36*37*, n. 5.

a) Abbr. e.g., Sent., I,
d. 1, q. 4 (I, IObT.

a) Scriptum •.. , book one, distinction one, question four
(volume one of Qpera Philosophica
et Theologica, page 106).

B) from distinctions IVXLVIII of the Ordinatio
and books II-IV of the
Reportatio.

A) Qpera Plurima: Guillelmus de
Occam, Vols. II-IV, Super Quattuor Libros Sententiarum (Lyons,
I'Zi'.9Z+-96) •

b) Abbr. e.g., Sent., II,
q. 19, o.

b) Super Quattuor .•. , book two,
question nineteen, marginal
letter 11 0 11 •

G) from the Quodlibetal
Questions

C) Quodlibeta Septem (Strasbourg,
1491).

c) Abbr. e.g., Quodl., I,
q. 20.

c) Quodlibet Primi, question
twenty.

D) from parts I, II and IIII of the Summa Logicae

D) William Ockham. Summa Logicae:
Pars Prima, ed. Philotheus Boehner-(st. Bonaventure, New York:
The Franciscan Institute, 1957);
Pars Secunda et Tertiae Prima,
·ecr:-PhilotheUS-Boehner (St.
Bonaventure, New York: The Franciscan Institute, 1962).

d) Abbr. e.g., Summa Log.,
I, c. 4, p. 15.

d) Summa Logicae, Pars Prima,
chapter four, page fifteen of
Boehner's edition.

E) from the works of John
Duns Scotus.

E) J. D. Scoti ~Omnia, ed.
Wadding and Vives~aris: 189195), 26 vols.

e) Abbr. e.g., Comm. Ox.,
II, d. 25, q. unica (XIII,
210).

e) Commentaria Oxoniensia super
Sententias, book two, distinction twenty-five, question unica
(volume thirteen of Opera Omnia,
page 210).
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CHAPTER I
'..,'...

,

THE HUMAN WILL, THE PRINCIPLE OF MORALITY
In 1270 and l277, the bishop of Paris condemned certain
tenets of Greek and Latin Necessitarianism. 1 These Parisian
statutes prompted an increased sensitivity to the large differences between Aristotle and Christianity and added motives of
orthodoxy to the perennial scholastic interest in the nature of
freedom and the will.

In retrospect, John Duns Scotus (d. 1308)

was a central figure in the theological reaction to the Paris
correctives; his doctrine of free will moves emphatically away
from the Aristotelian account of "choice" and "rational appetite."
Scotus proposed "the more formal characteristic of the will is
'freedom' rather than 'appetite;' as freedom is the will's form
of receptivity, so the characteristic of freedom is the more
constitutive feature of the will. 112 William of Ockham, sharing
the aims if not the methods of Scotus, also re-examined the
nature of human freedom.
1

see Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis, ed. H. Denifle and E. Chatelain, 4 vols. (Paris: Delalain, 1889-1897), Vol.
I, pp. 486-87; pp. 543-588. Etienne Gilson gives a balanced study
o~ these condemnations in History of Christian Philosophy in the
Middle Ages (New York: Random House, 1955), pp. 402-427 with
notes.
2 scotus,Comm. Ox., II, d. 25, q. unica, n. 6 (XIII, p.
210); "Ratio autem formalior voluntatis est magis libera quam
ratio appetitus, quare est ratio recipiendi inquantum libera,
sicut ratio libertatis est magis ratio constituendi .•• "
16

17
This chapter considers Ockham's conception of the human

will, its freedom, and its regulating influence on his moral
theory.

Our study intends to determine the sense in which the
will is a "sufficient principle" of morality; 3 and why "acts of
4
will" alone are moral.
The answers require close attention to

the psychological evidence, conditions and character of human
freedom.

Many commentators render Ockham's moral theory as a

function and prerogative of the omnipotent God.

The Venerable

Inceptor's examination of the human will provides a more accurate
record of his motives as a moralist.
marks on causality are in order.

But first, some general re-

The will involves a special

mode of causality and shares features and problems belonging to
causality in general.
1.

Causality in General

Ockham gives a descriptive definition of causality; that
is, he offers a set of criteria by which an instance of causality
can be recognized.

Experiencing an essential order among beings,

so that the occurrence of the posterior requires the prior, justifies an inference of causality. 5

3ouodl., II, q. 16; " ••• ad eliciendum actum laudabilem
concurrit voluntas; igitur nihil aliud a voluntate est sufficiens
principium ad talem actum."
4Cf. Sent., III, q. 10 R; Sent., III, q. 12, F, XX; Quodl.,
I, q. 20; Quodl., III, q. 13.
5 sent., I, d. 1, q. 3 (I, 418); "ad secundum, dico quod
ex tali ordine semper contingit inferre causalitatem in priori
respectu posterioris, maxime si prius potest esse sine posteriori
et none converse, naturaliter etiam •.. Ergo si prius exigitur ad
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To the first of these (objections), I answer that
although there can be many causes of the same effect,
nevertheless, this should not be asserted without
necessity. For instance, unless one can be convinced
through experience that precisely with this thing
present and the other absent, the effect follows; or
that with this thing absent and everything else present, the effect does not follow. An example of the
first--one proves that fire is a cause of heat because
with fire itself present and everything else removed,
heat follows in a heatable thing which is close. In
the same way, one proves that the sun is a cause of
heat because when fire is absent and the sun is brought
to bear, the production of heat follows. An example of
the second--one proves that the object is the cause of
intuitive cognition because with everything else present
and the object alone removed, the intuitive cognition
does not follow. Therefore, the object is a cause of
intuitive cognition. Such an argument is valid by
means of such a proposition that 'Whatever absolute
thing, required in real existence for the being of
another thing, is a cause of that thing in some genus
of cause.' The first argument is valid through this
proposition. 'All that, when asserted, is followed
by another thing, is a cause of the other thing.'
Otherwise, it could be proved that something is a
cause of another through reason, without such experience.6
esse secundi, quia secundum non potest esse sine priori, prius
erit causa illius in aliquo genere causae. 11 Also see, Sent. II,
q. 16, c.
6 sent., I, d. I, ·q. 3 (I, 416); "Ad primum istorum respondeo quod quamvis respectu ejusdem effectus possint esse plures
causae, hoc tamen non est ponendum sine necessitate, puta: nisi
per experientiam possit convinci, ita scilicet quod ipso posito,
alio destructo, sequitur ille effectus, vel quod ipso non posito,
quocumque alio posito, non sequitur effectus. Exemplum primi:
probatur quod ignis est causa caloris, quia ipso igne posito-omnibus aliis amotis--sequitur calor in calefactibili approximato;
eodem modo probatur de sole quod est causa caloris, quia igne
amoto et sole approximate sequitur calefactio. Exemplum secundi:
probatur quod objectum est causa intellectionis intuitivae, quia
omnibus aliis positis, ipso solo amoto, non sequitur notitia
intuitiva; ergo objectum est causa notitiae intuitivae. Et tenet
tale argumentum per talem propositionem quod "quaecumque res
absoluta requiritur in esse reali ad esse alicuius, est causa
illius in aliquo genere causae'. Primum argumentum tenet per
istam propositionem 'omne illud quo posito sequitur aliud, est
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Ockham's experimental or experiential approach to causal-

ity is manifest.

He proves or tests causality by perceiving the

essential order between two beings.

A causal nexus cannot be

established "through reason" or "through conceptual analysis."
According to Ockham, "cognition of the cause does not virtually
contain the notion of its effect. 117
rather easily.

This can be misunderstood

Ockham means that the concept of one absolute

thing excludes the proper conception of every other absolute
thing.

The metaphysical unity and singularity of being parallels

the discrete and singular perceptions caused by beings.

Hence,

the notion of "man" does not include any proper understanding of
the particular, non-human things producible by a man.
the notion of "cause" includes that of "effect."

To be sure,

As "correlative"

terms; cause and effect mutually and simultaneously entail each
8
other.
"Cause" is a complex or "connotative" notion precisely
causa illius." Aliter aliquid esse causam alterius potest probari
sine tali experientia per rationem." See Baudry, Lexigue .•. , pp.
34-43, for the major type-sand divisions regarding Ockham's doctrine of causality.

7sent., Prologue, q. 9 (I, 299); also see Idem (I, 241);

and ~·

:--r-;

d. 3, q. 8 (II, 528).

8
sent., I, d. 43, q. 2, F; "Generaliter, omni relative
correspondet si convenienter assignetur aliquid correlativum. Et
i('n omnibus relativis qui vocantur relativa secundum propositionem
activam et passivam vel causam et effectum), semper correlativa
~unt simul natura; et ideo quia sunt simul natura et mutuo se
inferant, neutrum est magis causam alterius quam e converso ••• 11
Because "cause" and "effect" are correlatives, Ockham says,
"cognoscere causam sub ratione causae praesupponit notitiam illius
rei quae est effectus. 11 Sent., Prologue, q. 9 (I, 243). Cf.
Aristotle, Categories, c.--r3""(14b 24-15a 12) for the source of
Ockham's notion of "correlatives."
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t;ecause its significance presupposes an observed priority between
two distinct beings.

No analysis of the proper concept of

cause, however, permits

<e.g.,

an~

11

a 11

priori deduction that this thing,

"man," produces this other thing, e.g., a statue.

Regarding

the requirements for a logical proof, Ockham points out that two
simple and proper concepts lack any intrinsic and necessary relationship which could serve as the means of demonstration. 9

Thus,

-Ockham insists that two things be perceived in an immediate,
!irreversable and essential order of dependence to justify an
inference of causality.
Notice that Ockham "inferred" causality from the experi~nced

dependence between two beings.

impossible to demonstrate even

Strictly speaking, it is

posteriori that this created
object produced this given effect. 10 The dictum that "God can
~

produce immediately what He ordinarily produces through secondary
causes" was true and "well known" for Ockham.

This theological

9 cf. Damascene Webering, Theory of Demonstration According
to William Ockham (St. Bonaventure, New York: The Franciscan InStitute, 1953), pp. 104-105; 146-149; for a technical discussion
of "proof" in Ockham and a more thorough explanation of why actual
causes cannot be demonstrated ~ priori or a posteriori. Cf.
Aristotle, Post. Analytics, II, c. 16 (98b 25-48).
10 sent., qes. 4-5, R; "Ex hoc sequitur quod non potest
demonstrari quod aliquis effectus producitur a causa secunda, quia
licet semper ad approximationem ignis ad combustibile sequatur
combustio, hoc tamen potest stare quod ignis non sit ejus causa,
quia Deus potuit ordinasse quod semper ad presentiam ignis passo
approximate, ipse solus causaret combustionem sicut ordinavit cum
ecclesia, quod ad prolationem certorum verborum, causetur gratia
in anima. 11 In a late theological work, Ockham affirms that the
entire order of natural causes and effects could be changed by
God. See De Sacramento Altaris, ed. T. Bruce Birch (Burlington,
Iowa: The Lutheran Literary Board, 1930), p. 191.
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axiom was reason to admit the possibility of causal "occasionalism."

Although combustion always results from the approximation

of fire and wood, their proximity may be the "occasion" in which
God directly and totally produces combustion.

It seems, there-

fore, that even experience cannot identify causes with absolute
certitude.
Ockham's "razor" cuts away any explanation of causation
as entitative, intrinsic and absolute relationship.

Production
is not an entity distinct from producer and produced. 11 But in
so doing, Ockham ends in modified scepticism about knowing the

extrinsic causal connections between natural beings.

Reliable

and evident knowledge of created causes depends upon conditions-e.g., the autonomy of Nature vis-a-vis the causal prerogatives
of God12 --which cannot be known evidently. As a philosopher,
11ouodl., VI, q. 12; 11 • • • si productio activa sit alia res;
aut ergo est prior natura ipso effectu producto, aut simul natura,
vel posterior natura. Non primo modo, quia relatio si sit alia
res essentialiter dependet tam a fundamento quam a termino, et per
consequens neutro est prius natura ••• Et eodem modo probatur quod
respectus causae ad effectum non est simul natura cum effectu; nee
est posterior natura ipso effectu quia tune prior natura esset
effectus in rerum natura quam produceretur ••. 11 Ockham's argument
is criptic. He seems to say that "production" or "active causality" cannot be asserted before or after the cause and effect
exist. No argument there. Many scholastics, however, would argue
that the "aspect of causality" is simultaneous with the cause and
effect, as the foundation of the terms of relationship. Ockham's
rejoiner is that if cause and effect exist, then a simultaneous
and entitative relationship of causality need not be asserted.
His rejection of a single, substantive referent for "causality"
parallels Ockham's denial of absolute space, time, and motion.
Cf. Herman Shapiro, Motion, Time and Place According to William
Ockham (St. Bonaventure, New York: The Franciscan Institute,
1957), pp. 132-144.
12 ockham does not systematically doubt the productiveness
of natural forces. But to attribute an effective influence to
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Ockham demands immediate experience as the means of knowing causes
because the logical analysis of simple concepts never reveals
their mutual dependence or entailment.

Then, as a theologian, he

admits that divine power can totally replace any effective influence between the natural beings of experience.

Ockham would

have the same trouble as David Hume in "seeing" that one billiard
ball "moves" another, albeit for different reasons. 13 Given
some created beings requires that the normal operation of nature,
or the usual concurrence of God, be presupposed. Ockham cannot
distinguish, on the basis of perception, the normal working of
secondary causes from a "special intervention" of God. Hence,
causal explanations of the physical world remain only probable
accounts; the laws of nature rest on hypotheses. The conditional
potency of natural causes, and the corresponding conditional
certitude of perceptual experience of natural causes, is called
"ex suppositione naturae" by Professor Ernest Moody, "Ockham,
Buridan, and Nicholas of Autrecourt, 11 Franciscan Studies 7 (1947),
pp. 120-146. William J. Courtenay speaks of causal connections
being necessary "ex pacto et ex natura rei. 11 "Covenant and Causality in Pierre d'Ailly," Speculum 46 (1971), pp. 116-119. These
studies are excellent in describing the historical and theological
context of Ockham's doctrine of causality.
13 The verbal parallels between Ockham and David Hume have
been drawn to show Ockham's "scepticism" about natural causality.
Cf. G. M. Manser, 11 Drei Zweifler am Kausalprinzip im XIV Jahrhundert, 11 Jahrbuch fur Philosophie und speculative Theologie 27
(1912), p. 408; H. Becher, S.J., "Gottesbegriff und Gottesbeweis
bei Wilhelm von Ockham," Scholastik 3 (1912), pp. 390-393; and
Harry R. Kloeker S.J., "Ockham and Efficient Causality," The ·
Thomist 23 (1960), pp. 112-120. The general complaint is that
"in all of his analyses, causality means nothing more than association, sequence and succession." (Kloeker, p. 120). This criticism is textually refuted by E. Hochstetter, Studien ~ Meta£hlsik und Erkenntnislehre Wilhelms ~ Ockham (Berlin, Leipzig:
Water de Gruyter, 1927), pp. 139-179, by showing Ockham's use of
the "causal principle" and his assertion of a "causal influx."
Ockham accepts the general scholastic position about "what" causality is; his novelty consists in casting doubts about the
identification of particular causes. A sequential definition of
cause permits Ockham to avoid identifying the source of a perfective transfer or influence when an effect is perceived. He
modestly wishes to identify only the precedents which govern the
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these problems in knowing the productiveness of causes, Ockham's
'sequential definition is understandable.

By describing "cause"

as "an absolute thing required in real existence for the being of
another thing," he can use the notion of causality in explanations
without compromising his logical or theological problems.

We

experience regular patterns of priority among natural beings;
Ockham's definition asserts only this observed order between prior
end subsequent.

Even if God were the only causal being, the

precedence of natural "occasions" to supernatural effects remains
constant and reliable.

Fire would precede heat in wood even if

God were the sole cause of the heat.

By teaching causality as

priority rather than productiveness, Ockham gives a working principle of discovery and explication.to physical scientists; he
allows.for generalization and predictability in personal experience.
Ockham's empirical treatment of causality entails a reinterpretation of many "causal laws" proposed by "realistic"
metaphysicians.

That causes "virtually contain" their effects

effect's occurrence. Ockham's belief extends to angels in human
form; to physical rituals or sacraments which had supernatural
effects; to miracles in which mud cures blindness and water heals
the lame. Scripture and theology suggest Ockham's doubts about
the perceptual differentiation between supernatural and natural
causality. And it is the religious conviction in God's "ordained
laws" and "general influence" which makes perception of natural
causality ordinarily and generally reliable. Hence, the origin
and limit of Ockham's alleged "scepticism" rest in theological
principles which cannot be evidently known. The History of Philosophy must wait for David Hume to hear the notion of causality
questioned because of an empirical or atomistic theory of perception.
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means, for Ockham, that causes "can produce" their effects. 14
That effects "are assimilated" to the form of the cause means that
the effect and cause are ordered as inferior to superior. 15 Because causality constitutes an external relationship between
things, Ockham seriously limits the "class parallel" or "type
similarity" between cause and effect.

For example, the ontologi-

cal similarity between the will-power and will-effect is expressed
when "real thing" is predicated of both. The freedom, indifference
and indetermination which belongs to the will cannot be attributed
to will-acts by warrant of "assimilation" or formal similarity
between producer and produced.

Predicates expressing the will's

nature are not applicable necessarily to voluntary acts.

Any

methodology, therefore, for examining Ockham's doctrine of the
14see Sent., Prologue, q. 9 (I, 229-244), where Ockham
refutes Duns Scotus regarding the virtual inclusion of accident
in subject and effect in cause. "Non est proprie dictum quod
talis una forma includat plures formas virtualiter, quia virtualiter includere aliquid est posse producere illud." Sent., I, d.
3, q. 5 (II, 481). Also see Sent., I, d. 7, q. 1, EE in finem.
15 sent., I, d. 6, q. 1, H; "Sexto, falsum est quid dicit
vel non est ad propositum, scilicet quod effectus assimilatur
formae agentis per quam agit, quia quaero; Aut ista assimilatio
est in genere aut in speciae aut inferiori, sive sit analogum sive
non. Primo modo non, quia sol agit naturaliter multos effectus
qui non habent formam ejusdem rationis cum forma solis. Similiter
nee secundo modo, guia substantia est causa accidentis et similiter, secundum eum (Scotum), e converse accidens est causa substantiae •.. Si intelligatur tertio modo, ita effectus assimilatur
formae per quam voluntas agit sicut formae agentis naturalis; quia
certum est quod tam forma quam voluntas agit quamvis effectus est
ens reale et ~er se in aliquo genere, saltem quantum ad multos
effectus ••• (KJ Praeterea, quid dicit (Scotus) quod agens naturale
facit quale ipsum est, si dicatur secundum formam specificam, hoc
est simpliciter falsum, quia tune sol non faceret nisi solem. Si
secundum genus vel secundum aliquid superius, hoc est certum quod
agens naturale facit rem naturalem. Et hoc potest concedi, sed
nihil ad propositum quia ita voluntas facit unam rem realem.
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will ought to respect the distinction of characteristics applied
to the volitional potency and the volitional effect.

To know the

will as the principle or sufficient cause of morality, and know-

ledge of the positive being of moral effects within the will, require distinct experiences and studies.
A thorough study of Ockham's doctrine of causality remains
unwritten.

Our modest contribution to this unwritten mono-

graph, and to the often-debated question of Ockham's "scepticism,"
is to indicate the dual meaning of "experience"--the indispensable
means of knowing causality.

Experience can mean the immediate
awareness of either external or internal facts. 16 Ockham doubts
only the infallibility of human perception (of externals).

In-

ternal experience or introspection, however, gives evident and
reliable knowledge about the productiveness of one's own powers.
Because of the greater certitude regarding inner experience, Ockham feels that his doctrine of the will is based upon better
evidence than the natural sciences.

And moral science "is more

16 sent., III, q. 12, SS; 11 Aliqua talis propositio habet
cognosci per experientiam acceptam respectu actus alterius hominus; alia non potest evidenter cognosci nisi per experientiam
acceptam respectu proprii actus.
Exemplum primi; 'Iracundus est
mitigandus per pulchra verba'quando vidi eum sic mitigatum per
alium vel per me. Notitia evidens istius potest esse sine virtute
morali quia aliquis potest evidenter illam propositionem cognoscere, et tamen nolle eum simpliciter mitigare sicut patet per
experientiam et probatur haec pars per rationes prius factas pro
secunda conclusione. Exemplum secundi; aliquis enim eliciendo
frequenter actum continentiae et temperantiae magis disponitur
ad Dei cognitionem et dilectionem et ad studendum ••• quae non possunt evidenter esse verae nee evidenter ab aliquo sciri sine actu
proprio elicitivo generative virtutis. 11 Also see Sent., Prologue,
q. 1 (I, 40-41) where Ockham appeals to Augustine that experience
directly concerns "intelligibilia" and "sensibilia. 11 Cf. De
Trinitate, c. 1, n. 3 (P. L., 42, 1015).
~
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g~rtain

than many others in so far as one can have a more certain

·
e
•~erienc

about his own acts than about others' acts. 111 7
2.

The Definition of Will

Ockham distinguishes clearly between two modes of producc

tion; causality is either natural or free.

Any agent whose

~ctivity is determined by its concrete possibilities is a "natural"

cause.

If the approximation of agent and patient results inevit-

~bly in a predeterminable effect, then the agent's production is
18
natural.-

[;1

Characteristically, non-free or natural causes produce

~t every moment everything within their power. 19

In every similar

l7Quodl., II, q. 14; see Introduction, n. 9.
18
t
sent., II, qes. 4-5, F; "Ad primum oppositum dico, quod
auctoritas Philosophi et Commentatoris et omnes consimiles intel1iguntur de naturalibus causis qui semper eodem tempore producunt
~osdem effectus nisi sit aliquod impedimentum.
Exemplum, sol
~emper in Autumno producit eosdem effectus et similiter aliis
temporibus per approximationem et remotionem nisi aliquid impedi4t. 11 Also see Sent., Prologue, q. 1 (I, 62), for a later and more
exact description. "Ad tertiam probationem, dico quod Philosophus
lI De Generatione loquitur de agente naturali, quod manens idem,
semper facit idem. Quia.scilicet quidquid facit uno tempore,
!acit alio tempore, nisi sit aliqua variatio ex parte passi vel
·ex parte agentis vel aliquod aliud impedimentum, ita quod si uno
tempore facit unum, omni tempore faciet unum, et si uno tempore
facit centum, alio tempore faciet centum, et ita semper idem."
Cf. Aristotle, De Generatione et Corruptione, II, c. 10 (336a
28-32).
-

19ockham's "probable proof" that God acts contingently
regarding finite beings depends upon the character of natural
~gents in producing everything within their power at any given
instant. God is capable of infinite effects; but an infinite number of finite effects do not exist; hence, God is not a natural
cause. In Ockham's words: 11 • • • tenendum est quod Deus est causa
contingenter agens quia si esset causa naturalis vel omnia produceret simul vel nulla, quorum utrumque probantur esse manifeste
falsum. Et ideo manifeste falsum est Deum esse causam naturalem
aliorum·a se." Sent., I, d. 43, q. 1, M. See also Quodl., II,
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situation, "Nature" causes similar effects.

On the other hand,

any agent capable of producing opposite effects within similar
situations possesses "Will"--the principle of free actions.
apprehension of

~egular

The

patterns of prior-posterior among beings

constitutes the evidence for natural causation.

What evidence

supports Ockham's claim of free causes?
Strictly speaking, it is impossible to demonstrate syllogistically that an effect is produced freely. Nevertheless,
man experiences himself as a free agent. 20 Inner experience is
evident and infallible evidence for human freedom and renders any
logical proof superfluous.
lege.

The evidence remains a personal privi-

To communicate this experiential truth, one can only appeal

to similar experiences.

As described by Ockham, freedom appears

q. 9. This is the only philosophical defense offered by Ockham
that God acts contingently; that "potest facere aliqua quae non
facit. 11 As a theologian, Ockham asserts the "absolute power of
God" to maintain this precise truth--God can do things which He
does not do. In Distinction Fourty-Three, Ockham rejects the
Thomistic proofs for the First Principle's contingency. See the
study of Anton Pegis, "Necessity and Liberty," The New Scholasti~ 15 (1941), pp. 18-45.
In Sent., II, qes. 4-5,"""'"iiUtrum Deus
sit agens naturale vel liberum?", he rejects the Scotistic arguments for God's contingent activity ad extra. By default of the
reasons of Aquinas and Scotus, Ockhaiilemphasizes the non-selective
and "total" quality of natural agency to preserve his own "persuasion" for divine contingency. This quality of natural causality is not explicit in the De Generatione et Corruptione text
which Ockham adduces to support his description.
20 Quodl., I, q. 16, asks "Whether it can be sufficiently
.
proved that the will freely causes its acts effectively?" His
answer: "Non potest probari per aliquam rationem, quia omnis
ratio probans accipit aequa dubia et aequa ignotum conclusioni
vel ignotius. Potest tamen evidenter cognosci per experientiam,
per hoc, quod homo experitur quod quantumcunque ratio dictet
aliquid, potest tamen voluntas hoc velle vel nolle." Cf. Sent.,
I, d. I, q. 4 (I, 434); and Sent. I, d. I, q. 6 (I, 490).--
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~!thin

the awareness that in every practical situation I have the

f\llldamental option of saying "yes" or "no. 11

In Ockham's words,

"l can indifferently and contingently cause something," so I am
able to cause and not cause the same effect without a change made
within that power."

21

Objects which are simply apprehended (e.g.,

this man, John), or apprehended within a proposition (e.g.,

11

I

should love John"), appear to the will's affection as options to
be accepted or rejected.

No object necessitates the will's love

or hate by its presence in consciousness.

Ockham's doctrine of

the will, therefore, flows from the experience of indifference
regarding known objects to the residual capacity to love or hate
any object.

As a residual potency, the ability to cause freely

is called "will" (voluntas).

The experience of indifference to-

wards opposite types of behavior indicates the free power from
which a person's deliberate actions originate.

Ockham's analysis

of the will's nature revolves around the experience of indetermination and self-determination.

Syllogistic proof is out of the

question.
The experience of freely causing can be approached indirectly from other perspectives.

First, a person's recognition

of guilt or moral responsibility entails the ability to avoid
wrong acts.
21

It is not cogent, Ockham says, to consider actions

auodl., I, q. 16; "Circa primum est sciendum quod voco
libertatem potestatem qua possum indifferenter et contingenter
effectum ponere; ita quod possum eundem effectum causare et non
causare, nulla diversitate circa illam potentiam facta." Also
see~., I, d. I, q. 6 (I, 501).
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either good or bad (imputable) when they occur necessarily. 22
The realization, therefore, that certain acts are blameworthy
constitutes a mediate experience that certain acts are done freely.

Secondly, accidental or chance happenings would be impossible
without the presence of free causes. 23 Natural causes inevitably
produce their determined effects if the conditions of their production, i.e., the potency and the object, are given.

Natural

22 sent., IV, q. 14, E; "Dico igitur quod libertas et posse
peccare se habent sicut superius et inferius, sit quod quicunque
potest peccare habet libertatem et non e contra. Et causa est,
quia potens peccare habet libertatem et contingentiam respectu
illorum actuum in quibus consistit peccatum." Quodl., III, q. 16;
"Ad istam quaestionem dico quod sic, quia homo laudabiliter et
viciose potest operari et per consequens potest mereri et demereri;
tum quia homo est agens liberum et omne tale potest mereri et
demereri; tum quia multi actus sunt imputabiles homini, ergo per
istos potest mereri et demereri." Also see Opus Nonaginta Dierum
c. 95, ed. H. S. Offler, Vol. II, Guillelmi de Ockham, ~
Politica (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1963)~-p---:- 723,
where Ockham puts this argument into syllogistic form. LHereafter citations from this three volume edition of Ockham's Opera
Politica will be abbreviated as "Manchester ed., volume number,
and page."] Liberty does not entail the ability to sin, according to Ockham, because God is free but cannot sin. Furthermore,
since Anselm's tract De Libertate Arbitrii, the scholastics commonly taught that sinconstituted a type of "servitude"--a
limitation of freedom. Cf. Anselm, De Libertate Arbitrii, c. 3
(P. L., 158, 500-503.)
~
2 3Quodl., I, q. 17; "In ista quaestione ostendam quod sine
libertate voluntatis non potest esse casus nee fortuna. Secundo,
quo modo ista salvantur per libertatem voluntatis. Circa primum
tune arguo sic: Omne quid inevitabiliter sit, non fit a casu nee
a fortuna, sed omne quid fit non ab agente libero sed naturali
inevitabiliter fit, ergo et cetera. Major patet in II Physicorum;
minor est manifesta. 11 This argument is repeated in the Summulae
.!.!!. libros Physicorum (Philosophia Naturalis), Pars II, c. 12, ed.
Bonaventure T. Veliterno (Rome, 1637--reprinted by Gregg Press:
London, 1963), p. 45. Cf. Aristotle, Physics, II, c. 6 (197b
1-14). "Chance and what results from chance are appropriate to
agents that are capable of good fortune and of moral action generally." (Trans. R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye.)
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effects are produced by necessity and in an inevitable manner.
T.ttUs, the fact that accidents and circumstances occur, which are
not inevitable, implies the involvement of a free cause.
Contrasting acts of knowing with acts of willing highlights the precise character of the free power. The intellect is
a "natural power; 1124 that is, its operation follows the mode of
,necessity.

Just as vision happens when the healthy eye contacts

color, so knowledge occurs when the intellect contacts the singular fact.

The presence of the object (intelligible) and potency

(intellect) invariably results in apprehension (intellection) unless this operation is impeded by a superior power.

Cognitive

acts, therefore, are experienced as determined by the object.

We

are aware of a proportion between the nature of a given thing and
the determinate act by which it is known.

Ockham asserts that the

essence of the thing known is the "cause (ratio) of understanding.1125The rational power is passive in the sense that its
24sent., I, d. 3, q. 5 (II, 473-474); "Contra: Quandocumque intellectus habet aliqua requisita ad intellectionem multorum,
si quodlibet illorum respeciat equaliter omnia illa multa, intellectus, cum sit potentia naturalis, vel intelliget quodlibet
illorum vel nullum." Also see Sent., I, d. 38, q. 1, F; for a
general description of a natural potency; and Sent., II, q. 3,
F-G, for the various meanings of the term "natural."
25

sent~, II, q. 15, U; "His visis, dico and primam questionem loquendo de cognitione intuitiva naturali quod angelus et
intellectus noster intelligunt alia a se non per species eorum,
nee per essentiam propriam, sed per essentiam rerum intellectarum,
et hoc prout ly 'per' dicit circumstantiam causae efficientis,
ita quod ratio intelligendi ut distinguitur a potentia est ipsa
essentia rei cognitae." Intellection, or the cognitive, act of
the intellect, is caused by the intellectual power and the object
known; the intellect being a passive cause and the object apprehended being the active cause. Cf. Sent., I, d. I, q. 3 (I, 416).
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activity is evoked by the given object and is impedable by
"superior" powers, e.g., the will or God.

Ockham hesitates to

say that "knowing" or any natural act stands "within our power"
except in a minimal and mediate sense. 26 True, man normally has
the power to know, but cognition and assent follow the given object automatically if no impediment intervenes.

The mind does

not control or initiate intuitive cognition because such activity
happens in the mind by necessity with the knowable object present. '
Given the conditions of knowing, therefore, the mind inevitably produces cognitive acts.

The passive nature of the

intellect insures the accurate representation of extra-mental
things within the mind.

In contrast, Ockham indicates that the

presence of every prerequisite for willing does not result necessarily in volitional acts. 27 The conditions for knowledge act
26 sent., III, q. 12, XX; "Contra primum: Impossibile est
quod de actu nonvirtuoso fiat virtuosus per aliquem actum pure
naturalem, qui nullo modo est in potestate voluntatis, quia
propter talem nullus laudatur nee vituperatur, ex quo solum est
actus naturalis. Sed actus prudentiae secundum eum (Scotum) et
secundum veritatem est solum actus naturalis, et nullo modo in
potestate nostra plusquam actus videndi. 11 An act of prudence,
according to Ockham, is an act of knowing accomplished without
the cooperation of the will.
2 7sent., IV, q. 14, G; "Loquendo de primo actu, posito
omni sufficienti et necessario requisite ad talem actum, puta ad
actum voluntatis, si objectum cognoscatur et Deus velit concurrere
cum voluntate ad causandum quando placet voluntati; potest voluntas ex sua libertate sine omni alia determinatione actuali vel
habituali actum illum et ejus objectum elicere vel non elicere.
Et ideo respectu illius actus non oportet in aliquo quod determinetur voluntas nisi a seipsa. 11 Also see Sent., I, d. 1, q. 3
(I, 417); where Ockham considers knowing and willing in terms of
his definition of causality. Cognition is necessarily prior to
volition and contributes partially to the specific character of
will-acts. By definition, therefore, cognition is a cause of
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as

intellectual determinants while the conditions for volition

remain mere possibilities or options.
The reliability of the experience of freely causing can
be questioned.

Ockham maintains that God could produce intuitive

cognition within the human mind without the natural object and
6ause of that intuition.
~hether

28

Serious questions have been raised

the knower could distinguish between naturally caused and

divinely caused intuitions. 29

In the same way, God could directly

and solely produce acts of volition within the human will without
':
the human will-power. 3
Could the agent distinguish supernatural
('

°

volition. Not a necessitating cause, however. The Will's capacity to.s~lect or decide its objects qlg causes renders it selfdeterm1n1ng. Also see Sent., II, q.
, M; and Quodl., I, q. 16.

28Cf. Sent., II, q. 15, D-E; Sent., Prologue, q. 1 (I,
'8-39); Quodl., V, q. 5.
29 The on-going debate regarding Ockham's "scepticism"
centers around the divinely caused cognition of non-existent objects. For the opinion that scepticism follows Ockham's position;
see E. Gilson, The Unity ... , 78-84; Anton Pegis, "Concerning
William of Ockham," Traditio 11 (1944), pp. 465-480; and "Some
Recent Interpretations of Ockham, 11 Speculum 23 (1948), pp. 452463; Marilyn McCord Adams, "Intuitive Cognition, Certainty and
Scepticism in William Ockham," Traditio 26 (1970), pp. 389-398.
Answering the charge of scepticism; see Philotheus Boehner,
Collected Articles ... , pp. 268-319; and Sebastian Day, Intuitive
Cognition. A Key to the Significance of the Later Scholastics
(St. Bonaventure, New York: The Franciscan Institute, 1957). The
state of the question now concerns how Ockham would or could distinguish intrinsically between supernatural and naturally caused
intuitions.
.

30 sent., III, q. 10, R; "Ad aliud dico quod ex hoc quod

praecise est conformis rationi rectae, non est virtuosus; quia si
Deus faceret in voluntate mea actum conformem rationi rectae,
Voluntate vel (read non) agente, non esset ille actus meritorius
nee virtuosus. Et ideo requiritur ad bonitatem actus quod sit in
potestate voluntatis habentis talem actum. 11 Also see Sent., II,
q. 19, N.
-In admitting this possibility, Ockham stimulated a
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effects within his will from volitions which he produced freely?
Ockham's solution to this question is remarkably unconvincing.
The problem arises within discussions of morality; Ockham merely

indicates that moral acts entail the free causality of the human
agent.

Acts produced within the human will supernaturally would

be beyond the power of the human agent and therefore non-moral
acts.3 1 This defense begs the question; if created freedom must
controversy which divided many 14th century thinkers. Konstanty
Michalski has outlined the arguments regarding the created will's
autonomy and freedom vis-a-vis its dependenc~ upon the Uncreated
Cause. La Philosophie ~ Xrve Si~cle: Six Etudes, Tome I,
0puscula Philosophica, ed. by Kurt Flasc'il"TFrankfurt: Minerva
GMBH; 1969), pp. 281-391. One aspect of this problem regards
God's ability to place volition within the human soul; another is
the requirement of God's "general influence" or co-agency for even
the normal (and free) operation of the will. Neither theological
truth, according to Ockham, impunes the will's liberty or causal
efficacy in its intrinsic operation. While the will can be necessitated to receive purely divine effects, it cannot be coerced!
"Ad aliud dico quod voluntas non cogitur in recipiendo illum actum
causatum a Deo solo, tamen, bene necessitatur. Primum probatur
quia tune aliquid proprie cogitur quando facit aut patitur aliquid
contra naturalem inclinationem suam ..• modo voluntas non recipit
illum actum contra naturalem inclinationem suam quia posset naturali ter illum causare saltem partialiter .•. Secundum probatur quia
tune agens vel patiens necessitatur quando non est in potestate
sua agere vel non agere, pati vel non pati, recipere vel non
recipere; sed non est in potestate voluntatis illum actum causatum
a solo Deo recipere vel non recipere, ergo necessitatur." Sent.,
II, q. 19, N. The subtle distinction between "coercion" and
"necessitation" was not satisfactory to many of Ockham successors.
Gabriel Biel (d. 1495) reviews many scholastic objections to Ockham' s solution and attempts an "explanation" of Ockham's position
that the will cannot be "coerced." See Collectorium in guattuor
libros Sententiarum II, d. 25, q. unica, art. 3 (Tubingen, 1501).
Cf. James E. Biechler, "Gabriel Biel on Liberum Arbitrium: Prelude
to Luther's De Servo Arbitrio," The Thomist 34 (1970), pp. 114-127.

--

--- -------

3lQuodl., V, q. 5; "Et si dicis; Deus potest facere assentum evidentem huius contingentis mediante existentia rei sicut
mediante causa secundaria, ergo potest hoc facere se solo. Respondeo, quod haec est fallacia figurae dictionis, sicut, Deus
potest facere actum meritorium mediante voluntate creata, ergo
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be established before asserting moral behavior then the possibil-

ity of moral behavior is itself questionable.

A better justifi-

cation of the Will's autonomy and freedom in causing can be given

-

ad mentem Ockham.

Namely, both the causal power and the effects

of will are manifest to introspection.

I am conscious of the

causal connection between my volitional power and my acts of
choice.

Immediate cognition of the created cause of volition

precludes the problem of distinguishing personal from supernatural
effects within the created will.

Divine productions within the

human will are "foreign" because they are not chosen by the
created agent.
Based on the evidence of personal experience, Ockham gives
various definitions of "will."

The "nominal definition" (guid

nominis) indicates what the term signifies. "Will" means "the
substance of the soul able to wil1. 1132 The name indicates
directly the unitary and simple substance, soul, and indirectly
the act of willing.

Ockham's grammar, therefore, preserves a

Franciscan tradition of not treating the will and intellect as
potest hoc facere se solo." Also see Sent., Prologue, q. 3
lI, 141).
32 sent., II, q. 24, K; "Sed distinguo de 1potentia' nam
potentia primo modo accipitur pro tota descriptione exprimente
quid nominis potentiae. Alio modo pro illo quid denominatur ab
1110 nomine vel conceptum. Primo modo loquendo de intellectu et
voluntate; dico quod distinguntur nam diffinitio exprimens quid
nominis intellectus est ista, quod 'intellectus est substantia
animae potens intelligere ;' sed descriptio voluntatis est quod
'est substantia animae potens velle. 1 " Also see Sent., IV, q. 2,

K.

~
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really distinct powers of the human soul.33
~',intelligere"

Although "velle" and

are numerically and specifically different acts,

;hey do not involve different powers.

The distinction between

will and intellect is not ontological but terminological.

Both

. !'will" and "intellect" directly signify the soul; they differ in
@onnoting different acts of the soul.

Ockham's semantics render

!'will"
a connotative term; it signifies two i tems--the soul and
'.
the act of volition.

In contrast absolute terms, e.g., tree, man,

stand for just one thing and receive "real definitions" (quid

re1. ) • 34

-

33Bonaventure and Scotus, to name two major Franciscan
thinkers, follow John of La Rochelle (d. 1245) in denying a real
distinction between the soul's powers. See texts and study given
by Vernon Bourke, History of Ethics, pp. 137-140. The "ancient
authority" for this position is St. Augustine, De Trinitate X,
c. 11 [P. L., 42, 983].
~
34Summa Log., I, c. 10, pp. 33-34; Unde sciendum quod
nominum quaedam sunt mere absoluta, quaedam sunt connotativa.
Nomina mere absoluta sunt illa quae non significant aliquid principali ter et aliud vel idem secundario, sed quid-quid significatur
per idem nomen, aeque primo significatur; sicut patet de hoc
nomine 'animal, 1 • • • Nomen autem connotativum est illud, quod
significat aliquid primario et aliquid secundario. Et tale nomen
proprie habet definitionem exprimentem quid nominis, et frequenter
oportet ponere unum illius definitionis in recto et aliud in
obliquo ••• 11
The difference between absolute and connotative terms is
crucial to the proper understanding of Ockham's psychology and the
moral doctrine built upon that psychological theory. Ernest A.
Moody explains the difference: 11 • • • an absolute term means precisely the things which it can be used to denote, and hence it
can be used as a sign of the things which it means without involving, implicitly or otherwise, the truth of any proposition or the
existence of any fact, circumstance, or temporal or spatial
determination such as might be involved in any particular experi. ence of such individuals. A connotative term is said to be one
which signifies one kind of thing primarily, and a different kind
of thing secondarily or obliquely. It stands for one kind of
thing by conpoting something distinct from it contingently
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Ockham also defines the will "properly" as "a.rational
potency capable of opposites. 1135 This formula indicates the
soul's ability to appreciate opposite objects and effects.

The

indifference toward opposites, possessed by the soul as a "rational power," results in contingent operations.

The psychologi-

cal evidence of causing freely is formulated to indicate the
inherent and habitual indifference of the soul towards opposite
objects. This description originates in Aristotle, 36 it is
commonplace among Ockham's predecessors.

But Ockham's effort to

conform to these "authorities" can be misleading.

The "liberty

of opposites" was not fundamental to the nature of the will, according to Ockham; the emphasis of his doctrine on the will's
connected with it, or by connoting a determinate part of it as if
separated or separable from it." The Logic of William of Ockham
(New York: Sheed and Ward, 1935), p. 55.
·
35 sent., IV, q. 14, G; "Ad aliud dice quod voluntas proprie est potentia rationalis quia valet ad opposita secundum
intentionem Philosophi. 11 See the later text in Sent., I, d. 1,
q. 3 (I, 425), where the will is identified with the "rational
soul." Leon Baudry, Lexigue •.. , p. 297, maintains that this
definition should be considered Ockham's fundamental one because
it also occurs in Quaestiones in libros Physicorum, q. 126 and
Expositio super Physicam Aristotelis. But Ockham does not seem
concerned to formulate a favorite or complete definition. A text
which indicates Ockham's 'nonchalence' pertaining to precise definition and his caution regarding the distinct characteristics of
Will-power and will-act comes in the Opus Nonaginta Dierum, c. 54
(Manchester ed., II, 543). "'Voluntas' habet plures significa. tiones quam hoc verbum 'velle,' ideo, licet 'voluntas' sic diffiniretur:
'Voluntas est potentia, quae primo et libere·valet ad
opposita,' non tamen 'velle' posset sic diffini: 'Velle est ferri
Primo et libere in opposita;' et licet 'voluntas' sic diffiniretur:
'Voluntas est potentia incorporalis potens ferri in opposita,' non
tamen 'velle' posset sic diffinire: 'Velle est actus incorporalis,
qui fertur in opposita. 11
36Metaphysics, IX, c. 5 (104sa 1-24).

r
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d'reedom rests with the "liberty of contraries"--which will be
discussed shortly.
A preliminary conclusion, however, regarding Ockham's socalled "Voluntarism" should be drawn now.

Within the Thomistic

and Scotistic debate over whether the intellect or will possesses
primacy and greater perfection among human powers, Ockham attempts
a neutral position. 37 The absolute simplicity of the soul--the
absence of distinct psychic parts or powers--makes the issue of
1tgreater nobility" a false question.

To ask whether the intellect

or will is more noble reduces to asking whether the same power,
1.e., the intellective soul, is more noble than itself.
To the first principle arg'Ument, I concede that
"enjoyment" is in the most noble potency. And when
someone says, "The intellect is the most noble
power," I agree; and likewise when it is said, "The
will is the most noble power." Because that potency which is intellect and that which is will are not
distinguished in reality nor in reason.38
37 This debate has psychological and moral dimensions.
Thomistic-Aristotelian "intellectualism" makes the intellect primary within the human psyche, while an act of intellect constitutes man's ultimate perfection. According to the FranciscanAugustinian tradition, this psychic primacy resides with the
will. When Ockham is called a moral "voluntarist, 11 of course,
the classification has ramifications beyond these historically
~ell-defined issues of human psychology.
For the historical
context of this aspect of Ockham's thought, see Paul Vignaux,
"Occam," Dictionnaire de Theologie Catholigue, Tome XI, cc. 877882; and Justification et PrGdestination au x1ve Siecle: Duns
. ~' Pierre d 'Auricle, Guillaume d' Occam-,-G~ire de RiiiiTiiI
\Paris: E. Leroux, 1934), pp. 127-140. Professor Vignaux indicates Ockham's general adherence to the Franciscan School by
teaching the greater nobility of will-acts. Left unsaid, however,
by Vignaux and most commentators, is Ockham's re-formulation of
the question and his attempt at a middle position.
38sent., I, d. 1, q. 2 (I, 402); "Ad primum principale
concede quod frui est in potentia nobilissima. Et quando dicitur

38
Ockharn rephrases the terms of the debate between the "Intellectualists" and "Voluntarists."

The proper question, he says, is

vhether the act of willing or knowing is more perfect.

Ockham

gives the greater nobility to volitional acts, although an act of
intellect precedes an act of will. 39 Both volition and intellection are involved, however, in beautitude--man's ultimate and
perfect happiness.

The chief antagonist of this position, Thomas

Aquinas, was "coerced by the truth" at least once when he admitted
the greater perfection residing in will-acts! 40
'intellectus est potentia nobilissima,' concedo; et similiter
voluntas est potentia nobilissima, quia illa potentia quae est
intellectus et illa quae est voluntas nullo modo distinguuntur a
parte rei nee a parte rationis." Also see Sent., II, q. 24, K.
"Utrum memoria, intellectus et voluntas sint potentiae distinctae
realiter?" Where Ockham argues the identify of psychic powers,
Ockham's position became a "strategy" for many Nominalists. For
example, Adam Wodham (d. 1358) sets Thomas against Scotus and
offers Ockham's solution: "teneo conclusionem ad viam reductionis,
cum dico scilicet quod non intellectus est potentia nobilior voluntate nee e converso. 11 Sent., I, q. 4 (quoted by Michalski,
Qpuscula Philosophica ... , p. 313).
3 9sent., II, q. 24, P; 11 • • • dico quod accipiendo 'voluntatem' pro illo quid denominatur a tali nomine vel conceptu, quid
est principium elicitivum actus volendi et intellectionis; similiter ut sic voluntas non est intellectu nobilior non plus quam
intellectus est nobilior voluntate, quia sunt omnino idem. Sed
accipiendo utrumque quantum ad signatum quid nominis eorum, sic
potest concedi quod voluntas est nobilior intellectu, quia actus
diligendi qui connotatur per voluntatem est nobilior actu intelligendi qui connotatur per int~llectum. Isto etiam secundo modo
potest concedi quod intellectus est prior voluntate; quia actus
. intelligendi qui connotatur per intellectum est prior actu volendi
g_ui connotatur per voluntatem." Also see Sent., I, d. 1, q. 2
{I, 402-403). That beatitude resides within the intellect and
Will, see Ibid., (I, 403).
40
Ibid., (I, 402-403); "Si tamen distinguerentur, dicerem
quod potentia volitiva esset nobilior. Et hoc dicit Thomas,
quamvis alibi dixerit oppositum. Unde libero primo, distinctione
Prima, quaestione prima dicit sic: 'Suprema pars habet intellectum

39
In what Konstanty Michalski has called "the battle for the
41
$oul" in the 14th century, Ockham's was a moderate voice.
His
writings attempt to reconcile the differences between Aquinas a .d
scotus which had been institutionalized into opposing schools.
But Ockham's tools were too radical, his approach too original.
Instead of resolving the "problem of the will," Ockham became a
third faction.

Ockham's "medicine" of logical precision was use-

iLess and "windy sophistry" against the needs of the Renaissance.
To the Reformers, his doctrine of man's freedom smacked of Pelagianism.

3.

The Will's Freedom

Ockham's definition or definitions of the will do not support the inference that every will-act occurs freely._ .. 'Yfuile every
et voluntatem, quorum intellectus est altior secundum ordinem et
voluntas secundum perfectionem. Et similis ordo est in habitibus
et etiam in actibus, scilicet visione et amore. Fruitio autem
nominat altissimam operationem quantum ad sui perfectionem.' Et
ita iste, tamquam a veritate coactus, dicit hie fruitionem, quae
est actus voluntatis esse nobiliorem actu intellectus."
4111 La lutte pour 1 1 '8.me, 11 Proceedin s of the Seventh International Congress of Philosophy, 1930 Oxford: 1931), pp. 508-515.
Whereas Michalski indicates clearly the controversies which surround the doctrine of human and divine volition in the first half
of the 14th century, his evaluation of Ockham's position is
derogatory and poorly documented. Professor Ernest Moody is one
of few commentators who notice that amid the extreme voluntarism
of Holcot, the voluntaristic determinism of Thomas Bradwardine
and John of Mirecourt, and the epistemological criticism of
Nicholas of Autrecourt, Ockham proposed a "conservative doctrine."
Professor Moody's comments, directed toward the doctrine of natural causality, apply to Ockham's doctrine of the will. See Moody,
Franciscan Studies, 7, pp. 141-146.
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free act is a volitive effect, the converse is not true. 42

Duns

scotus and Scotists such as William of Alnwick (d. 1332) constructed the evidence for natural and free modes of causality
into "Nature" and "Will"--principles with "opposed modes of origination.1143

But Ockham rejects their construction because both the

divine and human will produce certain acts of necessity.

To know

the will as a moral principle, and the formal character of all
moral acts, we must consider the nature and limits of human freedom.

Only acts which originate in freedom are imputable or moral.
The description of volitional freedom given by Ockham

approximates and represents the experiential evidence which establishes the facts of free causality.

Semantically, "freedom" is a

42 sent., I, d. 10, q. 2, H; "Si autem intelligatur quod
liberum sit idem quid contingens vel indi.fferens, sicut mihi
videtur esse de intentione auctorum; sic dico quod si voluntas
aliquid velit necessario, non vult illud libere. Et ideo Spiritus
Sanctus non producitur libere sicut non contingenter (licet voluntarie) .11 Also see Sent., I, d. 2, q. 1, (II, 34-35), and Sent.,
II, qes. 4-5, D ad tertiam.
~~
43 The strict division which Scotus places between Nature
and Will is analyzed by J. R. Cresswell, "Duns Scotus on the
Will," Franciscan Studies 8 (1953), pp. 147-149; and Etienne Gilson, Jean Duns Scot, Introduction a~ positions fondamentales
(Paris: J. Vrin, 1952), pp. 574-578. Ockham quotes this doctrine
of Scotus (Sent., I, d. 1, q. 6: I, 486-496) and William of Alnwich (Sent.~ d. 2, q. 1: II, 8-14) extensively to reject it.
Ockham will claim that "nature" and "freedom" are opposed principles; not "nature" and "will." In historical perspective, therefore, Ockham reverts more to the position of St. Thomas who also
asserted that some will-acts originate out of necessity. Unfortunately, Stephen Chak Tornay, Ockham: Studies and Selections (La
Salle, Ill.: Open Court Publishing Co., 1938), p. 175, attributes
to Ockham the position of Scotus and Alnwick. This mis-quotation
helps establish Ockham's "insistent voluntarism." In point of
fact, Ockham means to find a middle position between the Thomistic
and Scotistic doctrines on the limits of free-will.
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connotative term "meaning the will itself or the intellectual
nature while connoting that something can be accomplished contingently by the same (will). 1144 The term, therefore, collects the
items of inner experience which interject the agent's contingency
between the recognition and the execution of' practical possibilities.
Freedom had many dimensions within the theological anthropologies of Scholasticism.

Christendom's "great chain of being"

arranged in hierarchy the Infinite Being, angelic being (beatified
or damned), human being (beatified, damned or "in via").

Each

type and division of personal being possessed distinct brands of
freedom.

Ockham attempts to isolate the precise character of the

"viator's" freedom by contrast . . He reviews the traditional
dimensions of freedom to explain what the earthling's liberty is
not.

St. Augustine and Peter Lombard assert a three fold liberty

in men--the liberty of nature, the liberty of grace and the
liberty of glory. 45 These perspectives on freedom are expressed
44
sent., I, d. 10, q. 2, M; "Unde illa ratio et sequens
procedunt ex falsa imaginatione. Imaginantur enim ac si libertas
esset unum aliquid reale distinctum aliquo modo ex natura rei a
voluntate vel non omnino idem cum voluntate; quid tamen non est
verum. Sed est unum nomen connotativum importans ipsam voluntatem
vel naturam intellectualem connotando aliquid contingenter posse
fieri ab eadem. 11
45 sent., I, d. 1, q. 6 (I, 501); "Secunda distinctio est
de libere frui. Quia libertas uno modo distinguitur a coactione,
et sic accipitur impropriissime, quia isto modo libertas potest
competere i.ntellectui. Alio modo opponi tur servi tuti creaturae
rationalis, et hoc vel servituti culpae vel servituti poenae. Et
hoc modo beati sunt liberiores quam viatores, quia magis liberi a
servitute culpae et poenae. Alio modo opponitur necessitati
secundum quod necessitas opponitur contingenti secundo modo dicto
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as freedom from coercion, freedom from guilt and freedom from
punishment. 46 Ockham disputes each sense of freedom. Human
freedom does not exclude guilt or punishment which follow the illuse of freedom.

Here Ockham agrees with his "authorities" because

only men beatified in heaven withstand these consequences of free
activity.

But Ockham then rejects most of his predecessors when

they assert that "freedom from coercion" describes the type of
liberty peculiar to the "viator. 1147 Consider that the intellect
cannot be coerced to assent to false propositions.

Neither the

intellect (a natural power) nor the will (a free power) can be
forced by an external power to judge truth and goodness contrary
to the agent's own estimation and affection.

The point is

significant for Ockham since he begins to look for a description
of freedom which cannot be applied to the intellect--or any
natural power.

Autonomy is no longer sufficient for the prime

characteristic of experienced freedom.
Ockham's fundamental objective against his predecessors
on the question of freedom is their tendency to consider freedom
in priori distinctione. Et sic libertas est quaedam indifferentia
et contingentia, et distinguitur contra principium activum naturale.11 See the parallel and earlier text, Sent., II, q. 19, R,
where Ockham uses this framework to differentiate the liberty possessed by angels, devils and men.
46 For the history of these divisions, see St. Bonaventure,
.!.!!~.,- d. 25, part 1, q. 1 (Opera Omnia, II; Quaracchi: Ex
typographia Collegi St.Bonaventurae, 1885, pp. 594-95).
47 For- example, see St. Augustine, De Civit. Dei, V, 10
(f.L. 41, 152) and St. Thomas, Sum. Theol., Ia IIae, q. 6, art.4.
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or the will as another instance of "nature" whose inner structure
is revealed by the Aristotelian explanation of final, formal,
efficient and material causality.

Freedom, which is opposed to

the operation of natural powers, cannot be analyzed as if it
were a type of natural cause.

For example, St. Thomas claims

"Each power of the soul is a form of nature, and has a natural
inclination to something.

Hence each power desires, by natural
appetite, that object which is suitable to itself. 1148 Finality
or intrinsic

teleology is needed to explain both the operation

and the intelligibility of a spiritual power.

Ockham rejects

this "net of explanation" and those scholastics who used it to
capture the character of human freedom.

The human will possesses

no inclination to the good, no natural appetite for goodness.
According to Ockham, "inclination" or "appetite" can be taken in
two ways. 49 A loose meaning of the term implies a being "in
potency to another without any inclination and activity to the
contrary."

For example, prime matter has a receptive potency for

48Sum. Theol., I, q. 80, art. 2 (trans. Anton C. Pegis).
49 ouodl., III, q. 19; "Dico ad primum quod 'inclinatio'
sive 'appetitus' dupliciter accipitur, scilicet large et stricte.
Large accipiendo inclinationem, non est aliud quam esse in potentia ad aliud, sine omni inclinatione et activitate in contrarium.
Et sic materia est in potentia naturali ad formam, et inclinatur
ad earn. Et sie non accipitur inclinatio ut addit aliquid ultra
formam. Aliter vero accipitur et hoc prout aliquid ultra addit
esse in potentia receptiva, puta, activitatem.
Et sic materia
non inclinatur ad formam, quia sic accipiendo inclinationem nihil
inclinatur nisi agens naturale, nee aliquid agens naturale quid
sic inclinatur ad contraria non est indifferens, quia breviter,
inclinare est idem quid agere. 11 Also see Sent., IV, qes. 8-9, D.
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substantial form.

Strictly speaking, however, the term "inclina-

tion" indicates more than receptive potency, it implies activity
in some power.

Bodies with weight "incline" to the center; air

"inclines" upwards.

To assert that a power is inclined to some

object or end, is equivalent, according to Ockham, to saying that
the power does something.

"Appetite" implies some determined

activity so that the power in which appetite resides cannot be
undetermined.

If the notion of inclination is thus understood,

it follows that the will is not inclined either to the ultimate
end or its own perfection. 50 Such inclinations would jeopardize
the will's native indifference to opposites.
A review of Thomistic and Scotistic doctrines regarding
the will's inclinations reveals the originality of Ockham's position.

St. Thomas Claims that the will necessarily adheres to the

50sent., I, d. 1, q. 6 (I, 507); "Ad argumentum principale
dico quod voluntas non naturaliter inclinatur in finem ultimum,
n1s1 accipiendo inclinationem naturalem secundum quod sit secundum
communem cursum. Et de tali inclinatione non est verum quod quidquid fit contra inclinationem violentatur. Et quando dicitur quod
'unumquodoque inclinatur in propriam perfectionem,' ista est
neganda, stricte accipiendo inclinationem, nisi quando illud perfectibile est activum naturale, cuiusmodi non est voluntas." Also
see Sent., III, q. 3, G.
A qualification is required here. Ockham speaks frequently about the "inclination" within the will toward determinate
objects consequent to habit formation. See Sent., IV, q. 4, O,
and Quodl., III, q. 17. This "inclination," which Ockham calls
a "habit," consists in the previous will-acts which generate a
facility and promptitude in producing similar acts. Thus, the
inclination consists of acts and the will might well be inclined
or habituated to the ultimate end or self perfection. But Ockham's
argument concerns innate or natural inclinations. He proposes the
Will as a tabula rasa; its habits or inclinations are freely
generated rather than original equipment.
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ultimate end of human operations, happiness.

The desire for

happiness is not freely effected since the will moves to the
ultimate end by internal and natural necessity.

Aquinas maintains

that the will's freedom concerns the means which can be chosen to
.
th"is necessary en d • 51 Duns Scotus disagrees. According
achieve
to the Subtle Doctor, the will is not necessitated by the ultimate
end whether that end is known in general or in particular. 52 A
more radical and extensive conception of volitional indifference
accompanies Scotus' notion of the will because Infinite Goodness
cannot determine the will's movement.

The freedom of the will is

51 see Aquinas Sum. Theol., I, q. 82, art. 1. In this
article, Aquinas explains that freedom is "opposed" to the "necessi tas coactionis" and not to "necessitas naturalis." Hence-;the desire for the ultimate end derives from the will's nature
and ex-presses an ontological relationship and affective tendency
to the will's perfectant. See William R. O'Connor, "Natural
Appetite," The Thomist 16 (1953), pp. 361-409. In St. Thomas'
words, this volitive tendency or relation is the "necessitas
finis." This means; a) the will necessarily adheres to the ultimate end, happiness, and b) the will necessarily elicits acts
which are indispensable for freely chosen ends. Ockham, however,
denies that every movement of the will depends upon a immovable,
permanent orientation to happiness as a "root" and principle. On
the other hand, he agrees with St. Thomas that freely chosen ends
necessitate the selection of sine qua !!.2Q means. The texts of
St. Thomas and Ockham have been collected and contrasted by G. de
Lagarde, Ockham ... , pp. 72-73.
52 scotus, Ordinatio, I, d. 1, p. 2, q. 2, n. 82 (ed.
Vaticana, II, 62). In proving this conclusion, Scotus denies
both senses of "necessitas finis" explained by St. Thomas. "Necessitas naturalis non stat cum libertate, quia natura et voluntas
sunt principia activa habentia oppositum modum principiandi,
igitur cum modo principiandi voluntatis non stat modus principiandi naturae; sed voluntas libere vult finem; igitur non potest
necessitate naturali velle finem, ergo et circa finem. 11 (loc.,
.£11., n. 80; II, 60).
~
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manifested by its undetermination to the ultimate end of life and
the means to that end.

And Ockham sides with Scotus; the will

can recognize the ultimate end clearly and still not choose this
53
end.
Ockham's analysis of "inclinations," however, makes him
reject the Scotistic position that the will possesses both absolute freedom and natural inclinations.

To be precise, Scotus

posits a natural inclination within the human will toward its
proper perfection. 54 In effect, the will contains a natural
53 ockham accepts the conclusions, but not the reasons, of
Scotus. "Tertia conclusio est quod aliquis potest nolle beatitudinem in particulari creditam esse possibilem, ita quod potest
- nolle habere beatitudinem." Sent., I, d. 1, q. 6 (I, 504). Also
see Sent., IV, q. 14, D. Ockham's disagreement derives from his
conviction that certain acts are produced necessarily by the
-· will, e.g., acts which are entailed by a prior volition through
"necessitas finis."
54Comm., Ox., IV, d. 49, q. 10, n. 2 (XXI, 318-319);
"Respondeoactprimam quaestionem dico, quod duplex est appetitus
in voluntate, scilicet naturalis et liber. Naturalem solum dico
potentiam voluntatis absolute, sed non aliquid superadditum voluntati, sicut enim quaelibet natura habet inclinationem naturalem
ad suam perfectionem ••. De primo appetitu dico, quod non est actus
aliquis elicitus a voluntate sed tantum inclinatio, quaedam. 11 Also
in Rep. Par., IV, d. 49, q. 9, n. 3-5 (XXIV, 659ss). For Ockham's
refutation of this text, see above, note 50. This argument between Scotus and Ockham appears verbal rather than substantive.
Scotus claims the will's natural appetite is not an act; Ockham
rejoins that it must be. As interpreted by Father Allan Wolter,
O.F.M., the "natural appetite" is sim:ply "an ontological relationship between any faculty (or the soul) and that which perfects
it ••• [the will as nature] is regarded passively as the recipient
of its own immanent operations." "Duns Scotus on the Natural
Desire for the Supernatural," Franciscan Studies 31 (1949), pp.
302-305. Understood in this way, Scotus' doctrine on natural
appetite is not guilty of the inconsistency which Ockham attributes to it. Furthermore, the debate over terminology hides the
fact that Scotus conceives the freedom of the will more extensively than does Ockham. The Subtle Doctor claims that every
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appetite and a free appetite which Scotus (and St. Anselm) call
naffections" because these inclinations prompt selfish and
altruistic acts respectively. 55 The will's natural appetite
necessarily seeks its own perfection (velle commodi) while the
free appetite appreciates what is good-in-itself (velle justitiae).
Opposed appetites explain the will's indifference to opposites.
But to Ockham, dual appetites do not explain the will's indifference, they deny it.

The will cannot possess a natural and

pre-conscious inclination towards its own perfection without
eliminating the possibility of altruistic acts.

Consciousness of

a good-for-the-will would determine the will's natural desire
;... according to Ockham's analysis of "appetite" or "inclination" as
act.

Thus, Ockham rejects the Thomistic insertion of natural

neces$ity, and the Scotistic assertion of natural appetite, within
the free will.
Ockham's critique of St. Thomas and Duns Scotus appears
to announce a more radical and libertarian conception of human
freedom.

But the doctrinal development is not so clear.

Ockham

means to remove any intrinsic, teleological relationship from the
will.

He does not, however, eradicate all traces of necessity

voluntary act is a free act, while Ockham teaches that some voluntary acts are produced of necessity.
5 5comm. Ox., III, d. 26, q. unica, n. 17 (XV, 340-341);
"In voluntate sunt duae affectionae, scilicet justitiae et commodi. Nobilior autem est affectio justitiae .•• secundum quam aliquis
potest velle aliquod bonum non in ordine ad se. Secundum autem
affectionem commodi non potest velle, nisi in ordine ad se."

-· -

'

•.. ._,

48
from the will's operation.

To be specific, Ockham admits a

necessity of the end (necessitas finis) reminiscent of Aquinas'
doctrine. 56 He ever denied the natural or teleological necessity
of the ultimate end, but admitted the necessity which a freely
chosen goal imposes upon the selection of the consequent means.
For example, if an agent freely desires health while believing
that a certain medicine is indispensable for his health, then
volition of that medicine follows necessarily.

To terminate the

desire for this medicine, the agent must first cease to desire
health.

The will cannot seriously or efficaciously desire a goal

while rejecting sine qua .!!2.£ means.

The natural or metaphysical

dependence between things parallels a logical order of "consequentiae" and, according to Ockham, parallels a volitional exigency.which binds together certain ends and means.

In this

light, the freedom of will appears as the indifference and contingency with which the agent decides the goals of his affection
and behavior.

The will freely decides its ends; but once the

goals of activity have been established the will necessarily
elicits the means which appear necessary.

Ockham's criticism of

56 sent., I, d. 1, q. 6 (I, 499-500); "Hoc per experientiam:
quia experimur quod libere et contingenter ante volitionem efficacem sanitatis possumus appetere potionem amaram vel non appetere,
non autem stante illa volitione cum firma opinione aliter non
posse consequi ••. manifestum per experientiam quod aliquando ad
actum aliquem intellectus et actum voluntatis sequitur necessario
et naturaliter aliquis actus voluntatis, quod ille actus causatur
sufficienter ab illis actibus praecedentibus sine activitate voluntatis." Also see Sent., III, q. 4, O. Father Lucan Freppert,
O.F.M., The Basis of Morality .•. , pp. 58-60, seems alone among
Ockham's commentators in indicating this qualification on the
Will's freedom.
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Aquinas is that natural necessity contradicts the will's indifference to opposite ends; his objection to Scotus is that natural
inclinations deny the will's contingent operation concerning
opposite acts.

It is not coincidental, therefore, that Ockham's

positive analysis and characterization of volitional freedom involves indifference and contingency. 57
A.

The Freedom of Opposites
The will's indifference or "freedom of opposites" concerns

the connection between the will and its objects and between the
will and intellect.

Ockham indicates the psychological conditions

of the will's freedom through analysis of volitional indifference
or "rationality."

The psychic context of free acts will serve

to clarify the metaphysical basis of freedom--the "freedom of
contraries."
Volitional indifference concerns the will's undetermined
stance towards apprehended objects of desire.

Following Scotus,

Ockham claims that "being," not "good," is the adequate object of
the wil1. 58 The soul retains the capacity to love or hate any
57For exam~le, Sent., I, d. 1, q. 6 (I, 501); Sent., I,
d. 2, q. 1 (II, 42); Sent., I, d. 10, q. 2, H; and Quodl., I,
q. 16. These texts analyze "freedom" into indifference and contingency.
58sent., I, d. 1, q. 4 (I, 434); 11 • • • aut hoc esset per
libertatem voluntatis, quia scilicet voluntas ex hoc ipso quod
libera est potest appetere quodcumque volibile ••• aut per universalitatem objecti voluntatis, quia scilicet objectum suum est ens
in communi, et per consequens quodlibet contentum .•. aut per
capacitatem voluntatis, quia scilicet est capa boni infiniti."
Also see Sent., III, q. 13, S. For Scotus' position and texts
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being, or any aspect under which a being is conceived.

Everything

conceivable has an equal and un-determining claim to the will's
affection.

Perhaps, we should designate this the "primitive" or

initial indifference of the will toward being in general.

Accord-

ing to Ockham, the will loses its indifferent profile when eliciting objects which entail or require concomitant objects.

Preclud-

ing any prior volition which requires a further will-act--as
desire for health requires desire for the medicine considered
essential to health--the will is indifferent toward every being.
Nevertheless, given the desire for health, the agent experiences
medicine as necessarily desirable.

Hence, Ockham's statement of

the will's "primitive" indifference to opposites must be reformulated to express a permanent (rather than initial) capacity of
the created will.
object in

The human will is not indifferent to every

every~·

Rather, the will's indifference means

that: a) by nature the will is undetermined by its objects-bowever conceived, and b) the will can produce the situation in
which it might accept or reject any habituated object--however
conceived.
In his own mind, there is a large difference between Ockham 1 s doctrine of the will's indifference and the majority opinion
Of Scholasticism.

Many held that the volitive power must elicit

its objects sub ratione boni.

In every instance, volitional

·see, Robert Prentice, O.F.M., "The Voluntarism of Duns Scotus as
Seen in His Comparison of the Intellect and Will," Franciscan
:§.tudies 28 (1968), pp. 63-65.
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affection moves toward its proper object, the good.

For example,

manY Scholastics claim that the will necessarily chooses objects
'
.
b . 59 This terminology, and perhaps the entire
sub ra t ione
--2.!!,!·

-

"problem" which Ockham sees is a terminological one, the Venerable

Inceptor finds inconsistent with the will's primitive indifference.

He insists that "indifference" means a neutral stance

toward both opposite objects and objects c·oncei ved under opposite
modes.

As a moral power, the will can choose sub ratione boni

·or sub ratione mali.

Ultimately, Ockham sees the Aristotelian

analysis of a nature in terms of an inherent final cause as
insufficient and misleading when applied to a free nature.

Only

by understanding the term "good" in the metaphysical sense of
!'what is willed or willable" can Ockham accept the position of
the "authorities and saints. 1160 The transcendental or metaphysical
59cf. Sum. Theol., I, q. 82, art. 2; and I-II, q. 10,
art. 2, for the opinion that the will must choose its objects sub
ratione boni. See the study of Robert-P:-Sullivan, O.P., "Natural
Necessitation of the Human Will," The Thomist 16 (1951), pp. 351-

399; 490-528.

60 sent., III, q. 13, S-T; ttAd tertium dico quod 'bonum'
accipitur dupliciter. Uno modo ut dividitur in bonum honestum et
delectabile, alio modo bonum idem est quid volitum vel accipitur
pro omni illo quid est volibile. Et eodem modo, 'malum' accipitur
~upliciter ut opponitur bono primo modo dicto vel ut accipitur pro
aliquo quid est nolibile vel nolitum. Accipiendo 'bonum' primo
modo et 'malum' prout opponitur bono primo modo, sic dico quod
voluntas potest velle malum quid nee est bonum realiter nee appar. enter .•. Secundo, dico quod accipiendo bonum et malum secundo modo;
sic voluntas non potest velle aliquid nisi bonum nee nolle aliquid
nisi malum vel sub ratione mali. Hoc patet, quia sic accipiendo
bonum, idem est quid volitum vel volibile; malum idem est quid
nolitum sive nolibile. Tune autem videtur contradicere quod
Voluntas velit aliud [read, aliquid] nisi sit volitum et volibile.
Igitur, etc. Et sic possunt glosari auctoritates et dicta
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description of the good transforms the statement, 'the will must
desire what is good,' into the equivalent and innocuous assertion
that, 'the will must desire what is desireable.'

It is not clear

that Ockham's predecessors, such as Thomas Aquinas, did not hold
the same position.

Rather than a point of departure, it seems

that Ockham's doctrine represents an emphasis upon the volitive
capacity for evil chosen deliberately and unequivically.
Ockham's doctrine on habits offers certain difficulties
of consistency with the will's indifference.

He teaches that the

will lacks a necessary object, yet experiences that certain objects are chosen more easily than others.

For example, the

discipline of study becomes easier with each choice to apply oneself.

Repeated volitions have a cumulative and facilitating

effect upon the will; they generate a proclivity toward certain
. t s an d aversion
.
t owar d opposi. t es. 61 Habits incline the will
o'b Jee
to similar acts regarding similar objects.

Ockham categorically

denies an innate, inclination within the will, but allows for
habitual and acquired inclinations produced and constituted by
sanctorum qui dicunt quod voluntas non potest velle aliquid nisi
sit bonum realiter vel sub ratione boni apparenter. 11
61 sent., III, q. 10, G; "Ideo dico quod virtus est ponenda
in voluntate propter majorem perfectionem actus, et majorem facilitatem et inclinationem ad eliciendum actus, ceteris paribus, et
tune potest sic argui: Quaecumque potentia, ceteris paribus,
. magis inclinatur post actum quam ante et ad intensiorem actum,
-;~t ex illis acquirit habitum.
Sed voluntas est huiusmodi ..• 11
~lltso see Quodl., III, q. 14. The volitive habits are studied by
Oswald Fuchs, O.F.M., The Psychology of Habit According to William
Qckham (St. Bonaventure, New York: The Franciscan Institute, 1952),
pp. 64-76, but he remains silent about the problem of determining
habits within a free power.
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the combined "weight" of many free acts.

62

A strong volitive

habit, given the presence of its appropriate object, automatically
receives that object and precludes its opposite. 63 Habits, therefore, provide another example of the necessity which affects the
will's operation because of prior, free acts.

Habitual desires

give further evidence that total volitional receptivity and
indifference to every being is a "primitive," initial condition
of the will.

Soon enough, the will's possibilities are restricted

by its history.

The adult, through discipline and contrary

volitions, must frequently recapture his original capacity to
accept or reject certain objects.
It was Ockham's consistent position (Sent., III, q. 10,
H; Sent., III, q. 12, G; Quodl., III, q. 13) that only habits of
the will are per

~

virtuous.

Only free acts are intrinsically

moral; hence, only habits generated by free, voluntary acts are
62 sent., III, q. 4, U; "Ad aliud dico quod (habitus) non
requiritur propter facilitatem vel promptitudinem tamquam principium activum tantum. Sed propter inclinationem dicitur proprie
principium activum; et ex hoc sequitur facilitatio et promptitudo
quia magis inclinatur nunc quam prius, et ita principaliter ponitur propter inclinationem, secundario autem propter alia duo."
Also see Quodl., II, q. 18; for the two meanings of habitus.
6 3sent., III, q. 4, N-0; "Potest dici quod licet voluntas
sit libera respectu cuiuslibet actus ab eo eliciti absoluti considerati; tamen considerando aliquem actum voluntatis inquantum
ille actus antecedit in voluntate non est voluntas libera respectu
illius actus .•• Tunc dico quod non est in potestate voluntatis
quando eliciat cum habitu inclinate aliquem actum circa illud, et
ille actus potest dici primus motus qui excusatur a peccato secundum doctores. 11 See the parallel and later text in Sent., I, d.
17, q. 2, C. See Quodl., II, q. 13, where Ockham says that passions within the sensitive powers can override the will's freedom.
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intrinsically virtuous.

Habits formed in the intellectual or

sensitive powers are morally good by "extrinsic denomination,"
that is, by the causality of intrinsically good acts.
objection arises:

The obvious

Ockham has excluded habituated actions from the

dimension of free action and thereby, from morality.

How can

Ockham consider volitive habits intrinsically virtuous when everything produced "with a habit inclined" is not "within the power
of the will?"
explicit texts.

Any answer depends upon conjecture rather than
Ockham sometimes speaks as if the will's inclin-

ation or addiction to a determinate object must be presently
approved by a free volition to be operative; 64 elsewhere he says
that habits are only partial causes, with the will, of volitive
acts. 65 Such replies merely indicate that the primary and
intrinsically moral act is volitional consent or dissent to habits
which operate naturally within the will.

The will's primitive

indifference makes it possible for the agent to produce a situation, e.g., through formation of opposite habits, in which
habitual inclinations can be countermanded.

Thus, the presence

64auodl., III, q. 19 (corr. by Vaticana Lat., 3075); "Ad
aliud dico quod habitus et passiones proprie loquendo non inclinat
voluntatem nisi quando consentit eis mediante voluntate. Et ita
si voluntas nolit illas passiones et nolit elicere actum secundum
habitum non inclinabunt voluntatem."
6 5sent., III, q. 4, M; "Apparet inconveniens quod aliquis
actus totaliter causetur in voluntate a causa creata alia a
voluntate propter libertatem voluntatis quae non potest cogi,
saltem per causam creatam, licet talis actus posset causari a
Deo totaliter. Ideo potest dici quod ille actus (vel inclinatio
habitus) causatur partialiter ab habitu et partialiter a voluntate.11 Also see Sent., III, q. 10, D.
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. of habits within the will remains imputable even though the acts

generated by those habits are non-moral.

Of course, this does

not "explain away" Ockham's attribution of per g

morality to

volitive habits which are naturally determined causes.

It does

explain, however, the techniques by which the will retains its
indifference vis-a-vis its habitual inclinations.
The freedom of opposites was traditionally given to the
will as a "rational power."

The will's rationality indicates;

~a) its capacity to receive opposite objects, and b) its dependence

upon intellectual acts.

To "indifferently move to one opposite

or the other," the will must recognize opposite acts or objects. 66
Free choice (liberum arbitrium) implies knowledge of opposite
things and volitive indifference to those options or alternatives.

We must consider, therefore, the will's relationship to the
intellect.
Again, there is no real difference between the intellect
and will.

There is, however, a definite and constant order be-

tween cognitive and voluntary acts. "The will cannot wish something unless it is known. 1167 Volition does not create its options;
rather it chooses among the rational proposals.

Necessarily, an

66
Sent., IV, q. 14, G; and Sent., I, d. 10, q. 2, F.
Curiously, when the soul produces an act of understanding, it
should not be called a "rational power" according to Ockham. The
intellect knows by necessity when presented with an intelligible
object--it is a natural, active principle. "Sed omne principium
activum respectu cuius necessario agit; respectu illius non potest
dici potentia rationalis, quia respectu illius non potest dici
potentia valens ad opposita."
67 Quodl., III, q. 17; "Voluntas non potest aliquid velle
nisi cognitum."

act of knowledge precedes any act of volition.
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The operation of

the intellect determines the present scope, the "here and now"
limits, within which the will exercises its freedom.

Given Ock-

ham' s definition of a cause, he consistently concludes that in68
tellection is a partial cause of volition.
The will is a
passive potency in the sense that it must receive as a possibility
or option whatever the intellect apprehends as "do-able."

Know-

ledge is a necessary, but not a necessitating, cause of volition.
When the will elicits some volition, the preceding act of
intellection is constituted as an efficient cause (i.e., because
of Ockham's definition of cause as the essentially prior item
with a sequence) of the volitive act.
In summary, what we call the "freedom of opposites" concerns the will's connection with.its objects.

Ockham maintains

that the will is originally free from any extrinsic determination.
Furthermore, the human agent is permanently able to re-gain his
primitive indifference toward opposites--even after the growth
of passions or the formation of volitive habits and commitments.
It should be understood that Ockham's defense of the will's indifference was simultaneously an attack against a prominent doctrine of Aristotelian psychology and physics.

According to the

Philosopher, every nature or. "source of motion and rest" possessed
68 sent., II, q. 24, P; 11 • • • quia actus intelligendi est
causa efficiens partialis respectu actus volendi; et potest esse
naturaliter sine actu volendi, licet non e contra. Sed ista
prioritas non infert perfectionem in illo quid est prius nee
imperfectionem in posteriori." Also see Sent., II, q. 4-5, E;
Where Ockham asserts that volition has a natural and free cause,
namely, the intellect and will.
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a teleological relationship or intrinsic finality to its perfectant or fulfillment. 69 Independent of any act, a potency can be
analyzed and explained by means of its final cause.

For example,

the power of sight is ontologically related to its proper object,
color, as the condition of actually seeing.
or completes the visual potency.

Hence, color perfects

The Scholastics who considered

the will a distinct source of human operations generally followed
Aristotle in asserting the will's inherent finality to what
perfects or actualizes the volitive potency, i.e., "happiness,"
llbeatitude," "the good," etc. 70 But because Ockham denies the
"distinct faculties" or "formally distinct powers" theories of
the human soul, he protests against a specifically identical end
or "aspect" involved whenever the soul elicits an act of volition.
He denies that the will must be naturally and pre-consciously
69cf. Physics, II, c. 7-8; De Anima, III, c. 10. Sir
David Ross' comments on the Aristotelian doctrine of nature visa-vis the four causes is enlightening. "But further Aristotreoften indicates the identity of form with efficient and with
final cause ..• The form is the plan of structure considered as
informing a particular product of nature or art. The final cause
is the same plan considered as not yet embodied in the particular
thing but as aimed at by nature or by art .•. And in nature, the
form which is to find fresh embodiment is already present and is
the cause of movement. Aristotle (5th ed.; New York: Barnes and
Noble, 1949), pp. 74-75. Ockham complains that Aristotle and
Avicenna confused final and formal causality. Sent., II, q. 3, H.
70At least some Thomistic and Scotistic scholars assert
that the Will's natural desire, according to their mentor's
thought, concerns a pre-conscious and ontological relationship
rather than a conscious volition. Thus, Sullivan, The Thomist,
16, pp. 351-399; and Wolter, Franciscan Studies, 31-;-pp. 300307. Cf., for example, Aquinas, Sum. Theol., I, qes. 80-81.
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directed to the good to explain the possibility and intelligibili-

ty of the will's activity.

In asserting the will's freedom of

opposites, Ockham precludes an Aristotelian analysis of the will
.9..ua nature and form.

Whatever is known and however the mind

specifies the known object, the will remains indifferent.

Only

freely chosen final causes influence the will's operation.

The

will's objective indifference and undetermination has rather
obvious consequences within Ockham's moral theory.

To be explicit,

nothing can be classified a priori as "unsuitable," "unnatural,"
or "immoral" on the basis of the will's nature.
B.

The Freedom of Contraries
The freedom of contraries or "freedom of execution" con-

cerns the will's connection with its own acts.

The will is not

a passive potency in spite of the fact that volition requires a
prior intellection. 71 Everything required for a determinate
volition can be present to the will, yet the will need not act.
In discussing the fundamental locus of human freedom, Ockham
emphatically leaves the realm of "liberum arbitrium. 11

The will

acts freely and indifferently even without the choices or alternatives which derive from the intellect's activity. 72 In

?l Sent., I, d. 1, q. 6 (I, 486); "Voluntas est receptiva
nolitionis~volitionis respectu cuiuscumque objecti; sed nullius
est receptiva nisi cuius est activa; ergo active potest in voli-·
t~onem respectu cuiuscumque objecti, et etiam nolitionem; ergo
libere et contingeter. 11 Also see Sent., I, d. 17, q. 2, F; and
Sent., IV, q. 14, G.
72 Sent., I, d. 6, q. 1, G; "Si voluntas tantum posset in
unum, tamen contingenter sic quod haberet in potestate sua ferri
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deliberating about a single goal, i.e., conscious of only one
end, the will retains its intrinsic freedom to accept or reject
that goal.

For Ockham the freedom of the will rests ultimately

upon the contingent connection between the soul and the contrary
acts of "velle, 11 "nolle," and "non-velle."

"Properly speaking,

nothing is produced freely and non-naturally unless what is
produced contingently and can be produced and not produced. 1173
Ockham explains the positive freedom of the moral agent as the
active, self-determining capacity of the will and characterizes
every effect of freedom as contingent.
Ockham's explanation, in contrast to his assertion, of
the will's freedom rests upon the originative and spontaneous
causality of the will. 74 As an active power, the will is selfdetermining.

The soul is an "unmoved-mover" in producing, deter-

mining and specifying its volitive effects.
in illud vel non ferri in illud, adhuc sufficienter distingueretur
a natura in causando. 11 Ockham rarely utilizes the notion of
"free choice" in analyzing the will's freedom. "Choice" implies
a determination of alternative means; according to Aristotle's
terminology, one does not "choose" his ends. Ockham is emphatically opposed to the doctrine entailed by this vocabulary. He
maintains that men are free to establish or decide their goals,
and having decided their goals, certain means are willed naturally and necessarily. Father Boehner correctly remarks: "Therefore
according to Ockham liberty is not only the power of free choice
which would presuppose the choice between two objects, but ultimately the power of self determination or the dominion of the
will over its own act." Collected Articles ••. , p. L+26.
73sent., I, d. 2, q. 1 (II, 35).
7 4 sent., IV, q. 14, G.; "Si (voluntas) esset potentia
passiva et nullo modo activa, non videtur quomodo possit salvari
ejus libertas."
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If the object is known, and if God wishes to concur
with the will for causing whenever the will is ready,
the will can elicit or not elicit that act and its
object from its freedom without any other habitual
or actual determination. Therefore, concerning that
act, it is not necessary that the will be determined
to something unless by the will itself.75
Ockham's "principle of economy" prompts him to maintain
only one active (i.e., self-moving) power among the spiritual
faculties of man. 76 He rejects the Philosopher's and Commentatator's doctrine of an "agent intellect," just as he denies the
passivity attributed the "power of choice" or "rational appetite"
by Aristotle.

Only the will is active and "in nostra potentia"

because causal explanations of any volition cannot proceed beyond the will's power.

The effects of natural powers, however,

require explanation through a series of causes which include the
power and its determining object.

As an active cause, the will

75sent., IV, q. 14, G; "Loquendo de primo actu, posito
omni sufficienti et necessario requisito ad talem actum, puta ad
actum voluntatis; si objectum cognoscatur et Deus velit concurrere
cum vo1untate ad causandum quando placet voluntati, potest voluntas ex sua libertate sine omni alia determinatione actuali vel
habituali actum illum et ejus objectum elicere vel non elicere.
Et ideo respecu illius actus non oportet in aliquo quod determinetur voluntas nisi a seipsa. 11 Also see parallel and later texts
in~., I, d. 38, q. 1, G; and Quodl., I, q. 16.
Ockham's
evidence, therefore, for the will's active nature hinges upon the
Will's indifference. Given all the conditions for volition, the
will can produce or not produce its effect; thus, the determining
factor is the will itself.
7 6 In Sent., II, q. 25, A; Ockham reviews twenty-one arguments for asserting an "agent 11 or "active intellect." He refutes
all of them as inconclusive. 11 Sciendum est, quod circumscripta
omnium sanctorum auctoritate et philosophorum, propter nullam.
rationem necessario concludentem oportet ponere intellectum activum sed solum passivum ... 11 Often the arguments prove merely the
active nature of the will (AA).
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initiates and originates a causal series which can control every
other human power. 77 The will can command that the eyes close
and thus impede vision; volition.can direct or re-orientate the
intellect's consideration to certain objects.

The will, by means

of its acts, dominates the agent's physical faculties and controls the mental faculties by affecting the objects available to
the mind.
We can now answer why the will alone is a sufficient
principle of moral acts.

If the will elicits some act, the

moving cause is the will itself.

cy to act is self-determined.

The will's movement from poten-

Hence, the sufficient reason and

responsibility for volition rests with the active will.
A question might arise:

Does not the active nature of

the will's causality contradict the Aristotelian-Thomistic axiom
that "whatever is in motion is placed in motion by another"-omne guod movetur ab

alio movetur?

If the will is in potency to

volition, how can it reduce itself to act?

Three times Ockham
·considers this objection to the will's self-determination. 78 His
77 sent., Prologue, q. 10 (I, 292); "Omnis operatic quae
est in potestate nostra est praxis. Et ideo cum tam cognitio
quam volitio quam alii actus exteriores sint in potestate nostra,
sequitur quod quilibet istorum vere poterit dici praxis. Tamen
praxis primo dicitur de actu voluntatis, cum ipsa sit primo in
potestate nostra, et nulla alia sit in potestate nostra nisi
mediante ea .•• n The term "praxis" will be discussed in Chapter
Two. Also see Sent., III, q. 10, H, where Ockham asserts the
Will's mastery over the agent's physical operations.
78First, in Sent., IV, q. 13,· Kand in Sent., IV, q. 14,
~ and F; then in Quocrr.-:-;- I, q. 16; "Sed hie est dubium, quia
impossibile est quod agens dum existit per tempus in potentia
essentiali ad actum quod reducat se de potentia ad actum sine
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answer is that the cinesiological principle applies only to
natural agents, i.e., passive powers.

(And the principle is

not universally valid for instances of natural causality.)79 The
agente extrinseco. Sed voluntas potest esse per tempus in potentia essentiali ad volitionem; ergo, non potest educere seipsam.
Respondeo et dico quod argumentum est verum de agente naturali
sive sit corporale sive spirituale. Sed in agente libero cuiusmodi est voluntas est instantia manifesta .quia objectum potest
esse cognitum et praesens voluntati, et omnia alia requisita ad
actum volendi possunt manere per tempus, et potest non elicere
actum suum et deindi elicere sine omni actione extrinseca--et
hoc totum est propter liberatatem suam. Ad principale argumentum
dico quod idem potest esse activum et passivum respectu ejusdem,
nee ista repugnant ad invicem. 11 See the parallel argument of
Scotus in Comm. Ox., II, d. 25, q. unica, n. 5 (XIII, 200 ff).
Father Roy Effler has published a study of John Duns Scotus and
~Principle "Omne guod movetur ab alio movetur."
See especially
pp. 32-51. Scotus refutes both the physical and the metaphysical
sense of this axiom as given by St. Thomas, Henry of Ghent and
Godfrey of Fontaines. Many of Father Effler's comments could be
applied verbatim to Ockham's position. For example, "there is
nothing in the bare notions of active and passive pri.nciple to
forbid that one and the same thing be active and passive in
reference to one and the same perfection. Thus the two notions
do not necessarily exclude self-motion." p. 41. Cf. Aristotle,
Physics VII, c. 1 (24lb 25-242a 16).
79 In the above text from the First Quodlibet, Ockham
implies that natural agents are not self-moving. Elsewhere, Ock.ham analyses the mechanics of projectile motion as an instance
of self-movement. When a stone leaves the hand of the thrower,
it moves--not by the tangent air currents, or by an impressed
force--but by itself. Professor Ernest A. Moddy reviews the Greek,
Arabian and Scholastic background of the scientific discoveries of
Galileo; he gives Ockham's theory of projectile motion a place of
importance in the history of modern Mechanics. "Ockham helped to
break down the tacit assumption, made by the partisans of Averroes
and Avempace alike, which had vitiated the sound elements in each
position. This was the assumption, summed up in the phrase Omne
s_uod movetur ab alio movetur, that the condition of "being in
motionfl is ipso "fa'Cto a condition of "being moved by something,"
so that the motion under the action of no force was excluded as
f?rmally impossi.bl.e." "Galileo and Avempace," Journal of the
iistory of Ideas 12 (1951), p. 399. P. Duhem, Etudes ~Leonard
~Vinci, Vol. II (Paris: 1906), p. 86, maintains that Ockham's
rejection of the cinesiological principle produced the first
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experience in which all the external, non-volitive factors required for willing are operative, yet the will first refuses to
act and then produces a determinate act, can only be explained
as the will's self-activating ability.

The will cannot be moved

by another created power; an extrinsic force cannot actualize the
will's potency.

Although Ockham admits that cognition "causes"

volition, i.e., cognition is prior necessarily to any act of
willing, it is apparent that the intellect influences volition £y
means of, and contingent upon, the will's causality.

The intel-

lect's act does not place in act, or move, the will.

Thus, Ockham

asserts that the will can be both active and passive regarding
the same perfection, i.e., volition.

The soul is the active

principle of the action which it receives.

Hence, self-motion

is not only possible, but demanded by the experienced facts.
The acts within the will's power immediately are "velle, 11
"nolle, 11 and "non-velle. 11

Acceptance (velle), rejection (nolle)

or the absence of any decision (non-velle) regarding an object
depends upon the will's self-determination.

Not only positive

acts of accepting or rejecting (velle and nolle), but the lack
statement of the law of inertia. Herman Shapiro, Motion, Time ... ,
pp. 51-62, shows the tacit rejection of the principle of motion
in Ockham's treatment of many questions of Natural Philosophy .
. It should be noted, however, that Ockham's rejection of the causal
principle is not categorical; he denies its usual sense that
things in motion require an external created force to initiate
an.d continue movement. He also "reinterprets" this lm·; of movement as universally valid when it designates the necessity of
S.ivine force for all secondary causality and movement. See Sent.,
IV, q. 13, K.
-
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of positive action (non-velle) is attributable to the will's
freedom.

The will's responsibility for its active or indifferent

state extends to all the mental and physical effects of the agent,
which are controllable by volition.

Notice, however, that the

non-volitive powers regulated by the will's self-determination
are not themselves free powers.

Acts of eating, walking, think-

ing, etc., are natural activities although mediately controlled
by a free power.

This point deserves remembrance.

Upon this

basis, Ockham will claim that non-volitive acts have no moral
status.

Against his major predecessors--Aquinas and Scotus--

Ockham teaches that "external" actions lack a "proper moral goodness or evil."

His reasoning is that external acts are "natural"

and natural actions are not themselves contingent although they
are produced by means of contingent acts.

According to Ockham's

thought, "moral" or "imputable" can be predicated properly and
intrinsically of only the acts "velle, 11 ,"nolle," or "non-velle. 11
Just as Ockham traces human freedom to the will's self-moving
nature, so he attributes moral value only to acts produced freely
and contingently by the will. "Only the act of will is praiseworthy or blameworthy." 80 Sins of commission~ positive willacts (velle or nolle); sins of

omission~

the will-not-willing

(non-velle).
The possibility of two simultaneous acts within the human
I

Will is admitted by Ockham.

This assertion supports Ockham's

80
Quodl., III, q. 13; Sent., III, q. 10, H; Sent., III,
q. 13, P.
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claim of morally indifferent acts within the will; it renders
problematic a necessarily good act; it subjects Ockham to strong
criticism from his successors.

Thus, Ockham's position requires

close study.
In the Reportatio, Ockham's earliest work, the possibility
of indifferent acts derives from the will's capacity to constantly
81
will the same object for successively different reasons.
For
example, the will could first love some man and then love that
man for God's sake.

To simply love something is morally indif-

ferent--a single act; to love something out of love for God is
morally good--two simultaneous acts.

The love of object and end

81 sent., III, q. 10, P; "Si autem duo actus volendi possunt simul esse naturaliter in voluntate--quid credo esse verum
sicut in primo (Sent., I, d. 1, q. 1: I, 381-389) probatum est-tune in voluntate potest esse aliquis actus indifferens modo
praedicto. Exemplum, si enim diligam aliquem hominem absolute
terminando actum volendi ad illum hominem et non ad aliquam
circumstantiam bonam vel malam tune iste actus non est bonus vel
malus moraliter, sed est neuter. Sed tune stante illo actu
eligam alium actum quo volo diligere tantum hominem propter Deum
secundum rectam rationem et secundum omnes alias circumstantias
requisitas, iste secundus actus est perfecte et intrinsece virtuosus. Et qui prius fuit indifferens, nunc est virtuosus denominatione extrinseca quatenus elicitur conformiter actui perfecte
virtuoso et recto dictamini. 11
Ockham's consistency in this text is problematic. In
the preceding paragraph he claims that a change in the partial
objects of an act changesthe numerical identity of the act.
"Cum circumstantiae non sint nisi objecta partialia actus virtuosi, ad quorum variationem variatur necessario actus." (0). In
his example, therefore, to simply love a man cannot be specifically or numerically the same act as to love that man for God's sake.
The example introduces successively different acts rather than a
single act which remains in conjunction with a novel volition.
Yet unless two distinct actions occur simultaneously within the
Will, Ockham claims no act would be morally indifferent. And
Ockham proceeds to explain his example as "idem actus numero"
being first indifferent and then extrinsically go~
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are separable and distinct; hence, two acts can exist simultaneously within the will.
run thus:

Ockham's argument, therefore, seems to

If volition can occur without being ordered to some

end, then that volition is neither orderly nor disorderly.

At

the same time, Ockham implies that volition of the object and end
remain distinct acts--even when elicited simultaneously.

In the

Ordinatio, when discussing the Augustinian terms "frui" and "uti,"
Ockham asserts that the will can determine the means and the end
of action by a single volition or two simultaneous acts. 82 Just
as the intellect knows the principle and conclusion of some
'argument by distinct acts or by a single act; so the will can
desire the means and the end by distinct volitions or by a single
wish.

Volition of the object and the end are not always differ-

'ent actions.
objects.

Will-acts, therefore, can have simple or complex

How could Ockham distinguish between two simultaneous

·acts and one act with many partial objects?

What criteria

individuate an act within the will?
82 sent., I, d. 1, q. 1 (I, 381-382); "Sed istis rationibus
non obstantibus, videtur probabile quod possunt esse duo actus,
et quod possunt esse unus actus. Hoc potest declarari, quia
'sicut intellectus se habet ad principia et conclusiones, ita
voluntas se habet ad finem et ad ea quae sent ad finem. Sed
intellectus potest scire conclusionem distincto actu ab actu quo
pognoscitur principium, et potest unico actu cognoscere utrumque,
ergo eodem modo voluntas potest habere distinctos actus respectu
finis et illius quod est ad finem, et unum actum respectu utriusque. 11 This text begins Ockham's response to six objections against
his position that two acts might co-exist within the will (pp.
379-381). Ockham's solution to these difficulties (pp. 384-389)
proves how specifically different predications can be applied to
.the same will-act--how specifically different acts co-exist-and not how numerically distinct will-acts occur simultaneously.
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Ockham is simply not clear on these questions.

He seems

to vascillate between an integrated view of the will-act with
many partial objects; and an analytic view of many will-acts in
proportion to the partial objects.

The ambiguity reappears in

Ockham's effort to describe types of moral acts--witness below
in Chapter Four.

Ockham indulges in dubious logical acrobatics

when he: a) maintains against Scotus that change in the partial
objects of the act changes the act's numerical and specific
identity and b) maintains against Aquinas that the same (morally
indifferent) action can remain while the will's objects change.
Ockham's evidence for simultaneous acts within the will is fundamentally the experience that certain will-acts "endure" for
successively different reasons.

Thus, the agent might love this

man simply; then love this man for God's sake; then love this man
to impress others.

But by Ockham's standards, the same act
numerically cannot "endure" for different final causes. 83 The
same specific act endures; each action Ockham describes can be
called "love-for-man."

Ockham, who accepts the "plurality of

forms" doctrine, allows the same thing to receive specifically
different predications.

Hence, specifically distinct actions can

co-exist in the will because the same act can receive different
"class" or "type" predications.

The action "loving mankind for

God's sake" receives different and opposed classifications-8 3sent., III, q. 10, N; "Impossibile est quod unus actus
nunc terminetur ad unum primarium objectum et post terminetur ad
aliud objectum primarium; sed fines sunt objecta primaria voluntatis .11 See also Sent., III, q. 12, XX-YY; and Quodl., III, q. 15.
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namely, love for man/love for God, volition of means/volition of
end, ~ concupiscentiae/~ amicitiae, uti/frui, etc.

Given

the case of one who hates sin for God's sake, Ockham claims that
the "same action numerically" might be called "detestatio" and
namor." 84 Gregory of Rimini (d. 1358), among others, was incredu-

-

ious that hating (nolle) one thing while loving (velle) another
thing could be considered "the same action numerically. 1185 We
poncur with Rimini; Ockham's position is perplexing in the absence

pf a clear statement of what individuates action.

In place of

explanation, we have Ockham's assertion that the will's freedom
determines whether diverse objects are elicited by separate acts
or whether diverse objects are "ordered" and "conjoined" by a
single act.

This position rules

out~

priori or methodological

means_ for identifying individual volitions.

The irony is acute--

Ockham, who rejects the need for "principles of individuation" to

84 - . . .
Sent., I, d. l, q. 1 (I, 386.:.337).; "Ad quartum potest
concedi quod idem actus numero respectu unius potest denominari
detestatio seu actus detestandi et respectu alterius actus amandi
quando unico actu detest6r aliquid propter aliud amatum eodem
actu. 11 This example would seem to offer the clearest instance
~f two simultaneous acts within the will, but Ockham insists the
terms "to hate" and "to love" could apply to the same action, and
thus vitiates his only acceptable illustration that "in voluntate
possunt esse simul duo actus volendi." Also see Sent., IV, qes.
8-9, u.
85 super Primum et Secundum Sententiarum, I, d. 1, q. 1,
art.2 (Venice: 1522, f. 24r: reprint St. Bonaventure, New York:
The Franciscan Institute, 1955); "Ad hanc rationem respondet
Primus doctor (in marg •.. Ockham) concedendo consequens et dicit
quad non est inconveniens eundum actum esse volitionem unius et
n~litionem alterius .•• Sed procerto hoc non nj_si absurde concedi
Vl.detur posse." Rimini's argument proposes that whenever opposite
Predicates can be applied to the will, then two acts exist simultaneously.
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explain the singular facts of experience, has no method for isolating singular actions.
The will·, therefore, determines its object (or objects)
and its own act (or acts).

The will's determination is accom-

plished, however, without terminating the volitive potency to
opposite objects or acts.

The will's indifference to opposites,

to producing or not producing some act, occur "nullo variate
E.arte

~"

~

or "nulla diversitate circa illam potentiam facta."

With these phrases, Ockham describes a contingent power.
A fundamental motive which vitalizes Ockham's theological
orientation is to maintain the contingency of human existence
and action.

Our life and thought rest on a free divine choice.

Creation depends upon the Necessary Being whose omnipotence is
the sole sufficient

~eason

for non-necessary beings.

Ockham ex-

presses the contingency of every effect by saying that any effect
produced by a created and secondary agent can be done by God
immediately, as the primary and necessary agent. 86 Because of
this regulative notion, Ockham asserts that human causality-~hether

free or natural--is contingent since the Creator could
impede or totally effect any activity of the creature. 87 Anything

86
.
.
ouodl., VI, q. 6; "Praeterea in illo articulo fundatur
illa propositio famosa theologorum, Quidquid Deus producit median. tibus causis secundis potest immediate sine illis producere et
conservare."
8 7sent., I, d. 1, q. 6 (I, 501); "Prima distinctio est
,
~e contingenti quod dupliciter accipitur (ad presens) frui aliquo
rontingenter sicut et producere aliquid contingenter. In uno modo
~Uod simpliciter potest frui et non frui, vel producere et non
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which is an effect, therefore, is contingent in the sense that

its being is radically dependent, non-necessary, and mutable.
Besides this metaphysical contingency of created being,
which implies imperfection, Ockham also distinguishes another
meaning of contingency which connotes a perfection possessed by
the will.

This second sense of contingent refers to "that which

produces some effect, with no change on its part nor on the part
of another.

It has in its power, thus, to not produce as well

as to produce, so that of its nature, it is determined to
neither. 1188 (We imply this "volitive" sense of contingent when
discussing the will, unless otherwise stated.)

This conception

of contingence belongs to both the divine and human will, but not
to a natural power.

The production and continuing production of

natural potencies depend upon external factors; contact between
agent and patient necessitates action which continues until the
extrinsic conditions change.

Volitive contingency, however, implies that the will could cease its action unilaterally. 89 A
producere. Et isto modo, quidquid producit quemcumque effectum
producit contingenter, quia potest Deus facere quod non producat."
Also see Sent., III, q. 4, L; and Quodl., III, q. 13.
88 sent., I, d. 1, q. 6 (I, 501); "Alio modo accipitur pro
illo quod producit aliquem effectum et nullo variato ex parte sua,
nee ex parte cuiuscumque alterius, habet in potestate sua ita non
producere sicut producere, ita quod ex natura sua ad neutraum
determinatur. Et eodem modo dicendum est de contingenter frui."
89
.
Sent., I, d. 38, q. 1, F; "Concedendum est quod voluntas
quando causat contingenter causat. Sed ista potest habere duas
causas veritatis. Vel quia possibile est quod in eodem instanti
sit verum dicere quod non causat et hoc est impossibile quia
posito quod in aliquo instanti sit causans, impossibile est quod
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contingent act--and all moral actions are contingent--can be
retracted immediately although all other prerequisites for willing
continue unchanged.

Ockham cautions that "contingent" does not

mean that the will could ~ cause and not-cause at the same
instant. 90 Rather, before and after a will-act, the will can
either cause or not-cause.

A positive movement of the will

(either velle or nolle) produces a self-determined act but the
will is not thereby determined.

Ockham's rather extreme example

of the will's contingent character pictures a person jumping from
in eodem instanti sit non causans. Vel dicitur causare contingenter quia libere sine omni variatione adveniente sibi vel alteri,
et non per cessationem alterius causae potest cessare ab actu in
alio instanti, ita quod in alio instanti sit non causans, non quod
in eodem instanti sit non causans. Et isto modo, voluntas causat
contingenter. Also see~., I, d. 10, q. 2, H.
90 1n probably a later work, the Tractatus de Praedestinatione et de Praescientia Qtl_ et de Futuris Contingentibus (ed.
Philotheus Boehner, O.F.M.; Saint Bonaventure, New York: The Franciscan Institute, 1945), Ockham seems to distinguish three "moments" in the will's operation--before, during and after the willact.
Arguing against John Duns Scotus, Ockham insists
that while the will elicits its act, it cannot simultaneously be
capable of the contrary act. The will "valet ad opposita" successively, not simultaneously. Hence, the will can produce
opposite acts before or after its self-determination--but not
during or while it elicits some volition. 11 • • • voluntas creata in
illo instanti in quo agit contingenter agit. Sed hoc potest intelligi tripliciter: Uno modo quod ipsa prius duratione existens
ante A instans, in quo causat, potest libere et contingenter
causare vel non causare in A, et iste intellectus est verus .••
Secundo modo potest intelligi, quod in eodem instanti, in quo
causat, sit verum dicere, quod non causat; et iste intellectus
non est possibilis propter contradictoria ••• Tertio modo potest
intelligi contingenter causare in A, quia libere sine omni variatione et mutatione adveniente sibi vel alteri causae et sine
cessatione alterius causaepotest cessare in alio instanti post
A ab suo actu, ita quod in A instanti sit haec vera: Voluntas
causat, et in alio instanti post A sit haec vera: Voluntas non
causat; et sic voluntas contingenter causat in A." (pp. 35-36).
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a cliff to take his own life.

In the midst of his descent, and

with no possibility of stopping his fall, the person retains his
capacity to reject the volition which will produce his suicide. 91
Physically, the man's body is determined by necessary laws of
gravity but volitionally, the will is not necessitated to continue
its choice even though the effect of that choice is inevitable.
Thus, the normal sequence of volitive cause and effect is sometimes actual, always possible, but this sequence is never necessary or permanent.
Ockham often asserts a distinction between the Absolute
and Ordinate Power of God. 92 This distinction concerns the difference between what God can do (absolutely) and what God actually
decides to do (ordinately).

Absolutely, there is no necessity

that God produce or conserve any created effect.

Due to the

will's contingence, Ockham also speaks of the absolute power of
the human will.

"Every potency acting freely and contingently

can cease from its acts by its own absolute power either mediately

9lsent., III, q. 12, G; "Tum quia nullus actus est viciosus nisi s"i1:Voluntarius et in potestate voluntatis, quia peccatum
adeo est voluntarium etc. Sed actus exterior potest primo esse
in potestate voluntatis, puta quia aliquis dimittat se in praecipitium, et post descendendo potest illum actum simpliciter et
meritorie nolle propter deum. 11 Ockham gives this same example in
Quodl., III, q. 13.
92 The absolute/ordinate power of God will be discussed in
Chapter Three. Cf. below, pp. 190-197. For now, we only wish to
indicate that Ockham applies this distinction to the human will.
The parallel is important. The absolute power of the created
will expresses its contingent operation; likewise God's absolute
power indicates fundamentally the contingency of divine action
.§!.£ extra.
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or immediately ••• but the will acts freely and contingently regarding every object; therefore, the will can simply stop its act
by its absolute ·power. 1193 The absolute power of the will indicates that every free movement of the will originates and continues contingently.
Even though Ockham believes that the will's perfection
is the loving enjoyment of God, 94 the will and its mode of operation remain contingent when face to face with the Creator.
Ordinarily, the human will would elicit an act of love when presented with a vision of the Divine Essence.

But absolutely, the

human will could choose not to be blessed with the enjoyment of
God.

Just as Ockham claimed that "freedom of opposites" implies

the primitive, volitive indifference to all objects; so the
"freeqom of contraries" requires the will's native contingency
to all acts. Even the love for God-known-clearly. 95 If the will
9 3sent., I, d. 1, q. 1 (I, 399); also see Sent., II, q.

19, E.

and~

94 sent., I, d. 1, q. 4 (I, 447); "Ad secundum dico quod
solus Deus est summe diligendus, quia est summum bonum." Also
see I, 446; "Ad primum principale dico quod nullum aliud objectum
a Deo potest satiare voluntatem, quia nullus actus respectu cuiuscumque alterius a Deo excludit omnem anxietatem et tristitiam quin
quocumque objecto creata habito potest voluntas aliquid aliud cum
anxietate et tristitia appetere."
95sent., IV, q. 14, D; "Sexto potest dici quod videns
clare Deum habens actum beatificum a Deo totaliter, creatus non
potest Deum nolle propter repugnantiam formalem inter illos actus
diligendi et odiendi. Si tamen actus beatificus non causaretur
a Deo totaliter et voluntas relinqueretur totaliter naturae suae
et libertati et fruitio beatifica suspenderetur per potentiam
divinam, tune posset voluntas Deum nolle, sed illa non esset
beatifica. 11 According to Ockham the clear vision (visio nuda)
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necessarily loved its Creator when known through a proper concept,
then the love of God would not be praiseworthy.

Ockham intends

to build his doc·trine of moral goodness upon the foundation of
love for God; hence, he is careful to maintain the contingent arid
imputable character of the viator's love for God.
The will's contingency does not extend, however, beyond
death.

Ockham does not envision souls wandering between heaven

and hell in the after-life,

a la

George Bernard Shaw.

Rather,

Ockham claims the permanent beatitude called "heaven" and the
permanent misery called "hell" are supernaturally caused. 96 While
of God and the consequent enjoyment (beatifica fruitio) engendered
by that vision are effected supernaturally. Because God can separate what is prior and posterior, it follows that God could cause
the vision without the subsequent enjoyment normally associated
with seeing God face to face. In this abnormal case, then, Ockham asserts the will's natural power to cease loving God. Having
determined the meaning of volitive contingency regarding already
experienced volitions, Ockham simply extends this meaning to all
possible acts. Cf. Sent., I, d. 1, q. 2 (I, 398); and Sent., I,
d. 1, q. 6 (I, 505). When "left totally to its own nature," the
will produces and responds to its activity contingently. Ockham's
position in this question was questioned by the papal commission
at Avignon. See Auguste Pelzer, "Les 51 articles de Guillaume
Occam censures~ en Avignon, en 1326, 11 Revue d'histoire ecclesiastique 18 (1922J, p. 254; 266-67; 268-69. Articles 6, 40 and 4b"""
concern Ockham's doctrine of the relationship and primary causality of the vision and enjoyment of God. This seems to be the only
point at which Ockham's doctrine of created freedom ran into
official objections. The most strenuous censures were given to
Ockham's "Pelagian" tendencies; these articles touch on the relationship between free will and divine grace. We will consider
this relationship in Chapter Five.
96 sent., IV, q. 13, K (in finem); "Omnis natura libere
mota ad volitionem aliquam potest esse misera si ejus felicitas
non dependeat ab aliquo alio sicut a causa totali. Quid dico
propter angelos et homines qui possunt libere velle multa in
patria et tamen non possunt esse miseri quia eorum felicitas
dependet a Deo sicut a causa totali. 11 Also see Sent., II, q. 19,
F-G; and Sent., I, d. 1, q. 2 (I, 398).
~
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.th e created will retains its native contingency, God will not
cooperate with the "blessed" to cease loving God, nor with the
''damned" to cease hating God.

Unable to reject this love without

the general influence of God, the beatified person is necessarily
and permanently happy.

In his effort to reconcile permanent

states of beatitude and damnation with the will's contingency,
Ockham must appeal to the primary and total causality of God.
ln patria, the metaphysical rather than volitive
-creatures
is manifest.

contingency of

In summary, the freedom of contraries attributes a selfdetermined and contingent connection between the soul and its
volitive acts.

These

~haracteristics--not

indifference 97 --ex-

press Ockham's basic conception of human freedom.
speci~l

Except for the

intervention of God, no external power could challenge

the Will's sovereignty over its own acts.

Analysis of motives,

prior conditions and conditioning, and the immediate cognitive
possibilities cannot sufficiently nor precisely explain the will's
preference.

In Ockham's ·estimate, personal autonomy and freedom

97 It is common to read that "indifference," "indetermination" or "freedom from coercion" typify man's basic freedom according to Ockham. Thus, G. de La$arde, Ockham ... , p. 74; Anton Pegis,
~ ~ Scholasticism 15 (1941), p. 43; and James Kevin McDonnell,
'Religion and Ethics in the Philosophy of William of Ockham,"
(l.lllpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Philosophy, Georget. own University, 1971), p. 85. "Freedom from" external forces and
internal finality is part of Ockham's doctrine; bµt Ockham places
the emphasis or basic characteristic of human freedom on the
Will's active control over its own act.
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;. require the irreducible element of spontaneity. 98

Rather than

a lame excuse, the exasperating explanation "I wanted to" becomes
the only adequate reason for my deliberate acts.

Ockham's close

analysis of "contingent" insures that no determining reason could
be given for free volition save "I wanted to."

In the end, human

freedom is as unsearchable as personality itself.
Ockham insists that "necessary" and "free," "natural" and
•contingent" are formally contradictory notions--a position denied
by many Scholastics before and after the Venerable Inceptor.

The

meaning of "freedom" and "contingency" derive from the experience

·in which "I can cause or not-cause the same effect."

Oakham has

almost naive confidence in the libertarian meaning of this experience.

Yet the awareness described is compatible with a deter-

ministic interpretation.

The character resulting from native

temperament and infantile-adolescent experiences could make conscious options either illusionary or trivial.

Perhaps such

criticism is "philosophical hindsight;" twentieth century experiments in behavior modification and developments in psychoanalytic
techniques make contemporary Libertarians more cautious with
their evidence.

On the other hand, hindsight brings Ockham's

procedure into perspective.

Namely, if self-determined alterna-

tives give rise to the concept of freedom, then these characteristics must obtain whenever "free" is predicated.

The situational,

98 sent., I, d. 10, q. 2, H; "Unde libertas et spontaneitas
Videntur non posse distingui." Also see Quodl., II, q. 13.
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intermittant awareness of operative options (velle, nolle, nonvelle) is generalized as a volitive capacity for all situations.

-Ockham need not re-define the resultant notions of freedom and
contingency to describe the divine activity ad extra!

4.

The Moral Function of the Will
~~~~

~

~-

~

For Ockham, the question of free will remains inextricably
within a moralistic context.

His experiential evidence, his

logical and metaphysical analysis, serve to elucidate the will's
freedom as moral agency.

The elements of a humanistic and person-

alistic vision of human freedom are present, but not articulated.
Radically and originally indifferent to extrinsic forces and
attractions, the will possesses autonomy, self-determination and
a dominant influence over the direction of one's life and behavior.
Ockham mentions that "the rational animal is best distinguished
by freedom which is the principle of volition. 1199 But man's
uniqueness among the blind forces of nature introduces his moral
responsibility.

Freedom remains a Medieval preface to obligation

rather than creativity or dignity.

Ockham "secularized" the will

only by eliminating any natural and intrinsic connection to the
Supernatural.

Human freedom still must render its account to the

divine Legislator, find its perfect satisfaction in the Infinite
99sent., I, d. 1, q. 3 (I, 426); "Creatura rationalis est
perfectior--omni creatura irrationali, ergo illud accidens per
quod distinguitur maxime a creature. irrationali erit perfectius;
sed videtur quod creatura rationalis magis distinguitur per volitionem quam per quamcumque delectationem. Assumptum patet, quia
maxime distinguitur per libertatem quae est principium volitionis.

11
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Good, and realize its true nobility in conformity to the Supreme
Will.

Pico's "Oration on the Dignity of Man" is still in the

;future.
Although the freedom of will is a meta-ethical concern,
some moral doctrines follow immediately from Ockham's psychology.
q,'he causal indifference and contingency which describe the free
will also characterize every instance of "imputable" efficacy.
With admirable but frustrating consistency, Ockham insists that
moral value involve inevitably a radically free will.

To be pre-

cise, Ockham's usual parlance that morals are "acts of will" or
uwithin the power of will" must be understood as "contingent acts
of will" and "within the power of will freely."

This because some

will-acts are elicited necessarily and naturally.
"voluntary" but neither free nor moral.

Such acts are

With his rigorous logic,

Ockham excludes any moral value from natural causes.

Here is the

origin of Ockham's criticism of Natural Law moralists who find
a "proper moral goodness or evil" in external acts; here the
source of Ockham's nebulous, if not evasive, treatment concerning
the non-positive determinants of moral value.
11

He cannot predicate

good" or "evil" except of the free will, yet the will must

recognize the moral course before its free volition.
is developed later.

This problem

For now, we merely indicate that Ockham's

value theory hinges upon a conception of freedom which entails
indifferent, self-determined and contingent causality.
The psychic conditions and limitations of volitive freedom
· have a more extensive function within his ethic.

The qualifications
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of liberty which derive from the psychological environment-sensitive, mental or voluntary activity--directly affect certain
moral doctrines.

Passions or habits in the sense powers might

overwhelm the will's primitive indifference; cognition precedes
and causes every volition; previous volitive commitments could

necessitate further will-acts.

Each point has its impact.

First, if passions override freedom, they also eliminate
moral responsibility.

There are significant conditions which

must be met by the sensate-intellective-volitive complex called
"man" before freedom obtains.

The weight of repeated acts or the

pleasure which accompanies certain physical acts produce a disposition or "promptitudo" which cancel the agent's immediate
options.

If the motive force of passions or habits elicits a

determined effect within the will, that volition would be morally
neutral.

"Nothing is indifferent according to a habit since a

habit is a natural cause."lOO
Secondly, the immediate possibilities of volition follow
from the intellect's activity.

The specific acts "within the

power of will" at any instant are a function of the contemporaneous cognitive acts.

If the intellect (partially) causes every

free volition, we might expect that the intellect has an essential
part in moral activity.

On the basis of Ockham's psychology,

attempts to eliminate rationality from the fundamental character
100Sent., I, d. 17, q. 2, C.
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of morality should be suspect.

101

The created will requires both

efficient and final causality from the intellect.

Cognition does

not influence volition until the will's self-determination; but
when the will decides, the

intelle~tual

act then becomes an effi-

cient cause and the known end a final cause of the resultant willact.

Truely purposeful acts are permitted only to rational, free
·
l0 2 It is
· poe t 1c
. b u t 1ncorrec
.
t t o cons t rue na t ura1 f orces
beings.
as "intending some goal;" fire burns and the intellect knows
101Erwin Iserloh, Gnade und Eucharistie ..• , p. 47; and
Osward Fuchs, The Psychology of Habit ..• , pp. 80-81, for example,
tend to exaggerate the will's part in moral behavior to the
exclusion of reason's partnership. Thus Iserloh says: "Verdienstlich ist allein das Handeln und nicht das Sein, und das Handeln
wird moralisch gut nicht durch seine Ubereinstimmung mit der recta
ratio, durch sein Ziel oder einen anderen Umstand, sondern allein
durch seine Freiwilligkeit. 11
102 Sent., II, q. 3, NN; Sent., Prologue, q. 11 (I, 308309); Quodl., IV, q. 1-2; and Summulae in libros Physicorum II,
c. 6; "Praedicta de causa finali intelligenda sunt de agente a
proposito et sponte, de quibus manifestum est quod agunt propter
finem et quod est aliqua causa finalis eorum. De aliis autem
quae non agunt per cognitionem et voluntatem, magis dubium est ... "
Ockham's definition of "final cause" is "esse amatum et desideratum
efficaciter ab agente propter quod amatum fit effectus. 11 Quodl.,
IV, q. 1. Ockham's notion of finality is studied unsympathetically by Harry R. Kloeker, S.J., "Ockham and Finality" The Modern
Schoolman 43 (1966), pp. 233-247. We cannot agree with his analysis that "final causality can be reduced to efficient causality."
(p. 236) Rather, Ockham holds that the will freely establishes
which final causes operate within volition. The same efficient
cause, i.e., the will, produces specifically different acts
~ccording to different final causes.
Ockham's point, therefore,
is not that finality reduces to efficiency but that final causes
require (volitive) effects. In what viable sense could final
causes be said to "move" the agent to action, if the agent does
not act? Surely, Ockham does not eliminate final causes from
Philosophical explanation. On the other hand, Anita Garvens indicates the problems in determining natural moral norms which follow
Ockham's denial of a teleological connection between non-rational
natures. Franziskanische Studien, 21, pp. 249-262.
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because such is their nature. 103

It is cogent to ask "how"

natural causes behave but not "why" because motive and purpose
indicate a conscious and free agency.

While denying that intrin-

sic finality which attributes intelligence as well as intelligibility to Nature, Ockham insists upon final causality as concomitant with Will.

Restricted to the agency of free will, final

causes accept a central and critical role in morality.

Clearly,

Ockham's conception of final cause ("to be loved and desired
efficiently by the agent and for the sake of which the loved
thing is an effect") closes certain avenues of ethical knowledge
open to "realistic" or "Aristotelian" metaphysicians.

The end

embodied in the nature of certain acts allow, for example, St.
Thomas and Duns Scotus to judge the suitability and moral propriety of those actions.

In Ockham's system, the final cause and

intention established by the free will replaces the natural
finality of acts as standards of ethical value.
Thirdly ••. finally, the 'internal logic' of the will
directs Ockham to concentrate on the order between volitive ends
and means.

To achieve given purposes, an agent must accept com-

patible means.

Often the means selected are pre-determined and

automatic because the intellect (rightly or wrongly) considers
.
l03Quodl., II, q. 2; 11 Sed causa mere naturalis quae ex
sui natura determinat sibi certum effectum et non aliud non
requirit praecognoscentem nee ductorem; saltem ratio naturalis
non concludit quod requirat. Verbi gratia: Ignis approximatus
' ligno calefacit eum sive hoc intendatur a cognoscente sive non.
Et si quaeras, quare tune plus calefacit quam frigefacit? Dico
quod natura sua talis est."
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" them indispensable to the will's anticipated goal.

Ockham does

not hesitate to articulate the implication--the ethical importance
of "entailed" volitions is negligible.

104

Actions elicited be-

cause they are necessary to achieve more ultimate goals are necessary, natural and non-moral actions.

Ockham reserves intrinsic

moral status to volition-of-ends; the means chosen often have a
derived or extrinsic value.

Given correct knowledge and volition

regarding God, the rest of human activity falls into "ethical"
line. 105 In this light, Ockham's central motive as a moralist
is to articulate the ultimate end and greatest good which gives
the volitive structure of the moral life.

This is the moral

program encapsulated in the first distinction of his Commentary
on the Sentences.

Ockham's inspiration and guide in this enter-

prise will be St. Augustine.
The freedom of the will is a meta-ethical concern.

Never-

theless, upon this psychological basis Ockham constructs his theory
of morality.

Certain turns taken by Ockham's ethic derive

104sent., III, q. 4, O; 11 • • • voluntas non est libera
respectu secundi actus stante primo actu cum apprehensione praedicta; quia impossibile est quod ego uno actu diligam Deum et
omne quid vult Deus diligi a me in generali et quod sciam quod
Deus vult Johannem diligi a me, nisi diligam Johannem in speciali
..• licet in primo actu voluntatis consistat meritum quia est in
potestate voluntatis, non tamen in actu secundo qui non est in
potestate voluntatis. 11 Also see Sent., I, d. 1, q. 6 (I, 499).
l05Sent., III, q. 12, II; 11 • • • rectitudo circa finem ultimum repugnat omni difformitati circa ea quae sunt ad finem ••• 11
Also see Sent., I, d. 1, q. 1 (I, 390-391). Michele Fiasconaro
gives a thorough analysis of the relationship between Ockham's
psychology and ethics as contained in Distinction One. La
Dottrina Morale di Guglielmo di Ockham (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Philosophy, University del S. Cuore, 1958),
Chapter Three.
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properly from his conception of the conditions, limits and nature
of human freedom--the executive agency of moral activity.

But

I

free acts remain just that--free acts.

The transformation of

contingent volitions into good or evil acts requires the principle of Right Reason.

r
CHAPTER II
RIGHT REASON, THE PROXIMATE NORM OF REALITY
The translation and dissemination of the complete
Nicomachean Ethics during the early thirteenth century made the
notion of "recta ratio" a common topic in Scholastic moral systerns.

On the authority of Aristotle, most Schoolmen argued that
right reasoning must precede praiseworthy action. 1 A working
definition of "right reason" would be:

the correct understanding

of suitable behavior based on man's rational nature and his total
111 What affirmation and negation are in thinking, pursuit
and avoidance are in desire; so that since moral virtue is a
state of character concerned with choice, and choice is deliberate desire, therefore both the reasoning must be true and the
desire right, if the choice is to be good." Nie. Ethics, VI, 2
(trans. W. D. Ross; 1139a 21-25). The different perspectives
from which Aristotle considered "brthos 16gos" may explain the
diverse meanings which the Schoolmen attribute to recta ratio.
For the Philosopher, right reason is a component of virtue's
definition (II, 6, ll06b 35 - llo7a 3); it determines the mean
between excess and defect (VI, 1 1138b 17-20); it is identified
with Practical Wisdom or Prudence (VI, 13, 1144b 20-29); it is
called a virtue (VI, 5, 1140b 20-25). H. H. Joachim finds a
fundamental dualism in Aristotle's explanation. "The 1 l>rthos
logos,' therefore, is the right rule of conduct in the twofold
sense that (a) it is that which limits the amount of 'patha' so
as to make the action good, and (b) it is the principle of the
limitation formulated in and as the scientific knowledge of the
'phr6nimos'." The Nicomachean Ethics, A Commentary, (ed. D. A.
Rees; Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1951), p. 167. It is appropriate, therefore, to speak of right reason as knowledge qua
(the regulative function of practical knowledge) and knowledge
~uae (the content of practical knowledge).
Ockham emphasizes
the former sense.
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But the notion is curiously difficult to verify

by explicit definitions.

Right reason seems to have a loose

meaning: its manifestations include synderesis (knowledge of
general norms), prudentia (knowledge of particular norms), and
conscientia (knowledge of personal duties); its process merges
with the practical syllogism; its content often coincides with
eternal or natural law.

The scholastics usually reserved analy-

sis for specific facets of right reasoning.

Hence, elucive

variations in the meaning of "recta ratio" go unobserved although
they produce fundamental changes in the history of moral theory.
Usually sensitive to problems of terminology, Ockham also
neglects to define his understanding of Aristotle's phrase.
doctrine must be constructed from bits and pieces.

His

The picture

2Professor Vernon J. Bourke describes the general notion
of right reason as; "simply another name for a correct or justifiable understanding of the natural order. Universalized, right
reason is expressed in general rules; applied to particular
actions right reason is a personal decision as to the suitability
or unsuitability of this individual action in its present conditions." History of Ethics, I, 132. Robert Hoopes devotes half
of his published study of the Renaissance understanding of right
reason to the Greek and Medieval precedents. His general definition is: "Reason thus simultaneously disposed, so that it presides
with equal validity and certainty over the realms of intellect
and morality." Right Reason in the En~lish Renaissance (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962 , p. 4. These authors
point out that the phrase "right reason" was in general use from
the mid-thirteenth century into the eighteenth century. Their
definitions are more or less acceptable, as is our description,
depending on whose thought is under consideration. When Professor Bourke contrasts the Thomistic and Scotistic theories of
right reason (pp. 145 and 152-53), he adduces texts regarding the
relational sets constituting moral goodness rather than explicit
definitions. This comment does not intend criticism of the
excellent research of Professor Bourke; it intends to indicate
the indefinite, undefined status of this phrase which permits
its inclusion within diverse ethical systems.
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which emerges is considerably different than that found by, for
example, commentators of St. Thomas or Duns Scotus.

We will

argue that the.inconsistency alleged between the individual's
right reason and the moral prerogatives of God 3 results partially
from an inaccurate view of Ockham's unique doctrine of recta
ratio.

His peculiar understanding of a common scholastic posi-

tion supports a novel turn in the history of Medieval ethics.
This chapter examines the structure and nature of "right
reason" as the immediate, subjective norm of morality.

Part One

locates Ockham's doctrine within the context of the Practical
Intellect and its divisions.

Part Two takes up the analysis of

why "right reason" is the proximate standard of moral behavior.
The many facets of Ockham's doctrine reflect his essential
3 see Anita Garvens, Franziskanische Studien, 21, p. 374;
"Hinsichtlich der v5lligen Kontingenz des Sittengesetzes, wie
Ockham es in bezug auf Inhalt und Allgemeingultigkeit fasst,
staunt man deshalb nicht wenig, dass bei ihm trotzdem eine subjektive
das sittliche Handeln des Menschen bindende Norm sich
findet: die recta ratio ••• " Quoting Garvens approvingly, Father
Elzearius Bonke, O.F.M., mentions God's power to command theft
and adultery and concludes "In doctrina igitur Venerabilis Inceptoris ita considerata nihil remanet de relatione inter voluntatem et intellectum, immo videtur in flagranti contradictione
cum illis quae prius dixerat de recta ratione ut norma voluntatis •.• 11 Collectanea Franciscana, 14, p. 67. Georges de Lagarde
also cites the work of Garvens and concurs; "La somme des imperatifs de la droite raison s'impose a priori, sans qu'il y ait
besoin de les rapporter a la nature ou-a la volonte ~ternelle
de Dieu. 11 Ockham, La Morale ... , p. 67. The general criticism,
then, seems to hold-=fhat Ockham's doctrine of right reason is
inconsistent with the absolute power of God and that this doctrine is not justified rationally within his system. These
criticisms might be warranted if Ockham meant by "right reason"
exactly what, say, St. Thomas meant.
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assertion that no one sins unknowingly; or conversely, that no
one acts virtuously by accident. 4
Part I:
A.

The Description of Right Reason

Practical Reason
We begin with Ockham's notion of the Practical Intellect.

The myriad of issues which surround contemporary discussions of
"ought" and "is" were attached to Medieval analyses of the
"practical" and "speculative" intellects.

In Ockham's mind, man

possesses one, unitary intellect capable of formulating practical
and speculative propositions.

Practical Reason indicates the

human intellect constructing and retaining practical statements.
By way of preliminary definition, "practical" propositions
signify some "practice" or human operation.

Speculative propo-

sitions'signify matters which are beyond the scope of human
powers to alter or cause.

The precise character of these dif-

ferent propositions is established by Ockham in order to describe
the nature of Practical Reason.
Ockham holds that practical and speculative statements
can be distinguished 1) inherently, 2) according to the formative
causes, and 3) according to the objects of these statements. 5

4sent., III, q. 11, Z; "Sciendum est quod recta ratio
requiritur ad perfectam virtutem et actualis; et ideo ebriosus
et furiosus et pueri qui non habent usus rationis non peccant
coram Deo; quia nullus ignora.nter peccat secundum Augustinum."
Also see Sent., III, q. 12, GG; and Quodl., II, q. 6.

5sent., Prologus, q. 11 (I, 310); "Ex his respondeo ad
quaestionem quod istae scientiae seipsis distinguuntur intrinsece
et forma1iter, sed per fines vel per finem distinguunter

r
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Regarding the first, Ockham is clear that all knowledge is the
result of a unitary cognitive power and consists of simple,
accidental forms which inhere in a substance, i.e., the sou1. 6
As such, every proposition known is distinct from every other
proposition.

In this sense, speculative propositions are dis-

tinct from each other as well as distinct from practical propositions.

Regarding the second distinction, different types of

knowledge can be distinguished on the basis of different causes.
The end or purpose for which a person forms a mental proposition
has the character of a final cause. 7

Because the end is

causaliter, sicut causaliter distinguunter per causam efficientem.
Sed per subjecta scientiae nullo praedictorum modorum distinguuntur necessario quia, nee formaliter et intrinsece, nee causaliter
necessario, nee tanquam per aliqua sibi propria. Sed isto ultimo modo distinguuntur per objecta. Hoc est, per conclusiones
sci tas." See also R. Guelluy, Philosoz.hie et Theologie chez
Guillaume d'Ockham (Paris: J. Vrin, 19 7), pp. 300-306.
6 sent., Prologus, q. 11 (I, 311); "Primum patet quia
istae scientiae sunt formae simplices, sicut alias declarabitur
de omnibus accidentibus; sed formae simplices non possunt distingui intrinsece et formaliter nisi seipsis; ergo etc."

7Idem.;

Secundum patet, quia ab eodem causaliter habet
res esse et esse distinctum a quocumque alio; igitur cum quaelibet scientia, sicut quaelibet alia res, habeat esse suum a
causa finali sua, sequitur quod ab ea habet esse distinctum. Et
ideo dico quod posito quod scientia speculativa et practica
habeant eandem causam finalem, per illam distinguuntur causaliter, quia illa in illo genere causandi est causa distinctionis
earum. Et isto modo omnes res creatae distinguuntur per Deum,
quia est cause distinctionis omnium. Et si dicatur quod nulla
distinguuntur per illud in quo conveniunt. Respondeo, quod
verum est: tanquam per sibi propria •. Tamen causaliter, quando
causa est illimitata vel simpliciter vel secundum quid, non est
inconveniens quin per illud distinguantur in quo conveniunt, illo
modo quo conveniunt in illo. Verumtamen, sciendum quod accipiendo finem per illo qui secundum rectam rationem deberet esse
finis, modo exposito, sic distinguuntur per fines tanquam per
aliqua propria, quia alius est finis unius et alterius. 11 Also
11

r
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partially responsible for the reality of knowledge, it is also

t

!.·

partially responsible for the distinct reality of the proposition.
However, Ockham cautions that the same end can be the final
cause of specifically distinct types of knowledge.

For example,

out of self-love, a person might acquire both speculative and
practical knowledge. 8

The speculative and the practical proposi-

tions of the intellect are distinguished by their final causes
only when the "finis scientiae" is understood as what ought to
be done by the knower.

•

Ockham will accept the "common saying"

that the final cause which is characteristic of practical
see Summulae in Libros Physicorum, II, c. 5 (Rome, 1637).
8 sent., Prologus, q. 11 (I, 304-305). Ockham develops
his doctrine on the distinction of practical and speculative
propositions in terms of final causes in contrast to the doctrine
of Henry of Ghent. Henry's position is summarized accurately by
Ockham and then criticized. Henry taught that the end of knowledge and the end of the knower were different; the former is
"that to which knowledge is ordered," and the latter is "that
to which the knower orders knowledge." Furthermore, Henry maintained a distinction between the ends of knowledge; namely, an
accidental end and a principal end. The principal or per ~ end
of knowledge is "that to which knowledge is ordered by its
nature;" the principal ends of action and truth distinguish
properly the practical and speculative types of knowledge, respectively. See Henry of Ghent, Summae Quaestionum Ordinariarum,
art. 36, q. 4 (reprint of 1520 edition; edited by Eligius M.
Buytaert, O.F.M.; St. Bonaventure, N. Y.: Franciscan Institute
Publications, 1953). Ockham criticizes this doctrine by indicating that the reason for which a person acquires knowledge is
the final cause of both the knower and the knowledge he acquires.
Thus, Henry is wrong to claim that the end of knowledge and the
knower is distinct. For exactly the same motive; i.e., personal
gain, a person could acquire both practical and speculative
knowledge. Only when the end apprehended by the knower is something which should be done does Ockham speak of a final cause
which is proper and distinctive to practical knowledge as opposed to speculative propositions.
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propositions is a deed, whereas the final cause of speculative
knowledge is the truth; but he understands by "deed" an obligatory act.

Regarding the third, the "object" of knowledge can
distinguish speculative from practical propositions. 9 The object
of speculative knowledge; i.e., the speculative proposition itself, does not indicate anything which can be done by the knower.
The object of practical knowledge, however, is a proposition
which signifies something which can be accomplished by the
9 sent., Prologus, q. 11 (I, 315); "Ideo dico quod cum
notitia practica sit directiva alicuius praxis, oportet quod
semper notitia practica habeat praxim vel significans praxim
vel aliquid operabile a nobis pro objecto saltem partiali. Et
cum notitia practica sit respectu alicuius complexi, oportet
quod illa notitia sit magis directiva operis quam notitia incomplexa cuiuscumque termini illius complexi. Et quando sic est,
tune est notitia practica, aliter non."
Previously, Ockham considered the "object" of knowledge
as tbe "conclusion known." Now he speaks of the object as what
is signified by a proposition. It is necessary to refer to the
Expositio Super viii Libros Physicorum, which is one of Ockham's
latest philosophical efforts, to clarify the "subjectum et
objectum scientiae. 11 The subject of knowledge can be considered
in three ways; as the intellect in which knowledge inheres, as
the thing about which something is known, and as the subject-term
of the proposition. The object of knowledge is the whole proposition which is known. See Philosophical Writings: William of
Ockham, ed. by Philotheus Boehner, O.F.M. (London: Thomas Nelson
and Sons, Ltd., 1957), p. 9. The texts of the Ordinatio and the
Expositi2 consider the "object" of knowledge in a three-fold way;
as a conclusion known, as the significance of a proposition and
as a proposition which is known. These three meanings of the
"objectum scientiae" can be harmonized by considering the object
of practical knowledge as "a proposition which indicates human
operation." Father Armand Maurer, C.S.B. has published a valuable
study of the "object of science" in "Ockham's Conception of the
Unity of Science," Medieval Studies 20 (1958), pp. 98-100. "Let
us observe Ockham's distinction between the subject and object
of a science. This distinction became classic among the later
scholastics and was adopted even by some Thomists. According to
Ockham, the object of a science is the whole proposition which
is known; the subject is only a part of the ~reposition namely
the term functioning as its subject." (p. 99).

~
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}cnower.

In the end, therefore, Ockham proposes that the only

distinctive characteristic of practical propositions is reference
to human operations.
The nature of the object of practical knowledge is explained by Ockham through analysis of the term "praxis."

This

term is transliterated from the Greek and stands for "an operation existing within the power of the will. 1110

"Praxis" indi-

cates any deed which can be effected immediately or mediately
by the will.

All practical propositions imply or signify praxis,

i.e., a state of affairs subject to the contingent power of
volition.

Two items are clarified here.

First, statements

which include concepts or terms standing for human operations
are not thereby practical.

The praxis involved in practical

~

propositions is an operation producible or changeable by the
will.

For example, "rational animals are capable of thought"

signifies a state of affairs which is not within the power of the
will.

Hence, this proposition is not practical.

Secondly, spec-

ulation or the formation of speculative propositions is a human
operation which can be initiated and controlled by the will.

For

example, the proposition "God is triune" can be thought and its
thinking is subject to the will, i.e., an instance of praxis.
10

sent., I, d. 35, q. 6, G; "Ad cuius intellectum sciendum est quod differentia est inter actum practicum et praxim.
Nam praxis est operatic existens in potestate voluntatis, quia
omnis talis actus potest elici virtuose et viciose, loquendo de
actu voluntatis nostrae de quo est modo sermo. Sed actus practicus est ille qui habet pro objecto saltem partiali praxim, vel
aliqu.id operabile contingenter a voluntate. 11 Also see Sent.r
Prologue, q. 10 (I, 292).

r
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Although speculative propositions do not signify operative
potential, speculation itself can be effected by the will power.
Thus, speculation is praxis, but the statements of the specula11
tive intellect are never practical.
In Ockham's terminology;
"praxis" indicates an extra-conceptual action which the will can
accomplish in fact; "practical" is a linguistic category whose
member propositions all include a praxis-term; "speculative" is
a linguistic category whose member propositions never include
a praxis-term.
The function of a proposition is perhaps the most serviceable way to distinguish between Ockham's understanding of the
speculative and the practical.

A proposition can be a reason

for true knowledge or a reason to do something.

When a proposi-

tion is a reason to consider the truth, the proposition has a
speculative function •. When a sentence is a reason to act, that
knowledge is practical. 12 The particular function served by a
sentence is reflected in the signification of that proposition.
The speculative use of reason is apparent when the object of
knowledge--what is signified--cannot be altered or caused by
human powers.

The practical function of the intellect, however,

11 sent., Prologue, q. 10 (I, 296); "Et ideo pura speculatio et similiter dilectio, quia sunt operabiles a nobis, quamvis non habeant talia pro objectis; vere sunt praxes et de ipsis,
vere erit notitia practica. 11
12 sent., Prologue, q. 11 (I, 308); 11 A1ius est finis
scientiae qui secundum rectam rationem deberet intendi ab agente
quad libere agit. Et isto modo finis scientiae practicae est
opus vel operari, et finis speculativae est considerare." Cf.,
Aristotle, ~etaphysics, II, 1, 993b 20.
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is indicated by objects (propositions) which signify human actions.

The speculative and practical use of reason, therefore,

involves different uses of knowledge and concomitantly, different
meanings.
Two minor points must be made concerning the distinction
of speculative and practical propositions.

First, Ockham claims

that the subject-term of a proposition is not a reliable indicator of the difference between speculative and practical intellect.13

The same thing can have properties which cannot be

controlled by a human agent and other attributes which are.
Thus, the subject-term of a proposition can receive predicates
which do not signify praxis and others which do.

Secondly, Ock-

ham claims that speculative and practical propositions can be
distinguished by the conclusions which can be deduced from them~ 4
From the general principles of practical reason, other particular
13 sent., Prologue, q. 11 (I, 313); "Nee distinguantur
per subjecta tanquam per aliqua sibi propria patet, quia idem
simpliciter potest esse subjectum notitiae speculativae et
notitiae practicae. Nam de omni subjecto quod habet aliquas
passiones quae sunt in potestate nostra et aliquas quae non sunt
in potestate nostra, potest esse notitia speculativa qua sciuntur
illae passiones quae non sunt in potestate nostra de illo subjecto, et etiam notitia practica qua sciuntur aliae passiones
quae sunt in potestate nostra de illo eodem subjecto. 11
14Ibid., (I, 315); "Quartum, scilicet quod istae notitiae
distinguuntur per conclusiones scitas tanquam per propria sibi,
ita scilicet quod necessario est alia conclusio scita notitia
practica et alia scita notitia speculativa, patet; quia in illa
conclusione quae scitur notitia speculativa, nihil ponitur operabile a nobis, nee aliquid importans operabile a nobis, cum
notitia speculativa non sit de operibus nostris. 11
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propositions can be validly deduced.

It would be impossible to

deduce validly a practical conclusion from two
premises.

speculative

Of course, to distinguish the speculative from the

practical on the basis of distinct conclusions is a derivative
method.

That is, this method depends upon a prior difference

between the speculative and the practical propositions which are
the major premises of the syllogism.
irrelevant.

But Ockham's point is not

Ockham means to affirm that a valid conclusion can-

not contain an element which is not virtually contained in the
premises.

The conclusion of a practical syllogism implies that

something can be done or ought to be done; thus, a practical
proposition could not be deduced validly from statements which
do not imply that something can or ought to be done.
There is only one intellect in a man which is capable of
knowing speculatively and practically.

Still, the speculative

use of reason is nominally different from the practical function.
The nominal definition of the speculative intellect is "the
intellect able to consider those things which are not in our
power."

The definition of the practical intellect is "the intel-

lect able to consider or to have knowledge of those things which
are in our power. 111 5
15 sent., Prologue, q. 10 (I, 292); "Et ita est intelligendurn dictum auctorum quando distinguunt inter intellectum
speculativum et practicum, quia habent distinctas diffinitiones
exprimentes quid nominis eorum. Unde si definiatur intellectus
speculativus, hoc est, iste terminum 'intellectus speculativus,'
debet sic dici: 'Intellectus speculativus est intellectus potens
considerare illa quae non sunt in potestate nostra.' Intellectus
practicus sic: 'Intellectus practicus est intellectus potens
considerare vel habere scientiam illorum quae sunt in potestate
nostra. 11

r
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Having distinguished the practical use of reason from
the speculative on the basis of an object (proposition) which

. signifies something "do-able," Ockham further differentiates
practical propositions as "directive" and "ostensive. 11

Some

practical propositions express what ought to be done; that is,
some propositions imply an obligation to accomplish some deed.

A proposition whose object should be effected is categorized by
Ockham as directive, practical knowledge.

Other practical propo-

sitions show how a deed should be done without directing that it
16
be done.
Ockham mentions the propositions which form the
science of logic, grammar, rhetoric and the mechanical arts as
ostensive, practical knowledge because they show how certain
operations should be done.

For example, the statement "This

house should be built," is directively practical, while the
assertion that "This house should be built with brick walls"
is ostensively practical.

Both directive and ostensive

16 sent., Prologue, q. 11 (I, 316); "potest tamen distingui de practica, quia quaedam est dictativa et quaedam tantum
ostensiva. Prima est illa qua determinate dictatur aliquid esse
faciendum vel non faciendum; et sic loquitur Philosophus, vi
Ethicorum et iii De Anima. Et isto modo nee logica nee grammatica nee rhetorica est practica, nee etiam ars quaecunque mechanica,
quia nulla istarum dictat aliquid esse faciendum vel fugiendum,
sicut ars mechanica non dictat quod domus est facienda, sed hoc
pertinet ad prudentiam qua scitur quando est facienda et quando
non, et quando est operandum et quando non. Secunda notitia
practica est tantum ostensiva, quia non dictat aliquid fugiendum
aut persequendum, sed tantum ostendit opus quomodo fieri potest,
virtute cuius notitiae, si intellectus dictet illud est faciendum
et voluntas vellit, statim potest recte operari." Also see,
~., III, q. 11, U.
Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, VI,
c. 1 (1138b 18-29); De Anima, III, c. 9 (432b 26-29).
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statements comprise prescriptive language; but Ockham's moral
doctrine involves properly only the former.
It should be understood that Ockham does not explicitly
differentiate practical and speculative proposition on the basis
of the verbs "ought" and "is."

Rather, Ockham distinguishes

between a state of affairs within the will's competence and other
affairs which are not.

Ockham does not specifically say that

practical propositions are assertions of obligation or value
while speculative propositions are statements of fact.

This

-

terminology is characteristic of more contemporary discussions
of moral philosophy.

Nevertheless, the "ought-is" difference is

clearly implied by Ockham's analysis of practical, "directive"
propositions.

Some practical propositions are "directives,"
which "dictate that something is to be chosen. 1117 An analysis
of the structure of a directive practical proposition reveals
three distinctive features.

A directive proposition 1) signifies

a deed within the power of the human will, 2) has a final cause
which is that possible deed and 3) directs that this future deed
be done.
17 summulae in libros Physicorum, I, c. 4; "Duplex est
notitia practica: una dictativa quae scilicet aliquid esse
eligendum dictat vel dimittendum, et sic prudentia et moralis
philosophia est practica. Alia est notitia practica tantum
ostensiva quae scilicet docet qualiter res potest fieri vel debeat fieri, si aliquis vellet earn facere. Non tamen dictat earn
esse faciendum vel fiendum et sic artes moechanicae sunt practicae. 11 Notice that Ockham uses "debeat" to formulate an ostensive proposition. He does not seem aware of special problems
or pre-eminence belonging to "ought" statements within moral
doctrine.
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In summary, practical reason concerns what .£§;!! be through
the human will; the speculative reason involves what is.

In

Latin, the linguistic peculiarity of practical propositions can
be expressed adequately by gerundives or future passive participles which express actions "to be done."

But whether prescrip-

tive language incorporates gerundive constructions or the verb
"ought," its distinctive feature is the signification of behavioral ends.
11

Action "to be done" has the character of an end.

The practical intellect pertains to practical principles and

also practical conclusions, and thus, the practical intellect
concerns the end. 1118

Practical propositions originate evidently

from the consideration of the human will's capacities.

Ockham

finds empirical justification for expressing what .£§;!! be, as well
as for what is.

Men know the definite possibilities open to

their volitional acts as they know determinate facts.

Ockham

does not derive "ought" from "is", but he bases the demonstrative
and evident character of moral science on the validity of
deriving "can" from "is."

Knowing what the will-power is, and

knowing what a given extra-mental thing is, a person knows what
.£§;!!be done voluntarily.

Ockham never doubts the empirical

18sent., Prologue, q. 10 (I, 290); "Circa primum dico

quod intellectus practicus est respectu principiorum practicorum
et etiam respectu conclusionum practicarum. Et ideo intellectus
practicus est respectu finis, quando scilicet de aliquo fine
judicatur quod est appetendus vel prosequendus. Et hoc est
intelligendum quia est respectu unius complexi quod affirmat
aliquem finem esse appetendum, et istud est primum principium
practicum in operando." Ockham claims that "whatever can be
dictated by Right Reason can fall under the will's competence."
Sent., I, d. 1, q. 6 (I, 504).
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warrant and verification for practical statements such as "Health
is to be sought" or "The house is to be built."

This is hardly

the procedure of a strict empiricist since these gerundive constructions signify future, un-realized actions.

The descriptive

feature common to all directive and ostensive propositions is
the indication of "praxis," future ends available to the will's
free orientation.

The verbal structures of description--gerun-

di ves or the verb "ought"--lend themselves to prescription.

That

is, the normative feature of practical propositions derives from
what is implied by assent to particular, volitional ends.

If

the agent thinks "Health is to be sought" or "The house is to
be built," then his assent or "yes-saying" establishes a norm of
behavior.

Consistency requires the appropriate action if one

agrees that something is to be done.

Because of the meaning of

practical propositions, their affirmation entails or implies a
behavioral response.

Ockham's argument with Henry of Ghent

(d. 1293) regarding the "end of practical knowledge" clarifies
the Venerable Inceptor's position that linguistic structure alone
cannot explain the imperative function of normative language.
Academic moralists construe and analyze the logic of practical
propositions with the same detachment with which physicists
consider the law of gravity.

We speculate about moral laws for

reasons other than knowing what to do.

Ockham claims that the

significati.ve peculiarity of practical language does not explain
fully the moral function of such talk.

An obligatory final
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cause or "required" end of behavior follows from the meaning
of practical propositions and the assent of Right Reason. 1 9
The notion of Practical Reason is more inclusive than
that of Right Reason.

Practical Reason denotes the natural

apprehension and formation of practical propositions and the
habitual possession of such propositions.

However, there are

many propositions in the practical intellect which do not have
an immediate moral function.

For example, the ostensive proposi-

tion that "This house can be built with brick and mortar" might
be necessary to build this house correctly.

But this ostensive

proposition does not dictate that this house be built.

Further-

more, the practical intellect apprehends directives which may·
not be considered true.

For example, the propositions "men

should not eat meat" or "men should not cut their beards" may be
apprehended but not considered as true moral norms.

"Right

Reason" on the other hand, involves only those propositions of
l9Sent., I, d.·35, q. 6, I; "Secundum rectam rationem,
acquirens scientiam practicam debet intendere opus tanquam finem
et tanquam objectum illius scientiae." Sent., Prologue, q. 11
(I, 308); 11 • • • potest distingui de fine scientiae: Unus, qui
simpliciter potest esse causa finalis proprie dicta propter quern
ipsa scientia adquritur et qui movet agens ad agendum. Alius
est finis scientiae qui secundum rectam rationem deberet intendi
ab agente quod libere agit. Et isto modo finis scientiae
practicae est opus vel operari, et finis speculativae est considerare ..• 11 Also see Sent., Prologue, q. 10 (I, 291). Ockham's doctrine of practical reason \normative language) parallels the contemporery treatment of "assent to commands" by R. M.
Haret The Languag~ of Morals (New York: Oxford University Press,
1964), Ockham would say with Professor Hare "the essential difference between statements and commands ... lies in what is involved in assenting to them." (p. 19). For Ockham, "assenting
to them" is the function of right reason.

r
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the practical intellect which are judged to be true directives.
"According to Right Reason, one acquiring practical knowledge
ought to intend the deed just as an end or just as the object of
that knowledge. 1120
B~

Right Reason
Ockham, no less than his Scholastic predecessors, in-

sisted that morally right action was consequent to a right or
true reason for acting.

A proportion was established between

goodness in the will and truth in the intellect, based upon the
texts of Aristotle. 21 Thus, Ockham's doctr.ine of "Right Reason"
concerns the true, intellectual directives which are necessary
to correctly regulate the will.
Right Reason is discussed by Ockham in two ways; as a
possession and as a function of the Practical Intellect.

His

statements about "recta ratio" become hopelessly confused if.
these two meanings are not distinguished.

Indeed, the inconsist-

ency which commentators -find between the divine authority to
posit moral obligations and Right Reason as a necessary and
indispensable cause of moral goodness, betrays a lack of sensitivity for the two facets of Ockham's doctrine.
20 Sent., I, d. 35, q. 6, I.
21Nic. Ethics, VI, c. 2 (1139a 21-26); "What affirmation
and negati~are in thinking, pursuit and avoidance are in desire;
so that since moral virtue is a state of character concerned with
choice, and choice is deliberate desire, therefore both the
reasoning must be true and the desire right, if the choice is to
be good, and the latter must pursue just what the former asserts."
(trans. W. D. Ross) See St. Thomas' use of this text in Summ.
Theol. Ia IIae, q. 57, a. 5.

101

As a possession or content of the practical intellect,
right reason indicates every directive proposition which a person
knows to be true.
or by revelation.

These "right reasons" may be known naturally
22

Experiential, conceptual or revealed data

all provide and verify moral directives.

But Ockham will not

admit that contrary moral rules can be simultaneously true according to diverse types of evidence.

Apparent conflicts between

laws known naturally and divine laws are decided in favor of the
revealed and believed mandates. 23 One meaning of "recta ratio,"
therefore, signifies the apprehension of a complex or propositional statement which asserts that, in truth, some act should
be performed or avoided.
22 sent., III, 13, K; 11 ... ponatur aliquis habens istam
rationem universalem rectam 'omni indigenti in extrema necessitate est benefacienum ne pereat' quae est evidens ex notitia
terminorum •.• 11 Quodl., III, q. 16; "Reeta ratio deberet dictare
quod 'volendum est abstinere propter Deum' quia sic est dictatum
a recta ratione aliter non esset recta sed erronea. 11 Opus Nonaginta Dierum, c. 65 (Manchester ed.; II, 574); "Jus autem poli
vocatur aequitas naturalis, quae absque omni ordinatione humana
et etiam divina pure positiva est consona rationi rectae, sive
sit consona rationi rectae pure naturali, sive sit consona
rationi rectae acceptae ex illis, quae sunt nobis divinitus
revealata. 11
2 3sent., Prologue, q. 10 (I, 293); 11 •.• nulla ratio recta
potest dictare quod 'inimicus est odiendus' contra divinum praeceptum.11 Also see Sent., III, q. 13, M. This brief quotation
may leave the impression of an antagonism between faith and
natural reason; its meaning may be interpreted as a Scholastic
precedent for the Lutheran "so la fj_des." But Ockham means to
indicate the harmony of scripture and reason as he indicates
elsewhere. 11 •.. prima regula et infallibilis in huiusmodi est
scriptura sacra et ratio recta. 11 An Princeps pro~ succursu
...:....:_:.., c. 6 (Manchester ed.: I, 254).
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This descriptive or literal meaning of right reason insures an objective basis for morality.
simply a true norm of behavior.

A "right reason" is

However, coupled with strong

convictions about the primacy and contingency of the divine mandates, this conception of right reason opens to a system of
theological positivism.

When the absolute standard of morality

is conceived as the unlimited and changeable Will, then the human
formulation of the moral order, i.e., right reason, has an
objective but flexible basis.
the scope of flexibility.

The infinite freedom of God gives

Hence, Ockham and others of the so-

called "Nominalist" school will speculate on the extreme possibility of God's moral authority--the possibility of a divine
command and thereby a right reason to hate God. 24 Ockhamists
24Cf. Ockham, Sent., IV, q. 14, D; and Quodl., III, q.
13. Robert Holcot, Deterillinationes guarundam aliarum quaestionum,
q. 1, art. 2, ZZ (Lyons, 1497). Gregory of Rimini, Super primum
et secundum sententiarlUn, I, d. 42-44, q. 1, art. 2, F-H (Venice,
1522), and Gabriel Biel, Epi thorna pari ter et collectorium circa
tuattuor sententiarum libros, I, d. 42, q. 1, art. 2, concl. 2
Tubingen, 1501). The various branches of the so-called "Nominalist school" which have been indicated by Professor Oberman,
"Some Notes on the Theology of Nominalism," The Harvard Theological Review 53 (1960), pp. 51-56, should be kept in mind. Ockham,
Holcot, Rimini and Biel all raise the question of a commanded
odium Dei; their responses to the question show considerable
diversity. Ockham and Holcot seem to grant the possibility of
a meaningful, divine command to hate God. Rimini and Biel, however, admit only the metaphysical possibility of a command to
hate God since God is co-efficient with created agents who might
issue this command. But they deny that God could issue this
command as total cause without contradicting his Goodness. Cf.
Oberman, The Harvest of Medieval Theology (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans
Publishing Co. , 1967), pp. 90-96. We take up this question sys·tematically in Chapter Four. For now, we want to indicate only
that conformity to the will of God was critical to Ockham's ethical insight. His treatment of the commanded odium Dei means to
emphasize, not the possibility of drastic and perplexing changes
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do not necessarily stabilize morality by associating "right
reason" with God's eternal law, 25 since from eternity God might
have ordained individual exceptions and drastic changes to the
present moral order.

Because the revealed laws take precedence

over natural evidence, and because the revealed laws are contingent decrees of God ad extra, the truth of a "right reason" is
mutable.

The moral life becomes a question of obedience; its

orientation is given by private or public revelation.
More frequently, however, Ockham intends a technical
rather than a descriptive meaning of recta ratio.

As the oblig-

ing function of the practical intellect, "right reason" is an
act of judgment or assent to a directive proposition. 26 Ockham
in the moral order, but the permanent moral requirement of conformity to God's will. This emphasis fosters an authoritarian
morality; its spirit announces Luther's extreme example of conformity wherein the creature should wish his eternal damnation
and unhappiness if God so wishes.
2 5For example, Gabriel Biel, Sent., II, d. 35, q. 1,
art. 1, n. 1, C (Tiibingen, 1501); "Lex aeterna extendit se ad
omnem rectam rationem et non solum ad praeceptionem vel prohibitionem proprie acceptam. 11 Biel, however, goes on to say (Sent.,
III, d. 37, q. 1, art. 2, concl. 3) that the right reasons and
eternal laws contained in the second table of the Decalogue might
be dispensed. The identification of right reason with the
eternal law supports radically different deductions within the
"via moderna." See W. Kolmel, "Von Ockham zu Gabriel Biel.
Zur Naturrechtslehre des 14.. und 15.Jahrhunderts," Franziaskani~ Studien 37 (1955), pp. 218-259.
26 sent., III, q. 12, CCC; ·11 • • • recta ratio sive actus
assentiendi quae vocatur recta ratio .•• " Sent., III, q. 11, X;
"Reeta autem ratio est prudentia in actu vel in habitu .•. Et
sciendum quod actus dictandi intellectus non est formaliter
complexum; sed est actus assentiendi vel dissentiendi complexo
jam formate et ex illo actu assentiendi generatur prudentia; non
autem ex formatione complexi. 11 Cf. my article, "William of Ockham on Right Reason," Speculum 48 (1973), pp. 13-36.
.
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intends this second meaning with the phrase "the dictate of Right
Reason."

The difference between the descriptive and the func-

tional meanings turns on the separability of acts of apprehension
and judgment, and on the distinction between speculative and
practical assent.

An apprehended directive may be a true rule

of behavior, but it lacks the force of obligation until the agent
assents that it is true.

Ockham is emphatic on this point--it
is not enough to simply remember a rule and act accordingly. 27
The intellect must judge that rule to be true now, in this

.

situation, before the agent explicitly recognizes a moral obligation.

Thus, beyond the normal scholastic distinction between

speculative and practical propositions, Ockham teaches a specific
difference between speculative and practical assent.

To be

precise, judging that a directive is true constitutes an imperative or "dictate" that the will conform.

Rather than a "complex"

or proposition, the functional meaning of recta ratio signifies
a non-complex act of judgment which asserts an obligation.

The

human will is morally obliged, not when the intellect formulates
a directive, but when the intellect dictates that directive.

A

practical rule may be incorrect--literally a wrong reason for
27 sent., III, q. 11, X; "Si dicas quod ostenso objecto
diligibili sine omni dictamine rationis potest voluntas illud
diligere, et iste est bonus moraliter quia diligit quid diligendum est etc.: puta si formetur hoc complexum 'Hoc bonum est
diligible' et intellectus non assentiat, tune est dubium utrum
illa dilectio sit bona moraliter. Respondeo, licet actus ille
sit bonus ex genere et non sit malus moraliter, tamen non est
virtuosus quia de ratione actus virtuosi est quod eliciatur conformi ter rationi rectae et respectu objecti convenientis et
quod habens talem actum sit sciens."
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acting--yet judgmental assent through inculpable ignorance becomes a "right reason" for following the erroneous rule.

The

technical meaning of Right Reason (hereafter this useage is indicated by capitalizing), therefore, is that practical assent
which provides the proximate norm of morality and the subjective
basis of moral obligation.
Any natural or "secular" morality fostered by Ockham

would derive from this functional meaning of recta ratio.

Moral

autonomy centers on the personal and subjective judgment of
what is right; even divine commands must be judged as true moral
rules before they bind the creature.

Norms are variable with

changes in circumstance or divine decrees, but the sanction and
force of Right Reason's dictate remains constant for every moral
response.

Ockham maintains a "positive" obligation to conform

to Right Reason; but without any divine command the dictate of
Right Reason would still be binding. 28 Certain of Ockham's
28 Those commentator's who find an absolute voluntarism
or positivism in Ockham's ethic 11 explain 11 his doctrine of recta
ratio as ultimately a positive obligation and contingent upon
the divine will. E.g., Father Copleston, A !_Iistory ..• , p. 121;
Erich Hochstetter, "V.iator Mundi. Einige Bemerkungen zur
Situation des Menschen bei Wilhelm von Ockham, 11 Franziskanische
Studien 32 (1950), pp. 12-14; Professor Oakley, "Medieval Theories ..• , p. 70; and Professor Bourke, History of Ethics, p. 155.
Indeed, Ockham does teach that God commands the creature to
conform to right reason. An act against conscience or Right
Reason 11 eliceretur contra praeceptum di vinum et voluntatem di vj.nam volentem talem actum elicere conformiter rationi rectae. 11
Sent., III, q. 13, C. But Ockham also claims that the obligation
"t'Ofollow Right Reason is known naturally and is binding without
a "superior will." "Scientia moralis non-positiva est quae, sine
omni praecepto superioris, dirigi t actus humanos, sicut pri.ncipj_a
per se nota vel nota per experientiam, sic dirigunt, scilicet
quod 'Omne honestum est faciendum' et 'Orone inhonestum est
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successors, however, defend the legitimacy of Right Reason's
dictate as independent of the divine will.

For example, Gregory

of Rimini (d. 1358) and Gabriel Biel (d. 1495) both define sin
as "voluntarily to commit or omit something against Right Reason"
rather than "against the eternal law."

Why?

so that one would not think that sin is precisely
against divine reason and not against some right
reason about the matter, or would maintain that
something is a sin, not because it is against the
divine reason as right, but because it is against
the divine reason as divine. For although impossible, if there were no divine reason or if that
divine reason were in error, or if God himself did
not exist, still one would sin if he acted against
angelic or human or some other right reason - if
such existed. And if there were no right reason at
all, still if someone should act against that which
some right reason would dictate to be done - if
there were any - then he wou1d sin.29
Their defense of recta ratio strongly suggests the systematic
effort of Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) to elucidate a secular system
fugiendum" .•. 'Voluntas debet se conformare rectae rationi,'
'Omne malum vituperabile est fudiendum' •.. " Quodl., II, q. 14
(corrected by Vaticana Lat. 3075, f. 20vb).
2 9Rimini, Sent., II, d. 34-35, q. 1, art. 2, H-J (Venice,
1522); "Respondeo ne putetur peccatum esse praecise contra
rationem divinam et non contra quamlibet rectam rationem de
eodem, aut estimetur aliquid esse peccatum non quia est contra
rationem divinam inquantum est recta sed quia est contra earn
inquantum est divina. Nam si per irnpossibile ratio divina sive
Deus ipse non esset, aut ratio illa esset errans, adhuc si quis
ageret contra rectam rationem angelicam vel humanam aut aliam
aliquam - si aliqua esset - peccaret. Et si nulla penitus esset
ratio recta, adhuc si quis ageret contra illud quid agendum esse
dictaret ratio aliqua recta - si aliqua esset - peccaret." See
the literal parallel in Biel, Sent., II, d. 35, q. 1, art. 1,
D-E (Tubingen, 1501). Cf. Professor Oberman's treatment of
this text from Rimini and Biel in The Harvest of Medieval Theology_, pp. 105-107.
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of morality and legality which would be valid "etiamsi daremus
30
non esse Deum."

---

Ockham's own statements on natural or Aristotelian

morality serve to highlight the Christian transformation of
30see Grotius, De Jure Belli et Pacis, ed. Joannes
Barbeyracius and trans.-William Whewell (Cambridge, John W.
Parker, 1853), Vol. I, p. xivi; "Et haec quidem quae jam diximus,
locum aliquem haberent, etiamsi daremus, quod sine summo scelere
dari nequit, non esse Deum, aut non curari ab eo negotia humana."
The respect which Grotius had for Francis Suarez (1548-1617) has
been well documented by Anton-Herman Chroust, "Hugo Grotius and
the Scholastic Natural Law Tradition," The New Scholasticism
XVII (1943), pp. 114-120. Before Grotiuswrote the "De Jure
Belli et Pacis" Suarez had outlined a well developed tradition
of treating the dictate of right reason as valid independent of
any divine legislation. Mentioning texts in Gregory of Rimini
and Gabriel Biel, Suarez says "Atque hi auctores consequenter
videntur esse concessuri legem naturalem non esse a Deo, ut a
legislatore, quia non pendent ex voluntate Dei, et ita ex vi
illius non se gerit Deus ut superior praecipiens aut prohibens;
immo ait Gregorius quern caeteri secuti sunt, licet Deus non
esset, vel non uteretur ratione, vel non recte de rebus judicaret, si in homine esset idem dictamen rectae rationis dictantis,
verba gratia, malum esse mentire, illud habiturum eamdem rationem
legis, quam nunc habet." Tractatus de Legibus et Le islatore
Deo, II, c. 6, ed. Carolus Berton, Opera Omnia: Suarez Paris:
Vives, 1856), Vol. 5, p. 105. See Jaime Fernandez - Castaneda,
S.J., "Right Reason in Francis Suarez," The Modern Schoolman 45
(1968), pp. 105-122. A .rather clear line-O'f influence can be
dravm from Rimini and Biel, through Suarez, to Grotius and Pufendorf in the seventeentl) century. Commentators such as Chroust
(p. 116), and A. P. d'Entreves, Natural Law .•• , p. 70, see this
development as a reaction to the excessive voluntarism of Ockhamism. This judgment is only half true. True because Suarez
interprets this perspective on right reason as the "extreme
contrary" of Ockham's position. Ockham would not admit the
separation of morality from God's will; but neither would Rimini,
Biel or even Grotius. False because the hypothetical arguments
of Rimini and Biel in which this tradition originates are developed from Ockham's suggestion that "sine omni praecepto superioris" the will should conform to Right Reason:- Partially, therelO"re, the source of a secular theory of· natural law rests in
Ockham's doctrine of Right Reason's autonomy.
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.
31
e th ics.

He woUld not support a doctrine of Right Reason or

conscience which repudiates a theological foundation.

The

objective and subjective norms of morality, the literal and the
functional meanings of recta ratio, are mutually consistent and
required.

Every act of judgment entails an act of apprehension;

the "act of assent which is called Right Reason" includes the
directive or "right reason" to which the intellect assents. 32
Ockham distinguishes between directives and dictates; first
because prescriptive statements are not always moral imperatives
and secondly, because obligation occurs precisely with the
intellectual assent to, not formulation of, normative propositions.

Thus, it is appropriate to speak of two complementary

facets of Ockham's doctrine of recta ratio.

The texts do not

support the claim, however, that Ockham pursues the autonomy of
Right Reason's dictate into ethical Subjectivism or a "secular"
ethic.

Only excusable or inculpable ignorance can justify a

discrepancy between the objective (i.e., the will of God) and
31 The difference between Aristotle's ethic and that of
Christianity is not in what the moral agent does, but rather,
in why the agent acts. The intention to love God characterizes
the perfect, Christian virtue. See Sent., III, q. 10, I; Sent.,
III, q. 12, GGG; Sent., IV, q. 3, S.
3 2 Quodl., V, q. 6; "Circa primurn, dico quod duplex est
assentus, ' lL"'1US quo intellectus assen tit aliquid esse vel
aliquid non esse vel aliquid esse bonum vel album; alius quo
intellectus assentit alicui complexo. Secunda distinctio est
quod duplex est apprehensio; una est compositio vel divisio
si ve proposi tionis formatio, alio qua est cogni tio ipsius complexi jam formati ... 11 The assent of Right Reason is the second
type of judgment (see above, note 26) which presupposes an
apprehended "complex" or directive proposition to which it
a.ssents.
1
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subjective (i.e., the dictate of Right Reason) norms of morality.
On the other hand, Ockham could assert that the obligation to

obey Right Reason stands without any divine decree.
Although complementary, a careful determination of which
sense of "right reason" Ockham intends within a given text is
not merely academic.
of this notion.

Individual doctrines turn on the meaning

To give one example, Ockham criticizes Henry

of Ghent for distinguishing practical and speculative propositions in terms of intrinsic, final causality. 33

Only after the

judgment of Right Reason will Ockham speak of activity as the
proper and distinctive end of practical knowledge because activity is then the required or obligatory end.
Nevertheless, according to the common position, one
can distinguish regarding the end of knowledge: one
which can be simply the final cause (of knowledge)
properly speaking for the sake of which the knowledge
itself is acquired and which moves the agent to action. I spoke previously about this. The other is the
end of knowledge which according to Right Reason ought
to be intended by an agent which acts freely. In this
way, the end of practi.cal knowledge is the deed or the
operation.34
The assent of Right Reason gives a practical directive a morally
required final cause regardless of the purpose for which the
knower formulated that proposition.

Assent to factual statements,

on the other hand, does not demand a conforming act of the will.
Ockham's position on the causal import of prescriptive language

33 see above, notes 7 and 8.
34Sent., Prologue, q. 11 (I, 308).

See above, note 19.
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would be objectionable if recta ratio were taken in its literal
~ense

of a true directive proposition.

The literal meaning

makes the argument circular; namely, that right reason gives
practical knowledge its distinctive final cause while right
reason is itself practical knowledge.
Although Ockham is clear about what he means by recta
~;

w

f

ratio, the phrase is not explicitly defined.
notion in two different ways.

He simply uses the

Most of Ockham's commentators

~

equate right reason with prudence or conscience and analyze these
latter notions. 35 Father Lucan Freppert, O.F.M., seems alone in
indicating the importance which Ockham places upon Right Reason
as "an act of_ assenting or dissenting to this proposition already
3 5For example, Anita Garvens, Franziskanische Studien,
21, p. 374, says that recta ratio "dem scholastischen Begriff
des Gewissens entspricht. 11 Iserloh claims 11 • • • gebraucht Ockham
recta ratio gleichbedeutend mit conscientia und besonders mit
prudentia ... " Gnade und Eucharistie ... , p. 54. Ockham does
equate recta ratio with "prudence" and "conscience," but these
notions do not exhaust what Ockham means by "right reason." It
is important that "Right Reason" be understood in its nonpropositional designation. Logical contradictions obtain between
propositions. Even though the divine commands were formulated
as propositions they could not stand as contradictory to this
simple act of assent to directives which Ockham calls "Right
Reason." Reeta ratio is not "a" judgment about good or evil
which God might overrule; rather, it is that function of the
practical intellect which turns natural value judgments and
divine commands into moral imperatives. By considering recta
ratio as normative propositions, however, commentators introduce
the false possibility of conflict between God's legislative power
and the natural assessment of morals. In view of Ockham' s
doctrine of Right Reason, and the importance this doctrine assumes within his value theory, scholars might better ask if the
principles of the Practical Intellect and the general axioms of
ethical reasoning are normative statements or simply factual
assertions to the "Venerable Inceptor."
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formed. 1136

Surely, this is a unique perspective within the

Medieval history of Aristotle's irth~s ltgos; it argues irrefutably against construing recta ratio as a monolithic doctrine
which passes unchanged through the generations of Scholasticism.
Within Ockham's system, this functional sense of recta ratio
supports his analysis of normative language and his value theory.
Right Reason is the psychological mechanism which transforms
value judgments into imperatives; whether directive propositions

f:·
~

are grounded in experience or in revelation, the assent of Right

r

!';.,;

~

Reason renders them obligatory.
the judgment of Right Reason.

Moral values inevitably connote
The unity of Ockham's moral doc-

trine depends upon his innovative treatment of Right Reason.
And it is the unity of Ockham's ethic which suffers when recta
ratio is understood exclusively as moral knowledge.
and Conscience indicate

Prudence

types of directive propositions which

can be called right reasons or ethical knowledge.

But in con-

sidering these facets of Ockham's moral science, we must remember
that the assent of Right Reason gives prudence and conscience
their binding force.

36 The Basis of Morality .•• , pp. 71-72. Our only complaint with Father Freppert's treatment of "recta ratio" is
that, after detecting Ockham's unique understanding of this doctrine, he proceeds to split the Venerable Inceptor's ethical viewpoint into a right reason theory and a will of God theory. (pp.
241-247) We will argue, especially in the Conclusion, that the
functional meaning of Right Reason is precisely Ockham's method
of avoiding such dualism.
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c.

Prudence
Ockham's doctrine of right reason and prudence corres-

pond closely.

Ockham states that "the role (ratio) of prudence

is to regulate the act of will because it is the right reason
of do-ables. 1137 "It is impossible for moral virtue to exist
without right reason which is an act of prudence. 1138 A close
analysis of the meaning of "prudence," will clarify Ockham's
literal understanding of right reason.
According to Ockham, "prudence" can be understood in four
different ways. 39 Notice that the common element of these four
37sent., III, q. 13, D; "Cum igitur de ratione prudentiae
sit regulare actum voluntatis, quia est recta ratio agibilium."
38Sent., IV, q. 3, L. Also see Sent., III, q. 13, B.
39 sent., III, q. 12, H; "Circa secundum articulum est
prima distinctio quod prudentia accipitur quadrupliciter.
Uno modo accipitur pro omni noticia directiva respectu
cuiuscumque agibilis mediate vel immediate. Sicut accipit
Augustinus prudentiam in De Libero Arbitrio. Et isto modo tam
noticia evidens alicuius universalis propositionis (quae evidenter cognoscitur per doctrinam, quia procedit ex propositionibus
per se notis, quae noticia scientifica proprie est scientia
moral is) quam noticia evidens proposi tionis uni.versalis quae
solwn evidenter cognoscitur per experientiam, quae noticia etiam
est scientia moralis et prudentia. Exemplum primi:
'omni benefactori ·bene est faciendum.' Exemplum secundi:
'quilibet
iracundus est per pulchra verba leniendus.'
Secundo modo accipitur pro noticia evidenti immediate
directiva circa aliquid agibile particulare, et hoc per noticiam
alicuius propositionis quae evidenter sequitur ex propositione
per se nota tanquam majori et per doctrinam. Exemplum huius;
. 'huic benefactori est benefaciendum 1· quae sequitur evidenter ex
ista 'omni benefacienti ••• '
Tertio modo accipitur per noticia immediate directiva
accepta per experientiam solum respectu alicuius agibilis. Exemplum:
'iste iracundus est per pulchra verba leniendus.' Et
hoc noticia est solum respectu alicuius propositionis particularis cognitae per experientiam. Et hoc videtur esse prudentia
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definitions is the apprehension of a practical, directive proposition while the distinguishing feature of each description is
the way in which the practical proposition is recognized or considered.

First, "prudence" indicates every evident and directive

apprehension of some operation which can be done immediately or
mediately by the knower.

Thus, prudence signifies the universal

proposition known through their terms (per se) or known through
experience.

Secondly, prudence indicates an evident and immedi-

ately directive cognition of some particular operation.

Thus,

prudence signifies the particular propositions which can be
deduced from universal, directive premises.

Thirdly, prudence

indicates an immediately directive apprehension of some operation
which is known only through experience.

Thus, prudence signifies

the particular directive propositions whose origin is not deduction but rather experience.

Fourthly, prudence indicates the

collection of all, immediately directive apprehensions necessary
to live morally.

Thus, prudence designates the universal and

proprie dicta secundum intentionem Philosophi prout distinguitur
a scientia morali.
Quarto modo accipitur per aliquo aggregate ex omni noticia immediate directiva, sive habeatur per doctrinam sive per
experientiam, circa omnia opera humana requisita ad bene vivere
simpliciter. Et isto modo prudentia non est una noticia tantum,
sed includit tot noticias quot sunt virtutes morales requisitae
ad simpliciter bene vivere, quia quaelibet virtus moralis habet
propriam prudentiam et noticia directivam." Also see Sent., .II,
q. 15s G-H. A useful study of Ockham's doctrine of prudence was
made by Othmar Suks, O.F.M., "The Connection of Virtues According
to Ockham," Franciscan Studies 10 (1950), pp. 9-32, 91-119. The
above text follows Father Suks' correction of Sent., III, q. 12,
Hand Quodl.,IV, q. 6 according to the better manuscripts.
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particular propositions, known

per~

or through experience,

which are required "to live well."
The first two meanings of prudence coincide with Ockham's
notion of "moral science. 1140 He considers the universal directive propositions of Practical Reason which are known

per~

and their deducible conclusions as the content of ethical philosophy. 41

This agrees with Aristotle's maxim that "science" con-

cerns the universal.

Moral science is a collection of universal,

directive propositions regarding those things which are within
40 on the distinction between moral science and prudence
as between "habitus magis universalis et minus universalis" see
Sent., Prologue, q. 11 (I, 321); Sent., III, q. 11, U; and Sent.,
III, q. 12, U. Ockham describes moral science in a twofold way:
"Dico quod scientia moralis dupliciter accipitur: uno modo pro
scientia quae est praecise de moribus qui sunt in potestate
nostra, ita quod in omni scito ponatur aliquid importans aliquid
quod est in potestate nostra. Aliter accipitur pro illa scientia
secundum quod est tradita ab Aristotele et a philosophis et a
Sanctis." Sent., Prologue, q. 12 (I, 359). Ockham repeats this
division when explaining the term "morale" in Quodl., II, q. 14.
He gives a slightly different analysis of "moral science" in
Sent., III, q. 15, G.
41 ockham gives four different meanings of the term
"scientia." See Gaudens F. Mohan, O.F.M., "The Prologue to Ockham's Exposition of the Physics of Aristotle," Franciscan Studies
5 (1945), pp. 236 and 239-240. The meaning applicable to "moral
science" or "non-positive moral science" is "notitia evidens veri
necessarii nata causari ex notitia evidenti praemissarum necessariarum applicatarum per discursum syllogisticum." (p. 240)
This is Aristotle's description of "demonstrative science" in
the Nie. Ethics, VI, 6 (1140b 30-35). In Quodl., II, q. 14,
Ockham asks "Whether there can be demonstrative science about
morals?" and answers: 11 • • • disciplina moralis non-positiva est
scientia demonstrativa. Probo, quia notitia deducens conclusiones syllogistice ex principiis per se notis vel per experientiam scitis, est demonstrativa; huiusmodi est disciplina moralis;
ergo etc." On Aristotle's position that science concerns the
universal rather than the particular, see Meta., XI, c. 1
(1059b 26).
-----
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human powers.

42

The object of ethics is not the good life, nor

beatitude, nor virtue; rather, the object of moral science is
any proposition which directly or indirectly regulates human
volition. 43 In contrast to the interpretation that his moral
doctrine lacks any metaphysical basis, Ockham himself claims that
42 sent., Prologue, q. 1 (I, 8-9); "Ad primum istorum
dico quod scientia, ad praesens, dupliciter accipitur. Uno modo
pro collectione multorum pertinentium ad notitiam unius vel
multorum determinatum ordinem habentium. Et scienta isto modo
dicta continet tam notitiam incomplexam terminorum quam notitiam
complexorum, et hoc principiorum et conclusionum ..• 11 Also see
Father Mohan, Franciscan Studies, 5, p. 240. An important text
in this regard is Summulae in Libros Physicorum, I, c. l; "Sic
ergo dico, quod scientia naturalis non est una numero primo modo,
sed secundo modo quia est una unitate collectionis vel ordinis.
Omnes enim partes istius scientiae habent determinatum ordinem
inter se qualem non habent cum logica ~ cum morali philosophia
nee cum aliqua alia scientia, propter quod dicuntur una scien-cia. 11
Thus, the propositions which comprise "moral science" do not have
a determinate order; there is no primary or fundamental directive
to which all other moral norms are attached; there is no subject
matter common to all ethical knowledge. On the basis of this
text alone, the search for a central insight or an organizing
principle in Ockham's moral doctrine should be considered suspect.
4 3sent., I, d. 2, q. 4 (II, 134); "Ad secundum argumentum
principale dico quod scientia realis non est semper de rebus
tamquam de illis quae immediate sciuntur sed de aliis pro rebus
tantum supponentibus. Ad cuius intellectum et propter multa
prius dicta et dicenda, propter aliquos inexercitatos in logica,
est sciendum quod scientia quaelibet sive sit realis sive rationalis est tantum de propositionibus tamquam de illis quae
sciuntur, quia sole propositiones sciuntur." Father Maurer comments accurately that Ockham "was convinced with Aristotle that
science concerns the universal and not the particular as such ..•
Having proved to his own satisfaction that universality is a
property only of concepts, which are the terms of propositions,
he drew the inevitable conclusion: propositions alone are the
object of science." Medieval Studies, 20, p. 100. This study
shows the contrast between Ockham's notion of science and those
of Scotus and Aquinas.
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ontological truths contribute to ethical knowledge.

44 .Any

proposition which participates in a practical syllogism about
what ought to be done, is a part of moral science.
This conception of moral science reveals that turn in
moral doctrine peculiar to Ockham and his followers.

The tools

and concern of the moralist are propositions and concepts; logical formulas and words are the matter of scientific ethical
study.

To be sure, ethics is a "real" science (in contrast to

a "rational" science such as logic) because its concepts stand
for real, non-conceptual things.

But the created intellect

directly and immediately "knows" propositions; real things are
known through concepts.

For Ockham, there exists a certain

"distance" between thought and the extra-mental world.

This

distance or distinction between concepts and things is the heart
of Ockham's criticism of Scotistic "common natures" and "formal
distinctions."

Regarding morality, this notion of science

44sent., Prologue, q. 12 (I, 364); "Illa tamen quae considerantur--arrietaphysica possunt esse principia ad probandum
conclusiones practicas de Deo, sicut ex hoc quod Deus est causa
omnium est summe diligibilis vel honorandus vel aliquid huiusmodi." Ibid., (I, 360); "Et propter hoc in scientia morali
tradita a philosophis et a Sanctis inveniuntur multae veritates
simpliciter speculativae, sed vocant earn scientiam moralem quia
conclusiones practicae morales sunt ultima adquisita in illa
scientia. 11 These texts stand in direct opposition to the opinion
of Anita Garvens that "Das Sittengesetz hat sein Fundament nicht
in der Seinsordnung und damit im Wesen der Dinge und ihren Beziehungen zum Urheber allen Seins. 11 Franz. Studien, 21, p. 262.
Following Professor Garvens, commentators who find a strict
voluntarism or positivism in Ockham's moral thought also assert
that he "severs the bond between metaphysics and ethics." On
the contrary, Ockham claims there are "good reasons"--ontological
reasons--for certain moral norms.
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produces Ockham's certitude about the principles of morality and
bis doubt about a necessary and unchangeable moral status inherent in concrete acts.

The third meaning of prudence is a proper

definition because it distinguishes prudence from the meaning
of moral science.

Strictly speaking, prudence is constituted

by the particular, directive propositions of practical reason
which are known only through experience.

Properly, "prudence"

signifies the particular premises which are known experientially
and the conclusions of a practical syllogism. 45 Only by extending this signification can Ockham also consider the general
premises of a practical syllogism as constitutive of

prudence~

The fourth sense of "prudence" indicates the collective unity
imposed upon the total practical propositions required for the
moral pursuit of life.
The importance of prudence in determining what one
ought to do is clear.

Moral deliberation is resolved by action;

a moral agent who recognizes a required or obligatory end must
determine the means which will realize that end.

The sensitive

moment in determining a moral issue is the concrete decision

45sent., III, q. 12, T; "Virtutes omnes generales connectuntur in quibusdam principiis universalibus; puta, 'omne
honestum est faciendum,' 'omne bonum est diligendum,' 'omne
dictatum a recta ratione est faciendum, ' quae possunt esse
majores et minores in syllogismo practico, concludente conclusionem particularem, cuius noticia est prudentia immediate directiva in, actu virtuoso. Et potest idem principium numero esse
major cum diversis minoribus acceptis ad concludendum diversas
conclusiones particulares quarum notitiae sunt prudentiae
directivae in diversis actibus virtuosis." See also Sent., III,
q. 15, H.

--
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that

action should be accomplished for the sake of a deter46
mined end.
The general moral principles--such as "everything
~

honest should be done," and "all evil should be avoided"--would
be futile and ineffective if these norms could not be applied
to factual situations.

Universal directives can be realized in

particular situations, only after the intellect decides on the
basis of experiential evidence that "this is honest" and "this
is evil."

It is the proper role of prudence to take into account

the circumstances and peculiarities of an act, and thus to direct
that this deed should be done here and now. 47 The moral suitability of concrete acts often depends upon circumstantial
factors which can only be known experientially.
Ockham makes prudence an indispensible condition of
morally good behavior because experience is necessarily involved
in knowing what is good.
voluntary.

A virtuous act must be reasonable and

To be reasonable, a moral act requires the presence

of prudence in at least the second and third senses given to the
.
1
term by Ockham. 48 Thus, 0 c kh am asser t s th a t ei. th er universa
46 sent., III, q. 12, PP; 11 Peccans ex ignorantia habet
noticiam universalem sicut peccans ex malitia; quia peccans ex
ignorantia scit tales majores 'Orone justum est faciendum,'
'Orone bonum est faciendum,' 'Orone quid Deo placet .•• ' et cetera;
sed ignorans minores, puta quod, 'Hoc est justum,' 'Hoc est
honestum,' 'Hoc est placitum Deo. ' 11

47sent., Prologue, q. 11, (I, 316); "Et non dictat
(notitia practica ostensiva) quod domus est facienda nee quando
est facienda; sed ad prudentiam pertinet dictare quod tali tempore est facienda, vel sic est agendum vel sic."
48 sent., III, q. 12, UU; "Sed ad hoc quod actus virtuosu.s
eli ciatu.r necessario requiri tur prudentia secundo modo vel ter·t:io

r
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directives or particular directives known by experience are required for a person to elicit a virtuous act.

The notion of

"experience" can be taken in two respects; first, an "indirect
experience" in which a person perceives the activity of another
and secondly, a "direct experience" in which a person intuits
his own act. 49 Any practical proposition evidenced by direct,
inner experience indicated the presence of moral virtue.

Ockham

claims that "the acquisition of prudence cannot be separated from
moral virtue. 1150

He means, for instance, that a person cannot

know evidently that temperate acts prompt one to love God without
actually performing temperate actions.

Likewise, a person can-

not know evidently how much alcohol is a moderate amount to drink
without direct experience.

Such interior experiences indicate

the actual presence of a temperate or a virtuous act.
Ockham does admit that the divine will could alter the
"common law."

The scriptural commandments, for example, could

modo dica. Eodem modo ad virtutem moralem non requiritur prudentia primo modo dicta, quia ut patet notitia particularis
cuiuscunque immediate directiva potest haberi per experientiam
ad quam non requiritur notitia alterius universalis. Si tamen
notitia evidens alicuius particularis non posset haberi per
experientiam, tune virtus illa cuius notitia particularis esset
directiva requireret necessario prudentiam primo modo et
secundo modo et non tertio modo. 11 Also see Ibid., NN.
· 4 9,eent., III, q. 12, SS; "Aliqua talis propositio non
potest cognosci nisi per experientiam aliquam acceptam respectu
actus al terius horn.inis, alia non potest evidenter cognosci nisi
per experientiam actus proprii. 11
. 50

Sent., Prologue, q. 11, (I, 320); "Non potest prudentia
seperari, in acquisitione ipsius a virtute morali." Also see
~., III, q. 12, SS; and Sent., IV, q. 14,G.

120

be changed so that fornication, adultery, stealing, etc., would
be good and meritorious acts.

Given the possibility that God

could change the revealed directives of right reason, prudence
remains necessary to produce a moral act.

t

Whether a moral agent

thinks that "Murder is wrong" or "Murder is right" because of

~·

the divine wish, it is still necessary to determine experiential-

~

ly that "This is murder."

.,·~

f
r

Consequently, the possibility that

some directives of right reason are positive or authoritarian

k'

norms does not deny the absolute requirement of natural reason,

[
r

i.e., prudence, in establishing the particular location of moral

~

obligation.

I Virtues :::::i::~o O~:~:~. ~:~:z::n::::r::~::::::e :st:ecardi0

"' nal virtue. 51 This does not seem correct; prudence is not a
moral virtue in Ockham's thought.

For one thing, Ockham placed

the moral virtues in the will but prudence is clearly an intellectual habit.

Secondly, every moral or virtuous act requires

an act of prudence and an act of the will as partial efficient
causes of virtue. 52 An act of prudence must precede the
51Franciscan Studies, 10 (1950), p. 18.
5 2 sent., III, q. 12, NN; "Et si quaeras utrum post generationem virtutis potest elici actus virtuosus sine actu prudentiae; respondeo quad non, quia nullus virtuose agit nisi scienter
et ex libertate. Et idea si aliquando talis actus virtutis
voluntatis elicitur a tali habitu sine actu prudentiae non dicetur virtuosus, nee est ... Si quaeras de actu prudentiae; in quo
genere causae se habet ad actum virtuosum? .•• Respondeo quod est
causa efficiens necessario requisita ad actum virtuosum, sine
quae impossibile est actum esse virtuosum, stante ordine divi:'.1.o. t1
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production of a virtuous act.

If prudence were a virtue it

would precede .itself.

Thirdly, prudence is a "natural" or unfree
act "and no more within our power than an act of seeing. 1153
Only a free act of the will, however, can be intrinsically

virtuous and only a habit of the free will can be a virtue. 54
Prudence, therefore, is not a moral virtue but rather a necessary
condition and cause of any moral virtue.

Prudence is located in

the intellect and is presupposed by any moral action in the will.
The close association between prudence and right reason
gives an empirical feature to Ockham's notion of moral knowledge.
Prudence adds an experiential emphasis to Ockham's treatment of
moral science.

It is morally necessary to apply the knowledge

expressed as universal norms and general rules.

Consequently,

the collection of right reasons necessary to act properly is
impossible without an empirical and intuitive knowledge of
particular cases.

Ockham claims that it is impossible or "pos-

sible with extreme difficulty" to acquire the propositions
necessary for virtuous activity without prudence. 55 Ockham's
53sent., III, q. 12, XX; "Sed actus prudentiae secundum
veritatemest solum actus naturalis, et nullo modo in potestate
nostra plusquam actus videndi."
54 Ibid., F; "Quarta conclusio est hoc, quod actus primo
et necessario virtuosus est actus voluntatis. Haec patet primo
quia ille solus est laudabile et virtuosus secundum se; alii
vero non nisi secundario et per quandam denominationem extrinsecam, puta, per hoc quod eliciuntur conformiter actui voluntatis.
. 5 5 sent., Prologue, q. 11 (I, 320); "Et ideo dico quod si
aliquis studens in morali philosophia sine omni actu prudentiae
vel morali, posset acquirere notitiam omnium propositionum
uni versalium quas acquiri t alius exerci tatus, quod i ta perfechi.m
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notion of prudence indicates the importance of sensitivity to
the factual order and to the interior life in determining right
and wrong behavior.

Experience, both in the sense of perception

of other beings and in the sense of a person's awareness of his
internal condition, is required for a person to live morally.
Aristotle's empirical approach to determining the means of virtue
is apparent in Ockham's doctrine of prudence.
Is it possible to distinguish Ockham's notion of prudence
from his conception of right reason?

As was mentioned before,

Ockham sometimes considers the terms prudence and right reason
as convertible.

"Perfect moral virtue cannot exist without

prudence and consequently, there is a necessary connection among
the moral virtues to prudence.

This is proved because the es-

sence (ratio) of virtue and its perfect act is that it is elicited in conformity to right reason; because virtue is thus defined
by the Philosopher in the second book of the Ethics (Cf., Nicomachean Ethics II, 6, 1107a). Moreover, right reason is prudence
in act or in habit. 1156 It can be said, however, that right
habitum et ita perfecte directivum haberet ipse sicut alius.
Sed de facto vel hoc non est possibile vel cum maxima difficultate. Et propter istam rationem, sicut patebit in tertio (III,
q. 12), non potest prudentia separari in acquisitione ipsius a
virtute mor<?-li. 11 Also see Sent., IV, q. 14, G.
56 sent., III, q. 11, X; "Dico quod virtus moralis perfecta non potest esse sine prudentia, et per consequens est
necessaria connexio inter virtutes morales ad prudentiam. Quid
probatur, quia de ratione virtutis et actus ejus perfectae est
quod eliciatur conformiter rationi rectae, quia sic diffinitur
a Philosopho secundo Ethicorum. Reeta autem ratio est prudentia
in actu vel in habitu. 11
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reason is a more inclusive notion than that of prudence.

Every

moral directive, whether it is known through revelation or
through natural evidence, belongs to the content of right
reason.

The notion of prudence, on the other hand, properly in-

cludes only those directives which are known by experiential
evidence.

Thus, every act of prudence is a right reason but not

every right reason is an act of prudence.

Prudence signifies

only those right reasons which are known naturally.

Prudence

can be distinguished from the notion of right reason, therefore,

!;

t~
t

because

11

prudentia 11 has a less extensive signification than

"right reason. 11

Furthermore, prudence indicates a type of

ethical knowledge and is distinguishable from the functional
meaning of Right Reason which does not signify an act of know-

·'

~"

ledge.

D.

Conscience
Ockham's consideration of "conscientia" adds another

dimension to his notion of Reeta Ratio.

When Ockham wishes to

speak about the autonomy of Reeta Ratio, he speaks about
science.

con~

The inviolable and authoritative character of right

reason, as the conscious norm of moral right, is manifested by
Ockham's notion of conscience.
It is impossible that some act of the will
elicited against conscience and against the
dictate of reason--whether right or erroneous-be virtuous. It is clear about right conscience
because such an act would be elicited against the
divine precept and the divine will which wishes
him to elicit such an act in conformity to Right
Reason. Regarding an erroneous conscience in
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invincible error it is clear because such an error
is not culpable for him because it is not in the
power of the erring person to be acting against an
erroneous reason which you do not know is erroneous,
nor is it in your power to know this, that you are
acting against an erroneous conscience. Regarding
an erroneous conscience in vincible error, it is
clear because although the error is culpable by
which you are not aware that you, err, nevertheless,
by acting against such a reason you condemn a reason
which you do not know is erroneous; and thus you sin
from contempt.57
Ockham makes distinctions about conscience similar to
those made by St. Thomas, 58 namely: correct conscience, erroneous conscience in invincible error and erroneous conscience in
vincible error.

Both thinkers agree that to act against one's

conscience is sinful.
morally binding.

The conscientious judgment of reason is

No one sins unknowingly; to commit a moral

fault a person must violate his conscience.

What a person

believes to be his duty is thereby obligatory.
Ockham seems to consider conscience as the awareness of
a personal moral obligation.

As in the case of Right Reason,

57sent., III, q. 13, C; "Impossibile est quod aliquis
actus voluntatis elicitus contra conscientiam et contra dictamen
rationis sive rectum sive erroneum sit virtuosus. Patet de conscientia recta, quia talis eliceretur contra praeceptum divinum
et voluntatem divinam volentem talem actum elicere conformiter
rationi rectae. De conscientia erronea errore invincibili patet,
quia talis error non est culpabilis pro eo quod non est in potestate errantis sic faciendo contra rationem erroneam quam nescis
erroneam, nee est in potestate tua hoc scire quod facis contra
conscientiam erroneam. De conscientia erronea vincibili patet,
quia licet error sit culpabilis, tamen, ex quo tu ignoras te
errare faciendo contra talem rationem, contemnis rationem quam
nescis erroneam et sic peccas ex contemptu."
58 see St. Thomas, De Verit., q. 17, a. 4; Quodl., III,
q. 12, a. 26.
~

r
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Ockham does not define explicitly the concept of conscience.
statements such as "A person sins, when acting against conscience,
through contempt of that which ought to be his rule in acting, 115 9
however, indicate that conscience is the voice of personal duty.
Conscience might be expressed as personal directives, e.g., "I
should do this," or indicate the "assent of Right Reason" which
is invariably "my" judgment of practical truth.

By characteriz-

ing conscience as the awareness of a personal obligation, it is
possible to distinguish Ockham's notion of "recta ratio" from
that of "conscientia."

Right reason includes every normative

proposition of the Practical Intellect which is judged to be
true; conscience involves only those particular norms of the
Practical Intellect which express my obligation.

The distinction

between right reason and conscience is not superfluous or irrelevant.

The norms of right reason might include many dictates

which are not personally binding, but which are valid directives.
In Ockham's milieu, there were obligations endemic to the clergy
which did not apply to the laity.

A layman might consider cele-

bacy as a valid requirement for priests but not as a personal

59 sent., III, q. 13, M. St. Thomas is more clear that
the judgment of conscience is the last intellectual judgment
made by an agent regarding his actions. See Aquinas, De Verit.,
q. 17, a. l; Sent., II, d. 24, q. 2, a. 4. Vernon J. Bourke
presents a clear analysis of St. Thomas' doctrine of conscience·
which is helpful in recognizing the similarities between the
philosophies of 'I'homas and Ockham on this point. See Ethics:
A Textbook in Moral Philosophy (New York: The Macmillan Co.,
1951), chapters IV and VI.
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requirement, i.e., not as a matter of the lay conscience. 60
Ockham asserts that it is always sinful to act against
one's conscience.

The judgment of conscience can be wrong re-

garding facts which are pertinent to determining one's obliga- ·

.
61 or wrong regarding the divine command which pertains to
tion,
. 1 ar s1•tua t•ion. 62 Nevertheless, the Judgment about what
a par t icu
60
ockham gives examples of moral norms which are obligatory for one person and not another. "Et si dicatur voluntas
nunquam debet esse difformis voluntati divinae, sed iste qui vult
honorare parentes quos Deus non vult honorari habet voluntatem
difformem voluntati divinae, ergo peccat in honorando. Dicendum
est quod si Deus vult eos non honorari, nee ab isto nee ab illo,
iste peccat in honorando parentes suos. Si tamen Deus non vult
eos honorare ab alio, sed vult eos honorari ab isto, iste in
honorando non peccat. 11 Sent., I, d. 48, q. 1, H. Also see
Sent., IV, q. 9, E. James Keven McDonnell, "Religion and Ethics
Inl~°he Philosophy of William of Ockham" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Philosophy, Georgetown University, 1971),
pp. 135-136, claims that Ockham rejects the "universalizability"
of moral-norms in the above quoted text. "The commands of God,
as Ockham conceives them, are not universalizable in this way.
These commands are particular in that God may command one person
to do something in one situation while commanding another person
to do something quite different in a morally identical situation."
We cannot agree. Situations covered by different divine commands are not "morally identical" for Ockham.

61

.

Sent., III, q. 13, K; "Hoc patet per exemplum. Ponatur
aliquis habens istam rationem universalem rectam, "Omni indigenti
in extrema necessitate est benefaciendum, ne pereat, 11 quae est
evidens ex notitia terminorum. Occurrente igitur aliquo paupere
qui apparet indigere in extrema necessitate, si voluntas imperet
intellectui ut inquirat si talis sic indigeat, sicut apparet
indigere, facta investigatione per omnem viam possibilem poni,
si ex aliquo latente quid non est in potestate sua scire, intellectus assentiat quod talis indigeat sicut apparet indigere
(licet non sic indigeat secundum veritatem), evidenter intellectus dictabit quod tali qui sic apparet indigere (licet non sic
indigeat), est subveniendum ••. Et tamen voluntas volens efficaciter sic ei subvenire habet actum rectum et virtuosum et meritorium si hoc velit pro amore Dei."
62 sent., III, q. 13, O; "Ad propositionem dico quod
quamvis intellectus divinus dictet quod tali non sit subveniendum
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ought to be done by me in this situation conveys a moral obligation that the will execute this judgment.

Ockham's notion of

conscience, however, should not be considered as subjectivistic.
The judgment of conscience is not the source of moral obligation.
Clearly the foundations of moral obligation exist prior to the.
judgment of conscience if conscience can be mistaken about its
duty.

Furthermore, Ockham asserts only that it is always wrong

to act against conscience; he does not claim that one is always
right in following conscience.

On the contrary, to follow a

conscience in culpable error is wrong. 63

I~ a person does not

fulfill his obligation to be aware of his obligations, then that
person's conscience is "perplexus."

The state of 'perplexity'

results in a morally wrong act whether the will is conformed to
erroneous conscience, or not conformed to erroneous conscience,
modo predicto et voluntas Dei nolit quod sic ei subveniatur,
tamen, voluntas creata sequens rationem erroneam errore invincibili est voluntas recta quia voluntas divina vult earn sequi
rationem non culpabilem."

"Eli~iendo actum conformiter rationi erroneae
vincibili peccat, quia elicit actum quern non debet elicere, immo
oppositum actum tenetur elicere ... Si autem voluntas eliciat actum difformiter rationi erroneae culpabili, puta, contra talem
rationem, peccat etiam duplici peccato comrnissionis, eliciendo
actum contra rationem quam credit esse veram et sic peccat faciendo contra conscientiam per contemptum illius quid debet esse
regula sua in agendo, etiam tenetur conformare dictamini ... et
cetera, in operando sive sit rectum sive erroneum. Si ·autem
nullum actum eliciat nee conformiter rationi erroneae nee difformiter, sed omnem actum suspendit, tune peccat duplici peccato
ommissionis ... Et per consequens, talis necessario peccat et est
perplexus et sive voluntas operatur conformiter illi rationi
sive difformiter sive nihil operetur, semper peccet uno modo
Vel alio modo. 11 For a discussion about "perplexity" by St.
Thomas, see Sent., II, d. 39, q. 3, a. 3.
63 Ibid., M;
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or suspends any act regarding the dictate of erroneous conscience.
Therefore, the subjective norm of morality, i.e., conscience, is
not an independent source of moral authority.

The necessity of

acting according to one's conscience derives by definition from
the consciousness of duty.
notion of conscience has been cited as proof of
the nascent "natural morality" in his thought. 64 G. de Lagarde
Ock~am's

and Paul Vignaux find the seeds of a moral theory independent of
theology and scriptural authority which was to be characteristic
of Renaissance and Enlightenment morality.

This may be true

about the historical use of Ockham's doctrine, but not about his
own motives.

Ockham means to show the psychological constants

within moral deliberation and action; but he is also aware of
the tension between a naturalistic ethic and the prerogatives
which scripture attributes to God.

Ockham makes the point that

a law must be recognize&by the moral agent to be binding:

he

is cognizant of the complexity of concrete moral issues which
often must be solved by a sincere but not certain judgment of

64see G. de Lagarde, Ockham, La Morale ... , p. 66; "M.
Vignaux a done raison de dire que le nominalisme 'ouvre le plus
large horizon
la moralite naturelle.' Apres avoir paru resumer
toute la morale dans le precepte arbitraire de Dieu, il nous
incline~ penser que, meme si Dieu n'existait pas, la categorie
de moralite s'imposerait a l'homme qui trouverait toujours en
luimeme la coexistence des deux elements constitutifs de la
moralite: une raison dictant des imperatifs categoriques, et
une volonte libre de s'y soumettre ou de se rebeller contre eux."
This statement is based upon the text of Sent., III, q. 13, and
it refers to Vignaux' article "Nominalisme" in the Dictionaire
~ Theologie Catholigue, XI, col. 771.

a
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what should be done.

But Ockham also teaches that conscience

can be erroneous and that a person sins when following a (culpably) erroneous conscience.

Ockham's doctrine of conscience

substantiates that of St. Thomas; at least this aspect of Ockham' s moral doctrine does not break with the scholastic tradition.
In summary, it has been shovm that Ockham's notion of
Practical Reason, right reason, prudence and conscience all involve practical propositions but that each concept in this series
has a less extensive signification than the preceding concept.
Practical Reason is composed of the propositions which are known
to deal with volitive actions.

Right reason concerns those

propositions of the practical intellect which are directive or
prescriptive statements and which are-known to be true.

Prudence

indicates the particular directives of right reason which are
known by experience.

Conscience signifies the acts of prudence

which are personally obligatory.

Right reason, when considered

as moral knowledge, is a generic category so that the specific
acts of prudence and conscience can be considered as acts of
right reason.

Together, these intellectual judgments constitute

the structure or form of every moral

deli~eration,

and represent

the rational precedents for every virtuous act of the will.

It

should be clear, furthermore, that these intellectual acts pertain to the apprehension and attainment of human goals.

Ockham

describes right reasons or the prudential and conscientious acts
of right reason

HS

the intellectual effort to specify the proper

order between ends and means.

Right Reason, when considered as
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a non-propositional act of assent, is the technique by which
these various types of value judgments become obligatory.
Remember, however, that the act of conscience, which is
the final act of the intellect in a moral deliberation, can err
regarding what should be done.

Mistakes about the facts of a

given situation or mistakes about the divine mandate applying to
a given situation are mentioned by Ockham as the causes of an
erroneous conscience.

Conversely, evident facts and the divine

commandments can also be shown as the reasons for a correct
judgment of conscience.

It is now necessary to study these

natural and revealed foundations of Right Reason.
Part II:

The Foundations of Right Reason

The doctrine of Reeta Ratio is of central importance to
the ethical theory of William of Ockham.

A general feature of

every good act is the conformity of the will-act to an act of
Right Reason; conversely, the formal characteristic shared by
every evil action is a deformity to Right Reason.

In light of

the criticism of Anita Garvens and George de Lagarde that Ockham's doctrine is "unexplained" it is necessary to search the
reasons for Right Reason. 65

Analysis reveals both psychological

65 Professor Garvens claims: "Grund und Entstehung der

recta ratio ist nach Ockham in der urteilenden Tatigkeit des
praktischen Verstandes gegeben," Franz. Studien 21, p. 377.
G. de Lagarde says: "Or, cette loi exterieure a notre volonte,
qui s'impose
priori sans discussion et sans explication, est
celle de la "droite raison." Ockham, La Morale ... , p. 65. The
only explanation of recta ratio, whichthese and many other
comme~tators find in Ockham's writings is the free command of
God that men act in accord with Right Reason.
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and metaphysical dimensions.
tained in this section:

Two distinctions have been main-

first, the distinction between Right

Reason as the moral function and right reason as the propositional content of the Practical Intellect; secondly, the distinction
between "positive" elements and "evident" elements.

These dis-

tinctions are Ockham's own and should be recognized by any
interpretation.
We intend to answer two questions:

Why is Right Reason

itself a condition of moral behavior, and Why are the directives
of right reason morally binding?

A double question is required

because Ockham treats the notion of "Reeta Ratio" from two
perspectives.

That is to say, Ockham considers Right Reason as

a function or simple act of the practical intellect (a judgment
of assent to directive propositions) and as a complex act or
habitus of the

Practi.c~l

Intellect (the directive proposition,

itself).
A.

Right Reason as the Proximate Norm of Morality
As a condition of moral behavior, Right Reason indicates

the intellectual act of assent to a directive proposition which
must precede the production of any good or bad action in the
will.

The phrase "condition of moral behavior" is appropriate

because an intellectual dictate must precede but cannot necessitate the voluntary production of a good action.
assent or dictate is a

ne~essary

The intellectual

cause of moral goodness in the

Will, but not a necessitating cause.

The relationship between
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the intellect's assent and the will's volition is hypothetically

necessary.

That is, on the condition that the will acts cor-

rectly, the will-act must be conformed to, or caused by, the
intellect's directive.

Ockham formulates this connection as an

evident principle of demonstrative moral science--voluntas debet
• • 66 WhYf
se con f ormare rec t ae ra t ioni.

-

n

Ockham maintains that the human will is obliged to con-

form to Right Reason because the divine will has ordered it.
"While the present ordination stands, no action is perfectly
virtuous without being elicited in conformity to Right Reason. 1167
'~ction

of the will elicited against conscience ... would be

elicited against the divine precept and will which desire that
we elicit such action in conformity to Right Reason. 1168 Thus,
ther.e is a revealed reason; i.e., a law promulgated by the free
will of God through revelation, which supports Ockham's contention that an act of Right Reason is partially the cause of moral
goodness and presently the vehicle of moral obligation.

Can we

assume, therefore, that Right Reason is a necessary and permanent
~dition

of all moral behavior?

When Ockham asserts that the will is obliged by God to
conform to Right Reason, he is not asserting that Right Reason
is a necessary component of a virtuous act.
66 Quodl., II,
q. 14.
67 Sent., III, q. 12, CCC.
68Sent., III, q.
c.
13,

The phrase, "Stante
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.ordinatione guae ~ est," ("While the present ordination

-

stands") is a qualification which Ockham often attaches to his

statements about the world of experience.

The ordained order

could be changed by God's absolute power; if conformity to Right
1.·.·

t

~·
f·,.·.-.··. ·

I
.

~.. ·

.Reason is a moral requirement de potentia Dei ordinata, then de
potentia Dei absoluta non-conformity to Right Reason could become
a moral requirement.

69

If conformity to Right Reason is simply

a positive good, that is, good because it is commanded, then the
conclusion is inevitable that Right Reason is not a necessary
condition of moral behavior.

Ockham mentions that theft, adul-

.· tery and hate for God are evil because these acts are prohibited
by divine precept but the divine precept could change and render
.
.
70 Might the obligation to follow
meri•t orious.
th ese ac t ions
Right Reason change?

..

69 sent., III, q. 13, G; "Aliter potest dici quod actus
intrinsece virtuosus non potest fieri non virtuosus negative,
etiam per naturam, quia si corrumpatur actus prudentiae, necessario corrumpitur actus virtuosus cuius prudentia erat directiva
necessitate, dico, naturali •.. Tamen, per potentiam Dei absolutam
potest fieri contrarium sicut prius probatum est, quj_a de illa
potentia non intelligebatur illud dictum."
70Sent., II, q. 19, O; "Ad aliud dico quod licet odium
dei, furari, adulterari habeant malam circumstantiam annexam et
similia de communi lege quatenus fiunt ab aliquo qui ex praecepto divino obligatur ad contrarium. Sed quantum ad esse absolutum in illis actubus possunt fieri a deo sine omni circumstantia
mala an..Ylexa, et etiam meritorie possunt fieri a viatore si
caderent sub praecepto divino sicut nunc de facto eorum opposita
cadunt sub praecepto divino. Et stante praecepto divino ad opposi ta eorum non potest aliquis tales actus meritorie nee bene
exercere, quia non fiunt meritorie nisi caderent sub praecepto
divino et si fierent a viatore meritorie, tu..Ylc non dicerentur
nee nominarentur "furtum," "adulterium," "odium," etc."
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It is consistent with Ockham's principles to suppose that
the command to follow Right Reason could be changed by God's
absolute power·.

Unfortunately, Ockham never treats the possi-

bility of this divine precept being retracted.

However, the

command to love God could be changed and Ockham considers this
act as intrinsically and necessarily virtuous. 71 Thus, while
the possibility remains that the mandate to follow Right Reason
could change it does not follow that Right Reason is not a neeessary and essential cause of a virtuous act.

Philotheus Boehner

has shown that an actual divine command to hate God would result
in absurdity or an ethical antimony; i.e., the obedient hate of
God would be love for God. 72 In the same way, an antimony would
71 ockham frequently asserts that the command to love God
might change. See preceding note; Sent., IV, q. 14, D; Quodl.,
III, q. 13. But Ockham is specific that the altruistic love of
God is intrinsically, and necessarily right. See Quodl., III,
q. 13; Quodl., III, q. 14.
7211 it is well known that Ockham admitted that God can
command by His absolute power that a person should hate Him or
at least not love Him. It is important to note that this possibility is admitted in the purely ontological and logical realm.
For in this realm there cannot be a contradiction, since it is
a fact that creatures can command others to hate God; the command, therefore, is a reality, considered as a mental or spoken
sentence, and every reality has God as its primary cause. In
the ethical realm, however, an antimony is encountered, the only
real antimony in Ockham's philosophy. If God commanded a creature to hate Him or simply not to love Him, the creature would
be obliged to obey, but it could not obey since in obeying it
would love Him." See Philosophical Writings: Ockham, pp. xlix-1 .
. The love of God above all, as the intrinsically virtuous act,
will be discussed further in Chapter Four.
It is interesting that although Ockham speaks of the possibility of God changing the "positive" law to love God, he still
considers the act of loving God above all necessarily virtuous.
In the same way, Ockham admits that God might command acts contrary to Right Reason (Sent., III, q. 13, G), yet he later affirms
that "necessarily" Right Reason is required for intrinsically good
acts. Quodl., III~ q. 15; "Sicut voluntas potest velle abstinere
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occur should God command that a person violate Right Reason.
Right Reason is the dictate or assent to a directive proposition;
a directive proposition can be known naturally or known through
revelation.

The fact that God commands something to be done is
a "right reason" for the will to perform this act. 73 Consequently,
if God commanded the human will to elicit acts which are not con-

formed to Right Reason, Right Reason should dictate that the will
reject Right Reason.

Just as the divine command to hate God

would result in the moral absurdity of hating God out of love for
God, so the divine command to act contrary to Right Reason would
result in an act which is non-conformed and conformed to Right
propter Deum pro loco et tempore, mediante actu dictativo intellectus, ita potest velle abstinere propter Deum loco et tempore,
cum sola apprehensione illius propositionis--'Volendum est abstinere propter Deum pro loco et tempore'--sine omni assentu respectu
ejusdem. Hoc posito, tune quaero; aut ita volitio est virtuosa
intrinsece vel non. Si sic: contra, non elicitur conformiter
rectae rationi, quid necessario requiritur ad actum intrinsece
virtuosum; ergo, non est virtuosa intrinsece." Here, Ockham
clearly discusses the "assent of Right Reason" as a necessary
cause of moral virtue. What is necessary cannot be contingent
on the will of God. This is another example of the "distance"
between thought and reality. The changeable form of divine commands encounters certain moral "facts" which are constant. The
necessary goodness of the love of God is one such "fact;" the
regulative function of Right Reason's assent is another.
73 sent., Prologue, q. 10 (I, 293); "Ex istis sequuntur
aliquae conclusiones. Una, quod non est respectu cuiuslibet
~raxis est scientia practica cui notitia debeat conformari, vel
magis proprie, cui sit nata elici conformiter .ad hoc quod sit
recta. Et hoc quia quantumcumque de omni praxi posset esse
aliquod dictamen verum quid debet elici vel non elici, et ita
aliquo modo sibi conformatur, tamen aliqua est praxis mala quae
ntillo modo potest conformiter elici rationi rectae, quia nulla
ratio recta potest dictare earn eliciendam, sicut nulla ratio
recta potest dictare quod inimicus est odiendus contra divinum
praeceptum." Also see Sent., I, d. 41, q. 1, K.

r
Reason.
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Thus, while God's absolute power could issue the com-

mandment to "Hate God" and "Reject Right Reason," it would be
impossible for.the moral agent to accomplish these deeds in
obedience to the divine commandment.

Clearly, Ockham's statements

that Right Reason is an essential and a necessary cause of a
virtuous act 74 indicate a permanent, pervasive and indispensable
characteristic of moral goodness which remains unaltered in the
face of changeable divine commands.

The test of "God's absolute

power" can be used to establish necessary truth as well as contingency.

74Sent., III, q. 13, F; "Ad primum istorum tenendo istud
principium, quod effectus sufficienter dependet ex suis causis
essentialibus, ex quo sequeretur quod nullurn absolutum necessario
requiritur ad aliquem effectum nisi aliquo modo sit causa illius
effectus et per consequens cum prudentia actualis necessario
requiratur ad actumvirtuosum et est aliquo modo prior, necessario
sequitur quod actus prudentiae sit vera causa efficiens essentialiter et necessario requisita ad acturn virtuosum, ita essentialiter sicut voluntas necessario requiritur tanquam causa
efficiens ad hoc, quod sit virtuosus vel meritorius, et consequens
sequitur ultra quod suspensa activitate voluntatis vel actus
prudentiae nullo modo dicitur talis actus virtuosus. Et ratio
est; quia virtuosum et viciosum sunt nomina connotativa et significant ipsum actum non absolute sed connotando cum hoc activitatem
voluntatis et prudentiae, et quando deficit aliquid connotatum
non dicitur talis actus virtuosus. Et si dicas quod talis actus
per positurn elicitur effective a voluntate conformiter rationi
rectae secundum alias circumstantias requisitas, igitur est
virtuosus. Respondeo, actum elici conformiter rationi rectae est
ipsum elici secundum rectam rationem regulantem et dictantem
talem actum esse eliciendum, quid quidem 'dictare' sive 'regulare'
non est aliud quam speciali modo illum actum causare." Because
Right Reason is an essential and a necessary cause of virtuous
acts, Ockham says that a voluntary act conformed to Right Reason
cannot be evil. "Si quaeratur utrum ille habitus acquis.itus ex
actu detestandi peccatum propter Deum sit virtuosus vel non.
Respondeo quod sic, cuius ratio est, quia inclinat ad actus conformes rationi rectae et actus sunt ita boni quod non possunt
esse mali." Sent., IV, qes. 8-9, X. Acts which are "so good
that they cannot ..be evil" are necessarily good acts. AJ.so see ·
§.ent., IV, q. 3, L.
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Right Reason is a condition or necessary cause of morality
because of the divine command.

But what rarely is noticed is that

Ockham also teaches that the directive "The will ought to conform
to Right Reason" is known per g. 75

"Without any precept of a

superior" the moral agent knows the truth of this directive.
When the terms of this proposition are understood, the intellect
immediately and necessarily assents to this statement as evident
and true.

Ockham considers analytic propositions as "evident"

because intuitive knowledge of the meanings of the constitutive
terms is sufficient to assert the truth of the statement.

In-

tuitive knowledge of the meaning of the terms "will" and "Right
Reason" immediately causes the dictate or assent that, in fact,
the will ought to conform to Right Reason.

Ockham explains that:

For this, that a correct act be first elicited by the
will, some right reason in the intellect is necessarily
required. This is clear through reason and authorities;
through reason because that will which can act well or
badly regarding itself, because of itself it is not
necessarily right, requires some directing rule other
than itself for this, that the will act correctly.
This is clear, because for that reason the divine will
does not require some directing rule, because that will
is the first directing rule and cannot act badly; but
our will is like this because it can act correctly and
incorrectly, thus it requires some directing reason.
Through authority it is clear through the definition of

75 o\J.od1., II, q. 14; "Sed disciplina moraJ.is non-positiva
est scientia demonstrativa. Probo, quia noticia deducens conclusicnes syllog.istice ex principiis per se notis vel per exper·ientir.i.m sci t.ts, est demonstrati va; huiusmodi est disciplina rnoralis, ergo et cetera. Major est manifesta. Minor probatur, quia
mul ta sunt pri:nci~1ia :per se nota in philosophia morali; puta,
quod 'Volunt3.s de bet E~e conformare rectae rat.ioni'." See D.
Webering, O.? .M., 'l'heory cf pPmonstratJ.o!:?:. /1.c~_s:_0:cding to William
£! Ockham (St. BonaveTiture, N.Y.: Franciscan Institute, Philosophy
series, 10; J.9:53), for an exceJ.lent and pertinent study of Ock-.
ham's understarJding of demonstrative knowledge.
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virtue in the second book of the Nicomachean Ethics
that 'Virtue is an elective habit consisting in the
mean determined by reason' etc •.• And there are many
other authorities for this point that an act cannot
be right and virtuous unless it have Right Reason.76
The will is a rational, active potency capable of producing or not producing volition freely, contingently and indifferently:

this is known on the basis of inner-experience.

To call

volition right or wrong requires that some standard or criterion
be applied to the acts of will which sub-divides free actions into
correct and incorrect actions.

The standard or rule which deter-

mines free acts as good or bad is the judgment of Right Reason.
It is the nature of Right Reason to dictate what ought to be
done.

It happens when I say, "Yes, I should do this," that a

particular act is required.
"yes."

"Doing this" is implied by saying

The practical principle that the will should conform to

Right Reason, therefore, is grounded on evident facts of human
psychology known by anyone who has affirmed a directive statement.
Unfortunately, Ockham does not analyze the logical structure of this directive--the will ought to conform to Right Reason
76 sent., III, q. 13, B; "Ad quaestionem primo sciendum est
quod ad hoc quod actus rectus prirno eliciatur a voluntate necessario requiritur aliqua recta ratio in intellectu. Hoc patet per
rationem et auctoritates; per rationem quia illa voluntas quae
potest quantum est de se bene agere et male, quia de se non est
recta necessario, ad hoc quod recte agat indiget aliqua regula
dirigente alj_a a se. Hoc patet, quia ideo voluntas di.vina non
indiget aliquo c3.irigente, quia illa est p::·ima regula d:i.recti va
et non potest male agere; sed nostra volu.ntas est huiuzmodi quia
potest recte et :non recte agere, igitur indiget aliqua ratione
dirigente. Per auctoritatem patet per diffinitionem virtutis,
II ~ic2£_ll!ll, qucd 'virtus est habi tus electi vus consistens in
medio determinata. ratione' etc. Et multae aliae auctoritates sunt
ad hoc quod non po-test esse actus rectus et virtuosus ni.si habeat
rationem rectam.~ See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, II, 6,
llO?a. Another persuasion is given by Ockha.m in Sent., IVi q. 3,L.
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--to confirm that it is known per se.

Nevertheless, this direc-

tive can be corroborated by reference to Ockham's treatment of
".E..er

~"

knowl~dge.

Ockham hold$ that every necessary proposition

is known "through itself" in either the first or the second mode.
In the first mode, "per se" indicates that nothing signified by
I

the predicate is extrinsic to what is signified by the subject of
the proposition:

in the second mode, "per

~"

indicates that

what is signified through the predicate is really distinct from
77 In both the first and
what is signified through the subject.
second mode, per

indicates "direct and proper" predication,
and that "the cause of the other" is predicated. 78 The proposition
.§_£

77sent., Prologue, q. 6 (I, 178 and 180); "Circa primum,
dico quad omnis propositio necessaria est per se primo modo vel
secundo modo. Hoc patet quia omnis simpliter necessaria . . . .
Potest dici quod per se primo modo et per se secundo modo
dupliciter accipiuntur distingui: Uno modo, quando praedicatum
non dicit aliquid totaliter distinctum ab importato per subjectum
primo. Et tune dicitur 'per se primo modo', quando nihil importatum per praedicatum, tamquam praedicabile de illo praedicato
universaliter et non solum particulariter, est totaliter extrinsecum subjecto. Et sic nihil praedicatur per se primo modo nisi
per se superiora et partes intrinsecae rei, vel importantia
praecise partes rei. Per se autem secundo modo dicitur illud
quad importat aliquid distinctum realiter ab importato per subjectum, sicut hie:
'omnis homo est risibile;' 'Deus est creativus, 1· et sic de aliis." This text is discussed by Robert Guelley,
Philosophie et Theologie ... , pp. 215-217. Also, E. A. Moody, The
Logic ... , pp. 234-36; and Leon Baudry, Lexigue Philosophigue .•. ,
pp. ·196-99, offer useful analyses of Ockham's notion of "per se"
knowledge, and fill out this text from the Ordinatio with later
statements of Ockham in the Summa Totius Logicae. Ockham's comment that "nee potuit esse falsa" is an important characteristic
of necessary and per~ nota propositions which sheds light on the
distinction between intrinsically necessary and accidentally necessary propositions. Pertaining to ethical norms which are known
]er .§.£, Ockham certainly does not conceive of a time prior to the
divine commands of revelation in which such moral norms "were able
to be false."

78 summulae in Libras Physicorum, II, c, 8; "Ad cuius
evidentiam est sciendum quad 'per se' et 'per accidens'

r
t
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t "The will ought to conform to Right Reason," therefore, is known
1

f,.

r

~,

£,e.£

~

in the second mode because the act of Right Reason signi-

fied by the pre:dicate is extrinsic t0 the act of will signified
by the subject.

Simply by knowing the terms or concepts which

constitute this proposition, it is evident that this predication
\

.is direct and proper because Right Reason and the will are the

ordered, essential causes of a virtuous act.

Because Right Reason

-

is the rule of volition, the will ought to conform to Right Reason.

.An analysis of this practical principle from Ockham's logical

point of view would be helpful.

In its absence, we simply echo

Ockham's position that this directive is known

per~'

and is

logically necessary and universal--characteristics shared by all
principles of demonstrative science. 79
As the moral function of .the intellect, Right Reason
dictates what ought to be done by the will.

The intellect assents

to, or judges to be true, necessary and contingent propositions
multipliciter capitur primo Posteriorum quia aliqua sunt, in
quibus omnia sunt necessaria, et ubi est praedicatio directa et
propria et illi dicuntur 'per se' primo modo vel secundo modo ..•
Aliter accipitur 'per se' et 'per accidens" in propositio, quod
illa propositio dicitur 'per se' et non 'per accidens' in qua
praedicatur propria causa de aliquo, scilicet, quando in subjecto
exprimitur propria causa praedicati, sicut ista est per se,
'aedif'icator aedificat,' vel 'est causa domus.'" Cf. Post.
Analytics, I, 4 (73a 12-27). The history of the scholastic treatment of "propositions known through themselves" is covered by
Rainulf Schmucker, frc.2£.ositio p(r se nota. Gottesbeweis und ihr
Verhaltnis nach Petrus Aureoli Franziskanische Forschungen, Heft
'S; Werl. 1:-W.;"DrucK"erei, 1941).
7 9 11 Every proposition belonging to a demonstrative proof
must be necessary, per..§.£ and universal." Webering, The Theory
.Q.f Demonstration •.. , p. 32.

r
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because the propositions convey the facts.
the

intellectu~l

80

In distinction to

assent to a speculative proposition, the mental

assent to a directive proposition presents an obligation to the
will.

The difference between speculative and practical assent is
affirmed by Ockham when he calls the latter assent a "dictate. 1181

80 sent., Prologue, q. 1 (I, 16); 11 • • • Quia nulli assentimus
per intellectum nisi quod verum reputamus; nee dissentimus nisi
quod falsum aestimamus. 11 Also see Quodl., IV, q. 17; "Alius est
actus assentiendi quo assentio alicui ita quod actus assentiendi
referatur ad aliquid, assentiendo complexo vel dissentiendo; puta,
assentiendo huic propositioni 'Haec propositio, homo est animale,
est propositio vera,' ubi haec propositio 'homo est animale' est
subjectum. Sed assentio huic propositioni 'homo est animale' in
se et absolute. Et hoc quia scio quod sic importatur per istam
propositionem sicut est in re."
81 sent., III, q. 11, X; "Si dicas quod ostenso aliquo
objecto diligibili, sine omni dictamine rationis, potest voluntas
illud diligere, et iste est bonus moraliter quia diligit quid
diligendum est etc., puta si formetur hoc complexum, "Hoc bonum
est diligibile" et intellectus non assentiat; tune est dubiurn
utrum illa dilectio sit bona moraliter. Respondeo, licet actus
ille sit bonus ex genere et non sit malus moraliter, tamen non
est virtuosus quia de ratione actus virtuosi est quod eliciatur
conformiter rationi rectae et respectu objecti convenientis et
quod habens talem actum sit sciens. Unde dicit Philosophus secundo Ethicorum, primo quod sit sciens, deinde quod sit eligens
(Nie. Ethics, II, 9, 1109a 20-29); 1mde si modo omnes circumstantiae requisitae ad actum virtuosum praeter rectam rationem
ponantur, non erit ille actus perfecte virtuosus. Et sciendum
quod actus dictandi intellectus non est formaliter complexus, sed
est actus assentiendi vel dissentiendi complexo jam formate, et
ex illo actu assentiendi generatur prudentia. Non autem ex formatione complexi." Also see Sent., III, q. 13, F.
Both Aristotle and Augustine substantiate Ockham's position that an act must be done knowingly and willingly to be
morally good or bad. This quotation clarifies what Ockham means
by !'sciens. 11 First, a person does not know what should be done
until the intellect judges that some directive is true. Secondly
a person must choose to follow the dictate of Right Reason; that
is, the moral agent must intentionally execute the dictate of
Right Reason because it is right. Both of these elements are con-·
tained in t:he notion of "conformity to Right Reason."
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Even the principle "the will ought to conform to Right Reason"

roust be intellectually confirmed or "dictated" before this directive is morally binding.

"Conformity," therefore, is a proportion

which obtains between the dictate (assent) of the intellect and
the command (assent) of the will to execute that dictate.

The

will is conformed to Right Reason when the intellectual assent
to a directive is matched by the affective and effective volitional assent to that directive.

And conformity to Right Reason must

be deliberate.

The will should act because of, or for the sake
of, a practical dictate. 82 The obligation embodied in Right

Reason's dictate is a dimension of human experience with its own
exigencies.

We are not justified in asking:

what we ought to do?

Why should we do

We are not permitted to translate moral

"ought" into "the pleasing," "the socially expedient" or even
"the salvific."

Ockham considers the "dictate" of Right Reason

sas a cause and object of every good act produced by the will. 5
82 sent., III, q. 12, CCC; "Confirmatur, quia nullus actus
est perfecte virtuosus nisi voluntas per illum actum velit dictatum a recta ratione propter hoc, quod est dictatum a recta
ratione. Quia si vellet dictatum a ratione, non quia dictatum
sed quia delectabile vel propter aliam causam, jam vellet illud
dictatum si solum esset ostensum propter apprehensionem sine
recta ratione. Et per consequens, ille actus non esset virtuosus, quia non eliceretur conformiter rectae rationi; quia hoc
est elicere conformiter rationi rectae, velle dictatum a ratione
recta propter hoc quid est dictatum. 11 Also see Quodl., III, q.
14, and Sent., III, q. 11, X.
8 3sent., III, q. 13, f; "Respondeo, actum elici conformiter rationi rectae est ipsum elici secundum rectam rationem regulantem et dictantem talem actum esse eliciendum; quid quidem
'die tare' si ve 'regulare' non est ali.ud quam speciali modo 'illum
actum causare,' sicut alibi patet. 11 Quodl., III, q. 15; " •.. ergo
ille actus voluntatis, qui non habet istam rationem pro objecto,
non est natus elici conformiter rationi rectae .•. 11 Right Reason
as an object of virtuous will-acts is discussed systematically
in the fourth chapter.
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A person must know what is right before he can choose to do what

is right.

The intellect dictates or assents that "The will ought

to conform to Right Reason" is true per

~

because this proposi-

tion expresses the sequence of essential, necessary causes for
any and every virtuous act.

When Ockham calls Right Reason a condition or necessary
cause of moral behavior his reasons cannot be catalogued as either
voluntaristic or rationalistic.

Ockham teaches that conformity

to Right Reason is a moral requirement because of revealed evidence and the natural evidence of human psychology.
gives necessary truth.

This evidence

God's will complements the rational

determination of the inner moral order.

Upon the certitude of

free will and the normative function of Right Reason's assent,
Ockham supports the "non-positive part" of his moral doctrine and
his v<;:tlue theory.

The simple, non-propositional act of judgment

passed upon directive propositions and commands functions itself
as the proximate, indispensable norm of volition.

To identify

and exhaust Ockham's doctrine of "recta ratio" with the complex,
propositional acts of Prudence and Conscience is an unfortunate,
vitiating oversight.

The assent of Right Reason is a generic and

formal feature of all moral behavior whereas the particular
directives of Prudence or Conscience may or may not enter a
concrete moral deliberation.
According to Ockham, it is not cogent to ask why one
should do what he judges ought to be done.

On the other hand, we

must ask vrhy the agent judges, in the first place, that sometbh1.g
ought to be done'?

r
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The Evidence for the Directives of Right Reason
Ockham's two-sided conception of "recta ratio" permits

that all true directives of Practical Reason be called "right
reasons."

Thus, a preliminary but trivial reason for Right

Reason's assent is that the agent reputes the directive to be
true.

"We assent to nothing unless what we consider to be true."

Why do we consider a proposition true?

If the will ought to con-

form to Right Reason, to what should Right Reason conform?

It

·remains to establish the evidence on which the particular directives of right reason are based.
Ockham often asserts that the intellect should not consider anything as true unless there is an evident or a revealed
reason for doing so.

To be precise, the foundation of every

warranted assent of the intellect rests in conceptual analysis,
.
. t ure. 84 "Ratio," "experientia," and "auctoexperience,
or s crip
ritas" are the sources or types of evidence to which the intellect
refers in substantiating the truth of any proposition--speculative
or practical.

The directive propositions of the Practical Intel-

lect are morally binding, (a) because Right Reason judges them
to be true directives, and (b) because ultimately either logical
84 sent., IV, q. 3, N; "Ideo dico quantum ad istum articulum quod praeter virtutes morales natas acquiri ex actibus nostris, non sunt aliquae aliae ponendae. Sed istud non potest
evidenter probari vel improbari sed quia pluralitas non est ponenda sine necessitate, nee apparet aliqua necessitas; nee per
rationem nee per experientiam nee per auctoritatem ... 11 Also see
~., I, d. 30, q. 1, E; Sent., III, q. 8, D; Sent., Prologue,
q. 11, (I, 319-320); Epistola ad Fratres MinoreSTManchester ed.,
III, 16); and De Sacramento Altaris, ed. T. Bruce Birch (Burli ngton, Iowa: Lutheran Literary Board, 1930), p. 126.
1
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analysis or experience or revelation verify these directives.

We

roust consider the psychological and metaphysical aspects of Ock-

bam' s position on valid evidence.
The mind performs two related acts; apprehension and
85 The act of apprehension produces a concept while the
~µdgment.
a:ct of judgment produces "knowledge."

,

~cts

Ockham describes these two

in the following way:
I say that assent (judgment) is twofold: One, by
which the intellect assents that something is or
that something is not or that something is good or
white. Another by which the intellect assents to
some proposition. The second distinction is that
apprehension is twofold: One is the composition
or division or the formation of a proposition. The
other which is the cognition of the proposition itself already formed just as the cognition of whiteness is called apprehension.86

Assent or judgment, therefore, must concern an object which is
apprehended.

The first kind of judgment has an individual thing

for an object.

Assent in this sense forms a proposition.

The

second kind of judgment. has a "complex," i.e., a proposition, for
an object.

This second type of judgment includes those

85 sent., Prologue, q. 1 (I, 16); "Inter actus intellectus
sunt duo actus quorum unus est apprehensivus, et est respectu
cuius libet quod potest terminare actum potentiae intellectivae,
sive sit complexum sive incomplexum; quia non solum apprehendimus
incomplexa sed etiam propositiones et demonstrationes et impossibilia et necessaria et universaliter omnia quae respiciuntur
a potentia intellectiva. Alius actus potest dici judicativus,
quo intellectus non tantum apprehendit objectum sed etiam illi
assentit vel dissentit. 11
860 uo dl ., V, q. 6 ; II Circa
.
•
•
d ico
•
primum,
quo d dup 1 ex es t
'assentus;' unus quo intellectus assentit aliquid esse vel aliquid
non esse vel aliquid esse bonum vel album, alius quo intellectus
assentit alicui complexo. Secunda distinctio est quod duplex eq;t
apprehensio; una est compositio vel divisio sive proposition.is
formatio, alio qua est cognitio ipsius complexi jam formati,
sicut cognitio albedinis dicitur apprehensio. 11
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judgments called Right Reason.
truth value of the proposition.

This judment assesses

When the intellect judges

-hie truth or falsity of a proposition, it then possesses know;.· fedge.
'
87 The truth or falsity of a statement depends upon the
Jborrespondence between the significance of the statement and the
...
.
. . .f' • d 88 Ultimately, therefore, the
actual
sta t e 0 f a ff airs
s1gn1~1e .
psychological causes of Right Reason's assent to "evident" direc.fives are acts of apprehension which point to the natures of
_things as the real or non-conceptual foundations of moral rules.
8 7Quodl., III, q. 6; "Circa primum dico quod actus assentiendi duplex est sicut actus sciendi. Unus quo aliquid scitur
' ~sse vel non esse; sicut scio quod lapis non est asinus, et tamen
nee scio lapidem nee asinum, sed scio quod lapis non est asinus.
Similiter assentio quod homo est animale. Alius est actus quo
aliquid scitur quo de aliquo habetur scientia; ita quod actus
~ciendi referatur ad aliquid.n
Properly speaking, the second
sense of "knowing" or "assenting" means that a proposition is
considered or "referred" in terms of its truth or falsity.
"Scientia," therefore, is to know what is true. See Aristotle,
~ Interpretatione, 4.
88Philotheus Boehner has examined Ockham's theory of
truth, signification and supposition most thoroughtly. See Boehner, CoJlected .Articles, pp. 174-267. Father Boehner's studies
indicate that Ockham's epistemology is a form of Realism, namely,
Realistic Conceptualisrn. Ockham teaches an immediate causal
connection between reality and conception; his doctrine of intuitive and abstractive cognition is meant to insure the immediacy
of this causal connection. Regarding Ockham's theory of truth,
Boehner says: "Verum and Falsurn predicated about a proposition
mean or express the correspondence between the proposition and
the fact; i.e., between the proposition as signum and the fact
as significatum. If, therefore, the proposition signifies the
state of thing or the thing as it is, the proposition is true;
if it signifies as it is not, the proposition is false." (p. 200)
To justify this analysis Boehner quotes Expositi.Q. Aurea, In Periherm., Prooem.,: "Sed veritas et falsitas sunt quaedarn praedicabilia de propositione importantia, quod est ita vel non est ita'
a parte significati, sicut denotatur per propositionem, quae est
sigm.un. Unde proposi tionem esse veram est: i ta esse in re,
sicut significatur per eum. 11

r
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Regarding "revealed" directives, Ockham claims that the

;J.

will will can be a cause why the intellect assents to a proposition.

An act of the will is a psychic reason for assent to a

proposition in two ways.

First, apprehension is simply the

recognition of an object or of a mental statement.

The recogni-

. tion of a simple object results in a concept; however, apprehension cannot account for the formation of concepts into proposi-

tions.

Hence, Ockham considers the will's command that a certain

proposition be formulated as a cause of the truth or falsity of
that proposition. 89 Secondly, the intellect's assent to a proposition which is already formulated and apprehended, can be
commanded by the will.

Some contingent propositions are judged

to be true because the will wishes to believe them.

The will can

freely choose to consider some propositions as authoritative and
therefore the intellect assents to them.

Because of an assent to

one thing, e.g., God, the intellect will also assent to other

8 9sent., II, q. 25, K; 11 Ideo dico quod causa quare plus
.
formatur propositio vera vel falsa, affirmativa vel negativa, est
voluntas. Quia voluntas vult formare unam et non aliam. Et ideo
actus qui apprehenditur post complexum formatur a notitiis incomplexis terminorum illius propositionis, et ab actu illius voluntatis et hoc generaliter; quia posito actu voluntatis quo vult
~ale complexum formari et positis notitiis incomplexis terminorum
J.llius complexi, necessario sequitur actus apprehendendi sive
formandi illud complexum--sicut effectus sequitur necessario ad
suam causam." Ockham continues in this question to affirm that
contingent propositions can be affirmed because of authority or
because of the will. Ibid., L; "Et si sit contingens tune illi
assentit intellectus aliquando propter auctoritatem, aliquando
propter voluntatem quia vult credere. 11
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things, e.g., the divine precepts.90
Apprehension and volition are thus the psychological
causes of every intellectual judgment.

The judgments of Right

Reason are based upon internal acts of apprehension and acts of
the will.

The psychological causes of a judgment give the means

by which the intellect formulates an act of assent or diss$nt.

Ockham holds that an act of apprehension and volition must precede

and cause every intellectual judgment.

Natural directives are
known to be true; positive mandates are believed to be true. 91
Thus, acts of apprehension which terminate at factual matters
verify or falsify the practical propositions which are known
naturally; i.e., known per~ or known through experience. 92
Acts of the will which command that the mind consider a given
proposition as certain are psychic causes of non-evident directives.
90 sent., II, q. 25, L; "Et si sit contingens (propositio)
tune illi assentit intellectus aliquando propter auctoritatem,
aliquando propter volentatem, quia vult credere. Si primo modo,
assentus respectu auctoritatis causat assentus respectu illius
propositionis. Si secundo modo, tune volitio cum notitiis incomplexis et apprehensione complexi causat assentum illum. Et de
similibus, simile est judicium, quia non potest certa ratio dari
quomodo causatur assentus vel dissentus respectu omnium propositionum. 11 Also see Sent., Prologue, q. 1 (I, 21).
91 sent., III, q. 12, QQ; "Intellectus nulli adheret nisi
propter evidentj.am rei aut auctori ta tern, vel propter imperium
volu.ntatis; sed sive sic adhereat sive sic, semper necessario
~dher~t posito illo propter quod ad.heret, puta evidentia rei vel
1mper1.o voluntatis. 11
.
92 sent., Prola'gue, q. 7 (I, 187); 11 0mne quid est evidenter
notum, aut est per se notum, aut notificatum est per 'per se nota,'
aut per experientiam mediante notitia intuitiva, et hoc mediate
Vel immediate." Also see Quodl., IV, q. 17; and Quodl., V, q. 6;
"Actus apprehensivus causat actum judicativum. 11
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For a number of reasons, the positive norms of right
reason, which are based upon a divine command, constitute the more
sensitive issue regarding the metaphysical foundations of Right
Reason.

For one thing, the command of God could establish every

simple action which is possible for a man to perform as a moral
obligation.

By "simple act" we mean those volitions or nolitions

which terminate at one individual object.

The same voluntary or

physical act could be now good and later evil because the will
of God now commands and later prohibits that action.

Secondly,

_/the positive commands of God do not express the intrinsic and
necessary goodness or evilness of certain actions, but rather the
divine freedom in determining which acts will be conducive to
salvation.
that:

Thus, Iserloh, Lagarde, Garvens and others, claim

(a) there is no metaphysical basis for the positive right

reasons because they are grounded in the unrestricted freedom and
omnipotence of the divine will and (b) there is no metaphysical
basis for the non-positive, natural directives of right reason
because they could be countermanded by God's absolute power to
"posit" the contrary of any natural directive. 93 Ockham, for
one, would not agree.
93 see E. Iserloh, Gnade und Eucharistie ... , pp. 58-59;
"In bezug auf Ocl\:ham musste man sagen: Das Freigewolltsein eines
von der Vernunft als geboten hingestellten Aktes macht dessen
Moralitat aus. Dabei ist noch zu bedenken, dass die Vernunft fur
das Gebotensein keine vom Sein geforderten Gri..inde beizubringen
vermag, worauf auch de Lagarde geblihrend hinweist. Wir haben
keinen Grund, von besonderer Rationalitat oder gar von Rationalismu.s in Ockhams Moralauffassung zu sprechen. Ein Weniger an
Vernunftgebundenheit des moralischen Handelns war fur jemand, der
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The positive directives of Right Reason signify some action which is neither good nor evil of itself; but which is
presently a moral obligation or prohibition because of a command

of a superior. 94

"To worship God .2!! Sunday" is a moral obligation

"posited" by God; "To drive on the right side of the road" is an
noch im Rahmen des Christlichen bleiben wollte, kaum moglich."
Professor Iserloh quotes G. de Lagarde who also finds a separation
between metaphysics and morality and concludes: "Ainsi le voluntarisme ockhamiste commande un rationalisme intransigeant dont
aucune ecole n'avait encore approche-. 11 Ockham, La Morale ... , p.
77. In his turn, Professor Lagarde quotes Anita--a:arvens' comment
that moral norms in Ockham have no connection to the nature of
things. Franz. Studien, 21, pp. 373-74. Earlier, and in an
article known to Professor Garvens, Father Gallus Manser, O.P.,
had asserted a break between ontology and moral doctrine in Ockham' s thought. See "Drei Zweifler am Kausalprinzip im 14. Jahrhundert," Jahrbuck fur Philosophie und spekulative Theologie 27
(1912), p. 412. These systematic studies have had an influence
upon the textbooks of the history of Medieval Philosophy. It is
somewhat common to read that Ockham "severs the bond between
metaphysics and ethics."

94Quodl., II, q. 14 (corr. by Vat.

~at., 3075. f. 20 vb);
"Circa secundum; sciendum quod moralis doctrina habet plures
partes, quarum una est positiva, alia non-positiva. Scientia
humana positiva est illa quae continent leges humanas et divinas
quae obligant ad prosequendum vel fugiendum illa quae nee bona
sunt nee mala nisi quia sunt prohibita vel imperata a superiore,
cuius est leges condere seu statuere. 11 Regarding the divine
positive laws, Ockham does not mean that all the moral precepts
which God has revealed are "positive." Many revealed directives
can also be known naturally. See Sent., Prologue, q. 12 (I, 347348); "Ad tertium dubium dico, distinguendo de habitu theologico
practico sicut de theologico speculative, quod sicut dictum est
in una quaestione quidam habitus theologicus speculativus est
notitia evidens et quidam non est evidens. Ita est in proposito
quod habitus practicus quidam est evidens, sicut ille quo evidenter cognoscitur quod 'Unicuique reddendum est quod suum est.'
'Nulli est pro bono malum reddendum.' Alius est non evidens,
sicut ille quo cognoscitur quod 'Corpus Christi in sacramento
altaris est adorandum,' et sic de aliis. 11 Thus, in many cases
the revea1ed commandments reaffirm directives which are "evident"
or known by the Practical Intellect naturally.
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obligation "posited" by the legitimate civil authorities in the
United States •. The intellect dictates that these acts ought to
be done propter auctoritatem.

That is, if the source of a direc-

tive is a legitimate authority "able to decide and establish
laws," then Right Reason dictates.that directive on the basis of
its authority.

The commands to "worship God on Sunday 11 or to

"drive on the right side of the road" are not "evident;" that is,
these directives do not command the agent to perform acts which
are necessarily and evidently good.

If these commands were put

into propositional forms, they would be contingent propositions.
The assent of Right Reason to these commands depends upon a prior
assent to the source, divine or civil, of the commands and not
upon conceptual analysis or direct experience of the positive
directive itself.
It is Ockham's position that many propositions of the
Practical Intellect are dependent upon speculative or metaphysical principles. 95 That is, some practical directives can be

95!1ent., Prologue, q. 12 (I, 359-360); "Dico quod scientia
moralis dupliciter accipitur; uno modo pro scientia quae est praecise de moribus qui sunt in potestate nostra, ita quod in omni
scito ponatur aliquid importans aliquid quod est in potestate
nostra aliter accipitur pro illa scientia secundum quod est tradita ab Aristotele et a philosophis et a Sanctis. Primo modo
scientia moralis est simpliciter practica et nullam partem speculativam habet, quia sic nullum complexum ibi habetur nisi quod
includit aliquid importans aliquid operabile a nobis cuius not.itia
est directiva magJs quam notitia incomplexa illius operabilis.
Et sic scient.ia moralis non speculatur aliquod verum nisi simplici ter practjcwn. Unde isto modo accipiendo scientiam moralem
istae ve:citates 'Ornne quod est in anima vel est passio vel potentia' etc., et 'Anima dividitur in intellectum practicum,' etc.,
et huiusmod:L quae ponuntur in libro Ethicorum, non pertinent ad
scientiam mora:i.E:m. Secundo modo, tales veritates pertinent ad
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known through speculative truths "because practical moral conclusions are ul tim.ately acquired in that knowledge."

Pertaining to

the "positive" directives of God, Ockham holds that metaphysical

scientiam moralem, et sic una pars scientiae moralis est simpli. citer speculativa et alia simpliciter practica. Et ratio est
' quia, sicut dictum est prius, mul tae conclusiones practicae
. dependent ex principiis speculabilibus et sciuntur per ea, et
· ideo volens tradere notitiam talium conclusionum practicarum
,. oportet quod utatur principiis speculabilibus ex quibus conclusiones illae sequuntur. Et propter hoc, in scientia morali tradita
a philosophis et a Sanctis ·inveniuntur multae veritates simpliciter
speculativae, sed vocant earn scientiam moralem quia conclusiones
practicae morales sunt ultima acquisita in illa scientia. 11 See
fil.9:· (I, 314).
96 Ibid. (I, 364); "Ad aliud respondeo, quod metaphysica
non est practica quia quamvis de Deo sint aliquae veritates prac-, ticae etiam naturali ter inventae, illas tamen_ non considerat metaphysicus, quia metaphysicus non considerat aliquid de Deo quod
sit in potestate nostra sed tantum illa quae non sunt in potestate
nostra, sicut quod 'Deus est incorruptibilis, simplex, perpetuus)
causa omnium' et sic de aliis, et ideo metaphysica est simpliciter
speculativa. Illa tamen quae considerantur a metaphysica possunt
esse principia ad probandum conclusiones practicas de Deo, sicut
ex hoc quod 'Deus est causa omnium, est summe dil"igibilis vel
honorandus, 1· vel aliquid huiusmodi. Sed illae conclusiones
practicae non pertinent ad metaphysicam sed ad aliquam aliam
scientiam moralem quae erit practica."
97Quaestiones super Li bros Physicorum, q. 136 ;. and Quodl.,
~' q. 1, both affirm that the existence of God can be proven and
in the former question, Ockham offers a demonstration for a "I?..ri~ eff~iens:"
Boehner has edited and analyzed these texts in
_~u.i.ie0"ect Articles, pp. 399-420.
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E..erfectissimum?

8

that God is good, 99 the practical conclusion

follows that Gqd ought to be loved and obeyed.

Ockham does not

maintain that the positive directives of Scripture signify acts
which are good or evil by nature.

But he does assert that altru-

istic love and obedience to God are good by nature.

The authority

of divine positive laws is grounded (a), in the facts of God's
supreme goodness and perfection which can be known through a
natural use of reason. and (b), in the end served by the fulfillment of those positive laws; namely, the love of God.

Surely,

98 sent., IV, q. 7, I; "Unde argumentum de causalitate et
activitate respectu effectus perfectioris vel imperfectioris in
creaturis non concludit universaliter causam esse perfectiorem
effectu; et ratio est, quia nulla creatura est causa totalis respecu alicuius effectus sed tantum partialis, quia in omni actione
creature concurrit Deus. Sed ex causalitate et activitate causae
totalis quae est totalis vel potest esse totalis respectu cuiuslibet effectus potest argui causam esse perfectiorem effectu. Et
sic solus deus est causa totalis vel esse potest causa totalis
respectu cuiuslibet effectus. Ideo sequitur quod Deus sit perfectior omni effectu producto: aliter, enim, periret omnis via
ad probandum Deum esse ens perfectissimum. 11

99 sent., Prologue, q. 1 (I, 7); "Ex isto sequitur quod
aliquae veritates naturaliter notae seu cognoscibiles sunt theologicae, sicut quod Deus est, Deus est sapiens, bonus etc., cum
sint necessariae ad salutem; aliquae autem sunt supernaturaliter
cognoscibiles, sicut: Deus est trinus, incarnatus et huiusmodi."
Also see Quodl., II, q. 6. In 1326, the papal commission at
Avignon censured Ockham for saying that "ex puris naturalibus,
possumus cognosccre istam propositionem: Deus est summum bonum.ll
See A. Pelzer, Revue d'Histoire eccl~siastique 18, p. 57; and J.
Koch, "Neue AkenstU.cke zu dem gegen Wilhe1m Ockham in Avignon
gefiihrten Prozess," Rescherch~ de Theologie ancienne et medievale
8 (1936), pp. 169-171. The papal commission refers to Sent., I,
d. 1, q. 5 (I, 464) in Ockham's corpus.

r
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Right Reason does not dictate irrationally when directing the
will to fulfill the divine positive laws. 100
Ockham maintains explicitly that the principles of
Practical Reason are non-positive directives which are valid and
binding "sine omni praecepto superioris."

Indeed, these princi-

ples govern the application of positive directives.

In spite of

God's absolute moral authority, the directives of Right Reason
.which are known
which

Ocl~ham

per~

cannot change.

Consider the directives

mentions as being "evident" and "known per se:"

the will ought to conform to Right Reason; every evil is avoidable and should be avoided; everything honest should be done;
every dishonesty should be avoided; 101 everything determined by
Right Reason to be done for the sake of a determined end and also
concerning the other circumstances, should be done; every good
dictated by reason should be elicited. 102 The truth of such
propositions does not depend upon a positive command of God;
their evidence rests in the meaning of the constitutive concepts.
As universal, necessary and "per

~

nota" directives, conceptual

lOOindeed, Ockham is explicit that the obligation to obey
God is consequent to "some cognition of God." Sent., I, d. 48,
q. 1, D: "Dicendum quod aliquis talis quo complacet voluntati
omne illud quid complacet voluntati divinae, qui debet esse semper in omni honeste usum rationis postquam ad aliqualem Dei cognitionem attingerit vel potuit attingere. 11 Also see Sent., III,
q. 12, PP. where Ockham claims that the directive 11 Nullus est
inducendus ad faciendum contra praecepta Dei sui" is known per se.
101Quodl., II, q. 14.

--

102

Sent., III, q. 11, Z.
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analysis can show these norms are true by definition.

Ockham's

definition of '.'moral good" and the derivation of virtue-definitions from the primary value term will be discussed in Chapter
Five.

For now, we merely assert that "moral good" is something

which should be willed according to Right Reason; a moral evil
is something which should not be willed according to Right Reason.
The directives which are per

~ ~

are various

Ockham's basic definition of good or evil.

restatements of

In a given situation,

to tell a falsehood might be a "positive" right or wrong, but in
either case the moral agent is evidently obliged to pursue what
is right and flee what is wrong.

Thus, these evident norms of

morality do not signify absolutely the simple nature of some
action; rather, they are composed of connotative concepts which
signify an action and connote acts of will and Right Reason.
Divine commands or circumstances could change "what" is now
proper, but propositions known

per~

would still be valid direc-

tives on "how" the agent should respond to the changeable commands and circumstances.

The norms of morality which are

necessary and known through themselves are formal or analytically
true statements.

The meaning of these norms remains constant in

spite of variable circumstances and the mutable will of God, which
might alter the moral determination of particular acts.

The

validity of the natural or "evident" directives of Right Reason
depends logically upon the meaning of moral goodness and
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metaphysically upon the nature of moral goodness. 103
search for the.foundations of the evident

11

Thus, the

Right Reasons" keeps

returning to the executive powers of morality--the free will and
assent of Right Reason which cause and define moral goodness.
The principles of Practical Reason are "formal" directives in
that they describe and prescribe the generic features of moral
behavior rather than specific acts.

Indeed, with Ockham it ap-

.pears that human nature as a moral norm shrinks to the imperativegiving nature of Right Reason's judgment.
The formalistic character of the directives of Right
Reason which are known per se has been noticed

before~ 04 That is

l03Quodl., III, q. 14; "Nullus actus est moraliter bonus
vel virtuosus nisi sibi assistat actus volendi sequi rectam rationem, vel quia causatur a tali velle, puta, velle honorare
patrem vel continuare honorem quia volo facere quid recta ratio
dictat. Et similiter, volo benefacere tibi quia volo quid dictat
recta ratio .•. Et ideo rectitudo actus non est aliud quam ipse
actus qui debite elicitur secundum rectam rationem." Thus, in
answer to the question, What is moral goodness or rectitude? Ockham responds that it is the will act itself ·which is elicited in
conformity to Right Reason. This metaphysical stance supports
the prescriptive propositions which are known per se. Ockham
explicitly makes the connection between Right Reason and the factual state of affairs. See Sent., III, q. 13, S; "hoc solum voco
realiter apparenter bonum vel malum, quid judicatur ab intellectu
bonum vel malum. Et si judicetur ab intellectu recto, non errante,
esse tale, tune non solum est apparenter bonum vel malum sed
realiter, quia sic dictat intellectus esse sicut est in re."
Needless to say, Ockham considers the laws ordained by God as
"revealed" facts which an "unerring" use of Reason would recognize.
104E.g., Anita Garvens, Franz Studien, 21, p. 248; "Wenn
..
fur Ockham die allgemeinen ethischen Prinzipien schliesslich doch
mehr als nur formaJ.e Satze sind, wie im Laufe der folgenden
Untersuchung sich zeigen wird, so liegt das vornehmlich in seiner
glaubigen Annahme der Offenbarung als der Erkenntnisquelle fur
die vom Willen Gottes festgesetzte Sittenregel, die augenblicklich
und ordinate giiltig ist. Sie allein liefert Ockham den Inhalt
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to say, these directives are a priori statements which are true
by definition put which give little information about concrete

acts.

These general directives are not self-sufficient in estab-

lishing which particular acts are good or evil.

A person knows

by conceptual analysis that to do what is right remains his

unchangeable obligation; but on the basis of a directive which
is known per .§§., the moral agent does not know what particular

act is right.

Likewise, we know a priori that it is either

raining or not raining outside; but without knowing whether or
not we should take an umbrella.
While it is true that the universal norms called "right
reasons," which are known per.§§., have a formal character; nevertheless, Ockham provides a mechanism for adding "content," i.e.,
reaching particular, practical conclusions.

Namely, Ockham's

analysis of recta ratio as prudence indicates how a person applies
general norms, whether they are known through revelation or
through themselves, to particular situations.

It is the function

der sicheren allgemeinen ethischen Prinzipien." Erwin Iserloh
calls Ockham's ethic a "formalism" because the meaning of all
moral directives reduces to conformity to the will of God. Gnade
~ Eucharistie •.. , pp. 66-67.
It is undeniable that, for Ockham, the general ethical
principles which are known per se, are formalistic statements.
It is not true, however, that the will of God is the only means
of determining what particular acts are good or evil. The divine
will adds "positive" content to the general propositions of moral
science. But also, acts of prudence are means by which general
principles are brought to particular, practical conclusions which
are known naturally. See Sent., III, q. 15, G. And given a
"contentful" directive issued by God, e.g., "parents should be
honored," this directive is operative only through an experiential,
J?rudential judgment, e.g., "these are my parents. 11 See SummulaEl
1g Libros fhysicorum, I, c. 4.
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of prudence to consider the various circumstances of an act as
105
determinants of the correctness of that act.
Experience is

a necessity for the proper determination of a moral question
since the particular and individual aspects of an act--e.g., the
principal object or end, the common object which is the exercise

j;

;·
~·.

r~

f
~

of a human potency, the time and the place--affect the propriety
of that act. 106 For Ockham, morality is not simply a question of
deductions from a priori norms.

The effort to know what is right,

~

L

105 sent., I, d. 35, q. 6, C; "Sicut ostensum est prius,
, logica, rhethorica,grammatica et artes mechanicae sunt simpliciter
t practicae et tamen non sunt dictativae, sed dictamen de exercitio
illarum notitiarum practicarum non pertinet ad istas artes sed
ad prudentiam pertinet. Quod, autem, ad prudentiam pertineat
patet quia omnis actus imperatus qui virtuose elici potest ad
prudentiam pertinet. 11 Also see, Sent., Prologue, q. 11 (I, 316);
"Potest tamen distingui de practica, quia quaedam est dictativa
et quaedam tantum ostensiva. Prima est illa qua determinate
dictatur aliquid esse faciendum vel non faciendum; et sic loquitur
Philosophus VI Ethicorum et III De Anima. Et isto modo nee logica
nee grammatica nee rhetorica estpractica, nee etiam ars quaecumque mechanica, quia nulla istarum dictat aliquid esse faciendum
vel fugiendum, sicut ars mechanica non dictat quod domus est
facienda, sed hoc pertinet ad prudentiam qua scitur quando est
facienda et quando non, et quando est operandum et quando non ...
sed ad prudentiam pertinet dictare quod tali tempore est facienda
vel sic est agendum vel sic."

i·

106
sent., III, q. 10, N; "Respondeo, omnes circumstantiae
actus voluntatis sunt objecta partialia illius actus; ita quod
finis in omni actu est objectum principale sicut prius patuit,
aliae circumstantiae sunt objecta secundaria, partialia respectu
illius actus. Exemplum, si enim ad hoc quod actus voluntatis
quo aliquis vult orare deum sit perfecte virtuosus requirantur
de necessitate istae circumstantiae: quia velit orare propter
honorem dei seclrr1dum rectum dictamen rationis in tempore statuto,
. . puta, die dominico, in loco determinato, puta, in ecclesia; tune,
iste actus sic virtuosus habet honorem dei pro objecto principali,
actum orandj pro objecto communi, rectam rationem, diem dominicum
et ecclesiam pro objectis secundariis et partialibus."
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.. ,here a:nd now, requires that a person consider the variable factors
of each

situat~on.

The concrete decision that "I should do this,"

or "I should not do this" involves the facts which surround this
ac t ·

The circumstances or obJ·ects of a will-act are various

,determinants of the act's virtuousness.

Likewise, these circum-

stances are the various means or criteria by which the intellect
can determine the propriety of an intended act.
The positive directives of Right Reason, therefore, which
are based upon divine authority depend on the fact that God is
~h~ Summum Bonum. 107 The evident directives which are known per
.
;

.se are verified by the nature of a good act.

In either case, the
dictate of Right Reason is generated for the sake of an end; 108

:-

l07Sent., I, d. 1, q. 4 (I, 447); "Ad secundum dico, quod
.sol us- Deus est summe diligendus, quia est summum bonum." Also,
Sent., I, d. 1, q. 1 (I, 375-376); "Secunda conclusio est quod
, .Deus non est objectum usus ordinati, quia si sic, aut esset
objectum volitionis ordinatae aut nolitionis. Non nolitionis,
.quia nullus potest ordinate odire Deum; nee volitionis, quia tune
posset aliquid plus amari ordinate quam Deus. Similiter, finis
ultimus non est ad aliquid aliud referibilis, sed Deus est simpliter finis ultimus.
Tertia conclusio est quod omne aliud a Deo potest esse
objectum usus ordinati. Hoc probatur, quia omne aliud a summe
acceptato potest assumi in facultatem voluntatis propter summe
acceptatum; sed Deus ordinate summe acceptatur, ergo omne aliud
a Deo potest ordinate assumi in facultatem voluntatis propter

·neum."

108sent., Prologue; q:. 10 (I, 290-291); "Circa primum
dico quod intellectus practicus est respectu principiorum
practicorum et etiam respectu conclusionum practicarum. Et ideo
intellectus practicus est respectu finis, quando scilicet de
aliquo fine judicatur quod est appetendus vel prosequendus. Et
hoc est intelligendum quia est respectu unius complexi quod affirmat aliquem finem esse appetendum, et istud est primum principiurn practicum in operando. Et hoc modo dicit Philosophus quod
'sicut principium in speculabilibus, ita finis in agibilibus.' Et
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~

k

~ the end in the former case being the Ultimate End; in the latter
case being the production of a moral end or obligatory act.

nam

Ock-

shows no fear that the validity of divine positive laws might

undermine the validity of the formal principles of Right Reason.

On the contrary, Ockham teaches a single moral doctrine which
contains positive and evident norms.
are known per
sions.

~

The moral principles which

give the structure and framework of moral deci-

Right Reason necessarily assents to these principles

because they invariably signify
.goodness.

~he

essential causes of moral

Positive laws add content to this .austere framework.

Right Reason assents to the divine positive laws as deriving from,
and conducive to, the Greatest Good.

It is then, with the con-

tent or specific norms of morality that Ockham finds a certain
"relativity" here.

Those who call Ockham a moral voluntarist are

partially correct.

But only partially.

Reason as well as faith

militate against an intrinsic, native and unchangeable moral value
in simple acts.
Consider the Decalogue or Ten Commandments as examples of
non-formal, moral norms since these directives command or prohibit
specific acts as good or evil.

The formal directives or universal

"right reasons" which are known per .§.Q command goodness and pro. hibit evilness in general; the Decalogue precepts determine certain
acts as good or evil.

Are the ten commandments "evident," or are

they positive norms?
ratio huius est, quia voluntas nihil agit nisi propter finem .•• 11
See Aristotle; Physics, II, c. 9 (200a 15-24).

r

;
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Ockham never speaks of the Decalogue as moral rules which
are known per~ in the philosophical-theological works. 10 9

l09In the political works, Ockham finds occasion to discuss the notions of common law, natural law, and j(s gentium more
extensively. In the Opus Nonaginta Die~, c. 99 Manchester ed.,
II, 747); for example, Ockham claims that the Ten Commandments
were part of the law of nature before they were promulgated by
Moses. In the same work Ockham asserts that the natural law is
immutable (c. 66, p. 581). In the Octo Quaestiones de Potestate
Papae, q. 1, c. 12 (Man~hester ed.,--r;-245); Ockham speaks of
certain laws of the Old Testament which are known to oblige without dis~ensation. In the Dialogus III, II, I, X (Lyons edition,
F. 235r), Ockham considers the Decalogue precepts as "absolute
natural precepts" and without any condition, modification or
determination. These texts might incline one to think that the
commandments of the Decalogue are known per se since they are
characterized by immutability and unchangeableness. Such is not
the case. Ockham recognizes the right of the Creator to counte_r-·
mand the laws of nature. "Secunda absurditas est quad papa de
plenitudine potestatis posset contra legem divinam et jus naturae,
praesertim in hiis in quibus potest Deus contra huiusmodi; et ita,
quemad.modum Deus praecepit--nec contra fas praecepit--Abrahae ut
filium suum innocentem occideret, quia Deus est dominus vitae et
mortis, cum tamen ad legem divinam et jus naturae pertineat non
occidere innocentem, posset papa de plenitudine potestatis praecipere fidelibus occidere innocentes, et fideles Christi obedirent;
quod sapit haeresim manifestam." An PrinceI?s, c. 5 (Manchester
ed., I, 245). If there are cases in which natural laws, such as
the law not to take an innocent life, are not in effect; there
are also cases in which the divine laws are not operative. "Si
enim leges, non solum humanae, sed etiam divinae, in necessitate
cessant et in eis excipitur necessitas ... multo fortius privilegia
humana cessant et in eis necessitas excipi debet. 11 (Ibid., c. 8,
p. 259).
-.
These texts from Ockham's polemical tracts indicate that
he considers the Ten Commandments to be natural laws and revealed,
divine laws. There are exceptions to the validity of these mandates; both because God can order the opposite of some mandate and
because human events admit of extreme situations in which these
mandates are dispensed. Ockham implies that these special cases
or exceptions "prove the rule;" rather than denying validity of
the prohibition against killing, for instance, the case of Abraham
or the case of a just war, reveal the spirit or intention of the
law. Ewart Lewis' study of Ockham's political ideas (Medieval
Political Ideas, Vol. II, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1954) finds
that the Venerabile Inceptor makes constant use of the principle
that the authority of an office or a law is measured by the e:ad
for which that office or law exists. " Thus in Occam's system
the normal pattern of government in the Christian commonwealth,
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;

~owever,

Ockham does mention that certain revealed mandates can

pe known naturally.

-

reddendum

~

guid

For instance, the directives that "Unicuique

~

est," "Nulli est pro bono malum reddendum, 11

~d "~

est honorandus" are known through scripture and "evi110
dently."
Furthermo:i;e, the acts of P-_raying and giving alms are
generically good while acts of theft and fornication are evil "ex
111
genere."
On the basis of these texts, it would seem that Ock-

·ham considers the precepts of the decalogue as "evident" or

.naturally known moral norms.

On the other hand, Ockham says that

''hate for God, theft, adultery, etc.," are acts which could be
~one

meritoriously by the earthling, implying that the Decalogue

is a series of divine, positive laws which could change

was bordered by a frontier of special cases which required a more
tundamental criterion than could be derived from traditional right
or official fiat. For the solution of problems that arose on
that frontier he was willing to make use of precedent and canon
l~w, but he would not admit their validity against the imperative
'of a particular situation. Even the prescriptions of revelation
must be understood 'with their exceptions."' (p. 551, Lewis re-:ters to De Imperatorum, c. 11; and Breviloquium, II, c. 14, in
support of his statement.) The "exceptions" to natural or _divine
law are those peripheral situations in which such laws were not
intended to be authoritative; the "exceptions" clarify the application of the rule.
note 94.

110 Sent., Prologue, q. 12 (I, 348 and 364.
)

-

See above,

111 sent., III, q. 12, N; "Sexta distinctio est quod aliq~is actus est bonus ex genere vel malus, aliquis ex circumstantia, aliquis ex principio meritorio. Exemplum primi quantum ad
actum bonum ex genere, sicut orare, dare elemosinam sive velle
talia facere absolute sine omni circumstantia bona vel mala.
~xemplum quantum ad actum malum ut furtum facere, velle fornicari
absolute sine aliquae circumstantia bona vel mala, de quibus di~
cunt philosophi et sancti quod statim nominata convoluta sunt cum
malitia."
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·1 112
JDOillentari Y·

If the Ten Commandments are simply positive pre-

cepts, then the acts which are commanded or forbidden there, cannot be evidently known as "good" or "evil."

A reference to Duns

f scotus, with whom Ockham is in basic agreement regarding the

KDecalogue,
,
~

~

will set the stage for Ockham's own view.

Scotus asserts that most of the Ten Commandments do not

i~

r belong

,.

to the "law of nature," strictly speaking.

The commands

5·

! of the

Second Table--Honor thy father and mother, Do not bear

f

r false witness, Do not commit adultery, etc.--cannot be known per
'',.
f

-~

nor deduced from principles known per ££·

One reason for

· Scotus' position is that the bible and experience offers examples
~-

t

of situations in which these commandments were dispensed.
instance, the Israelites were

com.~anded

For

to despoil the Egyptians

before the exodus, and persons in extreme need may take what is
"

"'

necessary to preserve their life, although both of these cases
-'appear contrary to the prohibition against stealing. 113 Scotus,
-however, after a lengthy analysis of the "relativity" of most of
the precepts of the Decalogue, continues in the next question to
say that every lie is a sin. 114 His reason is that the term "lie"
112 Sent., II, q. 19, O; Sent., IV, q. 14, D•
·note 116. - ·

.See below,

ll3Scotus, Comm. Ox., III, d. 37, q. unica, nos. 5-10.
Efrem Bettoni, O.F.M.-,-Duns Scotus: The Basic Principles of
Hi~ PhilosoJ2hY, trans. by Bernadine Bonansea (Washington: Catholic
.University Press, 1961), pp. 170-174; and C. R. S. Harris, Duns
Scotus, Vol. II, The Philosophical Doctrines of Duns Scotus--COXford: The Clarendon Press, 1927'J'":-pp. 304-310;-for these texts and
competent surveys of Scotus' ethics.
114
Scotus, Comm. Ox., III, d. 38, q. unica, n. 6 (XV, 870);
"Aliter dicitur quodlffientiri' ex ratione sua dicit intentionem
S~e
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implies a bad and blameworthy intention on the part of the agent.
In the same way, Ockham maintains that the prohibitions
against the simple acts designated by the terms "murder," "adultery," and
morality.

"covetousnes~"

are not necessary and immutable laws of

Ockham takes the relativity of moral norms further

than Scotus did since the Subtle Doctor held that at least the
command to love God was the necessary and unchangeable standard
of morality. 115 Ockham holds that God could validly command a
person to hate Him.

Yet, Ockham speaks of acts that are "generic-

ally good;" and non-formal precepts of the Decalogue which are
evident.

Ockham clarifies this ambiguity by considering the

terminology contained in the moral prohibitions.

"Theft,"

"adultery," and "hate for God" are wrong acts because these terms
co-signify prohibitive circumstances; and the divine commands are
116
moral "circumstances" for Ockham.
Such terms indicate a
malam, quia intentionem decipiendi; licet autem aliqui actus non
includentes intentionem malam, possint aliquando esse boni ex
aliqua bona circumstantia, actus tamen includens secum intentionem
malam, nunquam potest esse bonus quia includit formaliter malum
'velle,' ita est in proposito."
115 scotus, Comm. Ox., III, d. 37, q. unica, n. 5 (XV,
826); "De praecepti"S"aUtemprimae tabulae .•. ista sunt stricte de
lege naturae, quia sequitur necessario si est Deus, est amandus
ut Deus ... " Ockham asserts that the command "hate God" or "Do not
love God" could issue from God as sole cause. But he insists that
4!! every instan_£_El:, the complex act of "loving God above all" is
intrinsically and necessarily good. Quodl., III, q. 13.
116 sent., II, q. 19, O; "Ad aliud dico quod licet odium
Dei, furari-;-acrulterari habeant malam circumstantiam annexam et
E.~m~lia de ..£2.!Q!!lUni lege, quatenus fiunt ab aliquo qui ex praecepto
~J.VJ.no obligatur ad contrarium; sed quantum ad esse absolutum in
illis actibus possunt fieri a Deo sine omni circumstantia mala

r

tt
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[ deliberate violation of a moral obligation which the agent recog~~

~

nizes.

The physical act signified by "theft" or "adultery" could

be done without guilt, but only on the condition that extreme
circumstance or a direct command of God dispense one from his
Qbligation to the contrary.
Ockham requires that the necessity attributed to the

f Decalogue precepts be logically apparent.

f,
~·.

When the divine com-

mands are stated proposi tional1y, or when the mind formulates

~.

~,'"

~

these directives through natural evidence, their necessary truth

l

derives from the constitutive concepts.

~-

.

t

If the Decalogue precepts

~.: '. signify the "absolute being" of specific acts, then they are not

!

.· necessarily true.

If, on the other hand, these mandates signify

annexa. Et etiam meritorie possunt fieri a viatore, si caderent
t(.. sub praecepto di vino sicut nunc de facto eorum opposi ta cadunt
·. sub praecepto divino. Et stante praecepto divino ad opposita
eorum non potest aliquis tales actus meritorie nee bene exercere;
• quia non fiunt meritorie nisi caderent sub praecepto divino et
~ si fierent a viatore meritorie, tune non dicerentur nee nominarentur 'furtum,' 'adulterium,' 'odium,' etc., quia ista nomina significant tales actus non absolute sed connotando vel dando int telligere quod faciens tales actus per praeceptum divinum obliga~ tur ad oppositum et ideo quantum ad totum significatum quid
L nominis talium nominum significant circumstantias malas; et quanJ tum ad hoc intelligunt sancti et philosophi quod ista statim nom, inata convoluta sunt cum malicia. Si autem caderent sub praecepto
J divino, tune faciens tales actus non obligaretur ad oppositum et
per consequens tune non nominaretur 'furtum,' 'adulterium,' etc."
By "common law," Ockham means those revealed moral laws
Those laws of ethics whose exceptions ref. Which generally obtain.
l. quire God's "special dispensation" belong to the "common law,"
l meant by God to be followed by all men. Father Lucan Freppert,
~ ~ B~ of Morality ... , pp. 223-24, shows the importance of
~ quoting paragraph 11 0 11 of question nineteen in its entirety.
Ock~ ~am claims that the simple acts described by the terms "theft,"
~·
adultery," etc., might be commanded by God. On the other hand,
~- Ockham could well assert that theft is always wrong because as ·we
. understand this concept, it signifies a simple act against ~'s
.\ mres_~ obligation.

l.:
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specific acts as ordered or forbidden by God then the Decalogue
is a series of necessary, indispensable moral norms.

Scotus in-

serts the connotation of an "evil intention" into the meaning of
concepts which stand for acts which are always evil.

Ockham seems

more confident in including "divinely prohibited" in the descrip;tion of such acts.

Both indicate that the concept of which "evil"

is predicated necessarily cannot have a purely descriptive content
and still attain the standards required for analytical truth.

The

natural evidence by which Right Reason might judge that, say,
"murder is wrong" receives but meager treatment by Ockham.

He

objects to the doctrine that "for one thing, there is one essential final cause," and thereby excludes a source of natural
evidence which Scholastics such as St. Thomas find significant.
Ockham gives only "quasi" validity to the moral uses of finality.
To all authorities, I respond that they treat the end
which according to Right Reason (at least in most
cases) ought to be intended if everything were ordered
suitably. Nevertheless, if it is not actually intended
then it is not truly and properly a final cause.117
We might well wish that Ockham had devoted more time to "the
order between things" as a basis of natural moral norms.

His

treatment shows the logician who is more concerned with the
conceptual formulation of necessary norms.
117 sent., Prologue, q. 11 (I, 309); "Praeterea, unius rei
est una causa finalis essentialis, sed si omne tale intentum esset
causa finalis, essent plures causae finales, cum talia plura possint intendi:
Ad omnes auctoritates respondeo quod procedunt de fine qui
secundum rectam rationem--saltem ut in pluribus--deberet intendi
si omnia essent convenienter ordinata, et ideo quasi ex natura sua
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Both

the political works and the philosophical-theologi-

cal texts, therefore, suggest that the precepts of the Decalogue
are known naturally and evidently as well as by revelation.

The

decalogue precepts, however, should not be considered as necessary
moral norms in the sense that they indicate acts whose "absolute
being" is good or evil.

These moral norms are necessary only in

the sense that connotations which Ockham associates with the
names of "theft," "adultery," "murder," etc., make these acts evil
by definition.

Regarding natural knowledge, Ockham points out

that even the pagan philosophers abstained from acts like fornication because such acts are generally inconsistent with worthy,
natural ends. 118 The impact of Christian Revelation upon natural
morality does not change "what" is right or wrong, but "why" the
agent acts.

Regarding revealed knowledge, Ockham indicates that

the acts commanded or prohibited by the Decalogue are ordinarily
habet quod sit ordinabilis ad talem finem. Si tamen non actualiter
intendatur non est vere et proprie causa finalis." Also see Sent.,
I, d. 48, q. 1, C.
118 sent., IV, q. 3, S; "Et quando dicitur quod virtutes
, philosophorum fuerunt ejusdem rationis cum virtutibus nostris
(Christianis). Nego et dico quod virtutes morales distinguntur
secundum distinctionem objectorum partialium. Nunc autem finis
est objectum partiale virtutis, sicut aliis dictum est; nunc
autem philosophi in acquirendo virtutes morales habuerunt alium
finem quam Christum. Verbi gratia, abstinet christianus ab actu
fornicandi propter Deum et quia Deus praecepit sibi abstinere,
ita quod Deus est hie causa finalis vel praeceptum istius absinentiae; et sic de omnibus aliis virtutibus acquisitis a bono
christiano, quia semper Deus est principalis finis intentus.
Philosophus, autem, licet abstineat a talibus, tamen totaliter
propter alium finem vel propter conservationem naturae vel ad
perficiendum in scientia vel propter aliquid tale. Igitur aliud
fuit objectum partiale abstinentiae philosophi et boni christiani." Also see Sent., III, q. 10, I; Sent.,III, q. 12, CCC.
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'conducive or detrimental to the achievement of man's Ultimate End.
However

these substantive norms are known, the circumstances of

the actions--the time, place, end and the command of God concern-

~

ing that act--are included ini:he meaning of actions which are
conceptualized as "obligatory. 11119 Consequently, the non-formal

I

directives or right reasons such as the Ten Commandments might

r

be

I:

precepts invariably connote contingent circumstances and pre-

I

~·.

kno~n

naturally or through scripture, but in either case these

.f suppose the conscious, deliberate and voluntary response of those
f
~

~·

L·

~

subject to these directives.
Previous interpreters have placed an exaggerated emphasis
upon the absolute power of God to posit moral obligations as the
reason for the "relativity" and contingency of moral rules in
Ockham's ethic.

While it is true that Ockham's belief in the

omnipotence of God prompts him to assert that God could order any
simple action possible to man as a moral obligation, it is also
true that Ockham has philosophical reasons for considering nonformal moral rules as contingent.

First, a madman could perform

the opposite of every divine and natural law without moral fault~ 20
ll9sent., IV, q. 3, L; "Contra, impossibile est virtutem
moralem esse sine suo objecto, quia sicut impossibile est quod
aliquis intelligat se intelligere nisi intelligat, ita impossibile
est talem virtutem esse sine tali objecto. Nunc autem objecta partiali.a virtutis moralis sunt circumstantiae, sicut locus et tempus,
inter quae est precipua recta ratio, cuius actus debet conformari
ad hoc. quod sit virtuosus perfecte." Also see Sent., III, q. 10,

o.

,

--

120sent., III, q. 11, Z; "Sciendum est quod recta ratio
requiritur ad perfectam virtutem et actualis, et ideo ebriosus
et :furiosus et pueri, qui non ha bent usus rationis non peccant
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In a
~.

I

similar way, God concurs in the production of every human

action since He is the immediate cause of the "absolute being" or
positive being of every hwnan act; yet God cannot sin. 121 These
considerations reflect and support Ockham's metaphysic of goodness
since the "absolute being" of any act--that is, an existential and
individual reality as isolated from its extrinsic causes--is
.

neither moral nor immoral.

The created will is completely free

to order and re-order the ends and means of volition.

Every

object accepted by the will, every individual whi.ch terminates an
act of volition, might be directed by the agent's motive or intent
to something else.

Hence, every action commanded by the Decalogue,

and even the love of God, could be performed with malice because
of an evil intention in the w.ill. 122

Ockham devotes the first

coram Deo; quia nullus ignoranter peccat secundum Augustinum.
Unde, ebrius non habens usus rationis committens adulterium non
peccat quia licet habeat volitionem respectu talis actus et
intentionem, non habet rectum dictamen rationis; idea non peccat. 11
Also see Sent., I, d. I, q. 1 (I, 378-379).
121 sent., II, q. 19, F; "Potest Deus causare actum obiendi

Deum quantum ad esse absolutum in actu in voluntate creata. Probatur, quia Deus potest omne absolutum causare sine omni alio
quid non est idem cum illo absoluto; sed actus odiendi Deum quantum ad esse absolutum in eo non est idem cum difformitate et
malitia in actu, ergo Deus potest causare quicquid absolutu.m est
in actu odiendi Deum vel nolendi non causando aliquam difformitatem vel malitiam in actu, ergo etc ... " In Sent., I, d. 47, q. 1,
Ockham takes up the question of "whether God can order that evil
. be done?" Ockham can avoid attributing the production of evil to
God, even though he holds that God is a partial cause in every
instance of human causality, by distinguishing the metaphysical
being of an act from the obligation to avoid that act which is
extrinsic and accidental. Also see Sent., IV, q. 14, D.
·

122 sent., II, q. 19, Q; "Illud etiam quid assumit est

falsun1 quod dilectio Dei sit semper bona propter de bi tum finem,
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distinction of the Ordinatio to various questions on "enjoyment"
(frui) and "use" (uti).

These terms designate acts of will assuming something "for its own sake or for the sake of another. 11123
Because God is the Ultimate End, God should be enjoyed or loved
for His own sake and cannot be ordinately "used" or loved for the
sake of something other than God. 124 Everything other than God--

~

quia aliquando potest esse mala et propter indebitum finem; puta,
quando amo Deum amore concupiscentiae." Also see the principal
objection in Quodl., III, q. 13.
12 3sent., I, d. 1, q. 1 (I, 374); "Circa quod primo videndum est quomodo distinguitur actus utendi ab actu fruendi; secundo,
quod est objectum actus utendi. Circa primum sciendum quod aliquis potest assumere aliquid in facultatem voluntatis dupliciter:
vel propter se vel propter aliud. Primo modo aliquid assumitur
in facultatem voluntatis quando aliquid praesentatum voluntati per
intellectum (etiam si sine omni alio praesentaretur) assummeretur
in facultatem voluntatis. Secundo modo assumitur in facultatem
volUl1tatis quando aliquid assumitur in facultatem voluntatis alio
praesentato, ita quod si illud aliud non praesentaretur voluntati
vel non assumeretur in facultatem voluntatis illud non assumeretur
in facultatem voluntatis."
124Ibid., 375-376; "Secunda conclusio est quod Deus non
est objectu.IllU.Sus ordinati, quia si sic, aut esset objectum volitionis ordinatae aut nol~tionis. Non nolitionis, quia nullus
potest ordinate odire Deum; nee volitionis, quia tune posset
aliquid plus amari ordinate quam Deus. Simi.liter, finis ultimus
non est ad aliquid aliud referibilis, sed Deus est simpliciter
finis ultimus.
Tertia conclusio est quod omne aliud a Deo potest esse
objectu.m usus ordinati. Hoc probatur, quia omne aliud a summe
acceptato potest assumi in facultatem voluntatis propter summe
acceptatum; sed Deus ordinate summe acceptatur; ergo omne aliud
a Deo potest ordinate assumi in faculatem voluntatis propter
Deum, et per consequens, omni alio contingit ordinate uti. Major
patet, quia omne aliud a summe acceptato aut est bonum aut malum.
Si bonum, potest esse amatum propter summe acceptatum. Si sit
malum, potest ordinate esse nolitum a voluntate propter summe
acceptatum. Igitur omne aliud a summe acceptato potest ordinate
assumi. in facultatem voluntatis propter ipsum." Notice that Ockham "proves" this argument; statements which are believed; i.e.,
"cred.abilia," cannot be demonstrated .
....,...,

··--
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persons, virtues, acts--should be accepted by the moral agent as
means to the Ultimate End.

Thus, Ockham establishes the required

priority of the will's affection and

t~e

moral direction of life

in the first distinction of his Commentary.

Consequently, every

object of the will's affection other than God is not valuable-initself but ought to be valued for the sake of God.

No simple act

of the human agent is good-in-itself; but every complex act could
be good if directed to, and ordained by, the Ultimate End. 125
12 5The first distinction of Ockham's Ordinatio, in our
interpretation, is the clearest and most systematic presentation
of his ethical program. The inspiration of this distinction
flows from St. Augustine, De Trinitate, X, 11, where Augustine
discusses fruition and use-Cfrui et uti); and Aristotle, Nie.
Ethics, I, c. 7, where Aristotle considers three kinds of ends
and asserts that the end chosen for itself and never for the sake
of another is simply perfect and the ultimate goal of action.
These precedents are accepted by Ockham and developed as the
framework of his moral doctrine. By identifying the Ultimate End
as God, Ockham establishes the priorities of human love, specifies
the intrinsically and primarily good act, and formulates the paradigm relation of end and means. Ockham's ethical doctrine, both
its positive and non-positive parts, elucidates the procedure of
the viator toward the Ultimate End. Erich Hochstetter has noticed
the general direction of Ockham's ethical thought (Franz. Studien,
32, pp. 9-16), and indicated that Ockham's basic purpose in
ethical doctrine is to articulate the way of man to God. On the
other hand, Muschietti, Breve saggio sulla Filosofia di Guglielmo
Ockham, Fribourg, 1908, p. 157; Garvens, Franz. Studien, 21, pp.
249-2"52; and Lagarde, Ockham La Morale ... , pp. 54-55; all deny
that the finality of human acts influences the morality of those
acts in Ockham's ethic. The importance of the end intended by an
agent in determining the morality of an act will be systematically.
studied and documented in the fourth chapter. For the present,
however, it should be said that the first distinction of the
Ord.inatio states emphatically that every human act should be a
means to the Ultimate End and every object of the human will
should be loved in terms of the Greatest Good. Thus, the finality
or teleology of the will-act, even though it is not the imminent
finality which Aristotle and Thomas teach, is crucial to the moral
determination of that act.
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The order between the ends and means of the moral life cannot be
established rationally without identifying the Greatest Good.

r a Christian,

[

Ockham means to emphasize that moral norms which are

~:

perfectly directive about "what" is good or evil, must conceive

':-"

those specific acts in relationship to God.

i
t;"

acts are ethically relative.
,

As

Not all concrete

The complex act of loving God above

all for His sake is necessarily, immutably and only good.

But

every moral norm, whether known naturally or revealed, which
signifies only the simple nature of human acts is but contingently
true.

Ockham's search for moral certitude, therefore, is not

jeopardized by the Absolute Power of God so much as by a standard
of logical clarity which requires every factor which affects the
moral performance of a specific act to be governed by the full
understanding of the pertinent directive.

Without connoting the

divine wish, no moral directive attains this degree of logical
precision.
Ockham does not doubt that in the ordinary course of human
events, the acts commanded or forbidden by the Decalogue can be
recognized by natural reason, as well as by scripture, to be valid
directives.

But Ockham is careful to admit that extraordinary

situations can arise naturally and supernaturally which are exeluded from the application of such precepts.

For example, a

starving person represents a peripheral case in which the law
against stealing does not apply.

Likewise, a "private revelation"

giving a special mandate to some individual or individuals would

r
I.

l~
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~;

be

an extraordinary situation.

Thus, if God countermanded the

order prohibiting theft, as when the Hebrews despoiled the Egyptians, it would be a particular and exceptional case rather than
126
the general rule.
Ockham expresses the binding force of Right Reason's
dictate as the practical principle:
itself to Right Reason."

"The will ought to conform

The directives which express the content

of the will's obligation are

through the principle
that "Every good dictated by Right Reason is to be chosen. 11127
authorit~tive

In general, the natural or revealed sources of directive propositions are also the means by which their truth is determined and
dictated by the intellect's judgment.

Positive laws are binding

because of prior assent to the origin of those laws.

Non-positive

laws are considered true and obligatory because of experiential
evidence (e.g., "whoever is angered is to be calmed through soft
126 sent., I, d. 47, q. 1, F-G; "Circa secundum dicerent
illi qui vellent tenere primam opinionem jam dictam, quod Deus
potest praecipere malum, non tamen male, et potest praecipere
injustum, non tamen injuste. Alii dicerent quod sicut haec est
impossibilis, 'Deus praecipit aliquid injuste sive male.' Et ideo
loquendo deberet dicere quod Deus non potest praecipere malum
propter quod illa distinctio quae ponit quod Deus potest praecipere malum non manens malwn, sed non potest praecipere malum manens malum; ut in uno sensu sit haec vera 'Deus potest praecipere
malum' et in alio sensu falsa: non est secundum artem logicae,
de qua tamen pertranseo quia alibi tactum est de consimilibus.
Ad primum principale, patet quod spoliare Egyptios non
fuit malum sed bonu~. Et ideo Deus praecipiendo spoliare Egyptios,
non praecepit malum, nee filii Israel peccaverunt spoliando, nisi
illi qui malo animo non precise obediendo divino praecepto s:polia.verunt.11 Ockham refers to Sent., I, d. 2, q. 1 (II, 47-49).
127
'Sent., III, q. 11, Z.
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or conceptual analysis (e.g., "all dishonesty is to
~ be avoided"). 129 It is simply untenable to claim that Ockham
~-

f }(nows no necessary and immutable moral norms.
his texts include many such norms.

In point of fact,

Ockham's ethical certitudes,

however, give little information to guide the decision-making
process.

The rational principles of morality indicate the psy-

chological framework of free will and Right Reason within which
ethical acts occur.

He conceives a permanent pattern of causality

among the changeable circumstances and determinants of morality.
Perhaps ••• perhaps it is warranted to speak of an "inner moral
order" and an "outer moral order."

Within the Christian agent,

morality requires the constant priority of Right Reason's assent
to the proper exercise of human freedom for the sake of God.
Without, the moral order displays all the flexibility of the
circumstances and determinants which might affect the moral
decision.
Ockham 1 s doctrine of free will reveals his consistent
effort to encapsulate morality within the created will.
tingent volitions are intrinsically "good" or "evil."

Only conIn conjunc-

tion with this doctrine, Ockham's treatment of the necessary and
immutable principles of morality concerns the "subjective" world
of intellect and will; the psychic complex of efficient and final
causality.

The ethical knowledge which gives demonstrative

128Sent., III, q. 12, H.
129ouodl., II, q. 14.
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certitude indicates the interior order between intellectual and
voluntary assent, between the ends and means of volition.

Ockham

interprets even the divine precepts as regulating primarily the
exercise of free will and secondarily the physical acts controlled
by the will.

The divine will might alter the moral choices or

means in particular situations; but Ockham consistently maintains
the unchanging end of morality to be God himself for all men who
recognize His goodness.

Beyond doubt, the circumstance of the

present divine wish has a special importance for Ockham in determining what choices the created agent should make.

But as long

as God commands men, the structure of moral response will be
rational-voluntary assent for the sake of the Greatest Good.
Finally, Ockham denies any determinant order among the
propositions which comprise moral science.

He does not speak of

a formal or material subject of ethics; he does not list "a"
first principle of morality.

Consequently, efforts to locate

Ockham's central insight or organizing principle are suspect.
Attempts to classify his ethics as "voluntarism," "subjectivism,"
"rationalism," "positivism," or "formalism," miss Ockham's point
that our understanding of morality--our "right reasons"--have no
formal or systematic unity.

These categories are all true par-

tially and, for that reason, imprecise.

To rigorously apply any

of these interpretive categories to Ockham's moral doctrine would
exclude a significant portion of the data to be explained.

r

'

CHAPTER III
THE DIVINE WILL, THE OBJECTIVE NORM OF MORALITY
Ockham has critics and sympathizers who place the emphasis
of his thought on God's omnipotence.
an unconstructive movement within

Those who see Ockhamism as

Scholasticism--a~d

this judgment

was current among some of Ockham's contemporaries 1 --complain that
speculation about the "absolute power of God" undermines not only
1 Father Damasus Trapp, O.E.S. A., "Augustinian Theology
in the 14th Century," Augustiniana VI (1956), pp. 146-274, indicates a movement of thought among the Augustinian order in reaction to the "logico-critical" and destructive tendencies of the
14th century. "The dis-quieting thought of the potentia Dei
absoluta, already prominent in Anselm for whom the Moderns and
the Modernists have so much affection, makes the revolutionary
Modernists in particular lose sight of all perspective and of all
horizons. On an ever-increasing scale, allowances are made for
a possible divine intervention liable to suspend the created
order ... " (p. 149). Ockham is one of the revolutionary Modernists
charged with"subtitilitas" or the unbalanced application of divine
omnipotence to theological and philosophical problems by the
Augustinian monks who Father Trapp quotes. The most serious
charges of the papal commission appointed to examine Ockham's
writings center on the employment of the doctrine of God's omnipotence which seems to promote the heresy of Pelagianism. See
the first four articles questioned in Auguste Pelzer, Revue d'histoire ecclesiastigue, 18, pp. 250-253; and F. Hoffmann, Die erste
Kritik des Ockhamismus durch den Oxforder Kanzler Johannes Lutter~ (Breslauer Studien, Neue Folge 9: Breslau, 1941), pp. 1-21.
Professor Moody's article on "Ockham, Buridan, and Nicholas of
Autrecourt, the Pa.risian Statutes of 1339 and 1340," Franciscan
Studies 7 (1947), pp. 113-146, is an important study showing
Ockham' s more conse:cvati ve image in the second generation of
"Nominal.ism."
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natural knowledge but the theological enterprise as well. 2

Re-

cent and generally approving studies of fourteenth century religious currents find a more biblical, less "philosophical," image
of God dominating Ockham's vision. 3 We wish to test the extent
to which God's omnipotence affects the conduct of morality.
The free will, the dictate of Right Reason and the will
of God are the three efficient causes of morality listed by Ockham. 4 The divine will, however, is a cause of moral goodness only
2 Thus, Iserloh, Die Gnade und Eucharistie ... , pp. 74-78;
David Knowles, The EvolutIOn of MeCII"eval Thought (New York: Vintage Books, 1962"},"" pp. 323-324; Gordon Leff, Medieval Thought, St.
Augustj.ne·to Ockham (Baltimore, Penguin Books, 1958), pp. 286290; and Bradwardine and the Pelagians (Cambridge: University
Press, 1957), pp. 130-133-.3 Leon Baudry, who can hardly be called Ockham's critic,
finds the divine omnipotence at the heart of the Venerable Inceptor's thought. Le/'Tractatus de Principiis Theologiae' attribut
~Guillaume d'Occam---C-Etudes de Philosophie MJdidvale, t. 23: Paris,
193b), pp. 23-25 of Introduction. Also discussing Ockham's philosophy, Francis Oakley claims " ..• from Ockham's fundamental insistence on the omnipotence and freedom of God follow, not only
his nominalism, not only his ethical or legal voluntarism, but
also hj.s empiricism." Natural Law Forum, 6, p. 82; and his
article "Pierre d'Ailly and the absolute power of God; another
note on the Theology of Nominalism, 11 Harvard Theological Review
56 (1961), pp. 63-65. Professor Heiko A. Oberman treats the
religious and theological character of Ockham's thought, and
concludes 11 that the theological concept of God is not merely one
of many aspects of the inner core of Nominalism, but that its concept of God and Revelation is at the heart of this movement, while
logic is its expression in philosophical language ... " "Some notes
on the Theology of Nominalism, with Attention to its Relation to
the Renaissance," Harvard Theological Review, 53 (1960), p. 49.
William J. Courtenay follows this line of interpretation j_n
"Covenant and Causality in Pierre d'Ailly," Speculum 46 (1971).

4sent., II, q. 4-5, K; "Dico ergo quantum ad secundum
articulrnn quod Deus est prima causa immediate omniwn quae producunter a causis secundis. 11 The fact that God is required for
producing volition, renders God a partial cause of good or bad
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~oncurrently

or co-operatively.

God is co-efficient in every

instance of created causality and thus participates in whatever
~ositive or metaphysical being that moral activity has.

Normally,

God's cooperation is available "whenever it pleases the created
will."

If God's co-efficiency were not forthcoming, the human

• agent could produce no activity--moral or otherwise.

If God's

cooperation turns to total causality, as when God alone produces
some effect within the human will, then that divine effect cannot
be imputed morally to the created agent.

Hence, the issue of

Ockham's "moral voluntarism" or "positivism" concerns the legislative rather than efficient influence of God's will.

The extent

of God's moral authority and the arbitrary character of His
authority are in question.

These problems become clearer against

the historical background of St. Thomas and Duns Scotus.

Their

solution requires a study of the prerogatives and rationality
which Ockham attributes to the divine will.

We hope to look

over Ockham's shoulder as he views the moral order from the awesome perspective of God's absolute power.
1.

The Historical Context

A growing positivism seems to characterize the development
of ethical doctrine from St. Thomas to Ockham.

The natural

foundation which Aquinas finds for the Decalogue gradually erodes
volition. Also see the parallel texts of Sent., II, q. 19, Land
IV, q. 14, K. For a statement of the three essential
causes of virtue--the will, Right Reason's assent and God--see
~., III, q. 12, NN.

~.,
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to reveal its sole support in God's discretionary powers.
It was the doctrine of St. Thomas that the precepts of
the Decalogue were

altogether indispensable.

These laws express

the intention of the Supreme Lawgiver; they are orientated to the
common and final good; they express the proper regulation of the
natural appetites of man. 5

Those instances related by the Old

Testament which seem to indicate that God dispensed or revoked
the natural law and Decalogue, e.g., the laws against murder,

£

~·

adultery, theft, etc., only show the right of the Creator to con-

~~

trol His creation.

B
j·

with the order of justice proposed by the natural law.

Thus, God's actions are always in harmony

~'

''t-

All men alike, both guilty and innocent, die the death
of nature; which death of nature is inflicted by the
power of God because of original sin, according to I
Kings, ii, 6: The Lord killeth and maketh alive. Consequently, by the command of God, death can be inflicted
on any man, guilty or innocent, without any injustice
whatever. --In like manner, adultery is intercourse with
another's wife; who is allotted to him by the law emanating from God. Consequently, intercourse with any
woman, by the command of God, is neither adultery nor
fornication. --The same applies to theft, which is the
taking of another's property. For whatever is taken
by the command of God, to Whom all things belong, is
not taken against the will of its owner, whereas it is
in this that theft consists. --Nor is it only in human
things that whatever is commanded by God is right; but

5sum. Theol., Ia IIae, q. 100, art. 8; "Praecepta autem
decalogi continent ipsam intentionem legislatoris, scilicet Dei.
Nam praecepta primae tabulae, quae ordinant ad Deum, continent
ipsum ordinem 2d bonum commune et finale, quod Deus est; praecepta autem secundae tabulae continent ordinem justitiae inter
homines observandae, ut scilicet nulli fiat indebitum, et cuilibet
reddatur debitum; secundum hanc enim rationem sunt intelligenda
praecepta decalogi. Et ideo praecepta decalogi sunt omnino indispensabilia.11

r
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also in natural things, whatever is done by God is,
in some way, natural, as was stated in the First
Part. (trans. by Anton C. Pegis)6
Scotus refuses to consider the whole Decalogue as "Laws
of Nature;" nor does he agree precisely with Aquinas regarding the
exegesis of the revealed "exceptions" (e.g., Abraham's duty to
kill his innocent son) to the common law.

In these cases, Scotus

teaches that God dispensed individuals from moral laws which are
neither immutable nor, strictly speaking, natural.

Such "excep-

tions" show how God intended His laws to be understood in particular situations.

For Scotus, the characteristics of "laws of

nature" are; first, that the precept is known as true when the
terms of the precept are known, secondly, that the precept com- mands some good necessary for the final end of men (or forbids
some evil which necessarily excludes the final end), and thirdly,
that the precept be stated negatively so that it is binding always
6 sum. Theol., Ia IIae, q. 94, art. 5; "Dicendum est quod
naturali morte moriuntur omnes communiter, tam nocentes quam
innocentes. Quae quidem naturalis mors divina postestate inducitur propter peccatum originale; secundum illud I Reg. ii: "Dominus
mortificat et vivificat. 11 Et ideo absque aliqua injustitia,
secundum mandatum Dei, potest infligi mors cuicumque homini, vel
nocenti vel innocenti. Similiter etiam adulterium est concubitus
cum uxore aliena, quae quidem est e.i deputata secundum legem Dei
divinitus traditam. Unde ad quam cumque mulierem aliquis accedat
ex mandate divino, non est adulterium nee fornicatio. Et eadem
ratio est de furto, quod est acceptio rei alienae. Quidquid enim
accipit aliquis ex mandate Dei, qui est Dominus universorum, non
accipit absque voluntate domini, quod est furari. Nee solum in
rebus humanis quidquid a Deo mandatur, hoc ipso est debitum; sed
etiam in rebus naturalibus quidquid a Deo fit, est naturale quodammodo, ut in Primo dictum est."
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and at every moment. 7
and indispensable.

These qualities make natural laws immutable

The laws of the "second table," however, can

change by special commands of God or by grace of extreme circumstances.

The precepts of the second table explain how the
Legislator intends that a man should love his neighbor. 8 Clearly,
the realm of natural law begins to shrink according to Scotus'
estimate, while the extent of positive law grows.
Ockham's sympathies are with Duns Scotus on this question.
But Scotus did not go far enough.

According to Ockham, even the

precepts of the "first table"--i.e., the command to love God,
could change by God's absolute power.

In his philosophical-

theological works, Ockham rarely even mentions "natural law" but

7

.

.

Comm. Ox., III, q. 37, q. unica, n. 5 and 10 (XV, 825 and
844); "Ad quaestionem igitur dico quod aliqua possunt dici esse de
lege naturae dupliciter: Uno modo tanquam prima principia practica,
nota ex terminis, vel conclusiones necessario sequentes ex eis; et
haec dicuntur esse strictissime de lege naturae ..• Non enim in his,
quae praecipiuntur ibi [in tabula secunda], est bonitas necessaria
ad bonitatem ul timi finis, convertens ad finem ul timum; nee in hi::;
quae prohibentur, est malitia necessario avertens a fine ultimo,
quin si bonum istud non esset praeceptum, posset finis ultimus
amari et attingi; et si illud malum non esset prohibitum, staret
cum eo acquisitio finis ultimi •.. (n. 10) Ad hoc potest tripliciter responderi: Primo modo, quod illud praeceptum: Diliges
Dominum Deum tuu.m, non est simpliciter de lege naturae, inquantum
est affirmativum, sed inquantum est negativum prohibens oppositum;
non odire enim est simpliciter de lege naturae •.• 11
8 Ibid., n. 12 (XV, 845); "Verum est igitur, quod diligens
.Proximum, legem implevit, eo modo scilicet quo lex explicata est
debere servari, licet non eo modo quo dilectio proximi concluditur
ex primis principiis legis naturae; et a simili, tota lex quantum
ad secundam tabulam, et Prophetae pendent ex hoc praecepto: Diliges proximum tuum sicut teipsum, intelligendo tale praeceptum, non
ut sequitur ex primo principio practico legis naturae, sed ut
Legislator intendit debere illud servari, prout explicatur in
praeceptis secundae tabulae. 11

r
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he is emphatic that God could command any act which is presently
forbidden by the Decalogue.

To some commentators, Ockham's ethic

is the total number of revealed precepts and a total rejection of
moral orders which are necessary, indispensable and evident to
natural reason.
Although hate of God, theft, adultery and such might
have an evil circumstance connected regarding the common
law; insofar as they are done by someone who, by the
divine precept is obliged to the contrary act; but
regarding the absolute being of these acts, they can
be done by God without any evil circumstance connected,
and they could even be done by the earthling meritoriously if they should fall under the divine precept just
as now, de facto, their opposites fall under the divine
precept. And with the present di.vine precept for their
opposite acts in force, one cannot perform such acts
meritoriously or well, because they are not done meritoriously by an earthling, then they should not be
called or termed "theft," "adultery," "hate," etc.,
because these names signify such acts, not absolutely,
but by connoting or giving to understand that one performing such acts is obliged to the opposite acts by
divine precept.9
9 sent., II, q. 19, O; "Ad aliud dico quod licet odium Dei,
furari, adulterari habeant malam circumstantiam annexam et similia
de communi lege quatenus fiunt ab aliquo qui ex praecepto divino
obligatur ad contrarium; sed quantum ad esse absolutum in illis
actibus possunt fieri a Deo sine omni circumstantia mala annexa,
et etiam meritorie possunt fieri a viatore si caderent sub praecepto divino sicut nunc de facto eorum opposita cadunt sub praecepto divino. Et stante praecepto divino ad opposita eorum, non
potest aliquis tales actus meritorie nee bene exercere, quia non
fiunt moritorie nisi caderent sub praecepto divino. Et si fierent
a viatore meritorie, tune non dicerentur nee nominarentur 'furtum, 1
'adul teriurG,' 1 odium, 1 etc., quia ista nomina significant tales
actus non absolute, sed connotando vel dando intelligere quod facj.e:ns tales Bctus per praeceptum di vinum obligatur ad opposi turn."
Not.tee that Ockham cons:!_ders d:Lv5ne laws as circumstances of moral
acts. Comment:Lng on this passage, Elzearius Benke says; "Clarius
certe et mag5.s concrete posi ti visrnus moralis exprimi non potui.sset'i
Collectanea Francj~, XIV, p. 60.
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The difference in doctrines between Aquinas, Scotus and
Ockham on the relationship of positive and natural law can be
overstated.

All three recognize the creature's obligation to obey

a direct command of God; all teach that the concept of "murder,"
"theft," "adultery," etc., connote some illicitness.

None would

assert that the significance of the term prescribed is simply
descriptive.

Each of these theologians admit that the Decalogue

consists of moral laws which are "natural" in some sense of the
term; 10 each teaches that moral doctrine includes positive and
non-positive norms.

Their disagreement over the "dispensability"

of the Decalogue precepts is a matter of terminology.

If the

negative precepts mean actions done "with evil intent" or "against
the divine command," then Scotus.and Ockham concur that these
mandates are "omnino indispensabilia. 11

The doctrinal variations

are more subtle than the stark contrast between the systematic
unity of positive and natural law in Aquinas and Ockham's thoroughgoing positivism.
Our intention is not to analyze the ethics of Thomas and
Scotus in depth; we only want to appreciate Ockham's heritage.
How to reconcile the Decalogue precepts with the apparent
10 Scotus asserts the precepts of the second table are
"consona" or harmonious with the laws of nature. Loosely speaking, all the Decalogue precepts are "laws of nature." Comm~ Ox.,
III, d. 37, q. unica, n. 8. Ockham's political works often appeal
to natural rights and laws as the individual's defense against
the excessive claims of either king or pope. See Opus Nonaginta
Dierum, c. 99 (Manchester ed.; II, 747); and Tractatus contra
Johannem, c. 28 (Manchester ed.; III, 118). See W. Komel, "Das
Naturrecht bei Wilhelm Ockham," Franziskanische Studien 35 (1953),
pp. 39-85.
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inunoralities of the Patriarchs was a lively issue in Scholasticism.11

The Scotistic solution was developed and extended by
Ockham giving his ethical outlook a biblical tone. 12 Scotus
taught that the mandates of the second table explain how one's
neighbor should be loved in normal situations.

In an extraordi-

nary case, and Abraham is witness, God might decide a different
way of loving one's neighbor.

Without changing any significant

factor save the divine command, an act which normally would be
murder becomes a moral obligation and praiseworthy.

In Ockham's

mind, this criticism suggests the overriding importance of the
present divine command in establishing the specific acts which
are morally suitable or unsuitable.

As a moral determinant, the

will of God takes precedence over any natural evidence.

To

reconcile the common laws with their exceptions, Ockham proposes
that all Decalogue precepts be understood as denoting:

a) the

simple nature of actions and b), the obligations presently
11 see Roland H. Bainton, "The Immoralities of the Patriarchs According to the Exegesis of the Late Middle Ages and of the
Reformation," Harvard Theological Review 23 (1930), pp. 39-49.
This article indicates the importance of the question for the
Scholastics. The four types of solution, however, are poorly conceived since Ockham would fj_ t three (supposedly) separate categories. Furthermore, the absolute power of God was Ockham's way of
allowing for the recurrence of "special revelations" and "exceptions" to the common law; Professor Bainton was unable to find "a
single clear illustration" of this position. (p. 51).
12 see Erich Hochstetter, Franz. Studien, 32, pp. 1-20, for
a fruitful attempt to place Ockham within the intellectual currents
Of the early fourteenth century and to locate his ethics within
a biblical or "covenantal" frame of reference.
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, associated with those acts. 13
was well taken by Ockham.

A second point of Scotus' solution

The Subtle Doctor maintains that only

· the negative formulation of the "first table" belongs to the law

of nature, strictly speaking.

God could not dispense men from

the command to love their Creator, but men are not obliged to
elicit the love of God continually.

The suggestion is that men

/could "not love" God momentarily without moral fault.

Here Ockham

begins to speculate on the possibility of a divine command "Do
not love God."

The permanence of the "first table" breaks down.

God can command that He be not loved for a certain
time, because He can command that the intellect be
occupied with study and the will likewise, so that
at this time it cannot think anything about God.
(P. Boehner's trans.)14
Developing suggestions made by Scotus on the exegetical
problem of the Patriarchs' "immoralities," Ockham holds the
"simple nature" of every human action is morally indifferent.

By

13 sent., II, q. 19, F; 11 • • • quia Deus potest omne absolutum
causare sine omni alio quid non est idem cum illo absoluto; sed
actus odiendi Deum quantum ad esse absolutum in eo non est idem
cum difformitate et malitia in actu ... 11 Scotus anticipates this
position, although not its radical application, in saying "Hoc
potest exponi sic, quia licet actus positivus et malitia non sint
unum per se, nee in re nee in conceptu; potest tamen aliquod nomen
imponi ad signif.icandum nee actum solum, nee deformi tatem illam,
sed totum simul. '' .Q:Q.. Ox., III, d. 38, q. unica, n. 6 (WaddingsVives, ed.; 15, 870-71).
·
14Quodl., III, q. 13. See P. Boehner, Ockham, Philosophi~ Writings, p. 146.
In earlier texts, Ockham asserts the possibility of a divine command to "hate God;" the difference between
"non-ve11e 11 and "odire" is considerable. We discuss the hate of
God (odire Deum) in Chapter Four. For now, we only indicate that
the question of "not loving God" could arise from a Scotistic doctrine which Ockham accepts and asserts, namely, 11 • • • non tenetur
(qu~libet) semper implere praecepta divina affirmativa. Sent.~ 1 1
d. 48, q. lr F.
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"simple nature" is meant the specific character of acts of volition or nolition which terminate at one object.
nolle

Even the act

reject God--is not wrong by nature. A man cannot
be obligated to the impossible; 15 but men might be obligated to

-

~--to

any simple act possible for them.

This latter assertion seems an

extreme position within the history of Scholastic ethics.

It

'demands a hearing for those commentators who claim that Ockham
-teaches moral "voluntarism."

The divine will might associate a

negative or affirmative command with the performance of every noncomplex act within the power of man.

A radical notion of divine

omnipotence supports this possibility.

But there is also a dif-

ferent conception of human nature at work.

Both Aquinas and Scotus

believed in "almighty God 11 without reaching this conclusion about
the divine legislative power.
2.

The Divine Will

Ockham's teaching on the divine will depends on the
privilege of revealed evidence.

The "facts" by which Ockham

governs a coherent image of God's operation ad extra are Scriptual
data and ecclesiastical pronouncement.

In particular, the abso-

lute simplicity, omniscience and power of God must be maintained
15 sent., III, q. 12, QQ; "Nullus obligatur ad impossibile
···" Also--se8, Sent., IV, qes. 8-9, E; and Sent., I, d. 1, q. 6
(I, 504-505). Ockham does not say that men could be obliged to
any simple act within their power; but his principles and, in
particular, the absolute power of God imply this position. This
opinion was current by the time of Gregory of Rimini who explicitly rejects it. Sent., II, d. 34-35, q. 1, art. 2 (Venice, 1522;
f. 119.r.).
--
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a"s revealed truth and each statement made about the di vine will
must be consistent with these tenets.

Scripture speaks of God's

external operation in diverse ways; Ockham's role as theologian
is to explicate these various locutions in a manner consistent
with the unity and omnipotence of God.
16
. 1 wi. th d.ivine
.
Being.
.
iden t ica.

Divine will-acts are

I n th e d.ivine
.
agen t , an ac t of

willing does not indicate a faculty or permanent power which is
distinct from intellect or essence.

Rather, an act of willing is

the divine will, is the divine essence. 17

The term

fies God's Being as productive and creative.

11

will" signi-

Ockham speaks of

the' will of God in diverse ways and by means of various attributes,
but these diverse locutions do not deny the Oneness of God.
Ockham discusses the will of God in terms of a distinction
between the voluntas beneplaciti (benevolent will) and a voluntas
signi (definite will). 18

The Benevolent Will is divided into

16

Sent., I, d. 35, q. 6, F; "Ad aliud dico quod volitio
divina diversimode accipitur. Uno modo pro ipso actu existente
realiter eodem cum divina essentia, et ista volitio divina non
est praxis quia non est in potestate voluntatis, sed tanta necessitate est illa volitio quanta est ipsa voluntas, quia est omnibus modis ipsa voluntas. 11 Also see Sent., I, d. 45, q. 1, B.
17 Sent., I, d. 10, q. 1, P;

• • • nihil est volitum a
voluntate creata nisi praecognitum, tamen in Deo est simpliciter
falsa, quia in Deo actus voluntati.s et actus intellectus et voluntas sunt omnibus modis idem, nee plus distinguitur actus voluntatis a volux1tate quam distingui tur voluntas a voluntate. 11
Also see Sent., I, d. 45, q. 1, C. This position is explicitly
critical of the "divine psychology" constructed by Duns Scotus.
See Quodl., XIV, n. 14 (XXVI, 52-54). The contrast between Scotus
and Ockham is analyzed by Paul Vignaux, 11 Nominalisme," DTC, XI,
Col. 762.
11

18Sent., I, d. 46, q. 1, Band C; "Ad quaestionem dicitur

conummi ter quod voluntas Dei est duplex, scilicet voluntas
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,~· a) the Antecedent Will which indicates the "antecedents given to
someone by which he can cause something and with whom God will
be prepared to cooperate if the other should wish" and b) the
consequent Will "by which God wishes efficaciously by actually
(iQ

~)

doing something."

The Definite Will of God is divided

into five acts:

prohibition, command, counsel, implementation,

and permission.

This structure of the divine will is imposed

upon God's Oneness by the human perspective which understands the
divine activity in diverse ways.

Scholastics often used these

categories (voluntas beneplaciti and voluntas signi) as a means
beneplaciti et voluntas signi, qui distinguitur in quinque--prohibitionem, praeceptum, consilium, impletionem, et permissionem.
Similiter, voluntas beneplaciti distinguitur in voluntatem antecedentem et consequentem. Contra voluntatem beneplaciti Dei
consequentem, nihil fit. Contra voluntatem autem Dei antecedentem beneplaciti, aliquid fit. Etiam contra voluntatem signi,
aliquid fit. Et ita patet quomodo voluntas Dei potest impediri
et quomodo non.
Concordando cum aliis in illa responsione; primo videndum
est de praedictis distinctionibus, secundo ad quaestionem. Circa prirnum sciendur.J. quod illa distinctio non est alicuius quid est
realiter in Deo quia in Deo non est aliquo modo multiplex voluntas. Immo, etiam divina voluntas nullo modo distinguitur ab
essentia, sed istae distinctiones sunt nominum et dictionum qui
significant divinam voluntatem, qui Deus est, ... Et ideo debet
intelligi quod sit multiplicitas nominis ita quod voluntas antecedens equivalet isti toti propositioni, 'dari alicui antecedentia unde potest consequi aliquid cui Deus erit paratus coagere
si alius velit,' et hoc cum praecepto vel consilio exequendi .••
Voluntas autem consequens est 'illa qua Deus vult efficaciter
ponendo aliquid in esse. '" The terms "voluntas beneplaciti" and
. "voluntas signi" are commonly rendered as "will of good pleasure"
and "will of sign." We feel that "Benevolent Will" and "Definite
Will" better captures Ockham's employment of these terms. See
below, footnote 20.
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of reconciling the diverse statements in Scripture concerning the
manifestations of God's activity. 1 9
Ockham distinguishes the Benevolent and Definite Will
because God wishes the existence of not only things, but free
things.

The Definite Will gathers the various ways in which God

guides the activity of free beings; the Benevolent Will handles
the possible discrepancy between what God antecedently wishes for
creation and what actually occurs.

Ockham claims that antecedent-

ly God wishes the salvation of all rational creatures; in fact,
20
some have been damned.
Yet the will of God as identical with
His essence remains unchanged, unchangeable.

There is a note of

optimism and trust in God's love throughout Ockham's writings;
an undercurrent which, as Gregory of Rimini would point out, 21
is not rationally warranted.

But Ockham's trust in God promotes

his fearless application of the distinction between God's absolute
and ordinate power.
19
.
Cf. St. Thomas, Summ. Theol., I, q. 19, arts. 6-11; and
~., I, d. 45, q. 1, art:--z+,"° C.
20 sent., I, d. 46, q. 1, G; "Ad tertium dico quod Deus
vult antecedenter omnes salvos fieri, quia scilicet dat eis antecedentia quibus possunt consequi salutem, cum praecepto et consilio exequendi et nunquam eis praecipiet contrarium et eis erit
paratus coagere permittens eos libere velle agere ad consecutionem
salutis. Et per illud ultimum excluditur una cauillatio quae
posset fieri de damnatis, quam Deus non V1ll t salvos fieri etiam
antecedenter. 11 Also see Quodl., IV, q. 10, in finem; Sent., IV,
q. 3, X; Sent., I, d. 17, q. 1, L.
.
-21Rimini, Sent., I, d. 41-42, q. 1, art. 1 (Venice, 1522;
f. 180r); "Si ideo dicatur Deus velle omnes salvari antecedenter,
quia omnibus vult vel dat antecedentia salutis quaecumque sint
illa; multo fortius dici deberet quod vult omnes peccare vel ess9
in peccato anteced.enter: quam omnibus dat antecedentia quibus
possunt peccare ... "
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It is difficult to overlook the importance of the distinc-

1 tion between God's
~

~

absolute and ordinate power in Ockham's thought.

The distinction itself was traditional, namely, that God could do
everything within the realm of possibility (His absolute power)
even though He determined to produce a certain set of possibles
(His ordinate power).
I say that God can do certain things by ordinate power
and others by absolute power. This distinction should
not be understood so that in God there are really two
powers, of which one is ordinate and the other absolute,
because there is only one power in God regarding created
being (ad extra) which is God Himself in every way. Nor
should the distinction be understood so that God could
do some things ordinately and others absolutely and
inordinately, because God can do nothing inordinately.
Rather, it must be understood thus, "to be capable of
something" is sometimes considered according to the
laws ordained and instituted by God. God is said to
be able to do those things by ordinate power. Otherwise,
11 to be capable of something" is taken as "to be able to
do everything which does not entail a contradiction to
be done," whether or not God ordained that He would do
this, because God can do many things which He does not
wish to do.22
Many studies, however, have isolated the dialectic of God's
absolute-ordinate power as the key to Ockham's thought and that
of Nominalism in generai. 23 It is true that the manner and
22 Quodl., VI, q. 1.
23 Professor Oberman indicates the vital part played by
this distinction in Nominalist theology. It is "the common denom. inator of four such diverse characteristics as: 1) the sovereignty
of God; 2) the immediacy of God; 3) the moral autonomy and freedom of man; 4) an attitude of scepticism which leans toward
secularization." (Harvard Theological Review, 56, p. 56. A more
critical interpretation of this distinction is found in David
Knowles, "A Characteristic of the Mental Climate of the 14th
Century' II Melanges offerts a Etienne Gilson (Etudes de philoso-phie medievale, hors seree, Paris: J. Vrin, 1959), p. 323; and
Gordon Leff, Bradwardine and the Pelagians. A Study of his De

~

r

J

:rrequency with which this distinction enters fourteenth century

i

debates is unique; it is a theological reason for enlarging God's

~

f
tt

moral authority and the domain of positive law.

But what needs

to be said, if research is to remain within Ockham's viewpoint,

~.

t.·.:·

is that nothing happens by God's absolute power.

l

an occurrence de potentia Dei absoluta would be a fact realized
without

~ivine

By definition,

ordination or foreknowledge--to assert such a

possibility would be both dangerous and untrue according to Ockham. 24 Christ's miracles, St. Paul's conversion, the immaculate
conception of the Blessed Virgin and the divine command that
Abraham kill Isaac were extraordinary facets of the divine plan,
but they occurred with God's prescience as products of His ordinate power.

Reference to the abs.olute power of God is one way

to express the contingency of the present physical and moral orders
as created systems, and the possibility of other exceptions to
the lex communis of salvation.
causa Dei and its Qpponents (Cambridge: University Press, 1957),
pp. 131-133. These commentators find scepticism and fideism
resulting from Nominalism's use of this distinction. We hold
that this distinction, by itself, gives no clue to the doctrinal
:peculiarities of Ockham, or any "Nominalist." God's absolute
power has an explosive effect only when asserted with a more
empirical metaphysical stance.
24 opus Nonaginta Dierum, c. 95 (Manchester ed., Vol. II,
p. 726); "Et ita dicere quod Deus potest aliqua de potentia abso~uta, quae non potest de potentia ordinata, non est aliud, secundum intellectwn recte inte.lligentium, quam dicere quod Deus aliqua
·..Potestr quae tamen minime ordinavi t se facturum; quae tamen si
·· ~ac~ret, de potentia ordinata faceret ipsa; quia si faceret ea,
prdinaret se facturum ipsa. 11 Also loc. cit., p. 727; 11 Ita haec
~st impossibilis: 'Aliquid fit a De~et non de potentia ordina.ta; ' haec tam en habet unu.rn sen sum verum: 'Aliquid potest fieri.
a Deo, quod non fiet de potentia ordinata;' et tamen, si fieret,
de potentia ordinata fieret. 11

~
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The absolute-ordinate distinction provides Ockham with
a methodology for analyzing issues in terms of necessity and
possibility.

He calls it "the famous distinction of theologians"

and uses it with sophistication.

To understand Ockham's subtlety,

one cannot identify and exhaust God's ordinate power with the
expression "communis lex" or "stante ordinatione quae

~

est."

Nor is it correct to equate God's absolute- power with the phrase
"specialis dispensatio."

The ordinate will of God includes past,

present and future facts; it includes the "common law" or Decalogue precept against theft currently in force, the past exception to this common law, e.g., Exodus 12:36, and any future
dispensation to this mandate.

On the other hand, the absolute

power of God is somewhat hypothetical.

It is Ockham's reminder

that whatever God ordains, He ordains contingently.

Together,

the ordinate and absolute power of God expose the hypothetical
necessity of creation.

The use of this theological distinction

was paralleled by the philosophical development of the conditional or hypothetical syllogism within the Nominalist school-a fruitful movement from the perspective of modern logic. 25 The
dialectic of absolute-ordinate power shows the contingency of
creation and affirms its nature as a process rather than a static
25 cf. Philotheus Boehner, O.F.M., Medieval Logic: An Out~ of Its Developmen_i;; from 1250 to .£· 1400 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1952);-and "Does Ockham know of material
implication?" in Collected Articles ... , pp. 319-351. Also E. A.
Moody, Truth and Consequence in Medieval Logic (Amsterdam:North
Holland Publishing Co., 1953).
.
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fact.

But, at the same time, this dialectic reveals the condi-

tional necessity of certain features of human experience.
Ockham asserts, by means of the absolute-ordinate distinction, the omnipotence and freedom of God's creative activity.
The omnipotent God can effect "everything which entails no
contradiction to be done. 1126 Ockham maintains that God could
produce any "thing" whose "absolute being" is both possible and
producible.

He has in mind finite things which could be the

referent for "absolute terms."

The scope of God's omnipotence

would not include, for example, moral .goodne_ss or evilness which
are not things with "absolute being," but states of affairs which
obtain between created beings and which are signified by "connotative terms. 1127

On the other hand, an infinite-eternal person

is a non-contradictory notion which could signify an independent
or "absolute" being, yet such being cannot be produced. 28

Most

26 Quodl., VI, q. l; "Aliter accipitur "posse" pro posse
facere omne illud quid non includit contradictionem fieri .•. 11
Also see Sent., I, d. 20,. q. 1, L-M.
27 sent., Prologue, q. 3 (I, 141); "Et ideo in rnultis
argurnentis est fallacia figurae dictionis, sub nornine sirnpliciter
absoluto accipiendo nomen connotativurn. Sicut sic arguendo:
quidquid potest Deus rnediante causa secunda, potest immediate per
se; sed actum meritorium potest producere mediante actu voluntatis; ergo sine ea." Also see Quodl., V, q. 5.
28 sent., I, d. 20, q. 1, L; "Ad probationem, dico quod
ornnipotentia sicut modo loquirnur non respicit omne illud quid non
includit contradictionern. Hoc est dictum quod ornnipotens non
potest eff:i.cere ornne illud quid non includit contradictionern,
quia non potest efficere Deurn. Omnipotens tamen potest efficere
ornne factibile quid non includit contradictionern .•. 11 Father Lucan
Freppert, The Basis of Morality •.. , pp. 148-155, indicates that
Ockham tries to rectify the imprecision of Duns Scotus regarding
divine omnipotence. It was Scotus who said 11 ... ornnipotentia est

r
f

~:

t
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Scholastics would agree that the effective potential of God's
will initially includes all possible and producible beings.

Ock-

ham, however, seems the first to apply this position to statements.

Sentences which are contradictory are nevertheless real

as spoken, written or mental expressions.

For example, the

proposition that "all men are immortal" might indicate an impossible state of affairs but nothing prohibits this proposition
from being said, written or thought.

In affirming God's omni-

potence, the Venerable Inceptor allows that meaningless statements or contradictory commands are creatable.
The divine will is capable of producing all finite, possible beings.

But their actual production or creation remains a

free, non-necessary act.

"God does nothing externally (ad extra)

by necessity; nor wills anything other than Himself by necessity.1129

Ockham explains this position by means of necessary

propositions, i.e., those propositions which are true independently of any divine volition.

Absolute necessity obtains when a
statement cannot be denied meaningfully. 3
For examples, Ockham

°

ad omne quad non includit contradictionem." Comm. Ox., I, d. 20,
q. unica, n. 5 (X, 200). Ockham quotes this formula to refute
it be the above "proof." It appears that St. Thomas would be
included in Ockham's criticism. See Summ. Theol., I, q. 25,
art. 3. For Ockham' s claim that contradictory statements (e.g.,
man is an ass) are possible as assertions, see Quodl., III, q. 3;
and Quodl., II, q. 8.
29 Quodl., VI, q. 2.

Also see Sent., I, d. 4•3, q. 1, L.

30Quodl., VI, q. 2; "Circa primum dico quod duplex est
necessitas, scilicet absoluta et ex suppositione. Necessita.s
absoluta est quando aliquid simp1iciter est necessarium ita quad
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gives "God exists" and "man is capable of laughter" which cannot
be denied without contradiction. God is the only necessary
being; 31 but necessarily true propositions can be formed regarding contingent things.

If no man ever existed or ever will

exist, it remains true to say that "man is capable of laughter."
Hypothetical necessity deals with contingent propositions which
have some necessary connection. 32 In the conditional statement,
"If Peter is predestined, Peter will be saved," neither the antecedent nor the consequent are necessary--but the "consequence"
is.

The will of God affects the state of affairs signified by

both the antecedent and the consequence.

But "if" God creates

and predestines Peter, then necessarily "Peter will be saved."
While Ockham claims everything other than God is radically or
ontologically contingent, the truth value of certain categorical
and conditional statements does not derive properly from divine
creativity.

God's will freely governs the existence of all finite

ejus oppositum esse verum includit contradictionem. Et sic haec
absolute est necessaria:
'homo est risibilis,' ' Deus est,' quia
contradictio est quod hae sint falsae et contradictoriae verae. 11
31 summ. Tot. Log., III, II, c. 5 (quoted from Webering,
Theory of Demonstration., p. 37); "Propter quod sciendum est quod
necessarium, perpetuum et incorruptibile dupliciter accipiuntur.
Uno modo dici tur aliquid necessarium, perpetuum et incorruptibj_le
quia per nulJ.am potentiam potest incipere vel desinere esse. Et
sic solus Deus est perpetuus, necessarius et incorruptibilis."
32 ouodl., VI, q. 2; "Necessitas ex suppositione est quando
aliquid conditionalis est necessaria quamvis tam antecedens quarn
consequens sit contingens. Sicut haec est necessaria: Si Petrus
est praedestinatus, Petrus salvabitur. Et tamen tam antecedens
quam consequens est contingens. 11
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beings; but the possibility and intelligibility of finite things
is clearly not a function of divine freedom according to Ockham.
Those facts which constitute the experienced world, and
the physical and moral laws which connect these facts, are
dependent upon the contingent will of God.

Even the formation

of "necessary" propositions is a mental effect which requires
the free co-efficiency of God.

The absolute-ordinate distinction

gives Ockham a way to assert the hypothetical necessity of what
is given in experience.

The ordinate power of God locates a

hypothetical necessity within the laws and entities of creation;
the absolute power of God reveals its lack of absolute or metaphysical necessity.
existence.

Nothing compels God to continue the world's

And given the continued existence of the world,

nothing compels God to conserve any physical or moral law which
is not entailed necessarily by the existent natures.
There are two sides to the hypothetical necessity of
creatures.

From one perspective, all finite existence depends

upon the free creative action of God.

From the second perspective

--and this facet is too often overlooked--the essential properties
or characteristics of an individual thing are necessary on the
condition that the individual exists.

Ockham spoke of the "nec-

essity of the end'' which typifies the logic of human volition. 33
If the agent-freely desires health, then the indispensable· means
to health must be chosen.

In a similar way, if God wishes the

33see above, Chapter One, pp. 47-49.
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,

factuality of something, He is thereby committed to willing all

f

the essential features of that thing. God could not create a
f naturally immortal man. 34 Nor could God produce a virtuous act
l
without producing the created will and Right Reason which are
necessarily required for morally good action.
seems to be:

The rule of thumb

any attribute which can be predicated necessarily

about some subject, must obtain if that subject exists.

Hence, ..

if Ockham extends the legislative authority of God there must be
a corresponding reduction in the moral consequences which follow
from the idea of human being.
3.

The Divine Ideas

Ockham does not admit any priority of intellection to
volition in the divine Being. 35 Acts of intellect completed prior
to, and independent of, volition would jeopardize the absolute
simplicity of God.

For this reason, Ockham denies that the divine

will is regulated (i.e., caused) by Right Reason.

A text fre-

quently offered as proof .of the irrational and blind obedience
which Ockham's God requires of His creatures intends to show the
identification of will and reason in God.

In response to the

principal argument:
34Quodl., II, q. 5.
35sent., I, d. 10, q. 1, P; 11 Nihil est volitum a voluntate
creata nisi praecognitum. Tamen in Deo est simpliciter falsa
quia in Deo actus voluntatis et actus intellectus et voluntas sunt
omnibus modis idem; nee plus distinguitur actus voluntatis a
voluntate quam distinguitur voluntas a voluntate. 11
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Every right will is conformed to Right Reason; but that
will by which God predestines this man and not the
other is right, therefore it is conformed to Right
Reason. Thus, there is some reason why the former man
is predestined and not the latter. But that reason is
not in God who is equally disposed to all men on His
part since He is no respector of persons. Hence, there
is some reason in another and that can only be in the
predestined.
Ockham replies: ·
To the first principal argument, when it proves that
generally there is some reason and cause for both
predestination and reprobation, it can be said that
every right will is conformed to Right Reason. But it
is not always conformed to a prior Right Reason which
shows cause why the will should wish this; but by the
fact that the divine will wants it, Right Reason dictates that it should be willed.36
Because God's intellect, will and essence are the same "in omni~

modis" there is no possibility of non-conformity between

intellect and will.

Hence, Ockham frequently insists that God

cannot act immorally; that God is subject to no moral obligation. 37
36 Sent., I, d. 41, q. 1, A and K; "Omnis voluntas recta
est conformis rectae rationi; sed illa voluntas qua Deus praedestinat istum et non alium est recta, ergo est conformis rectae
rationi. Ergo, est aliquae ratio quare illllin praedestinat et non
alium. Sed illa ratio non est in Deo quia Deus equaliter se habet
ad omnes quantum est ex parte sua, cum non sit acceptor personarum. Ergo, est aliquae ratio in alio et non nisi in praedestinato. 11
0
Ad primum principale, quando probat quod generaliter tam in
praedestinato quam reprobato est aliquae ratio et causa, potest
dici quod omnis voluntas recta est conformis rationi rectae. Sed
non est semper conformis rationi rectae praeviae quae ostendat
causam quare voluntas debet hoc velle, sed eo ipso quod voluntas
divina hoc vult, ratio recta dictat quod est volendum. 11 Clearly,
Ockham means to show the identity of reason and will in God. Yet
Francis Oakley uses this text to show that for Ockham's version of
morality "the last word lies with the will." Natural Law Forum 6,
p. 70. Professor Vernon Bourke calls this quotation "aclassic
statement of divine voluntarism." Proceedings of the American
Qatholic Philosophical Association 36 (1962), p. 2~
37For example, Sent., II, qes. 4-5, H; Sent., II, q. 19,

199
The divine Bring is beyond good and evil.

An essential condi-

tion of morality is absent without the possibility of discrepancy
between one's reason and will.
moral order is extrinsic.

Thus, God's connection with the

Whatever moral norms are embodied with-

in the nature of created things operate because of God's creative,
unilateral action.

Revealed commands express some moral neces-

sity or salvific economy for those other than the divine Legislator.

It is foreign to Ockham's viewpoint to conceive of

eternal truths of morality which necessitate the divine will.
Nevertheless, God operates rationally.
gibility describe how the divine will operates.
posse non-esse" and

"~

volitive characteristics
velle."

Laws of intelliThat which "non

posse esse" can be expressed as the
"~posse

non-velle" and

"~posse

First, that which "cannot not-be" is necessarily loved

by God because of the inner logic of His own activity.

To be

,

precise, God necessarily loves Himself as the only necessary
existent. 38 . Perhaps this assertion explains one sense in which
H; ~., III, q. 13, O; Sent., IV, qes. 8-9, S. Occasionally,
Ockham implies the identity of Right Reason and will in God as
the reason He cannot act immorally. Thus, Sent., I, d. 14, q. 2,
G; "Ex hoc ipso quod (Deus) vult, convenienter fit et non frustra;
secus est in causis naturalibus et in causis voluntariis creatis,
quae voluntariae causae debent se conformare rectae rationi primae,
nee aliter faciunt aliquid juste vel recte. 11 At other times, Ockham asserts that God cannot act immorally because He is "debtor"
to no one. That is, God is totally self-sufficient and existentially independent. No other being presents a "claim" on the
divine activity. Thus, see Sent., II, q. 19, Hand P; Sent., III,
q. 13, O; Sent., III, q. 5, N.
38Sent., I, d. 1, q. 1 (I, 385-387); and Sent., I, d. 17,
q. 1, T. - -

r
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Ockham considers the divine will the 11 first directing rule 11 of
morality. 39 The natural exigency of God's self-love becomes a
moral necessity for creatures to love the Creator.

The importance

which Ockham places on "conformity to the divine will 11 gives
credance to this conjecture.

Whatever God produces ad extra is

done for the sake of His Goodness; likewise, Ockham claims that
every perfectly virtuous movement of the created will is done
for His Goodness.

Secondly, that which

11

cannot be 11 indicates the

limits of divine volition.

God cannot will to produce a mani40
fest contradiction; He cannot actualize the impossible.
But
Ockham does not speak of the law of contradiction as "limiting"
•or

Impossibility or possibility is
simultaneous with the divine will's incapacity or capacity. 41
11

obliging" the divine will.

What "cannot be" describes the extent of the divine will's competeirce.
39sent., III, q. 13, B; 11 • • • illa voluntas quae potest
quantum est de se bene agere et male, quia de se non est recta
necessario, ad hoc quod recte agat, indiget aliqua regula dirigente alia a se. Hoc patet, quia ideo voluntas divina non indiget aliquo dirigente, quia illa est prima regula directiva et non
potest male agere. 11 Ockham implies the identification of will
and Right Reason in God; but further, God's will is necessarily
directed to the Greatest Good. And Ockham claims elsewhere that
"rectitudo circa finem ultimum repugnat omni difformitati circa
ea quae sunt ad finem. 11 Sent., III, q. 12, II. (Also see Sent.,
III, q. 13, O; where Ockham discusses another ramification of conforming to the divine will.) In his late work, the Quodlibetal
Questions, Ockham calls the 'Love of God above all' necessarily
virtuous and "prirnus omnium actuum bonorum. 11 Quodl., III, q. 13.
The moral priority of love for God thus reflects the metaphysical
exigency of God's self-love.
40
Quodl., VI, q. 6; 11 Quidlibet est divinae potentia attribuendum quod non includit manifestam contradictionem. 11 Also see
Sent., II, qes. 8-9, S.
4.1 Sent., I, d. L~3, q. 2, F; "Et quando quaeritur, an primo
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For many reasons, the relationship between the divine
will and that which "posse

~"

is the important issue in deter-

mining the legislative authority of God.

Creation makes no

necessary claim on the divine will yet it remains a contingent
possibility and producible by God.

Does God operate rationally

regarding creatures?
Ockham discusses God's knowledge in Distinction ThirtyFive of the

11

Sentences-Commentary. 11

Question five of this dis-

tinction asks; Whether God understands everything other than
Himself though ideas of them?

Here Ockham claims that there are

divine ideas because, as Augustine says, "God operates rationally. 1142

11

By the fact that God is God, He knows everything;
-

otherwise He would not be said to operate rationally unless He
conveniat Deo non posse facere impossibile quam conveniat impossibili non posse fieri a Deo, dico quod non prius convenit Deo
non posse facere impossibile quam convenit impossibili non posse
fieri a Deo. Nee etiam prius convenit impossibili non posse
fieri quam Deo non posse facere impossibile. Et eodem modo dico
de affirmativis, quod non prius convenit Deo posse facere possibile vel creaturam quam creaturae posse fieri a Deo, sed simul
. natura eo modo, quo secundum Philosophum factivum et factibile
sunt simul natura ..• 11 Father Allan Wolter has published a thought. ful study of Ockham's doctrine of intrinsic and extrinsic possibility. His ironic conclusion is that Ockham is often criticized
for the position of Henry of Ghent (i.e., the possibility of
things derives from the divine will) which the Venerable Inceptor
refutes. 11 0ckham and the Textbooks: On the Origin of Possibility,"
Franziskanische Studien 32 (1950), pp. 70-96.
42

~., I, d. 35, q. 5, F;

Ideo dico quod ideae sunt
ponendae praecise ut sint examplaria quaedam ad quae intellectus
divinus aspiciens producat creaturas; cuius ratio est quia,
secundum beatum Augustinum ubi supra, propter hoc praecise ponendae sunt ideae in Deo quia "Deus est rationabiliter operans."
See Aueustine, De diversis guaestionibus LXXXIII, q. 43 (P.L.,
XL, 30).
11
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could know that which is done. 1143

God acts reasonably regarding

the creation and conservation of finite things--at least in the
sense of having ideas about what He accomplishes.

At face value,

this does not attribute greater rationality to God than is attained by psychotics.

But Ockham.has an interesting and innova-

tive conception of the divine ideas.
Ockham describes a divine idea as "something known by the
effective intellectual principle, to which the causative (activum)
knower can look to produce something in real being. 1144 This
description hardly pertains to the divine essence; Ockham consciously steps outside the majority opinion of Scholasticism which
held that the divine ideas were really the divine essence and
distinguishable only by reason. 45 Ockham's definition indicates,
43 sent., I, d. 35, q. 5, R; "Ex hoc ipso quod Deus est
Deus, Deus cognoscit omnia, nee aliter diceretur rationabiliter
operans nisi cognosceret illa quae operatur. 11
44 Ibid., D; "Idea est aliquid cognitum a principio effective intellectuali, ad quid activum aspiciens potest aliquid in
esse reali producere. 11
4 5Ibid., B; "Circa primum (i.e., Quid sit idea?) concordant multi doctores et fere omnes in una conclusione communi;
scilicet quod idea est realiter divina essentia et tamen differt
ratione ab ea ..• Contra istam conclusionem communem ostendo quod
idea non est realiter divina essentia ... 11 Also see Sent., I,
d. 2, q. 3 (II, 93); 11 ... ideae in mente divina non sunt realiter
ipsa divina essentia. 11 Ockham cites as examples of the "common
opinion" Godfrey of Fontaines, Quodl., VII, q. 1 (ed. M. De Wulf
and J. Hoffmans, Les Philosophes Belges, III); Henry of Ghent,
Quodl., IX, q. 2 (Paris, 1518); and Duns Scotus, Comm. Ox., I,
d. 35, q. unica. St. Thomas could be included, see Summ. Theol.,
I, q. 15, art. 1. When Ockham claims the ideas are "in the divine
mind" but are different from the divine essence he means: a) the
act by which the ideas are known is the divine essence, and b),
What is known is other than the divine essence.
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not the divine essence as imitable, but the creatures-as-known
which are really distinct from the divine mind. Indeed, "the
creature itself is the idea. 1146 In Ockham's jargon, the divine
ideas are "connotative terms" which signify the creatures-asknown directly and the singular act of divine knowing indirectly.
This definition avoids, to Ockham's satisfaction, certain perplexing problems annexed to the question of God's omniscience.
First, it allows that God knows everything without disallowing
the simplicity of God's Being.

An infinite number of ideas are

known by a single and unitary act of knowing which is the divine
essence.
plurality~

God's intellection terminates at, but does not include,
Secondly, as external to God's essence or as the

creatures themselves, the ideas insure that God knows what is
other than Himself.

Ockham thinks that previous attempts to

bring the divine ideas into God's mind as "relations of imitability" or the divine essence as "participateable" throws into
question any divine knowledge of difference or otherness.

Third-

ly, the "cause of knowing" (ratio cognoscendi) remains God's
46
sent., I, d. 35, q. 5, E; 11 • • • quantumcumque Deus cognosceret suam essentiam, nisi cognosceret creaturam non diceretur
rationabiliter producere quantumcumque produceret. Ergo, ipsa
creatura est idea." Also see Sent., I, d. 2, q. 2 (II, 71); ..•
quia ideae in Deo sunt ipsae res producibiles a Deo, nee praedicantur de Deo sicut ipsa attributa vere de Deo praedicantur."
Grammatically, the term "idea" signifies "ipsammet creaturam in
recto et etiam ipsammet in obliquo et praeter hoc, importat ipsam
divinam cognitionem vel cognoscentem in obliquo. Et ideo de ipsamet creatura est praedicabilis ut ipsa sit idea; sed non est
_praedicabilis de agente cognoscente vel cognitione, quia nee
cognitio nee cognoscens est idea sicut nee exemplar." Sent., I,

d. 35, q. 5, E.

~
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intellect.

A finite being cannot cause knowledge in the infinite

and self-sufficient God.

The ideas are "what is known" and the

means by which they are known is the divine essence.

Finally,

the ideas were known eternally by God although what is signified
by the ideas, i.e., the creatures themselves, begin-to-be.

The

necessity and immutability by which God understands the ideas
cannot be attributed to the ideas, but only to God's knowledge.
This gives Ockham a foundation for necessary and immutable truths
about the created world without asserting anything but God exists
necessarily.
The Scholastics spent considerable metaphysical energy
on the question of the divine ideas.

It was Aristotle's position

that scientific knowledge "must rest on necessary basic truths;
for the object of scientific knowledge cannot be other than it
is. 1147 Accepting this position, and the revealed truth God alone
"cannot be other than He is," the Schoolmen had to find some
basis for necessary truth about the created world besides Plato's
world of forms or Aristotle's eternal species.

The divine ideas

provided a likely place to establish at least the necessity of
being known for finite things.

The "common opinion" on the

divine ideas was unacceptable to Ockham.
two lines:

His objections follow

a) if the divine ideas are really the divine essence

then God does not know other things and b) if the ideas have some
type of being or ontological "weight" within God's mind then the
47p OS t • . Anal., I, c. 6 (trans. G. R. G. Mure).
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divine simplicity is lost.

Ockham avoids these problems by

eliminating the ideas qua creatures from God's intellect. He is
left with divine ideas which are "nothings. 1148 They have neither

-

esse essentiale, nor esse intelligibile, nor

~

possibile, nor

esse creabile:

the eternal ideas are simply "null classes" whose
one member might exist actually. 49 Yet Ockham insists that God's

48 Sent., I, d. 36, q. 1, P; "Ideo dico quod 'nihil' multipiciter accipitur. Uno modo sincathegoreumatice et sic est unum
signum universale negativum includens suum distribuibile secundum
modum loquendi logicorum; sicut dicimus 'nihil currit,' 'nihil
est intelligens.' Alio modo accipitur cathegoreumatice pro
aliquod quid dicitur 'unum nihil.' Et hoc potest accipi dupliciter: quia uno modo 'nihil' accipitur et dicitur illud quid
non est realiter, nee habet aliquid esse reale. Et isto modo
dicendum est quod angelus ab eterno fuit nihil quia nullum esse
reale habuit ab eterno, quia nullum esse fuit ab eterno nisi
solus Deus. Aliter accipitur 'nihil' pro illo quid non tantum
non habet esse reale sed etiam sibi repugnat esse reale, et isto
modo dicimus quod chymera est nihil .•. Dico, ergo, quod esse
repraesentatum vel esse cognitum creaturae ab aeterno fuit 'nihil'
primo modo accipiendo vel cathegoreumatice, non secundo modo. Et
ideo non infert istam quod nihil fuit repraesentatum a Deo •.. 11
Ockham explains the difference between "categorematic" and "syncategorematic" terms in Summa Logicae I, c. 4 (ed. by Philotheus
Boehner, pp. 15-16). Also see Boehner, Collected Articles .•. ,
pp. 22-224. Also see Quodl., VI, q. 6 where Ockham claims that
every creature is a "pure nothing" before its production.
49 ockham, in denying the position of Henry of Ghent and
Duns Scotus that ideas have a type of being in the divine mind
(~in essentia and esse intelligibile), denies any ontological
or positive status to the ideas. The fact that they are known
and can be created implies no reality on the part of divine ideas.
Ockham is not asserting that the possibility or intelligibility
of finite being is a function of the divine will or intellect;
but that _§§~ possibile and ~ intelligibile are not "quasi" or
"diminished" beings which precede the actuality of created things.
For the context of Ockham's doctrine see Father Armand Maurer,
"Ens diminutum: A Note on Its Origin and Meaning," Medieval Stud~12 (1950), pp. 216-222; and Edward Sullivan, The Divine 'ICie'as
!?cording to William of Ockham: Study and Text (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Department of Philosophy, University of Toronto,
1951), pp. 1-92. Father Allan Wolter comments that, according to
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'Jictivi ty regarding creation is guided by these exemplars.

We

•. jnust determine the type of rationality these ideas-examplars.creatures impute to God's legislation.
God knows perfectly, intuitively and individually every
"creatable."

As omniscient, God recognizes the truth and falsity

of every proposition which could be formulated about that creature at any instant. 50 This knowledge includes certain hypotheti·cal necessities.

If a human creature exists, then he is existen-

tially dependent upon the Creator; then he is a rational animal;
then he is composed of matter and form; then he is mortal; then
he is similar to every other existing man; 51 then he is a free

[
~
f

Ockham, "possibility is not a real something which inheres in a
creature. 'To be possible' is something predicable of a creature;
it is a logical modality that has been elevated to the status of
a predicate." Franz. Studien 32, p. 89. In support of this analysis, Fr. Wolter quotes: "Nee est proprius modus loquendi dicere
quod esse possibile convenit creaturae, sed magis proprie debet
dici quod creatura est possibilis non propter aliquid quod sibi
conveniat sed quia potest esse in rerum natura." Sent., I, d.
43, q. 2, F. Fr. Wolter's comments regarding"~ possibile"
could be extended to other areas on the basis of Sent., I, d. 36,
q. 1, S - DD. Ockham maintains that: a) knowing-knowable, creating-creatable, able to do-able to be.done, etc., are correlative
terms so that neither is prior to or cause of the other; and b),
that from eternity creatures were knowable, creatable and able to
be done although metaphysically they were "nothings"! After
solving the problem of attributing simplicity and omniscience to
God, Ockham might have smiled at the consequent questions whose
solution he left unclear.
50 Tractatus de Praedestinatione ..• , q. 2, art. 4 (ed.
Philotheus Bo elmer, pp. 28-29); " ... sci en ti.a Dei, qua sciuntur
futura contingentia, sit necessaria; et hoc est verum, quia ipsa
essentia di vina est uni ca cogni t.io necessaria et immutabilis
omnium tam complexorum quam incomplexorum, necessariorum et contingentium." See also the parallel text in Sent., I, d. 38, q. 1,

L-M.

51 ockham's position on universal divine ideas is somewhat
confusing. He first claims that 11 ideae praecise sunt singularium
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being.

Divine knowledge of the ideas entails these truths.

These facts must obtain if

~

exist; expressed in the mode of

possibility they are necessarily true even if men do not exist.
Ockham's position that men cannot be obliged to the impossible
indicates that God's creative power and legislative power are not
co-extensive.

God conceives inteliectually and could effect

verbal commands whose significance ·is incompatible with the
ideas of human creatures.

For example, the commands "Never die,"

"Lift yourself by your shoe laces," and "Know everything" are
possible for God to produce but impossible for men to fulfill.
Whatever God commands while expecting men to obey must respect
the natural capacities of the human being commanded.

Thus, the

scope of God's legislative authority is established by what is
impossible for.moral beings to accomplish.
The moral "facts" which derive from the divine ideas are
few.

For one thing, the ideas as creatures depend upon God as

their ontological principle or source.

The original inventory

of the divine mind comprises everything "producible" whose actual
production requires a free and creative decision by God.

Thus,

quia praecise singularia sunt factibilia." Sent., I, d. 35, q.
Then he proceeds to say that "Deus de fiendis ab eo non
habet tantum cognitionem de universalibus, sicut habet artifex
. creatus de fiendis ab ipso, sed itiam habet cognitionem distinctam et particularem de quolibet particulari fiendo ... 11 Ibid., R.
Probably, Ockham means that God knows every "universal proposition" which can be expressed about or by creatures. Surely, God
knows the similarity between things because men can form true
propositions about specific likeness.
From eternity, God knows
that "Socrates is similar to Plato." The truth of this proposition, however, does not require a universal essence of humanity
but only knowledge of Socrates and Plato.

5, Q.
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creatures are "debtors"--an ethical expression of man's dependence
in origin and destiny.

To be created, conserved and redeemed by

God places a rational creature in a "claim producing" or obliging
situation.

Secondly, created acts of will and reason are not

identical--whence the possibility of moral good or evil.

The

human capacity for free and rational actions gives the "condition
of the possibility" of morality and meaningful divine commands.
Those principles of demonstrative moral science listed by Ockham
--Everything honest is to be done, All dishonesty is to be avoided, The will ought to conform itself to Right Reason, All blameworthy evil is to be avoided--are necessarily true. 52 Such
principles are valid "sine omni praecepto superioris;" if they
are formulated they cannot be false; God knows them from eternity
as immutably true.

Yet the value terms contained within these

ethical principles are "connotative" and invariably signify a
52 These principles are listed in Quodl., II, q. 14. Ockham follows Aristotle in asserting that the principles of demonstrative proof must be necessarily true. See Meta., V, C. 5
(1915b 5-10) and Nie. Ethics, VI, c. 3 (1139b 18-35). As a
Christian, Ockham believes that only God is absolutely necessary
and everything else, even the facticity of a proposition, is
radically contingent. These principles of morality are necessarily true in the sense that they cannot be false if they ~
formulated. "Aliter dicitur necessarium, perpetuum et incorruptibile propositio, quae non potest esse falsa, quae scilicet ita
est vera, quod si formatur, non est falsa sed vera tantu,"Il. 11 Summ.
12g., III, II, c. 5 (quoted from Webering, Theory of Demonstra-=cIOn ... , p. 37, also found in Baudry, Lex.igue Philosophique, p.
170). Thus, before creation these moral principles would be true
~f God formulated them.
Other per ~ nota principles are given
in~., III, q. 12, H; Sent., III, q. 11, Z; Sent., III, q. 13,
K; and Sent., Prologue, q. 12 (I, 348). Among the divine ideas,
therefore;-are some "eternal laws" although-not in the sense of
Aquinas' "Eternal Law."
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created volition and its created causes of freedom and Right
Reason. 53

Moral necessities, for Ockham, are grounded on the

human possibilities of free and rational behavior.

No man exists

necessarily; no virtuous act is metaphysically necessary--but if
either is asserted then the "inner moral order" of intellectual
dictate and volitive freedom must be asserted as the possible or
actual causes of morality.

Whatever transcends the productive

powers of the created will (either categorically such as eternal
life or "individually" such as singing tenor or understanding
Einstein's theory of relativity) cannot be matters of conscience.
We can speak of God's absolute power to issue "impossible" commands such as "Hate God" or "Act contrary to Right Reason," but
according to Ockham, the discussion has left the realm of morality. 54
Creating while He looks to the exemplars, God knows; a)
the creature's existential "indebtedness," b) the freedom and
Right Reason which together make men moral beings, and c) the

53chapter V treats the meaning of value terms.

Here we
only assert that moral values are defined by Ockham by their
essential causes, i.e., the created will and Right Reason. "
'virtuosum' et 'vitiosum' sunt nomina connotativa et significant
ipsum actum non absolute sed connotando cum hoc activitatem voluntatj_s et prudentiae; et quando deficit aliquid connotatum non
dicitur talis actus virtuosus. 11 Sent., III, q. 13, F, ad primum.

54Quodl., II, q. 14; "Circa primum; dico quod morale

accipitur largiter pro humanis quae subjacent voluntati absolute,
~t sic accipitur in Decretis, distinctio prima, c. 'Mos,' ut patet
in glossa.
Aliter accipitur stricte mqgis pro moribus sive actibus subjectis potestati voluntatis secundum naturale dictamen
rationis et secundum alias circumstantias. '' Also see Sent., Prologue, q. 12 (I, 359).
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total volitional capacities of every individual man.

He knows

the framework of morality as hypothetically necessary.

These

facts validate God's moral authority and define the limits of its
application.
Ockham's doctrine of divine ideas allows God to command
any "simple" act producible by the creature's operative power.
{"Simple" means the volitional power as actualized or specified
by a single object.)

Between the individual nature of creatures

and the simple nature of actions within the power of those creatures, God "sees" no inherent and necessary bond of moral suitability or unsuitability.

Is there any simple act which would not

be morally indifferent when performed by the insane, or one in
inculpable ignorance, or accidentally?

Besides distinguishing

carefully between fact and value, Ockham requests a strict distinction between moral determinants and moral actions.
nature of an action is one moral determinant among many.

The simple
(Ockham

does talk about actions which are generically good; but he is
clear that eliciting such acts for improper motives renders the
volition an evil.)5 5 Ockham insists that moral activity is a
human enterprise with complex causes, objects and circumstances.
55 sent., III, q. 12, N; 11 Sexta distinctio est quod aliquis
actus est bonus ex genere vel malus, aliquis ex circumstantia,
aliquis ex principio meritorio. Exemplum primi quantum ad actum
bonum ex genere; sicut orare, dare elemosinam, sive velle talia
facere absolute sine omni circumstania bona vel mala. Exemplum
primi quantum ad actum malum; ut furtum facere, velle fornicari
absolute sine aliqua circumstantia bona vel mala, de quibus dicunt philosophi et sancti quod statim nominata convoluta sunt cum
malitia."
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At the same time, he allows for drastic and sweeping changes in
the circumstance of the divine determination of right and wrong.
Ockham saw an internal problem with asserting; a) the
creatures' ontological-moral "debt" to the Creator, and b) the
possibility of affirmative or negative commands regarding every
simple act of man.

For example, rejecting God is a simple action

(nolle Deum) controllable by the human will yet this action seems
clearly inconsistent with man's existential dependence.
could not resolve this problem at first.

Ockham

In the Ordinatio, he

-

claims "no one can ordinately hate God;" in the Reportatio, he
reasons that "to hate God can be a correct act on earth, if prescribed by God, therefore in heaven also. 1156 His final solution
in the Quodlibetal Questions does not retreat from his assertions
that, a) God could command creatures to hate or "not love" Him
and that, b) the creature ought to obey this extraordinary mandate.

But he finds a way to maintain these prerogatives of the

divine Legislator while simultaneously asserting that love for
56 sent., I, d. 1, q. 1 (I, 375); 11 ••• nullus potest ordinate odire Deum ... 11 Sent., IV, q. 14, D; "Praeterea, omnis voluntas potest se conformare praecepto divino; sed Deus potest praecipere quod voluntas creata odiat eum; igitur, voluntas creata
potest hoc facere. Praeterea, omne quod potest esse actus rectus
in via, et in patria: sed odire Deum potest esse actus rectus
in via, puta si praecipiatur a Deo; ergo, et in patria." Also
see Sent., II, q. 19, 0. We discuss the odium Dei further in
the following chapter. As Erich Hochstetter has indicated, Ockham seems to change his mind about this question. Franz. Studien,
32, pp. 15-16. Yet when the papal commission at Avignon questioned
Ockham about the possibility of the commanded hate for God and the
human fulfilment of such a command, they determined that "non
dixit. 11 See Pelzer, Revue d'Histoire ecclesiatigue, 18, pp. 253254. The commission cites the text quoted above in Sent., IV,
q. 14, D.
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God above all is necessarily and immutably good whenever it
occurs within the created will.

Ockham's solution re-affirms the

free and rational character of human moral response; man's moral
nature requires conformity to the divine wish in a deliberate,
well-motivated and free manner.
Thirdly, I say that this necessary virtuous act in the
manner mentioned is an act of will, because the act by
which God is loved above all for His own sake is this
kind of act. For this act is so virtuous that it cannot
be wicked nor can it be caused by the created will unless
it be virtuous •..
If one objects: God could prescribe that He not be loved
for a certain time because He could command that the intellect and likewise the will be occupied with study so
that it could not think about God for that period. Then
I request that the will elicit an act of loving God.
Now either that act is virtuous--and this cannot be
asserted since it is elicited against God's command-or it is not virtuous and the proposition prevails
that the act of loving God above all is not virtuous.
I answer:
if God could prescribe this act as it seems
He could without contradiction, then I assert that the
will could not elicit such an act for this period. By
the fact that it elicits such an act, the will would
love God above all and consequently would fulfil the
divine command because to love God above all is to love
whatever God wishes to be loved. And by the fact that
it would thereby love God, the will would not follow
the divine command in this hypothetical case. Consequently, by thus loving God, one would love and not love
and fulfil the divine command and not fulfil it.57
Ockham did not repudiate the common Scholastic position
that loving God above all is necessarily and unalterably good.
Nor is it correct to interpret Ockham as knowing only positive
moral obligation.

Given a hypothetical and highly improbable

divine command to hate God, the created nature of man requires
a loving, obedient response to the Creator's command.

The

57Quodl., III, q. 13. Our translation follows the text
established by Father Boehner in Ockham, Philosophical Writings,
pp. 146-147.

r
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absolute power of God does not throw all morality into question.
on the contrary, divine omnipotence highlights and "proves" the
natural structure of moral activity.

-

This because God commands

man who necessarily executes his moral obligations rationally
and freely.

Without asserting a divine idea of "humanity" Ock-

ham' s God is conditionally (i.e., if men exist) committed to
"how" moral goodnei?s is accomplished and the immutable goodness
of created love for Himself above all.

4. The Objective Norm of Morality
Ockham maintains:

"Every created will is obligated to

conform itself to its rule; but the divine will is the rule of
every created will; therefore, every created will is obligated
to conform itself to the divine will. 1158 Religious belief affects the conduct of morality.

Concern to fulfill the divine
wish "always should be in every honest use of reason. 1159 The
manner in which the divine will governs moral decisions, however,
is far from clear.
Belief changes the motives or final causes of moral
activity.

The Christian acts are orientated to God; this perva-

sive intention

differentiates Christian from "philosophical"

58 sent., I, d. 48, q. 1, A; "Ad oppositum: quaelibet
voluntas creata tenetur se conformare regulae suae; sed voluntas
divina est regula cuiuslibet voluntatis creatae; ergo, quaelibet
voluntas creata tenetur se conformare voluntati divina.e. 11
59 Ibid., D.

2l4

virtues.

60

Ordering human acts to the Infinite Good seems to

be an implication of religious belief rather than an explicit

demand of divine positive law.

At least, Ockham's willingness

to defend the virtuousness of loving God above all in the face
of divine commands to the contrary suggests the "natural" or non-

positive obligation to love God.

Believing that God is the cause

of everything and the ultimate end has moral consequences.

De-

pendent upon the divine will for his existence, the human creature
should not allow a more fundamental obligation than his "debt"
to the Creator.

The moral necessity of loving God reflects the
absolute necessity with which God loves Himself. 61 The altruistic
love for God, the "first of all good acts," becomes the human
image of God's own life.

Thus, the Christian conscience appreci-

ates· a motive in acting which is not apparent nor operative outside of faith.
The commands which God has or might institute, however,
require behavior patterns which are observable.

Here "conformity"

60 sent., IV, q. 3, S; 11 • • • abstinet Christianus ab actu
fornicandi propter Deum, et quia Deus praecepti sibi abstinere,
ita quod Deus est hie causa finalis vel praeceptum Dei istius
abstinentiae. Et sic de omnibus aliis virtutibus acquisitis a
bono Christiano, quia semper Deus est principalis finis intentus.
Philosophus autem licet abstineat a talibus, tamen totaliter
propter alium finem, vel propter conservationem naturae vel ad
proficiendum in.· scientia vel propter aliquid tale. Igi tur, aliud
fuit objectum partiale abstinentiae philosophi et boni Christiani
et per consequens alia virtus et aliterius rationis •.. 11 Also see
~., III, q. 12, GGG; Sent., III, q. 10, I.
61 sent., r; d. 10, q. 2, L; "Ad aliud dico quod voluntas
divina necessario vult bonitatem suam; non tamen libere sed it.a
naturaliter sicut naturaliter intelligit bonitatem suam."
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means the creature's accomplishment of a contingent divine wish. 62
Ockham maintains that God's express desire for the human agent
to perform some action is reason enough for Right Reason to dictate such action.

It would be incorrect to conceive of God's

will as "superceding" or "overriding" Right Reason--the proximate
norm of morality.

The requirement to love and obey God presup-

poses that this obligation is recognized and dictated by Right
Reason. 63 Rather, the objectively correct use of Practical
Reason would not prefer some natural criterion of moral goodness
to the revealed will of God in determining the concrete location
of one's obligation.

Thus, God's will might require church

attendance or baptism as facets of "Christian" morality--a somewhat trivial difference between the ethics of belief and unbelief.
More importantly, on the basis of a divine command the Christian

62 sent.

I, d. 48, q. 1, G; "Quinto dico quod voluntas
tenetur se conformare voluntati divinae volendo ea quae voluntas
divina vult earn velle; et hoc si velit earn velle illud voluntate
beneplaciti vel voluntate praecepti." See Freppert, The Basis
of Morality ... , pp. 157-67, for a study of the various senses of
"conformity."
6 3sent., III, q. 11, Z· 11 • • • hoc est unum tale principium
(quibus virtutes connexae sunt): Omne determinatum a ratione
recta propter determinatum finem et sic de aliis circumstantiis
esse faciendum, est faciendum; aliud, Omne bonum dictatum a recta
ratione est eligendum--ista et alia multa sunt principia communia
omni virtuti sine quibus non potest elici actus virtuosus. Et
sicut ista principia sunt communia, ita habitus sunt communes
istorun1 principiorum quae vocantur prudentiae; i ta quod no ti tia
istius principii communis est causa partialis immediata notitiae
conclusionis in speciali. Et loquor de notitia actuali utrobique,
ut si arguatur: Omne dictatum a recta ratione esse diligendum est
diligendum; sed patrem vel matrem vel Deum diligendum esse est
dictatum a recta ratione; ergo, et cetera." Also see Sent., I,
d. 1, q. 4 ( I, 44 3) .
--
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__ might be obliged to actions which the non-believer would find
unconscionable.

For example, Ockham teaches that the directive,
"each should receive what belongs to him" is known evidently. 64

Yet religious commitment to God, the Creator of heaven and earth,
gives a "supernatural" flexibility to the notion of ownership or
property.

According to the natural evidence, the Israelites were

wrong to plunder Egypt prior to the Exodus, i.e., they committed
"theft."

But Ockham claims:

"To despoil the Egyptians was not

wrong but right, and thus God did not prescribe evil when commanding them to take from the Egyptians.

Nor did the children

of Israel sin by despoiling them unless they acted in the wrong
spirit--unless they did not pillage precisely in obedience to the
divine

command~ 1165 God's wish not only presents a valid claim

upon the created will's activity, it-also affects the application
of evident moral norms and the ethical designation of concrete
actions.
Those who claim that Ockham teaches moral voluntarism
have their point in that the divine will could override every
natural criterion of moral right and wrong.

With the exception

of the altruistic love for God, which seems to be the only neeessarily good act, the "content" or application of ethical prin66
ciples is relative to God's contingent decrees.
Two common

64Sent., Prologue, q. 12 (I, 348).
65 sent., I, d. 47, q. 1, G.
66Anita Garvens suggests the "form--content" distinction
in Ockham' s ethic. "Wenn fiir Ockham die allgemeinen ethischen
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assertions of the Scholastics--a) that God is omnipotent and
absolutely free and b) that God can produce immediately what He
ordinarily causes mediately through secondary causes--break loose

l-

from their metaphysical restraints of intrinsically related es-

ff~;

sences, teleological connections between individuals and the
internal continuity of divine operations ad extra.

Thus, God

could command or totally create acts 6f hate for Himself in
spite of the moral necessity that men love God or the internal
exigency of divine self-love. 67 As total cause, God might produce statements which are logically contradictory or imperatives
which are humanly impossible to fulfill.

The permanent truths

Prinzipien schliesslich doch mehr als nur formale Satze sind, wie
im Laufe der folgenden Untersuchung sich zeigen wird, so liegt
das vornehmlich in seiner glaubigen Annahme der Offenbarung als
der Erkenntnisquelle fur die vom Willen Gottes festgesetzte
Sittenregel, die augenblicklich und ordinate gultig ist. Sie
allein liefert Ockham den Inhalt der sicheren allgemeinen ethischen Prinzipien." Franz. Studien, 21, p. 248. This terminology
is helpful with two qualifications. First, the love of God above
all is a concrete and "contentful" moral value whenever it occurs
in the created will regardless of changeable divine decrees.
Secondly, God's positive .laws may be self-authenticating but
they are not self-explanatory. That God has issued the command
is warrant to obey the law for any believer; but understanding
the intent and application of the law requires by necessity the
agent's prudent judgments. For example, the agent must judge on
the basis of experience that "this is murder," "these are my
parents," etc., to recognize how to fulfill the divine mandates.
67 To reconcile the freedom of the created will with the
"obstinacy" of the damned, Ockham makes God the primary cause of
the permanent hate for God which characterizes the state of
damnation. "Et eodem modo, potest assignari ratio obstinationis
malorum per hoc quod Deus causat tanquam causa totalis quicquid
absolutum est in actu nolendi et odiendi Deum ... 11 Sent., II,
q. 19, F. The fact that God does produce hate for Himself in
the devils is a fortiori evidence that He might do so in men.

218

of morality and the limits placed upon God's legislative power
derive from the nature of men and virtuous activity--not from
the intrinsic necessity of divine Goodness.
Without doubt, Ockham's confidence in the ordained will
of God makes the present moral order reliable.

He speaks of

God's "quasi absolute" will regarding "all goods which are not
evils by guilt nor punishment. 1168 And notice that by defining
"murder," "theft" and "adultery" as "contrary to divine command,"
Ockham can maintain that only a direct revelation by God would
justify the deliberate and voluntary taking of innocent life,
another's property or wife.

The biblical instances of dispensa-

tions to the "common law" are few; the likelihood of future
expectations is small.

But Ockham's expectation of continuity

is just that, an expectation.

God might have foreknown and

ordained drastic and universal changes in the content of moral
obligation.

After allowing for particular exceptions to the

present classification of (simple) acts as right or wrong, what
prevents the exception from becoming the rule?

The ordinate

power of God might contain general mandates whose application
would be as socially ruinous as the revolutionary potential which
commentators have located mistakenly in God's absolute power.
Admittedly, images of indiscriminate homicide or appropriation
of property are completely foreign to Ockham's viewpoint and
68
sent., I, d. 48, q. 1, B; 11 Tertio, sciendum quod quaedam
sunt volita a Deo quasi absolute; cuiusmodi su..'YJ.t omnia bona quae
nee sunt mala culpae nee penae •.. 11
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intentions.

Nevertheless, only terminology stands between his

principles and such chaotic possibilities.

A "common law" has

been revealed; God is committed to the physical, moral and salvific orders which He has "ordained."

But Ockham insists that

God has commanded exceptions to the common law, e.g., in the
cases of Abraham and Osee; and whatever God ordains regarding
creatures is itself contingent.
The prerogatives of the divine will are a serious and
pervasive polarity in Ockham's moral doctrine.

But he does not

recognize the discretionary power of God as the only source of
moral obligation. 69 Without cognition or belief regarding the
deity, divine positive laws should not be considered as authoritative within the non-believers moral decisions.

For believers,

God's wish the objective norm of morality because His will is
the unqualified extrinsic basis of obligation.

It is only be-

lievers who face the "theological" possibility of slight or
sweeping changes in the content of one's duty.

And Christians

can balance this highly unlikely prospect with religious convictions about God's faithfulness and mercy.

69sent., III, q. 13, M; 11 • • • semper peccat voluntas peccato
commissionis quando elicit aliquem actum ad cuius oppositum obligatur per praeceptum divinum vel ordinationem divinam vel alio
.!!!2..£2. obligatur ad oppositum .•. "

r
CHAPTER IV
THE CONSTRUCTION OF MORAL ACTIONS
William of Ockham seems reluctant or unable to explain
the natural and evident criteria by which moral agents decide
right and wrong.

There are strong suggestions that the Decalogue

precepts are harmonious, at least, with the natural evidence for
ethical value.

For example, he claims that Christian and "philo-

sophical" virtues differ in motives--not in what is done. 1

In

his political writings, he asserts that the Decalogue precepts
were matters of natural law before their positive revelation. 2
What empirical data supports the moral judgments that acts of

1 sent., III, q. 12, GGG; "Philosophus tamen non ponit
virtutem moralem esse respectu objecti supernaturalis sicut nos
ponimus; quia non ponit quod abstinentia et continentia sit
volenda propter honorem divinum tanquam propter finem, nee talia
et consimilia quae sunt praecepta a Deo quomodo bonus Christianus
ponit talia. Sed solum ponit talia esse volenda quia sunt honesta vel conservativa naturae vel aliquid aliud mere naturale."
Also see Sent., III, q. 10, I; and Sent., IV, q. 3, S; and Sent.,
III, q. 12, CC.
2 opus Nonaginta Dierum, c. 99 (Manchester ed.; II, 747);

"Male arguit [Johannes XXII in bulla "Quia vir reprobus"], acsi
argueret: 'Deus praecepit filiis Israel, ut legitur Exodi xx,
li2.g occides, non moechaberis, !l2!.! furtu.rn facies; haec ergo eis
prius praecepta non erant.' Constat enim quod in lege naturae
ante legem Mosaicam haec erant praecepta .•. haec ante librum Deuteronomii praecepta fuerunt. 11 See W. Kolmel, "Das Naturrecht bei
Wilhelm Ockham, 11 Franziskanischen Studien 35 (1953), pp. 39-85.
Francis Oakley's article, "Medieval Theories of Natural Law;
William of Ockham and the Significance of the Voluntarist Tradition," shows the problem with attempts to derive a coherent
theory of natural law from the political works. Natural Law
Forum 6 (1961), pp. 65-72.
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theft or adultery are wrong?

Because of Ockham's ambitious

doctrine of God's legislative authority and his frequent descriptions of the divine will as the "first directing rule" of morality, the question of experiential criteria is problematic.
Two doctrines cause interpretive difficulties when isolating the non-scriptural foundations of moral judgments.

First,

ethical value is unavoidably an affair of human volition for Ockham.

The intricate system of relationships proposed by St.

Thomas and Duns Scotus for establishing moral suitability (.£.Qgvenientia) in actions controlled by the will are applied by
Ockham to the will-acts themselves.
and time pertain to the will itself. 3

Circumstances such as place
Even divine commands are.

understood as prescribing specific volitions and the circumstances
of specific volitions.

4 When the objects, ends and situational

3 sent., III, q. 10, F; 11 • • • circumstantiae nihil faciunt
ad actum ve1 habiturn partis sensitivae; sed tantum ad actum voluntatis quia sunt objecta ad actum voluntatis •.• " Also see Quodl.,
I, q. 20.

4sent., III, q. 10, K; "Aliter potest dici quod actus
interior et exterior prohibentur distinctis praeceptis, non quia
sunt distincta peccata, quia peccatum solum consistit in actu
interiori qui potest esse unus et idem cum actu exteriori et
sine, sed ne detur simplicibus occasio errandi. Potest enim
aliquis cred.ere quod est peccatum solum quando actus interior
est malus et actus exterior similiter. Et haec est opinio multorum quod non est peccatum in sola voluntate sed tantum quantum
ponitur in opere. 11 Also see Quodl., I, q. 20. Here Ockham objects to the doctrine of Duns Scotus that external (i.e., nonvolitive) actions have some "proper moral goodness or evilness."
See Scotus, Quodl., q. 18, nos. 12-14. This denial shows the
clear dist:i.nctior; made by Ockham between moral determinants and
moral values. On the other hand, it complicates the decisionmaking process. If there is nothing good or evil about sexual
intercourse with another's wife, on what evident basis might the
agent determine that to will adultery is evil?
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factors affecting moral decisions are discussed in Ockham, their
referent is- not external or physical actions.

Secondly and

corroboratively, Ockham establishes the elements of the decisionmaking process as constitutive of actual virtue.

Moral criteria

appear in Ockham's work as components of the specific nature of
will-acts.

With these peculiarities in mind, we will study the

causes-criteria of moral virtue, the degrees of virtuousness and
the necessarily virtuous act.

Our analysis attempts to recon-

struct the moral order from the human agent's point of view.
The final picture which emerges shows Ockham's concern for the
divine will; but voluntarism is not the final word of his moral
doctrine.
1. Causes and Criteria of Virtue
Ockham accepts the Aristotelian scheme of causality as
comprising material, formal, efficient and final causes. 5

But

Ockham proposes definitions of these types of causes which cannot be considered strictly Aristotelian.

Specifically, he de-

fines an efficient cause as "that whose being or presence is
followed by something else;" and a final cause is "a thing which
is loved and desired efficiently by an agent. 116 Both efficient

5 summulae in Libros Physicorum, II, c. 1-13; Sent., I,
d. 35, q. 5, N; Quodl., IV, q. 1.

6ouodl., IV, q. l; "Ex his patet quod causa finalis et
efficiens ratione distinguuntur. Hoc est, diffinitiones exprimentes 'quid nominis' earum sunt diversae; quia diffinitio causae
f'inalis est esse amatum et desideratum efficientis est esse
agente propter quid amatum sit effectus. Diffinitio causae

.

.'
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and final causes are involved in the production of a moral act.

Ockham's unique understanding of efficient and final causes provides the technique by which the circumstances-objects of a
voluntary act become partial causes of the substance of a willact and therefore the rectitude or evil of the will-act.
Ockham mentions three powers which comprise the total
cause of a moral act--the will, God and the intellect. 7 A voluntary act, the divine concursus and an intellectual act are
efficientis est esse illud ad cuius esse sive praesentiam sequitur aliquid. Et aliquando una istarum diffinitionum convenit uni
et alia alteri; aliquando possunt competere eidem."
Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, V, 2; Physics, II, 7, 198a
14 -198b 10. It should be mentioned that the identification of
final and efficient causality in some cases is not an innovation
in Ockham's thought. Aristotle also teaches that these causes
can be the same. "The soul is the cause or source of the living
body. The terms cause and source have many senses. But the soul
is the cause of its body alike in all three senses which we explicitly recognize. It is (a) the source or origin of movement,
it is (b) the end, it is (c) the essence of the whole living
body." (De Anima, II, 4, 415b 8 - 12, trans. J. A. Smith). Also
see Physics, II, 7, 198a 25-27. On the other hand, Ockham's description of efficient causality seems to be more reserved than
Aristotle's. Aristotle defines efficient causality as "initiating mot.ion" as "the source or origin of movement" as "that from
which the change or the resting from change first begins." Ockham, however, prefers to describe efficient causality without
asserting a transfer of power. In Ockham's thought an efficient
cause is a being whose precedence is required before another
thing can be asserted. (See above, Chapter I, pp. 17-26 .) Thus,
all knowledge required for virtuous will-acts appears as a cause
of virtue.
7 sent., III, q. 12, NN; "Si quaeras de actu prudentiae in
quo genere causae se habet ad actum virtuosum, ex quo necessario
requiritur per se? Et effectus sufficienter dependet ex causis
suis essentialibus; igitur etc •.. Respondeo quod est causa efficiens necessario requisita ad actum virtuosum sine qua, impossibile est actum esse virtuosum stante ordinatione divina quae
nunc est. Ita quod ad actum virtuosum necessario requiritur
acti vi tas actus prudent.iae et acti vi tas volur1tatis; i ta quod
illae duae causae sunt causa.e partial.es cum Deo respectu actus
virtuosi. 11 Also see Ibid. , CCC; Quodl. , III, q. 3.
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mutually necessary to produce moral behavior.

However, the

causality of the will is "principally" required for the production of a praiseworthy or blameworthy act.

Strictly speaking

only a voluntary act is considered as a moral act. 8

There is a

rigid distinction between natural and free causality in Ockham's
thought; moral goodness is necessarily the contingent effect of
a free cause.

Ockham implies that the free choice of the will

establishes God and the intellect as partial causes of a moral
effect.

Given the willingness of God to concur and the mental

preconception of some act, the human will remains free to produce
or not produce the action. 9

If the will elicits the act, however,

then God and the intellect become partial causes.

Because the

efficient causality of the will is a sine qua !!.2Q of moral
activity, the fundamental characteristic of moral behavior is its
8

sent., III, q. 12, F; "Quarta conclusio est quod actus
primo et principaliter virtuosus est actus voluntatis. Hoc patet
primo quia ille solus est laudabilis primo vel vituperabilis.
Alia autem non nisi secundario et quadam denominatione extrinseca;
puta, per hoc, quod eliciuntur conformiter actui voluntatis .•.
Praeterea, secundum sanctos, nullus actus est laudabilis vel
vituperabilis nisi propter intentionem bonam vel malam. Intentio autem est actus voluntatis; ergo etc., Item, sola voluntas
punitur sicut sola peccat secundum Anselmum, igitur etc ..• Also
see, Quodl., III, q. 13; Sent., III, q. 10, D, H, R, I.

9sent., IV, q. 14, G; "Loquendo de primo actu, posito

omni sufficienti et necessario requisito ad talem actum, puta,
ad actum voluntatis; si objectum cognoscatur et Deus velit concurrere cum voluntate ad causandum quando placet voluntati;
potest voluntas ex sua libertate sine omni alia determinatione
actuali vel habituali actum illum et ejus objectum elicere vel
non elicere. Et ideo respectu illius actus non oportet in aliquo
4uod determinetur voluntas nisi a seipsa." Also see Sent, I, d.
3, q. 1, K.
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voluntariness, its origination in freedom.

Ockham's ethical

program means to contain moral value within the contingent
operation of the free will.
The intellect is a cause of moral activity because an
act of reason must precedee.rery volitional act.

An act of under-

standing is an efficient cause of volition and hence, a partial
10
efficient caus~ of every moral use of the will.
To be precise,
Ockham considers an act of prudence or Right Reason as the mental
precedent for a correct act in the will. 11 An act of Right
Reason is an essential cause of moral goodness in the will, but
not a necessitating cause.

The dictate of Right Reason does not

force the will's production of a good act; on the contrary, Right
Reason is not even a partial cause of moral behavior unless the
will freely and contingently elicits an act conformed to Right
10
Sent., III, q. 11, C; Sent., III, q. 12 NN. Cf. Chapter I, pp. 42-43.
11 sent., III, q. 13, B; 11 Ad quaestionem primo sciendum
est quod ad hoc quod actus rectus primo eliciatur a voluntate
necessario requiritur aliqua recta ratio in intellectu. Hoc
patet per rationem et auctoritates. 11 Also see Sent., III, q. 11,
C; and Sent., Prologue, q. 10, K. On the basis"""()f"°these texts,
we must take exception to Oswald Fucks, O.F.M., who denies that
Ockham teaches the causal participatJon of Right Reason in the
production of a good act. "If the contribution of Right Reason,
while being necessary, is not one of causal influence on the
moral act, then it can only be of the nature of a necessary condition or constitutive element of that act." The Psychology of
~ According to William Ockham (St. Bonaventure, New York: The
Franciscan Institute, 1952), p. 89. In this text just quoted
and in others (Sent., III, q. 13, F; Sent., III, q. 11, C), Ockham asserts that because Right ReasoniSa necessary condition
or precedent for a virtuous act of the will, that Right Reason
is thereby a cause of virtue. "Dictare sive regulare non est
aliud_quam speciali modo illurn actum causare" as Ockham says.
See below, in footnote 12.
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Reason.

The will freely chooses to accept or reject the intellec-

tual dictate that "this ought to be done."

But in order to freely

do what is right, the agent must first know what is right.

Hence,

because acts of Right Reason or prudence must precede every

cor-

rect operation of the will, Ockham considers Right Reason as a
necessary efficient cause of moral goodness.
The dual meaning of "right reason" is consistently maintained in Ockham's analysis of the components of a morally good
act.

Reeta ratio is both cause and object for virtuous will-acts.

Assent to moral rules dictates the will's conformity; dictating
12 The conformity of the will to
. 1 mo d e o f causing.
.
is a specia
Right Reason, a point which Ockham's moral doctrine insists upon,
becomes the psychological parallel between intellectual and
volitional assent to the same directive.

Furthermore, Ockham

calls recta ratio an "object" of a virtuous act.

"The end and

right reason and all the other circumstances are secondary partial
objects of a virtuous act. 1113 The objects of an act give that
action its specific nature.

Every factor which determines a

moral decision--intention, time, place, divine command, moral
directive, physical act, sensitive passion, etc.--comprise the
total object and specific character of a virtuous act.

The

12 sent., III, q. 13, F; "Respondeo actum elici conformiter
rationi rectae est ipsum elici secundum rectam rationem regulantem
et dictantem talem actum esse eliciendum (quid quidem 'dictare'
sive 'regulare' non est aliud quam speciali modo illum actum
causare; sicut alibi patet). 11
l3Sent., III, q. 12, CCC.

Also see Sent., III, q. 10, Q.
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criteria by which future acts are known to be virtuous are the
constituents of actual virtue.

For example, walking to church

for the exercise is morally indifferent and specifically different than walking to church because "God ought to be worshipped."
These are not specifically identical acts with different circumstances.

While Right Reason dictates or partially causes moral

behavior, right reason (as a directive proposition) partially
determines the kind of moral act produced.
It is the role of prudence to consider the propriety of
an action in.terms of its circumstances. 14 All the circumstances
which affect the moral status of intended acts, are determined
and jointly dictated by the intellect.

For example, the time

and place in which volition should occur are dictated by Right
Reason or prudence. 15 A moral agent cannot determine whether the
14Sent., Prologue, q. 11 (I, 316).
l5sent., III, q. 12, DDD; "Si dicas quod requiritur ad
actum virtuosu.s quod locus et tempus apprehendatur et dictentur
a ratione sicut finis; et taliter non potest ratio causare actum
virtuosum et per consequens tam locus quam tempus sunt objecta
partialia actus dictandi et apprehensionis, non tamen sunt objecta volitionis virtuosae. Contra, volitio dicitur perfecte
virtuosa quia in on;mibus conformiter elicitur rationi rectae,
quia si in aliquo conformiter eliceretur et in aliquo non, jam
non essetperfecte virtuosa. Exemplum, si aliquis vellet actum
carnalem propter talem finem dictatum a ratione recta, et nullum
alium actum volendi haberet respectu loci et temporis quamquam
ista dictentur a ratione recta, ista volitio non est perfecte
virtuosa sed potius viciosa vel indifferens. Igitur ad hoc,
quod sit perfecte virtuosa oportet quod conformetur rationi rectae
et omnibus dictatis a ratione recta sibi debite competere. Igitur, si recta ratio dictet quod talis actus sit volendus loco et
tempore, et per consequens, quicquid est objectum actus dictandi
rectae erit oppositum [read, •.• "objectum"] actus perfecte virtuosi."
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act of drinking is correct or incorrect without considering the
circumstances within which the act of drinking occurs.

To perform

a virtuous act of drinking, the moral agent must voluntarily conform to Right Reason because it is obligatory, because the time
and place are correct, because the end is right.

Profit or

pleasure are morally unacceptable motives to act in the correct
time and place.

The dictate of Right Reason includes a determin-

ation of the proper rule and end according to which the will
should act.

Consequently, Ockham considers the circumstances of

an intended action as partial objects and partial causes of an
actually virtuous act. 16 The reasons why the will should elicit
certain acts are recognized and affirmed intellectually, prior
to any volitive fulfillment of obligation.

Thus, the influence

of final causes arrives through the efficient causality of the
dictate of Right Reason.
Acts which St. Thomas Aquinas considers as intrinsically
wrong, e.g., theft and murder; and which Duns Scotus considers
as contingently wrong, e.g., telling a falsehood, are considered
16 sent., III, q. 10, N; "Respondeo, omnes circumstantiae
actus voluntatis sunt objecta partialia illius actus; ita quod
finis in omni actu est objectum principale sicut prius patuit,
aliae circumstantiae sunt objecta secundaria partialia respectu
illius actus. Exemplum, si enim ad hoc, quod actus volun.tatis
quo aliquis vult orare Deum sit perfecte virtuosus requirantur
·de necessitate istae circumstantiae; quia velit orare propter
honorem Dei secundum rectum dictamen rationis in tempore statuto,
puta, die dominico, in loco determinato, puta, in ecclesia; tune
iste actus sic virtuosus habet honorem Dei pro objecto principali,
actu orandi pro objecto communi, rectam rationem, diem dorninicum
et ecclesiam pro objectis secundariis et partialibus; ita quod
respectu actus voluntatis istae circumstantiae sunt objecta. et
causae effectivae partiales respectu illius actus. 11
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as the "common object" of a volitional act by William Ockham.
The physical actions denoted by the participles "stealing,"
"killing" or "lying" can be "common" to agents who act according
to worthy or unworthy motives.

An agent could contemplate steal-

ing with a worthy motive, e.g., to avoid starvation; he could
intend not to steal with an unworthy motive, e.g., to promote
his own reputation.

Physical acts are not moral actions inde-

pendent of their voluntary and rational causes.

The end or motive

for which these "common objects" are produced by the will is
considered by Ockham as the "principal object" of the will-act. 17
"That object is the principal object of an act of the will whose
choice is intended principally."
the sake of an end.

The human will always acts for

Hence, Ockham asserts that the "common ob-

ject"- of a will-act can be substantially identical while the moral
status of the will-act might change.

During the same physical

action--walking to church--an agent's intentions might change.
Regarding the same physical act the will can produce a praiseworthy and a blameworthy act.

Although the agent's physical

action of walking to church is uninterrupted, and "walking to
17 Idem., "Si dicas quod actus principaliter intentus a
voluntate dicitur esse objectum primarium illius actus; scilicet,
si velim ambulare ad ecclesiam ad orandum propter laudem Dei,
actus principaliter intentus est actus orandi vel ambulandi;
ergo, isti actus sunt objecta primaria respectu actus voluntatis.
Respondeo, illud objectum est principale objectum actus volunta-tis cuius dilectio principaliter intenditur; huiusmodi est finis.
Sed tamen vocando illud objectum principale quid est objectum
causae, prout dicitur contra circumstantias requisitias, tune
actus exterior est objectum principale, quia objectum eorum commune est actus exterior, quia posset idem manere respectu mu1torum actuum voluntatis."
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church" remains the common object of the will act, Ockham holds
that a change in the agent's intention produces two different
moral acts.

In terms of the principle of morality, the will, an

act of walking to church for God's sake and walking to church
for my sake are not the same act.

A change, therefore, in the

partial objects of the will-act results in a different will-act. 18
Ockham may follow the doctrine of St. Thomas and Duns Scotus in
holding that certain acts are good or evil "by nature."

But

Ockham holds that only volitional acts which are deliberately
conformed to Right Reason, or deliberately opposed to Right
Reason, are good or evil "in se. 11

The physical actions possible

for the moral agent are "common objects;" they are one of the
partial objects which together with the principal object or end,
Right Reason dictates as the total cause of moral goodness in a
voluntary act. 19 Similarly to Peter Abelard, Ockham conceives
the importance of the agent's intention to a degree which jeopardizes the

11

simple" natures of actions as sufficient or inde-

pendent criteria of moral value.

Dictated prior to virtuous

will-acts, the required end affects the specific nature of the
morally good volition.
Just as an action of the will is morally good because of
its objects and causes, so also moral evil must be discussed in
18 Ibid., O; 11 • • • quia semper per additionem vel subtractionem alicuius, quid est objectum et causa partialis respectu
actus, variatur actus."
19 Ibid., P-Q.
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terms of causes.

A sin of omission is a "privation;" that is to
say, such a sin has a "defective cause. 1120 The absence of an

act which ought to be in the will indicates the absence of a
cause which ought to have been operative.

A sin of commission

is not a privation; rather, it is the presence of a forbidden
act within the will.
have a positive cause.

Thus, the "positive" sins of commission
It is an act which "lacks rectitude" in

the case of evil by commission; the will "lacks rectitude" in the
case of evil by omission.

Ockham questions the somewhat tradi-

tional distinction between the matter and the form of sin or
moral evil because he thinks it incorrect if applied indiscriminately to both sins of commission and omission which have different causes. 21
20 sent., III, q. 12, YY; "Ex hoc patet quomodo peccatum
dicitur privatio quia peccatum omissionis est formaliter privatio,
et aliquid peccatum, scilicet commissionis, non dicitur privatio,
sed est actus positivus quern voluntas tenetur non elicere, et
ideo est peccatum. Si tamen cum isto peccato sit semper peccatum
omissionis, tune cum omni peccato est privatio, quia est peccatum.
Non tamen omne peccatum est privatio quia solum peccaturn omissionis est privatio. Et ex hoc patet quid est causa efficiens
peccati, quia peccati omissionis nulla est causa positiva quia
ipsum nihil est positivum, sed tantum habet causam defectivam, et
illa est voluntas quae tenetur actum oppositum illi carentiae
elicere et non elicit. Si autem loquamur de peccato commissionis,
sic non solum voluntas creata est causa efficiens illius actus sed
ipse Deus qui omnem actum immediate causat sicut causa secunda
quaecunque, et ita est causa positiva difformitatis in tali actu;
sicut ipsius substantiae actus, quia sicut dictum est, difformitas
in actu commissionis non est nisi ipsemet actus elicitus contra
praeceptum divinum et nihil penitus aliud dicit."
21 Idem., "Ex hoc etiam patet quod non bene dicitur quod
actus positivus est materiale in peccato et carentia justiciae
debitae inesse est formale; quia aut est peccatum commissionis
aut omissionis in voluntate aut utrumque simul. Si primum solum,
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The objects and circumstances do not merely "surround"
a morally good act, they cause and constitute that act.

The

dictate of Right Reason, the end or principal object, the common
object, the time and place, the divine commands--these considerations are part of the prudential judgment that "this ought to be
done."

The factors by which the intellect judges what should be

done, constitute the specific nature of the will-act which fulfills the dictate of prudence or Right Reason.

The criteria

which enable the moral agent to determine his moral obligation,
comprise the structure of moral actions which are good.

Ockham's

doctrine of causality renders means by which the intellect decides
moral goodness, as objects and causes of actual moral goodness.
It seems to follow that there are no extrinsic moral determinants
in Ockham's system regarding actual moral goodness.
The mind begins its deliberation with a directive proposition; a problematic situation which calls for some action generates a principle governing the agent's response.

"Problematic"

might mean a claim-producing situation (to meet a beggar evokes
puta si voluntas eliciat aliquem actum contra rectam rationem et
praeceptum divinum et non teneatur elicere oppositum actum, tune
solll.t~ est in voluntate actus peccati sine omni carentia rectitudinis vel justiciae debitae inesse. Et per consequens, carentia
non est illi formale. Si secundum solum sit in voluntate, puta,
quia voluntas tenetur aliquem actum elicere quern non elicit, tune
solum est illa carentia rectitudinis sine omni materiali et sine
omni actu elicito. Si tertium detur, puta, quod voluntas elicit
actum aliquem contra praeceptum Dei cum ad oppositum tenetur tune
est ibi duplex peccatum commissionis et omissionis. Peccatum
commissionis est actus ille positivus solum; omissionis est
carentia alterius actus debiti inesse. Et quod per consequens,
nihil aliud erit dicere quam quod in peccato sunt talia duo materiale et formale, et quod peccatum commissum est materiale et
omissum est formale. 11
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the proposition - Every indigent in extreme need is to be helped)
or a stimulation of sorts (to fall sick engenders the formula Health is to be attained). 22 Concrete circumstances suggest an
end which the agent expresses as a directive.

Ockham's analysis

of the situational factors concern how or if these directives
should be applied.

He refrains from a priori classifications of

specific will-acts as "suitable" or "unsuitable" with human nature.

Instead, he outlines the procedural decisions which affect

the relevance of rules to particular situations, of means to
ends.

Criteria serve to elucidate the precise import of evident

directive principles and to characterize those actions subsumed
under the principle.

All virtuous activity is connected--not

because virtuous actions all conform to some ideal of rational
humanity or reflect a divine idea of human nature--but because
f rom common pr1nc1p
.
. 1 es. 23
.
th ey d er1ve

The elements of an ethical

22 sent., Prologue, q. 10 (I, 290); "Circa primum dico quod
intellectus practicus est respectu principiorum practicorum et
etiam respectu conclusionum practicarum. Et ideo intellectus
practicus est respectu finis, quando scilicet de aliquo fine
judicatur quod est appetendus vel prosequendus. Et hoc est intelligendum quia est respectu unius complexi quod aff irmat aliquem finem esse appetendum, et istud est primum principium practicum in operando. 11 Ockham describes the process of moral deliberation regarding the principle, Every indigent in extreme need
is to be helped, in Sent., III, q. 13, K. The principle that
"Health is to be attained" occurs in Sent., Prologue, q. 10 (I,
285-287) and Sent., II, q. 3, LL. Usually, therefore, the divine
commands affect the agent's deliberation about the proper means
for achieving his express ends. In the case of a special revelation, the divine wish would be the principle or expressed end
since the encounter with the diety would be the "problematic"
situation.
2 3sent. , III, q. 12, T; 11 • • • virtutes omnes general es con-nectuntur in quibusdam principiis universalibus; puta, Omne
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deliberation are together dictated by Right Reason giving the
specific nature of conformed will-acts.

The intellectual dictate

includes and combines decisions about pertinent rules, the "sim. ple" or common nature of the proposed action, the proper end,
time and place.

Conforming to this dictate, the will-act assumes

the specific "ratio" of the combined judgments.
Two difficulties attend Ockham's methods.

First, he

gives no clear explanation of how the "suitability" or "propriety"
of situational factors could be inferred from directive principles.

For example, he claims that

practica~

principles suggest

a certain final cause which "ought to be intended if everything
were ordered suitably, and thus practical knowledge is orderable
to such an end as if by its nature. 1124 Ockham seems to teach
that the propriety of circumstances and ends are indicated by the
directive which initiates moral deliberations.

The precise tech-

nique for deriving the "suitable order" of situational factors
is left unsaid.

Ockham offers only the prudence of the moral

agent to fill the silence.

The second problem arises because

Ockham contains all moral determinants within the will-act itself.
The goodness or evilness of will-acts is not distinct from the
substance of those acts.

"If you ask from where an action

honestum est faciendum, Omne bonum est diligendum, Omne dictatum
a recta ratione est faciendum ... 11 Also see Sent., III, q. 11, Z.
2Lf

Sent., Prologue, q. 11 (I, 309). The passages in Ockham which assert some order between things as the basis of moral
judgments are rare.
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receives its goodness or evil?

I answer from the same causes

by which the act has its substance--from the common object and
all the circumstances as if from many partial causes which
asserted together make one total cause. 1125 The difficulty here
is that Ockham also claims that God could separate the
being 11

absolute
of any created volition from its goodness or evilness. 26
11

If the nature of volition varies in proportion to the diverse
causes-objects, how could God produce the specific nature of any
created will-act without producing moral goodness or evil?

Ock-

ham would answer that God is not subject to any obligation and
thus He cannot produce

11

goodness" or "evilness" even though He

might "duplicate" every human volition as total cause.

Yet by

Ockham's standards, acts which are not caused to fulfill the
agent.' s obligation cannot be specifically similar to actions
which are so caused.

This problem affects the coherence of Ock-

ham' s doctrine of the moral good.
2.

Degrees

~

We return to it in Chapter V.

TyPes of Moral Virtue

The rational object of volition gives the will-act its
specific nature.

The intellectual consideration of the propriety

25 Sent., III, q. 10, Q. Also see Quodl., III, q. 14.
26 sent., II, q. 19, F; 11 • • • quia Deus potest omne absolutum
causare sine omni alio quid non est idem cum illo absoluto; sed
actus odiendi Deum quantum ad esse absolutum in eo non est idem
cum difformitate et malitia in actu; ergo, Deus potest causare
quicquid absolutum est in actu odiendi Deum vel nolendi non
causando. aliquam difformitatem vel malitiam in actu."
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of some action (common object), includes deliberation about the
end (principal object), the right reason, the place, the time and
the divine wish.

These objects.can be partial causes, and thus

components of the volitional act which conforms to Right Reason
or prudence.

Thus, in discussing Ockham's doctrine of degrees

and types of moral goodness, it is important to recognize that
only direct and immediate experience of an agent's spiritual
acts can verify whether the agent's effects are morally good or
evil.

The motives and intentions of a person's behavior are not

readily apparent to the observer.

I know the reasons for my

actions; I do not perceive or observe the reasons for the behavior
of other persons.

The constitution of moral good and virtue must

be approached introspectively.
Ockham distinguishes five grades or degrees of virtuousness on the basis of variations of the intellectual objects of
volition.

He cautions that each degree of virtue is an instance

of generically the same virtue, e.g., justice or temperance, but
that each grade constitutes a specifically different act than the
other four grades of that virtue. 27
27 sent., III, q. 12, K; "Tertia distinctio est quod justitia et quaelibet alia virtus moralis secundum quid, non est alia
virtus nee formaliter nee equivalenter, habet quinque gradus non
quidem ejusdem speciel sed distinctarum specierum ... (in finem) ..•
Distinctio numeralis istorum actuum et habituum patet per separabilitatem ipsorum. Distinctio specifica patet primo per distinctionem specificam objectorum partialium •.•. Ideo quando talia
objecta variantur secundum speciem, actus et habitus eorum variantur secundum speciem, sed actus cuiusli.bet gradus ascendendo
habet aliquid objectum et circumstantiam speciem quid non habet
alius gradus inferior. Secundum patet quia quantumcunque unus
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The first level of virtuousness is described as an act
produced in the created will which is conformed to Right Reason,
and the definite circumstances dictated by Right Reason for the
sake of the "justness" or "goodness" or "peace"--or any naturally
good end. 28 The second degree of perfection possible in a virtuous act includes these elements and the added resolve that the
agent will persevere in his virtuous act in spite of the consequences.

In this situation, the agent might intend to follow

Right Reason for the sake of justice and intend to perform this
just act in the face of forture and death. 29 The third degree of
virtuousness includes all the elements of the first two degrees.
This third "level" is characterized by the added intention to
perform some just act precisely because it is obligatory--"quia
gradus augeretur in infinitum, nunquam inclinabit ad actum
alterius gradus, sed illa quae sunt ejusdem speciei possunt habere effectum ejusdem speciei, igitur etc."
28 Ibid., "Primus gradus est quando aliquis vult facere
opera justa conformiter rationi rectae dictanti talia opera esse
facienda secundum determinatas circumstantias, respicientes praecise ipsum objectum propter honestatem ipsius operis sicut propter
finem; puta, intellectus dictat quod omni tale opus est faciendum
tali loco, tali tempore, propter honestatem ipsius operis vel
propter pacem vel aliud tale et voluntas elicit actum volendi
talia opera conformiter juxta dictamen intellectus."
29 Ibid., 11 Secundus gradus est quando voluntas vult facere
opera justa secundum rectum dictamen predictum et propter hoc,
cum intentione nullo modo dimittendi talia pro quocunque quid est
contra rectam rationem et non pro morte si recta ratio dictaret
tale opus non esse dimittendum pro morte; puta, si homo velit sic
honorare patrem secundum predictum dictamen rectum, loco et
tempore etc., cum intentione et voluntate non dimittendi illum
hominem·pro morte si immineret."

r
238
est sic dictatum a recta ratione. 1130

-

The fourth degree of virtue

is the "true and perfect moral virtue about which the saints
speak. 1131 Virtue in the fourth grade includes all the elements

of the prior degrees but adds the precise intention of loving God
by producing the action.

Finally, Ockham identifies a fifth
stage of virtuousness, namely, heroic virtue. 32 This level of

30 Ibid., "Tertius gradus est
opus facere-8e'cundum rectam rationem
etc., et propter hoc, vult tale opus
praedictas facere praecise et semel;
recta ratione. 11

quando aliquis vult tale
praedictam cum intentione
secundum circumstantias
quia est sic dictatum a

3libid., 11 Quartus gradus est quando -vult illud facere
secundum omnes conditiones et circumstanitas praedictas et propter hoc, propter amorem Dei precise; puta, quia sic dictatum est
ab intellectu quod talia opera sunt facienda propter amorem Dei
praecise, et ita universaliter est perfecta et vera virtus moralis de qua Sancti loquuntur. Autem sit prorie virtus moralis
patet, primo, quia proprie generatur ex actuibus moralibus et
inclinat ad actus consimiles et dirigit in actibus respectu
eorunidem objectorum quid proprie pertinet ad virtutem moralem.
Secundo, quia variatio finis non variat virtutem quantum ad
moralitatem vel non moralitatem, quia respectu diversorum finium
possunt esse diversas virtutes morales. Hoc autem solum variatur
finis a tribus primis gradibus. Tertio quia vicium oppositum est
proprie vicium morale, igitur istud est virtus moralis. 11
32 Ibid., "Quintus gradus quando aliquis eligit facere tale
opus et non praedictas conditiones excepto fine, quando indifferenter potest fieri propter Deum tanquam propter finem aut propter
honestatem vel pacem vel aliquid tale quid, dico pro intentione
philosophi et propter hoc, elicit tale opus facere actu imperativo formaliter non tantum equivalenter, et si tune velit actu
imperativo formaliter facere vel pati aliquid quod ex natura sua
excedit communem statum hominum, et est contra naturalem inclinationem vel si tale opus non excedit communem statum hominum, nee
est hoc contra inclinationem naturalem quantum est ex natura
actus, tamen ex circumstanita est contra incli.nationem naturalem,
talis inquam actus .imperatus formal.iter tale opus est generativus
virtutis heroicae, vel elicitus a virtute heroica secundum intentionem philosophi et secundum veritatem, et nullus alius habitus
generatus ex quibuscunque aliis actibus est virtus heroica. Exempla primi, aliquis vult actu imperativo formaliter morte sibi
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virtue directs an action to either God or a natural end such as
"justice" without considering the other objects and circumstances.
This degree of virtue is characterized by a general commitment
to acts which exceed the "common state of man" or "natural inclinations" for the sake of some worthy goal.

To profess one's

faith in spite of imminent death is an example of heroic virtue.
Heroic virtue is not identical with-the second stage of virtue
because it is the total and unqualified love of some good, while
the second level of virtuousness is the commitment to some good
within a definite set of circumstances.
Strictly speaking, a moral virtue is a volitional habit
rather than an act of the will.

However, these five grades of

moral habits are caused by repeated will-acts which are specifically the same as the various habits engendered.

Further, moral

habits incline the will to produce specifically the same acts
as those which produce.the volitional habit.

Hence, these grades

of moral habits can be applied to five corresponding degrees of
virtuous acts.

Clearly, the degrees of morally good or virtuous

action show a progressively more complex structure (at least,
through the first four grades) which is indicated by a progressively more complete object.
The different levels of moral perfection possible for a
volitional act reflect different partial objects of the will-act.
imminente pro definsione fidei sive combustione sibi imminente
sustinere mortem vel combustionem. 11 Also see Sent., III, q. 15,
D, where Ockham disputes Duns Scotus on the nature of heroic
virtue.
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Especially important is the end intended by the agent in differentiating the five kinds of virtuousness. 33 Each level is
characterized by the distinct intensity with which the agent intends his end, or by a distinct and proper end.

The importance

of the agent's intention, and the end intended in determining the
virtuousness of an act is further substantiated by Ockham's
doctrine of the types of morally good actions.
Ockham holds that acts of the human will can be morally
indifferent, contingently good or evil and intrinsically good or
evil.

Indifferent acts are possible; first,_ because the human

will can immediately and spontaneously love or reject any object
on the basis of its apprehension, and secondly, because the
human will can produce two acts simultaneously.
tions~'

require explanation.

These "explana-

Regarding the first, Ockham is not

prepared to admit that a moral agent acts correctly or incorrectly without deliberately intending to do so.

To love some object,

without considering the object as morally good or evil, is not
actually good or evil.

For example, to simply pray without

considering the propriety of the circumstances or motive, is
morally neutra1. 34 Ockham suggests that not every action possible

33 The fourth level of moral virtue is "true and perfect"
virtue for Ockham. It is interesting to note that Ockham holds
that the Aristotelian virtues produce the same physical acts as
do Christian of "true and perfect" virtue, but they are specifically different virtues since the end or intention of a pagan is
different than that of a Christian. See Sent., III, q. 10, i;
~., IV, q. 3, s.
~
3 4sent., III, q. 12, M; "Quinta distinctio est quod aliquis habitus est i.ntrinsece bonus moraliter, aliquis intrinsece
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to man is the subject of moral obligation; man is not obliged to
direct every action to the love and honor of God. 35

A will-act

produced without regard for the circumstances or the dictate of
Right Reason, and which is not commanded or prohibited by some
valid moral obligation is morally indifferent.

Regarding the

second, Ockham considers morally indifferent acts as ones which
can be rendered morally good or evil by an intrinsically good
malus et viciosus, aliquis neuter sive indifferens •.. Exemplum
tertii, velle simpliciter orare sine aliquae circumstantia dictata a ratione, quia nee propter bonum finem nee propter malum
finem, et talis actus sive sit interior sive exterior, solum
dicitur bonus denominatione extrinseca, et nullo modo intrinsece
bonus nee viciosus."

35 ockham defends his assertion that the human will can
produce acts which are morally indifferent in Sent., I, d. 1,
q. 1 (I, 378); "Et si dicatur quod ille actus est malus quando
diligitur aliquid quod est ad finem et non propter finem, respondeo quod actus respectu alicuius ad finem potest esse non malus
quamvis non dirigatur vel non referatur positive ad finem; et hoc
maxime si non apprehendatur finis. Et si dicatur quod omnis
defectus circumstantiae requisitae ad actum bonum facit actum
malum, sed circumstantia finis est requisita ad actum moraliter
bonum, ergo quandocumque deficit, actus erit malus. Sed in proposito deficit, ergo etc. Respondeo quod non omnis defectus
circumstantiae requisitae ad actum moraliter bonum facit actum
esse malum vel peccatum. Tune enim ignorantia nunquam excusaret;
cum tamen secundum doctores et Sanctos, ignorantia aliquando
excuset a toto. Sed quando deficit aliqua circumstantia ad quam
eliciens actum pro tune obligatur, tune est actus malus, si autem
non obligetur tune ad illam circumstantiam, non est actus malus."
Ockham may argue here against the position of St. Thomas
that a free act within the human will is always either morally
good or bad, since that actual act is either referred to the final
end or not. See Thomas, Summ. Theol., Ia IIae, q. 18, art. 9.
Scotus affirmed the possibility of actually indifferent acts (See
~· O!., II, d. 41, q. unica; and Rep. Par., II, d. 41, q.
unica) because there is no affirmative command of God that every
human act must be directed to the Ultimate End. Ockham seems to
agree with the argument of Scotus on this point.
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act.3 6

Moral goodness or evil can be predicated of an indiffer-

ent act by extrinsic denomination; such predication requires that
the will produce two acts simultaneously--one which is morally
neutral and the second which is intrinsically good or evil.

For

example, the human wil-1 can simultaneously hate sin and love
God.

To simply hate sin without any ulterior motive or regard

for the pertinent circumstances is morally indifferent; to hate
sin, however, out of the contemporaneous love of God renders the
hate of sin an extrinsically good act.
Indifferent actions are morally good or evil "per aliud. 11
If an indifferent act is caused by an inherently good action, then
the morally neutral act is "denominated" or called extrinsically
good.

Ockham does not distinguish sharply between morally

36 sent., III, q. 10, P; "Secundo, dico quod si quaeratur
utrum aliquis actus voluntatis posset esse indifferens ad bonitatem et maliciam, et post fieri bonus vel malus denominatione
extrinseca, sicut actus partis sensitivae? Tune distinguendum
est, quia aut ponitur quod in voluntate possunt esse simul duo
actus volendi naturaliter aut non. Si non, tune non posset esse
aliquis actus in voluntate indifferens praedicto modo, quia non
posset sic esse indifferens nisi quatenus conformare posset se
alicui alteri perfecte et intrinsece virtuoso; sicut actus appetitus sensitivi non dicitur aliter virtuosus, ut patet. Si autem
duo actus volendi possunt simul esse naturaliter in voluntate,
quid credo esse verum, sicut in primo probatum est, tune in
voluntate potest esse aliquis actus indifferens modo praedicto.
Exemplum, si enim diligam aliquem hominem absolute terminando
actum volendi ad illum hominem et non ad aliquam circumstantiam
bonam,vel malam, tune iste actus non est bonus vel malus moraliter, sed est neuter; sed tune stante illo actu, eligam alium
actum quo volo diligere tantum hominem propter Deum secundum
rectam rationem, et secundum omnes alias circumstantias requisitas, iste secundus actus est perfecte et intrinsece virtuosus, et
qui prius fuit indifferens nunc est virtuosus denominatione
extrinseca. 11 Ockham refers to Sent., I, d. 1, q. 1 (I, 381-384),
where he shows the possibility of two acts simultaneously inhering in the human will.
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indifferent action and morally contingent acts. 37

Both indif-

ferent and contingently moral acts are considered as actually
good or evil only "per aliud"--that is, by being caused by an
action which is good or evil "in se."
Some actions are called good or evil by intrinsic denomination or "in ~.

1138

Now Ockham considers acts such as "to

wish to pray," which is conformed to Right Reason and the divine
precept and which intends to honor God, as intrinsically good.
A volitional act which is contrary to Right Reason and the divine
commandment and which intends an unworthy end, is intrinsically
evil.

The simple act of praying can be morally indifferent,

intrinsically good or intrinsically evil depending on the reasons
why the agent prays.

"Praying" is the common object of will-acts

of various moral degrees and of various intentions.

When the act

of praying is produced by the will because it is right, and

37ouodl., III, q. 13; "Et sic intelligendo 'actum virtuosum' dico secundo, quod sic potest aliquis actus esse virtuosus
necessario. Quod probo: Quia impossibile est, quod aliquis actus
contingenter virtuosus, i ta quod i.ndifferenter potest dici virtuosus vel vitiosus, fiat determinate virtuosus nisi propter alium
actum necessario virtuosus. 11 (ed. P. Boehner, Philosophical
Writing§,, p. 145.) Also see Sent., III, q. 12, E.
It seems that Ockham means by contingently and indifferently good and evil acts, those acts which are good or evil "per
aliud." While intrinsically and necessarily good or evil acts
are those which are good or evil "in~·"
38 sent., III, q. 12, M; "Quinta distinctio est quod aliquis habitus est intrinsece bonus moraliter, aliquis intrinsece
malus et viciosus ... Examplum primi, velle orare propter honorem
Dei et quia praeceptum est a Deo secundum rectam rationem etc.,
Exemplum secundi, velle orare propter vanam gloriam et contra
praeceptum Dei et contra rectam rationem. 11
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because of the honor of God, and because the time and place are
right, then the act of praying is intrinsically good.
The sources of goodness or evil can be threefold; ex

~nere, ex circumstantia and ex principio meritorio/ 9 A generically good or evil act is simply an "imputable" act; that is to say,
an act of the free will in desiring an apprehended object .£§.!.! be
40
good or evi1.
Without considering the dictate of Right Reason
or the proper circumstances, the will spontaneously moves to
some rationally given object.

As a free act of the will, this

spontaneous act has the genus of moral acts, i.e., it is within
the power of the will.

If the will happens to choose an object

which is either permitted or commanded by valid moral laws (but
without a deliberate intent to fulfill those laws), then the act

39 sent., III, q. 12, N; "Sexta distinctio est quod aliquis actus est bonus ex genere vel malus, aliquis ex circumstantia, aliquis ex principio meritorio. Exemplum primi quantum ad
actum bonum ex genere; sicut orare, dare elemosinam, sive velle
talia facere absolute sine omni circumstantia bona vel mala.
Exemplum quantum ad actum malum, ut furtum facere, velle fornicari absolute sine aliquae circumstantia bona vel mala, de quibus
dicunt philosophie et sancti quod statim nominata convoluta sunt
cum malitia. 11 Also see Sent., Prologue, q. 10 (I, 284); and
Sent., III, q. 11, X.
~~
40 ockham does argue against calling an act which is good
"ex genere" virtuous. "Si dicas quod ostenso aliquo objecto
dITigibili, sine omni dictamine rationi.s posset voluntas illud
diligere et iste est bonus moraliter, quia diligit quid diligendum est etc.~ puta, si formetur hoc complexum 'hoc bonum est
diligibile' et intellectus non assentiat, tune est dubium utrurn
illa dilectio sit bona moraliter. Respondeo, licet actus ille
sit bonus ex genere et non sit malus moraliter, tamen non est
virtuosus quia de ratione actus virtuosi est quod eliciatur conformi ter rationi rectae et respectu objecti convenientis et quod
habens talem actum sit sciens." Sent., III, q. 11, x. Cf. Scotus, Quodl., q. 18, n. 6, where Scotus analyzes "generic" and
"specific" goodness in acts similarly to the analysis of Ockharn.
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is generically good.

If, however, the will spontaneously loves

an object which is morally forbidden, then that act is generically
bad.

The difference between generically good or evil acts, and

morally indifferent acts, is whether the object chosen is morally
commanded, morally forbidden, or subject to no moral obligation. 41
Ockham does not mean that generically good or evil acts are actually good or evil.

This would mean that a moral agent acts cor-

rectly and virtuously without intending to act correctly--an
implication which Ockham rejects.

Rather, good and evil

~

genere should be conceived as the "common object" of will-acts
which can be actually good or evil depending upon the specific
determinations which the "common object" receives.
Actual moral goodness or evil depends upon the circumstances

(~

circumstantia).

Ockham's examples show the dictate

of Right Reason, the end, the required circumstances of time and
place and the divine commands as the specific determinants of
41we disagree with Othmar Suks, Franciscan Studies, X,
p. 32, who sees generic goodness or evil as the logical concept
of a possible act while an indifferent act is actually produced
within the created will. "An act~ genere is taken as the
general notion or concept of such good or bad acts which are not
as yet actualized, while the indifferent act regards the act in
its actual performance." The previous footnote shows that Ockham
recognizes that generically good or evil acts can be actual with
the will. The proper distinction between indifferent acts and
acts which are good or evil ex genere is the fact that the former
acts can be rendered good or evil by a different act which is
intrinsically good or evil, while acts which are generically good
can be specified as actually good acts within the present moral
order, while acts which are generically bad cannot be specified
as actually good stante praecepto guae ~ est.
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mora 1 goo dn ess or evi·1 . 42

The factors by which the agent recog-

nizes the moral right or wrong of a possible act are the criteria
of time and place, end and dictate of reason.

These criteria

become moral determinants if the will actually produces the act
which is recognized as potentially good or evil.
Ockham's discussion of actions which are good ex principio
meritorio, moves into the realm of extrinsic moral determinants. 43
The fact that an action is meritorious depends upon the free and
undetermined will of God who can accept that action as worthy of
a supernatural reward.

Such acceptance is extrinsic to the
44
nature of the action caused by the moral agent.
When a generically and specifically good action is produced by the created
will, while intending to love God by this action, then this action
is meritorious by God's ordinate power. 45 The meritoriousness
42 sent., III, q. 12, N; "Exemplum secundi [boni vel mali
ex circumstantia], velle abstinere secundum circumstantias debitas
et dictatas a recta ratione propter honestatem tanquam propter
finem vel propter conservationem naturae vel propter alium finem
quern intenderet purus paganus. Exemplum secundi quantum ad actum
malum, velle fornicari contra rectam rationem, loco indebito etc.,
et propter libidinem tanquam propter finem."
4 3Idem.,"Exemplum tertii [boni ex principio meritorio],
velle continere secundum rectam rationem et secundum circumstantias et propter honorem divinum, quia talis actus est Deo acceptus."
44Even the act of loving God above all is not meritorious
of its nature. See Sent., I, d. 17, q. 2, C. The love of God
above all is, however, morally good of its nature. See Quodl.,
III, q. 13 and 14.
45 sent., III, q. 10, I; "Aliae autem virtutes requirunt
naturaliter tam actum quam habitum in parte sensitiva et generantur ex actibus voluntatis et requirunt caritatem ad hoc, quod
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of an act, therefore, is the extrinsic determination of divine
acceptance given to actions which are good "through the circurnstances."

Such "acceptance" does not affect the nature of the

created volitive act.
The degrees and types of moral perfection possessed by
voluntary acts are distinguished by Ockham on the basis of the
will's objects.
are good

~

All five degrees of virtuousness, and acts which

circurnstantia, are intrinsically good so that "good"

is predicated of these acts
which are good or evil

~

"in~·"

Indifferent acts, acts

genere, and contingently virtuous or

wicked acts are called good extrinsically; that is, by causal
dependence upon an intrinsically virtuous or wicked act.

If a

generically good action is further specified by the proper end
and circumstances of that act, or if an indifferent act is caused
by an intrinsically good act, then it is possible to call those
acts "good" by extrinsic denomination.

Notice that the exercise

of freedom is a factor common to all types of moral acts and to
all degrees of moral perfection.

The rational objects of voli-

tion account for the specific differences.
Ockham's explanation of contingently and necessarily good
acts through the Reportatio, Ordinatio, and Quodlibetal Questions
is not without certain problems of consistency.

The major prob-

lem should be indicated before continuing to an analysis of the
Quodlibet Three, question 13, in which Ockham resolves this
caus(;:!nt actum meritoriurn; ita qu.od in omni actu meritorio,
caritas est causa efficiens partiali.s ... "
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problem.

It is Ockham's position, from his earliest treatment

of moral goodness in the Reportatio, that some activities are
46 Somewhat
necessarily good, and not simply contingently good.
later, Ockham offers a proof that some act must be necessarily
good, else no act would be even contingently good. 47

Since

Ockham considers a contingently good act as good "per aliud," he
finds it necessary to terminate the analysis of the causes of
contingent goodness at some act which is "in se" or intrinsically
virtuous, or admit an infinite series of causes.

For example,

"to pray" without considering the propriety of praying, is a
morally contingent act; this act can be good or evil depending
upon the reasons for which the agent continues to pray.

"To

pray" is simply the common object of will-acts which can be
morally good or evil.

But Ockham also speaks of "praying" as

intrinsically good when this act is elicited for the sake of

46 Ibid., P-Q.

47 Sent., III, q. 12, E; "Tertia conclusio quod aliquis
actus est necessario et intrinsece virtuosus. Hoc probatur quia
impossibile est quod aliquis actus contingenter virtuosus, sic
scilicet quod potest dici indifferens viciosus et virtuosus, fiat
determinate virtuosus propter novitatem alicuius actus non necessario virtuosi, quia per nullum contingenter modo dicto, virtuosum fit alius actus sive denominatur virtuosus; quia si sic, aut
ille secundus actus qui est contingeter virtuosus per aliquem
alium actum est necessario viciosus, aut per actum contingenter
virtuosus. Si primo modo, tune eadem ratione erit standum in
primo, etiam tune habetur propositum, scilicet, quod in homine
est aliquis actus qui est necessario virtuosus. Si secundo modo
erit processus in infinitum vel stabitur ad aliquem actum necessario virtuosus, et sic habetur propositum; sed actus hominis tam
exteriores quam interiores, puta 'intelligere et vellet secundum
quod quilibet est actus indifferens sunt contingenter virtuosi.
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God's honor and according to the dictate of Right Reason and the
divine command.

In this example, "praying" is intrinsically good

because the will chooses to pray for the honor of God and the
other required circumstances.
is good ex circumstantia.

Now, this intrinsically good act

It is performed in a determinate place,

at a determinate time, for a definite end and according to a
definite command of God according to Right Reason.

It is con-

ceivable that a different set of circumstances would render this
act as morally wrong.

For example, if I pray at a time when I

should be working to support my family, if I_ pray in the middle
of the highway, or if God commands that creatures should not
pray, then praying might not be intrinsically virtuous.

The act

of praying, therefore, is intrinsically good only within a
definite set of circumstances.
Ockham's exposition so far.

And this is the problem with

Some act must be necessarily good

or no act would be morally good; however, the intrinsically and
necessarily good acts which Ockham describes are clearly dependent upon a definite set of changeable circumstances for their
moral goodness.

Thus, it seems to follow that unless Ockham can

locate an act which is morally good regardless of the circumstances of time and place and divine commands, then Ockham has not
48
established the possibility of a necessarily good act --nor the
possibility of any moral action.
48 ockham even asserts that "there are no circumstances
regarding an act intrinsically and necessarily virtuous." See
~., III, q. 12, FFF; "Ad primum argumentum secundae
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3.

The Necessarily Good Act

In the Quodlibetal Questions, when Ockham again discusses
the importance of asserting some act as necessarily good, there
is a subtle but important shift in his treatment of this issue.
Ockham is now concerned, not with showing that some act of the
will is good

"in~"

or intrinsically good; but with showing that

some act of the will is good whenever it occurs in the human
These are distinct issues. In Quodlibet Three, question
-will.
13, Ockham asks, "Whether only an act of the will is necessarily
virtuous or wicked?"

Therein, Ockham explicitly considers the

problem of reconciling the assertions, first, that some act of
the will must be morally good whenever it is elicited by the
created will, and secondly, that God can render any action possible- for a man to perform as morally obligatory through His
absolute power.

Father Boehner has edited this question and it

stands as Ockham's most mature statement on the problem of the
necessarily good act.

Ockham's scholars, however, do not agree

upon the proper interpretation of Quodlibet Three.
dubitationis, dico quod non sunt circumstantiae respectu actus
intrinsece et necessario virtuosi; sed sunt objecta secundaria
respectu illius actus, sed sunt circumstantiae respectu illorum
actuum sive sint actus voluntatis sive intellectus sive cuiuscunque alterius potentiae, qui solum sunt virtuosi extrinsece
secundum guamdam denominationem extrinsecam per conformitatem ad
actum aliquem intrinsece virtuosus." Also see Quodl., III, q. 14
for a parallel text. Furthermore, Ockham has not defended the
fact of a necessarily good act against the absolute power of God.
Ockham often shows that moral norms could change due to the
absolute power of God. Thus, a change in the divine command
would apparently render any action which Ockham asserts as
intrinsically good, as evil if the divine command should now
prohibit that act.
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To Erich Hochstetter, Ockham's argument proves that God
could not change the moral requirement to "love God above a11. 1149
Hochstetter sees a development within Ockham's work because the
earlier Commentary asserts the possibility of a divine command
to hate God and the creature's conformity, while the thirteenth
question of Quodlibet Three holds the human fulfillment of this
command as impossible.

Father Boehner holds that "God can com-

mand everything with this power (potentia Dei absoluta) except
not to obey him. 1150 The divine command to hate God is an ontological and a logical possibility.

-That is, the statement "hate

49 Franz. Studien, 32, p. 16; "Das Ganze ist also eine
blosse theoretische Moglichkeit ohne ethische Konsequenzen. Auch
hinsichtlich des Gebotes des Gotteshasses ist Ockham im Sentenzenkommentar, soweit wir schen, noch nicht zu voller Klarheit
durchgedrungen. Denn dort sagt er noch: 'Deus potest praecipere,
quod voluntas creata odiat eum. Igitur voluntas creata potest
hoc facere.' In den Quodlibeta aber hat er die Unmoglichkeit
dieser Position erkam1t. Denn einem Gebot Gottes folgen heisst
Gott lieben, weil nur in der Gesinnung der Liebe zu Gott fur Ockham echter Gehorsam moglich ist, wie wir oben dargelegt haben."
Professor Oberman claims that Hochstetter interprets this "Quod
libet passage as denying the possibility for God to command somebody to hate him." The Harvest of Medieval Theology, p. 93, n.
10. But it seems that Hochstetter is claiming only that men could
not obey the command.
50Philosophical Writings, p. xlix-1; "However it is well
known that Ockham admitted that God can command by His absolute
power that a person should hate Him or at least not love Him. It
is important to note that this possibility is admitted in the
purely ontological and logical realm. For in this realm there
cannot be a contradiction, since it is a fact that creatures can
command others to hate God; the command, therefore, is a reality,
considered as a mental or spoken sentence, and every reality has
God as its primary cause. In the ethical realm, however, an
antinomy is encountered, the only real antinomy in Ockham's
philosophy. If God commanded a creature to hate Him or simply
not to love Him, the creature would be obliged to obey, but it
could not obey since in obeying it would love Him."

r
252

God" as a verbal, mental or written sentence is fully possible .•
The statement "hate God" is not logically self-contradictory
since it is a meaningful statement.

However, the divine command

would be ethically or psychologically impossible for the creature
to obey.

Thus, an actual command to hate God, if issued by God,

would constitute an ethical antinomy, i.e., an instance of
simultaneously valid but contradictory obligations.

Erwin Iserloh considers a divine command to hate God a contradiction. 51
Iserloh, however, quotes the Centiloguium in support of his
interpretation and Father Boehner has offered serious and unanswered evidence that this work is not an authentic text of
Ockham. 52 Ernest A. Moody holds that "although there would seem
to be no patent self-contradiction in supposing that God could
issue such a command, it would seem to be self-contradictory, and
hence impossible for God to will that this command be fulfilled. 1153

Father Lucan Freppert agrees that God might issue

this command, but he holds that the moral agent "cannot disobey
5lGnade und Eucharistie., p. 50; "Die nach Bohner im
Quodlibet von Ockham aufgewiesene psychologische Unmoglichkeit
ist klarer gesehen vom Verfasser des Centiloguium, allerdings
sieht der auch einen logischen Widerspruch gegeben. Gott kann
alles, was keinen Widerspruch in sich schliesst. Den Gotteshass
befehlen heisst aber, etwas Widerspruchliches anordnen. Denn ein
Gebot erfullen, heisst verdienstlich handeln. Verdienstliches
Handeln ist aber Handeln aus Liebe zu Gott. Der Betreffende
wlirde also Gott hassen aus Liebe zu ihm."
52 collected Articles, pp. 33-42.
53"William of Ockham," The Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
Vol. 5, p. 316.
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in this case. 1154

Presupposing the creature's obligation to the

divine legislator, the command requires both love and hate.
Father Freppert claims either response is ethically satisfactory.
In light of these divergent interpretations, it is necessary to
reconsider Quodlibet Three, question 13.
When Ockham asserts that "Some act of the will is necessarily virtuous" it is necessary to consider the meaning of
"necessarily."

It can mean that the act exists necessarily--it

cannot not-exist.

This, of course, is not Ockham's meaning since

every created effect is ontologically contingent; only the
divine being is metaphysically necessary.

There are two accept-

able meanings of "necessary" when referring to a virtuous act:
first, "it cannot be wicked while the divine commandment stands,"
secondly, "it cannot be caused by the created will unless it be
virtuous. 1155 These two meanings are obviously distinct yet Ockham considers them as similar.

Nevertheless, Ockham offers

distinct proofs to establish that the same act, namely, the
54The Basis of Morality ... , pp. 189-190.
5 5Quodl., III, q. 13; "Circa affirmativam exponentem dico
primo, quod de virtute sermonis nullus actus est necessario virtuosus. Hoc probatur: Tum quia nullus actus necessario est, et
per consequens non est necessario virtuosus. Tum quia quilibet
actus potest fieri a solo Deo, et per consequens non est necessario virtuosus, quia talis actus non est in potestate voluntatis. Tamen aliter potest intelligi actum esse virtuosum, ita
quod non posset esse vituosus stante divino praecepto. Similiter,
non potest causari a voluntate creata nisi sit virtuosus. Et sic
intelligendo 'actum virtuosum' dico secundo, quod sic potest aliquis actus esse virtuosus necessario." (Quoted from Philosophical
Writings, p. 145, since Boehner's edition of this question is
preferred to the Strasbourg Edition of 1491).
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altuistic love of God, is virtuous necessarily in either of the
acceptable meanings of "necessarily."
The proof that some act "cannot be wicked while the
divine commandment stands" actually proves that the love of God
above all is necessarily virtuous even if the divine command does
not stand. 56

Admitting the possibility that God could command a

creature to hate Him, Ockham does not believe that a creature
could obey this command without thereby performing an act of love
for God by his obedience.

The command is neither logically nor

metaphysically impossible; Ockham affirms the position that he
had maintained since the Reportatio, that God could issue such
a command. 57
able.

Thus Iserloh's interpretation does not seem ten-

The impossibility associated with this command pertains

56 Ibid., pp. 146-47; "Si dicatur, quod Deus potest praecipere, quad pro aliquo tempore non diligatur ipse, quia potest
praecipere, quod intellectus sit intentus circa studium et voluntas similiter, ut nihil possit illo tempore de Deo cogitare:
tune volo, quod voluntas tune eliciat actum diligendi Deum, et
tune aut ille actus est virtuosus--et hoc non potest dici, quia
elicitur contra praeceptum divinum--aut non est virtuosus, et
habetur propositum, quod actus diligendi Deurn super omnia non
sit virtuosus.
Respondeo: Si Deus posset hoc praecipere, sicut videtur
quod potest sine contradictione, dico tune, quod voluntas non
potest pro tune talem actum elicere, quia ex hoc ipso, quod talem
actum eliceret, Deum diligeret super omnia; et per consequens
impleret praeceptum divinum: quia hoc est diligere Deum super
ornniay diligere quidquid Deus vult diligi. Et ex hoc ipso quod
sic diligeret, non faceret praeceptum divinum per casum, et per
consequens sic diligendo Deum diligeret et non diligeret, faceret
praeceptum Dei et non faceret."

57Not only does Ockham affirm the possibility that God
could command the odium dei in Sent., IV, q. 14, d; and Sent.,
II, q. 19, O; but as Hochstetter has indicated, Ockham suggests
that the creature could obey such a command.
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to the inability of the creature to execute such a command, not
the divine inability to propose the command.
If Ockham's ethical theory were simply a case of divine
positivism or voluntarism, this hypothetical command to hate God
would not constitute an ethical antinomy.

If morality were simp-

ly a question of executing the divine wish, Ockham would not
appreciate the complexity of this issue which stems from a
difference between "what" the will elicits and "why" the will
elicits it.

The divine command to hate God means that one

"common object" of volition ought to be rejected by the human
will.

But the problematic of this command stems from the fact

that the "principal object" or epd which ought to be chosen by
the human will is not altered by the commanded odium dei.

The

obligation that the will be orientated "intentionally" toward the
Greatest Good and the Final End is grounded in the nature of
things and not positive commands.

Moral behavior is not simply

de facto conformity to the positive commands of an absolute moral
authority.

Rather, it is a question of deliberate and purposeful

conformity to moral authority.

Thus, the divine command to hate

God requires that human will produce simultaneously an act of
hate and of love (or obedience) for the same object--this is
psychologically impossible for the human will to do.
alter the means, but not the

e~1d,

God might

of the moral order.

Ockham holds that the human will cannot be obliged morally to do what it cannot do.

A valid moral "ought" entails that
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the agent "can. 1158

The possibility of God issuing the command

"hate God" does not render it possible for the agent to execute
this command.

For example, the command "pick yourself up by

your shoelaces" is possible for God to issue but impossible for
the human agent to accomplish.

Ockham tests the necessarily good

act, in terms of the dialectic of God's absolute-ordinate power,
and proves that love-obedience to God remains an essential component of virtuous behavior for the Christian regardless of God's
ability to command the opposite.

The love of God is necessarily

good because the human agent cannot obey a divine mandate to hate
God without, paradoxically, eliciting an act of love for God.
If the moral agent cannot fulfill some command (i.e., fulfill
some command knowingly and voluntarily), then the command is not
a val-id moral obligation.
The proof that some act of the will "cannot be caused
by a created will without being virtuous" turns on the argument which Ockham has already mentioned (in Sent., III, q. 12, E)
that no virtuous act can be asserted unless a necessarily virtuous act is asserted. 59 Ockham now identifies this necessarily
58 sent., III, q. 12, QQ; "Confirmatur, quia ratio aliquando errat; tune quaero, aut hoc est in potestate voluntatis
aut non, si non, non peccat ex ignorantia, quia nu1lus obligatur
ad impossibile ... 11 Also see Sent., I, d. 48, q. 1, A; and .§ent.,
IV, qes. 8-9, E-F.
~~
59 ouodl., III, q. 13; (Philosophical Writings ..• , pp.
lli-5-146). "Quod probo: Quia impossibi1e est, quod aliquis actus
contingenter virtuosus, ita quod indifferenter potest dici virtuosus vel vitiosus, fiat determinate virtuosus nisi propter
alium actum necessario virtuosum. Hoc probatur : Quia actus
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contingenter virtuosus, puta actus ambulandi, fit determinate
virtuosus per conformitatem ad alium actum. Quaero de isto
secundo actu: aut est necessario virtuosus modo praedicto, et
habetur propositum, quod est aliquis actus in homine necessario
virtuosus, aut est contingenter virtuosus, et tune iste fit virtuosus determinate per conformitatem ad alium actum virtuosum. Et
de illo quaerendum est sicut prius. Et erit processus in infinitum, vel stabitur ad aliquem actum necessario virtuosum.
Tertio dico, quod iste actus necessario virtuosus modo
praedicto est actus voluntatis, quia actus quo diligitur Deus
super omnia propter se est huiusmodi; nam iste actus sic est
virtuosus, quod non potest esse vitiosus, nee potest iste actus
causari a voluntate creata, nisi sit virtuosus: Tum quia quilibet pro loco et tempore obligatur ad diligendum Deum super omnia,
et per consequens, iste actus non potest esse vitiosus; tum quia
iste actus est primus omnium actuum bonorum. Praeterea, solus
actus voluntatis est intrinsece laudabilis vel vituperabilis.
Praeterea, secundum Sanctos nullus actus est laudabi1is vel
vituperabilis nisi propter intentionem bonam vel malam; intentio
autem est actus voluntatis; ergo etc."
A point of clarification is required here. Ockham asserts
that "everyone is obliged for the place and time to love God above
all." We have argued that the development of this question over
Ockham's previous attempts to specify the necessarily good act,
is that the love of God above all is not intrinsically good because of a definite but changeable set of circumstances. The
love of God above all is intrinsically good regardless of changes
in time, place, or even the divine law. It would be a misinterpretation of Ockham, however, to say that the moral agent need
not consider the dictate of Right Reason, or the time and place,
in producing a morally good act of love for God. In question 15,
of Quodlibet Three, .:Ln which Ockham asks: \Vhether the circumstances of an act, for instance the end, Right Reason, and such things,
are objects of a virtuous act?, he clarifies the structure of the
nece'ssarily good act. "Ad istam quaestionem, dico quod a.ctus
virtuosus est duplex: Unus qui contingenter et indifferenter
potest esse aliquo modo virtuosus et viciosus; Alius qui sic est
virtuosus quod non potest esse aliquo modo viciosus. Primus actus
non habet circumstantiam pro objecto, quia non est virtuosus nee
viciosus nisi ex assistentia vel carentia actus boni vel male, a
quo dependet in aliquo genere causae. Et ille actus potest esse
idem cum circumstantiis talibus et sine. Secundus actus habet pro
objecto circU.J."TIStantias, · quid probo, quia alias sequerentur duo
inconvenientia.: Primum quod nullus actus sit intrinsece et necessario virtuosus sed solum contingenter, cuius opposi tum prius pro-batu..11 est; Sec·undum, quod de actu non meri torio fieret meri torius
per rationem alicuius materiae naturalis." Ockham's argument concludes that an act cannot be intrinsically virtuous if "non elicitur conformiter rectae rationi, quid necessario requiritur ad actum intrinsece virtuosum." Hence, the change of circumstance cannot affect the propriety of love for God above all.
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good act as "the act by wh1ch God is loved more than everything
else for His sake."

This act is not merely good "in se" or

intrinsically but necessarily good so that "this act cannot be
caused by the created will without being virtuous."

The altuistic

love of God is necessarily good; first, because regardless of the
time or place, everyone is obliged to love God, and secondly,
because this is the "first of all good acts."

The moral goodness

of loving God is not bound by a definite set of circumstances;
every act performed by the will can be performed virtuously for
the love of God.

There is no time or place in which loving God

would not be right; there is no "right reason" for not loving
God.

Ockham's assertion that the love of God for His sake is

the "first of all good acts," is more descriptive than explanatory.- Ockham's meaning seems to be that, for a Christian, all
explanations of morally good acts must ultimately arrive at the
altuistic love of God as the essential, the necessary and the
first virtuous act.

Only this action has the intrinsic, necessary

and· immutable goodness required to support a Christian morality.
Any action which can be performed for an evil intention
is contingently good.

Before the Quodlibetal Questions were com-

posed, Ockham had considered "to will to pray for the honor of
God and because it is commanded by God according to Right Reason,
etc.," ns intrinsically good, 60 and "to do something because it
is cormnanded by God" as necessarily good. 61 However, to pray or
60 Sent. , III, q. 12, M.
618 en t . , III, q. 12, E.

r
259
to obey God can be done by the moral agent for the sake of gaining public acclaim or out of hypocracy.

The necessarily and in-

trinsically good act which is described in Quodlibet Three, questions 13 and 14, brings together the "common object" and the
"principal object" of volition.

The love of God for His sake and

above all indicates both the act produced and the intention of
the agent.
position:

Thus, Ockham answers the principal objection to his
"Every act of the will can be elicited with an evil

intention; therefore, every act of the will can be evil" by denying the premise.

"Some act of the will (i.e., the love of God

for His sake and above all) cannot be elicited with an evil intention.1162

Ockham admits elsewhere that the will can elicit an
act of love for God with a bad intention. 63 However, the will
cannot love God above all for His sake with an evil intent since
the love of God for His sake precludes a selfish motive.

The

''first of all good acts" is a complex action which allows Ockham
the simultaneous assertions that God can attach a positive
62 ouodl., III, q. 13; (Philosophical Writings, pp. 144
and 147) "Utrum solus actus voluntatis sit necessario virtuosus
vel vitiosus? Quod non: Quia omnis actus voluntatis potest
elici intentione mala; ergo omnis actus voluntatis potest esse
malus ... Ad argumentum principale, nego assumptum, quia aliquis
actus voluntatis nullo modo cum intentione mala potest elici,
sicut patet ex dictis. 11
63 sent., II, q. 19, Q; 11 Ad aliud dico quod si odium Dei
causetur a solo Deo semper esset hoc, propter bonum finem, quia
Deus ex odio creaturae in nullo damnificatur; sed odire Deum
propter indebitwn finem est malum et sic est actus creatuae et
non a solo deo. Illud etiam quid assumit est falsum quod dilectio
dei sit semper bona propter debitum finem; quia aliquando potest
esse mala et propter indebitum finem, puta, quando amo Deum amore
concupiscentiae. 11
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obligation (negative or affirmative) to any simple action with
the created will's power and that some (complex) action is necessarily good.
By asserting the altuistic love of God as necessarily
good, Ockham affirms the central importance of the end intended
by the agent as a moral determinant and affirms that a perfect
love of the Ultimate End is primarily required to order and arrange

the possibilities of volition as means to the Final End. 64

Given the ability of God to command a creature to hate Him, Ockham can still maintain that the love of God above all is essentially, morally good every time it occurs in the human will.

On

the other hand, it appears that Christians must derive the moral
status of all their voluntary acts from this "primary" act.

Ock-

ham' s tendency to empirically divide and analyze the components
of will-acts to determine which are contingently and which necessarily good arrives at only one element which is irreducibly

64 sent., III, q •. 12, II; "Septima conclusio (est) quod
v1rtutes theologicae nullum vitium morale compatiuntur. Hoc
patet quia rectitude circa finem ultimum repugnat omni difformitati circa ea quae sunt ad finem; quia si non, aut illa difformi tas procedit ex ignorantia vincibili et tune vincit si potest,
aliter non est rectitudo circa finem; aut invicibili et tune non
est culpabilis; aut procedit ex malitia et passione, sive sic
sive sic, destruitur rectitude circa finem ultimum. Patet enim
quod si recte diliget Deum, diligit Deum super omnia, quia habet
autem aliquid vitium, diligit objectum illius plusquam Deum, ista
non stant simul. Also see Sent., I, d. 1, q. i (I, 391); where
Ockham argues that everything which is an object of volition,
other than God, ought to be "referred" to God or accepted volitionally for God's sake. Also see Sent., III, q. 12, YY; where
Ockham explains how every evil can be considered as an instance
in which the created agent does not love God above all.
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good--the love of God above all.

In causal dependence upon this

final cause or motive, other objectives of volition can be called
ngood. 11

4.

Teleology and Deontology

An area of development apparent in Ockham's moral doctrine

is the increasing emphasis on "why" the moral agent elicits some
act, as opposed to "what" the moral agent elicits.

Ockham's

search for a necessarily good act is resolved only by identifying
the love of God propter

~

as incompatible with evil

intentions~

This act, in which the object chosen merges with the agent's
motive in choosing the object, is the "first of all good acts."
The love of God-in-Himself brings together the "common object"
of volition and the "principal object"--"what" is chosen and
"why" it is chosen.·

As the "first" of all good acts, the love

of God above all is the "only" necessarily good act.

Every per-

fectly good act of the Christian is either an act of love for
God above all or causally dependent upon the love of God above
all.

In his early works, Ockham describes a "perfectly circum. t rinsica
. . 11y vir
. t uous; 65 in
. th e Quo dl'b
s t ance d i! ac t as in
i et a1

65 sent., III, q. 10, P; "Si enim diligam aliquem hominem
absolute terminando actum volendi ad illum hominem et non ad aliquam circumstantiam bonam vel malam; tune iste actus non est
bonus vel malus moraliter sed est neuter. Sed tune, stante illo
actu, eligam alium actu quo volo diligere tantum hominem propter
Deum. secundum rectam rationem etsecundum omnes alias circumstantias
requisitas, iste secundus actus est perfecte et intrinsece virtuosus et qui prius fuit indifferens, nunc est virtuosus denominatione extrinseca, quatenus elicitur conformiter actui perfecte
virtuoso et recto dictamini." The new element which characterizes
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Questions, he concentrates upon the perfect motive or end in
acting which cannot be intended by the moral agent without being
66
virtuous.
Both divine and human laws can change, but Ockham's
doctrine of the necessary goodness of man's interior and unselfish
orientation to the Creator is not jeopardized.

Legalities are

subject to flux; the fundamental exigency of morality is stable.
It is Ockham's mature position that the intention to love
God above all is intrinsically and necessarily good.

God's abso-

lute power to posit moral standards does not alter the fact that
God is the Greatest Good and therefore, ought to be the Ultimate
End of human life and activity.

The necessarily virtuous act

gives the permanent orientation of the Christian conscience.
Psychologically, the premises of a moral deliberation are
formulated with the apprehension and judgmental assent to some
object as an end or goal of volition. 67 A statement of the end
the second act, is that it· is "propter deum" and "secundum rectam
rationem et secundum omnes alias circumstantias requisitas." However, Ockham does not identify the "propter deum" as the intrinsically virtuous element as his does in Quodl., III, q. 13.
66 ouodl., III, q. 15; "Praeterea, probatur quod finis est
objectum actus virtuosi. Tum quia quando voluntas diligit aliquid
propter finem, magis diligit finem quia propter quid •.. Tum quia
si essent duo actus respectu duorum objectorum, quorum unus est
causa alterius, si illa duo objecta diligeretur unico actu, i11ud
objectum esset primum cuius actus esset causa alterius quando
diligerentur distinctis actibus. Sed si quis diligeret finem
uno actu et illud quid est ad finern alio actu; actus respectu
finis esset causa actus illius quid est ad finem ..• Ad secundum
dubium, dico quod finis est objectum principale actus virtuosi
intrinsece, et hoc, quia dilectio finis principaliter intenditur. 11

67sent., Prologue, q. 10 (I, 290); " •.. Circa primum dico
quod intellectus practicus est respectu principiorum practicorum
et etiam respectu conclusionum practicarum. Et ideo intellectuE
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to be attained is the major premise of a practical syllogism;
the means utilized to attain this end are inf erred from the
68
nature of the end.
Thus, the directive proposition which is
dictated by Right Reason as the norm and rule of virtuous volition, originates in the end which is mentally recognized.
The will, which is the principle of virtuous activity,
always acts for the sake of an end. 69 The acts of "velle, 11
11

nolle" and "non-velle" are within the power of the will; the

will's freedom is the reason for its assent, dissent or indifference to a possible good or end.

Also, the will is responsible

for accepting or rejecting objects according to three (and only
three) possible aspects:

an end-in-itself which is loved

greatest, an end-in-itself which is simply loved, and an end
which is loved for the sake of another. 70 On the part of the
practicus est respectu finis, quando scilicet de aliquo fine
judicatur quod est appetendus vel prosequendus. Et hoc est
intelligendlun quia est respectu unius complexi quod affirmat
aliquem finem esse appetendum, et istud est primum principium
practicum in operando. 11
68
sent., II, q. 3, 11; "Quinta conclusio (est) quod finis
est principium in agibilibus quia est medium et causa in syllogismo conclu.dente determinatum medium requiri ad talem finem.
Exemplum, si enim finis praestitutus a voluntate infirmi sit quod
sanitas sit acquirenda, et potio sit medium acquirendi sanitatem,
tune istud medium debet sic syllogistice inferri ex tali fine."
Also see Sent., Prologue, q. 10 (I, 291).
69 Sent., Prologue, q. 10 (I, 291); Sent., III, q. 13, T;
Sent. , III-;-q:- 10, n.
70 sent., I, d. 1, q. 1 (I, 374-375); "Circa primum sciendum quod a1iquis posset assumere aliquid in facultatem voluntat.is
dupliciter; vel propter se vel propter aliud •.• Sed quod aliquis
actus sit non referns posset esse dupliciter; vel quod objectum

-
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moral agent, therefore, the recognition of moral standards and
the volitional execution of moral directives, is unalterably a
question of the ends of human activity.

This, however, says only

that man is a goal-orientated and purposeful animal.
Metaphysically, a human being is a "debtor."

He owes his

existence, his life, his activity to an Infinete and Creative
Being.

While a man exists, he is dependent moment to moment on

the conserving causality of God for his existence.

In the same

way, whatever ontological value or desirableness a creature has
is dependent upon the divine creativity.
good or willable because they are.

All created things are

To be morally right, a man's

love for created "good" or finite ends ought to reflect their
dependence on God. Both reason 71 and revelation assert that
finite, experienced things have being and goodness "per Aliud.

11

Thus, the ends available to human activity are de facto ordered;
created goods are ordered to the Uncreated Good as effects to
acceptetur tanquam summum sibi possibile praesentari, hoc est
tanquam summe diligendum ab ea, vel absolute quod acceptetur et
absolute assumatur in facultatem voluntatis, nee ut summum nee
ut non-summum."
71 Sent., Prologue, q. 12 (I, 364); "Illa tamen quae considerantur--arlletaphysica possunt esse principia ad probandum conclusiones practicas de Deo, sicut ex hoc quod Deus est causa
omnium est summe diligibilis vel honorandus vel aliquid huiusmodi." In spite of the fact that Father Boehner has edited two
questions of Ockham which contains "proofs" for the existence of
God, it is still common to read that Ockham denied the possi. bility of such demonstrations. See Collected Articles ... , pp.
399-420. The basis of this proof concerns the impossibility of
an infinite series of conserving causes and the necessity of every
production to be conserved in bei.ng while it remains in being.
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cause.

The order and priorities of the human will ought to

reflect this real state of affairs.

The rationale for this

position is thoroughly Augustinian.

Only God should be "enjoyed"

(~)

for his own sake; everything else should be "used (uti)
for His purposes. 72 "Only God should be loved greatest since He
is the Greatest Good."73
The psychology and metaphysic by which Ockham describes
the human moral condition render final causes critical to ethical
judgments.

This important aspect of Ockham's moral theory is

often vitiated by the claim that he denies the finality or teleological connection of the world. 74 Truly, Ockham denies that the
7 2 sent., I, d. 1, q. 1 (I, 373); "Solo illo utendum quod
est ad aliud ordinabile et omni illo; sed quidlibet aliud a Deo
est ordinabile ad Deum, qui est finis omnium, et Deus non est ad
aliud ordinabilis; ergo etc." See Augustine, De Trinitate, X,
c. 11, n. 17 (P. L. 42, 982-983), and De doctrIDa christiana, I,
c. 4, n. 4 (P.-L.:- 34, 20).
73 Sent., I, d. I, q. 4 ( I, 447.
)
74Anita Garvens argues at length that Ockham rejects any
effort to explain morality by finality. Franz. Studien 21, pp.
249-257. "Die Annahme durchgangiger Zielstrebigkeit aller Natur
nach ihrem letzten Ziel, nach Erfullung und Vollendung ihres Seins
in Gott als ihrem ewigen Urbilde, bot der Scholastik die Grundlage, sittliches Streben fur moglich und notwendig zu erklaren.
Eine solche Grundlegung der Ethik ist bei konsequenter WeiterfUhrung der Grundgedanken Ockhams nicht moglich, denn ihm f~hlen die
mataphysischen Voraussetzungen, um auf dem Wege rationaler Deduktion auf eine immanente und notwendig bestimmte Zielstrebigkeit
aller Natur schliessen zu konnen. So finden sich unter seinen
Erorterungen keine Versuche, die Finalitat der Welt aus dem Ordnungsgedanken zu folgern." (p. 249). For verification, she cites
the study of H. Becher, "Gottesbegriff und Gottesbeweise bei Wilhelm von Ockham," Scholastik III (.1928), p. 382. In turn, G. de
Lagarde refers to Garvens' article in agreement, Ockham, la Morale .•. , pp. 54-55.
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actions of irrational causes "intend" some end. 75

To act "E.!:£E-

-

ter finem" is the exclusive privilege of free and rational beings.

But natural causes always produce the same effects given similar
conditions.

The regular and predictable effects of non-conscious

operations give the moral agent a basis for judging the means
conducive to his ends and the pragmatic outcome of his own
physical actions.

The natural outcome of human activity is part

of the "common object" of deliberation and volition.

It is man's

dignity and responsibility, however, that his motives can transcend the effects of his natural powers.

The "suitable" end of

voluntary acts is dictated by Right Reason and becomes the "principal object" and chief characteristic of conformed volition.
Rather than eliminating teleology from morality, Ockham teaches
that inevitably moral actions have an intrinsic finality.
To act correctly, the agent must both recognize what is
obligatory and deliberately fulfill that obligation.

The will

should elicit what is dictated by Right Reason "because it is
dictated by Right Reason. 1176 Prior to morally good or evil
7 5Quodl., IV, q. 2; " •.. non potest sufficienter probari
vel demonstrari, nee sciri per principia per se nota nee per
experientiam, quod agens de necessitate naturae agat secundum
talem causam finalem praestitutam a voluntate. Et hoc quia
actio talis agentis sine variatione agentis vel passi vel alicuius concurrentis ad actionem nunquam variatur sed semper uniformi ter sequitur actio. Et ideo non potest probari q_uod tale
agens agat propter finem." Also see Summ. in libros .PhysicorUJ!!,
II, c. 6.
76 sent., III, q. 12, CCC; 11 • • • quia nullus actus est perfecte virtuosus nisi voluntas per illum actum velit dictatum a
recta ratione, propter hoc, quod est dictatum a recta ratione."

r
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volition, the mind must recognize an obligation. 77

Whatever the

reasons for which the Practical Intellect decides and dictates
some volition, the will should execute each facet of the directive
precisely because it is morally required.
gation must be asserted before moral value.

It appears that obliOckham's account of

the phenomenology of ethical experience thus might suggest the
classification of "deontological. 11

Indeed, commentators have
mentioned the "precocious Kantian" in Ockham. 78 Yet the category
11

deontological" cannot be applied definitely to Ockham's ethic.

His claims that, a) the dictate of Right Reason must include a
decision about the suitable end, b) God should be loved because
He is the Greatest Good, and c) rectitude regarding the ultimate
end repels any distortion about the means to the ultimate end,
do not sound like the assertions of a deontologist.

A definitive

classification of either teleological or deontological is as
tenuous as the strict application of the categories of rationalism or voluntarism.

This ambivalence requires a close look at

Ockham's theory of moral value.

77 sent., II, q. 19, P;

• • • sed Deus ad nullum actum causandum obligatur. Ideo, quemlibet actum absolutum potest sine
omni malo culpae causare et ejus oppositum; et ideo sicut potest
causare totaliter actum diligendi (Deum) sine bonitate vel malitia morali--quia bonitas moralis et malitia connotant quod agens
obligatur ad illum actum vel ejus oppositurn--ita potest totaliter
causare acturn odiendi Deum si.ne omni mali tia morali propter eamdem causam. 11 Also see Sent., II, qes. 4-5, H; Sent., IV, q. 9,
S and Sent., I, d. 42, q. 1, H.
78cf. Ernest A. Moody, The ~ncyc1opedia of Philosophy,
Vol. 5: pp. 315-316; and James K. McDonnell, Religion and Ethics
.:...:..:..' pp. 138-141.
11
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CHAPTER V
THE CONCEPT OF MORAL GOOD
It is somewhat common to read that moral goodness for
Ockham is determined extrinsically and positively by God.

1

good is what God commands; the evil is what He prohibits.

The
This

interpretation gives the prescriptive and descriptive import of
moral language to divine discretion.

Morality becomes the ex-

trinsic assessment of human volition.

Goodness derives from

God's contingent approval rather than the nature of the act-initself.

The typical argument proceeds:

If God could change the

obligation presently associated with any simple action within
man's power, then moral value is external to the nature of every
human action.

It is curiously difficult, however, to produce

ex1)lici t texts to establish Ockham' s definition of "good."

Leon

Baudry thinks that Ockham's ethic fits the interpretive model of
1 cf. Anita Garvens, Franz. Studien, 21, p. 248; "Hierzu

muss vorweggenommen werden, was erst die Darlegu...~g seiner material-ethischen Lehren deutlich aufweisen wird, dass namlich die
Begriffe Gut und Bose von Ockham positivistisch bestimmt werden
dadurch, dass er sie lediglich als Ausdruck momentaner Entscheidungen des gottlichen Willens betrachtet, der die letzte Norm des
sittlichen Handelns darstellt. 11 Similar positions are maintained
by J"oseph Lortz, "Einleitung, 11 Gnade und Eucharistie ... , (bei
Erwin Iserloh), p. XXXVI; Konstanty Michalski, "Les Courants
Ph.ilosophi.que a Oxford et ~ Pari~ pendant le XIVe Siecle," in La
Philo_E!_c:.phie ~ xrve Siecle: Six Etudes ( Opuscula Philosophica,
Vol. I: Frankfurt; Minerva GIVIBH, 1969), p. 11; G. de Lagarde,
Qckhcgg. ba Morale ... , p. 55; and Vernon J. Bourke, History of
Ethics, Vol. I, p. 155.
268
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divine voluntarism but he admits that explicit definitions of
moral goodness cannot be found to include in his Lexigue philosophigue de Guillaume d'Ockham. 2 We propose to re-examine this
issue by considering the doctrines of "rectitude," moral evil,
and the meaning of moral good.

Our study maintains a sharp

distinction between "moral" and "meritorious" goods:

the dis-

tinction is Ockham's and argues strongly against the voluntaristic
and extrinsic conception of moral value.
The discussion of Ockham's value theory has been postponed to this final chapter for a number of reasons, but mainly
to show the need to re-open the question in spite of the "majority opinion."

Chapter I indicated Ockham's effort to contain all

actual good and evil within the created will.

Chapter II argued

that the nature of an intellectual dictate is to regulate the
will's freedom.

Thus, certain moral norms--the will ought to

conform itself to Right Reason--are necessarily true "without
any precept of a superior."

Chapter III studied the legislative

power of the divine will and noticed the primacy of God's commands among the determinants of morality.

God could posit a

moral obligation regarding all simple acts within man's power.
Chapter IV revealed that at least one complex action, the love
of God above all, is

n~cessarily

dates to the contrary.

good regardless of divine man-

These chapters should indicate the com-

plexities involved in tracing Ockham's notion of moral goodness.
2Paris: P. Lethielleux, 1958, p. 32; "Guillau."lle ne donne
pas, a ma connaissance de definition du bien moral."
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As prima facie evidence that Ockham does not hold an extrinsic
or positivistic conception of moral value, consider that Ockham
criticizes Duns Scotus for just such a position.
1.

Moral Rectitude

It is helpful to remember the Subtle Doctor's position
on "rectitude."

As in so many cases, Ockham's own position

developed in contrast to the doctrine of Duns Scotus.

Scotus

defines the goodness of an act as the integrity of all those
things which the right reason of the agent judges to be required
for that act or the agent. 3 Scotus lists the circumstances of
an act as the object, end, mode, time and place; when these
circumstances are agreeable or proper in terms of the agent's
nature, his producing potency and the essence of the act pro4
duced, then the agent has caused a morally good act.
When one
or more circumstances are "unsuitable" so that the complex relationship becomes improper, then that act is morally bad.

Scotus'

position on moral goodness, therefore, involves the relationships
possessed by an act of the will.

The same volitional act could

be morally good or evil depending on its extrinsic relationships.
For example, the same act such as "walking to church" could be
3 scotus, Comm. Ox., II, d. 40, q. unica, n. 3; Quodl.,

18, n. 4.
4Scotus, Comm. Ox., II, d. 40, q. unica, n. 3; Quodl.,
18, nos. 5-6; see Comm. Ox., I, d. 17, q. 3, n. 2; where Scotus
affirms the "relational 11 character of moral goodness. "Bonitas
moralis in actu non dicit nisi relationem. 11 (Waddings-Vives ed.;
v' 947).
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good and then evil because the agent's motive for walking to
church is first proper and later improper.

According to Ockham,

Scotus' position asserts that "rectitude" and "difformity" are
extrinsic determinations or relationships possessed by voluntary
acts.
On at least five occasions, Ockham argues against this
position of Scotus 1 • 5 Ockham's own answer to the question, What
is moral rectitude?, is contrasted to the Scotistic position.
In one sense, Ockham's disagreement with Scotus about the nature
of rectitude results from Ockham's different metaphysical stance.
Denying the reality of relationships as substances distinct from
the related objects,

O~kham

must relegate the traditional quali-

ties of a relationship to the "relata" themselves.

In another

sense, however, Ockham's argument with Scotus is more verbal
than substantive.

Both Scotus and Ockham agree that the circum-

stances and objects of a will-act are moral determinants; they
differ regarding the manner in which the situation and objects
function as moral determinants.

For Ockham, the circumstances

and objects of an intended action are together apprehended by
reason and constitute the rule or moral standard to which volition
ought to conform. 6 The apprehension of all the pertinent,

5 Sent., III, q. 15, D; Sent., III, q. 12, XX; Sent., III,
q. 13, E;-OU:Odl., I, q. 20; Sent., III,q. 10, H, P, and Q. Ockham refers to Scotus' doctrine in Quodl., III, q. 14, without
indicating the position he rejects as that of Scotus.
6 sent., III, q. 10, N; "Respondeo, omnes circumstantiae
actus voluntatis sunt objecta partialia illius actus, ita quod
finis j_n omni actu est objectum principale sicut prius patui t;
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situational factors--the end, time, place, etc.,--is the total
object of a will-act and gives the will-act its specific nature. 7
Acts of the agent's will are distinguishable on the basis of what
is willed; a change in volitive objects entails a corresponding
change in the nature of the will-act.

Ockham's general disagree-

ment with Scotus, therefore, results from Ockham's insistence
that the objects and circumstances of volition are intrinsic and
internal determinants of moral goodness.
While Ockham's metaphysic takes issue with Duns Scotus
on the substantial reality of relationships, their sharpest
aliae circumstantiae sunt objecta secundaria partialia respectu
illius actus. 11 Sent., III, q. 12, CCC; "Ad secundum dubium, dico
quod tam finis quam recta ratio et omnes aliae circumstantiae
sunt objecta partialia secundaria actus virtuosi. Cuius ratio
est, quia est aliquis actus voluntatis qui est intrinsece et
necessario virtuosus stante ordinatione divina quae nunc est,
et nullo modo contingenter virtuosus. Nunc autem si illa quae
dicuntur circumstantiae non sunt objecta actus virtuosi, nullus
actus voluntatis esset necessario et intrinsece virtuosus, sed
solum extrinsece et contingenter; cuius oppositum prius probatum
est."

7ockham teaches that the same potency can produce specifically different acts because of specifically different objects
of that potency. Sent., III, q. 12, D; "Secunda conclusio est
quod respectu objectorum distinctorum specie, sunt actus distincti specie. Hoc patet, quia aliter non potest probari distinctio
specifica actuum, quia si illi essent ejusdem speciei, multo
magis actus respectu objectorum ejusdem speciei essent ejusdem
speciei; et sic omnes actus essent ejusdem speciei. 11 In ethical
theory, Ockham's position that: (a) the circumstances are partial objects of the will-act and (b) the object to which the will
moves is responsible for the specific nature of that will-act,
substantiates Ockham's claims that the circumstances of an intended act affect the moral nature of that act. "Si quaeras
unde actus habet bonitatem suam vel malitiam? Dico quod ab
eidem a quibus habet substantiam actus; quia ab objecto communi
et omnibus circumstantiis tanquam a causis multis partialibus,
quae omnes simul positae, faciunt unam causam totalem." Sent.,
III, q. 10, P-Q. Also see Sent., III, q. 12, CCC.
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conflict in ethics concerns the extrinsic-intrinsic status of
rectitude or goodness.

For Ockham the goodness or evilness of

a voluntary act is not distinct from the substance of that act. 8
Consequences which are totally unacceptable for Ockham result
from asserting that moral goodness is a relational and extrinsic
quality possessed by will-acts.
For one thing, the same act can be first morally indifferent and then intrinsically good according to Scotus. 9 Sub~
stantially the same will-act could be both morally indifferent
and morally good because of changing relationships.

For example,

a person could perform the act of walking to church spontaneously
and without consideration for the rightness or wrongness of that
8 sent., III, q. 10, P; "Hoc substantia actus est haec
bonitas actus; et similiter de actu vitioso, haec substantia
actus est haec malitia actus." Quodl., III, q. 14; "Ad istam
quaestionem (i.e., Utrum rectitudo actus et difformitas differant a substantia actus?), dico quod nunquam actus et sua rectitudo
differunt, quia omnis actus aut est rectus essentialiter aut per
denominationem extrinsecam. Si primo modo, tune substantia actus
est sua rectitudo quid patet ex hoc, quia impossibile est quod
talis actus sit a voluntate creata nisi sit rectus. Si secundo
modo, tune iste actus dicitur rectus, quia causatur vel continatur ab actu essentialiter virtuoso--ad cuius conformitatem dicitur
actus rectus. 11 Also see Sent., III, q. 12, YY.

9sent., III, q. 12, XX; "Ad primum istorum, respondit
Johannes in 'principio' de materia caritatis et 'secundo,' ubi
quaerit utrum aliquis actus voluntatis sit indifferens et in
Quotlibet ubi quaeri t utrum act1 ''..> dilectionis naturalis et meritoriae sint e~lusdem speciei ( Oc · · ""lm refers to Scotus' Comm. Ox.,
I, d. 17, q. 6; Comm. Ox., II,
40, q. unica; and Quodlibetales
Quaestiones, 17), et dici t quoc ·:am habi tus quam actus voluntatis
pot.est esse indifferens sicut quod idem habitus abstinentiae
generatus solet inesse naturae cuiusmodi actus solum est actus
naturalis; pot.est postea per coexistentiam act.us prudentiae esse
intrinsece bonus."
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act.

Later, the agent might continue that act of walking because

he now judges that walking to church is right and obligatory.
For Scotus, this example indicates that an indifferent act can
become intrinsically good through the "co-existence," or relation
to, prudence.

Ockham rejects this analysis because, first, it

asserts that morally good acts can occur without being

volu..~tary

or deliberately chosen by the will and secondly, it asserts that
a non-virtuous act of intellectual prudence can render another
1
non-virtuous act as morally virtuous.
For Ockham, the act of

°

walking to church spontaneously is not substantially or by nature
the same act as walking to church deliberately to fulfill an
obligation.

Furthermore, the same act could be first a natural

act, then morally good, and finally meritorious according to
Scotus. 11 The change from natural (non-voluntary), to morally
-lOidem.; "Contra primum, impossibile est quod de actu non
viruoso fiat virtuosus per aliquem actum pure naturalem qui nullo
modo est in voluntatis potestate; quia propter talem nullus laudatur vel vituperatur, ex guo solum est actus naturalis. Sed actus
prudentiae secundum eum ('Scotum) et secundum veritatem, est solum
actus naturalis et nullo modo in potestate nostra plusquam actus
videndi. Igitur, impossibile est quod actus voluntatis indifferens et non virtuosus fiat virtuosus per solam coexistentiam
prudentiae. Praeterea, nunquam de actu intrinsece non virtuoso
potest fieri virtuosus nisi per actum intrinsece virtuosum, et
non solum extrinsece et contingenter; quia aliter esset processus
in infinitum sicut patet supra. Sed sicut supra dictum est,
solus actus voluntatis est intrinsece virtuosus vel viciosus, et
nullu.s alius nisi extrinseca denominatione, ... quia impossibile
est quod aliquis actus voluntatis non bonus fiat bonus propter
solum actwn prudentiae." Also see Quodl., III, q. 15; where Ockham repeats this criticism of Scotus. - 11Idem., "Secundo (Scotus) dicit in Quotlibet quod idem
actns non solum specie sed numero, [in]differens potest esse sic
quod erit solum primo aetus naturalis, nee laudabilis nee vituperab:i.lis, et postea manens omnino idem nrnnero, potest esse
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good, to meritoriously good can occur without any substantial
change in the nature of some act.

Ockham rejects this position

of Scotus' because it asserts that, without a positive and essential change in the nature of an action, the act can change from
non-voluntary to voluntary. 12
Ockham hopes to avoid and remedy the problems he finds
in the Scotistic analysis of moral goodness, by considering the
circumstances and objects of a voluntary act as intrinsic moral
determinants.

The rectitude of an action is not its "proper"

relationship; "the rectitude of an act is not a quality of the
act nor its accident, therefore, it is the substance of the act. 1113
"If you ask, from where an act has its goodness or evil?--I say,
from those causes by which the act has substance, because by the
common object and all the circumstances, just as by many partial
causes which, all asserted together, make one total cause." 14
Ockham agrees with Scotus that often goodness is ex circumstantia;
virtuosus et moraliter bonus et tertio, idem manens, actus potest
esse meritorius; quia secundum eum (Scotum) moralis bonitas vel
meritoria non addit super substantiam actus nisi quosdam respectus ad circumstantias actus vel tantum unum respectum ad rationem
rectam plene dictatem de circumstantiis, et ille respectus secundum eum oritur ex natura rei. 11
12 Ibid., YY; "Quantum ad secundum quod dicit Johannes,
dico quod j_mpossibile est quod quicunque actus sit primo naturalis et indi:.fferens so1um, et postea intrinsece bonus moraliter vel
meritorie; et hoc propter transitum de contradictorio in contradictorium; qui non potest salvari· sine novo actu voluntatis, sic
patui t pr:i.us."
13Quodl., III, q. 14.
11+

Sent., III, q. 10, P-Q.

See above, note 7.
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but according to Ockham the situational

facto~s

affect the nature

and not simply the relationship of voluntary acts.

Interestingly,

Ockham objects to the formula "rectitude is relationship" because
it renders the moral order completely "relative"--a charge often
advanced against Ockham himself.
Although goodness is the substance of certain will-acts,
Ockham's ethic should not be considered a "natural law" theory,
at least not a Thomistic or a Scotistic doctrine of Natural Law.
The claim that the substance of a will act is its rectitude must
be balanced by the assertion that God can separate created willacts from any moral status.
absolutum

The individual being of any act, its

can be present in the human will without entailing moral goodness or evi1. 15 Neither the love of God above all
~'

nor the murderous hate of one's neighbor have a moral status
because they exist, or because they conform or conflict with an
ideal conception of human nature.
for Himself in the created will:
bor.

God could totally produce love
a madman could hate his neigh-

In both cases, the proper causes of morality are deficient.

Hence, Ockham's position that rectitude is the substance of
15 Sent., II, q. 19, F; "Deus potest omne absolutum causare
sine omni alio quid non est idem cum illo absoluto; sed actus
odiendi De1nn quantum ad esse absolutum in eo non est idem cum
difformitate et malitia in actu; ergo, Deus potest causare quicquid absolutum est in actu odiendi Deum vel nolendi, non causando
ali.quam di:fformi tatem vel mali tiam in actu ... " Here the "esse
absolutum" or.absolute being of an act signifies the positive
nature of that act as distinct from its causes. This phrase,
probably taken from Scotus, Quodlibet 17, n. 6 (XXVI, 202), is
rendered as the "simple nature 11 of an act, signifying the act
gu~ subsistent rather than gua effect.
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will-acts must be carefully interpreted.
acts can be good in

~'

but not good per

The nature of voluntary
~·

"Goodness" signifies

volitive actions and their created causes.
2.

Moral Evil

Ockham's debate with Duns Scotus has its interpretive
problems.

The Venerable Inceptor claims that rectitude is not

a quality or accident attending will-acts, but the substance of
volitive actions.

By nature, virtuous acts differ from non-moral

or immoral acts because virtuous acts include all the pertinent
moral determinants.

On the other hand, Ockham claims that God

can separate the substance of any action from moral goodness or
evil.

This position seems to imply that the substantive will-

act and its rectitude are not identical. Since Ockham did define
"moral evil, 1116 we can unravel parts of this problem through a
16 sent., II, qes. 4-5, H; 11 Malum nihil aliud est quam
facere aliquid ad cujus oppositurn faciendum aliquis obligatur. 11
In the absence of an explicit definition of "moral good" in Ockham' s texts, Baudry composes a definition of moral good--"le
bien moral consiste a faire ce qu'on est tenu de faire"--in contrast to the given definition of moral evil. It does not seem
inconsistent with Ockham's principles to consider this definition
as ad mentem Ockham. However, Professor Baudry holds that this
definition must be understood as a facet of Ockham's "voluntarism"
or "subjectivism." "Il faut bien comprendre la port~e de cette
definition. Comme Dieu n'est soumis a aucune obligation, le bien
tel qu'on vient de le definir n'existe pas pour lui. Dieu ne
veut pas tel ou tel acte, parce qu'il est bon, parce que sa bonte
intrinseque l'imposerait
son intelligence et a sa volont~, il
est bon parce qu'il le veut, parce qu'il le prescrit. (I S. d.
43, q~ l; IV, q. 8 et 9 E; III, q. 12 YY). La definition que
Guillaume donne du mal moral et cons~cutivement celle qu'il aurait donnee du bien moral, doivent etre mises en rapport avec ce
qu'on appelle son volontarisme et, dans une certaine mesure, avec
ce qu'on nomme aujourd'hui le subjectivisme moral." Cf. Lexigue

a
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systematic study of "malum. 11 "Evil is nothing else than to do
something when one is obliged to its opposite."
Probably the earliest treatment of moral evil by Ockham
is found in Sent., II, question 5.
a natural or a free agent?"

Ockham asks, "Whether God is

In answering this question Ockham

raises a related issue--"How does evil exist and not be caused
by God (.!l2,!! .§:. Deo)?" Ockham replies that evil is not a "producible thing. 1117 Surely, Ockham recognizes that a moral agent can
produce an evil act; a human will can do wrong.

Thus, the state-

ment that "evil is not a producible thing" must be understood to
assert that "evil is not a substance or an individual being which
exists independently."

Ockham describes evil as "nothing else

than to do something while one is obliged to its opposite."
Since God is not necessitated or obliged to produce any action,
He can not produce or create something which is contrary to His
Philosophique, pp. 32-33. The charge_ of divine voluntarism and
moral subjectivism are strange bedfellows when these classifications come to rest in a single moral system. At any rate, to
define moral evil as an action contrary to one's obligation and
to define moral good as an action which fulfills one's obligation is not, at face value, a statement of moral voluntarism or
subjectivism.
17 Sent., II, q. 5, H; 11 Sed hie sunt dubia. Primum, quomodo malum est et non a Deo? Quia videtur quod sit eadem causam;
reducere mala ad primum malum sicut bona ad primum bonum. Et sic
erunt duae causae primae--una bona alia mala sicut dixerunt Manichaei. Sed istud dubium bene procederet si malum esset res
factibilis, quid falsum est, quia malum nihil aliud est quam
facere aliquid ad cuius oppositum faciendum aliquis obligatur,
quae obligatio non cadit in Deum, quia ille ad nihil faciendum
obligatur; nee praesupponitur malitia in causa, quae sit causam
malitiae effectus, sed malitia effectus est causa malitiae in
ca.usa. 11
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obligation, i.e., something evil.

Thus, Ockham answers his

immediate question by maintaining that God causes, at least
partially, everything which exists.

But since God is not sub-

ject to any moral obligation, He cannot produce an evil effect.
Ockham objects, in this initial treatment, to "reifying"
or substantizing moral evil.

Everything real--every individual
18
substance and quality--is metaphysically good.
Moral evil

indicates a metaphysically good act which is produced in violation of the agent's moral duty.

The presence of moral evil,

therefore, does not require a "principle of darkness" or a
Manichean "evilness" as the source of evil in the world.

Indeed,

it is incorrect to speak of an evil cause before an effect contrary to one's obligation has been produced.
Moral evil is not a singular thing but can be described
as a voluntary effect which ought not to have been produced by
the agent.

Similarly, Ockham will object to "imagining" that
moral goodness is a thing. 19 Moral evil or moral goodness are
incorrectly conceived as real qualities or as distinct beings.
18As Ockham explicitly says in the Ordinatio, Sent., I,
d. 17, q. 1, Q; "Quod aliquis potest esse secundum se charus
etiam si nihil habet sibi inherens nee habuit, quia ipsum secundum se est bonum nee est aliquid positivum nisi sit bonum; ideo
potest sine omni tali esse objectum voluntatis et dilectionis."
Also Quodl., VI, q. 2; "Ad argumentum principale, dico quod
laudabile accipitur multipliciter. Uno modo pro omni natura quae
est bona sive sit creata sive increata."
19 sent., III, q. 12, YY; "Unde omnes istae ymaginationes
quae dicunt quod 'rectitudo' in actu addit aliquid supra actum
absolutum vel respectivum false sunt; quia nihil aliud est quam
ipsemet actus, et ideo carere rectitudine in actu est carere tali
actu."
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The terms "evil" and "good" can be truly predicated of certain
human acts.

They cannot truly exist as distinct beings.

In question 19, of book II, the Reportatio considers the
question, "Whether an evil angel is always producing an evil act

(21! actu malo)?"

Ockham answers in the affirmative:

a devil is

always in the state of sin because God will not concur with the
devil in rejecting evil or causing a good act.

However, God is

not responsible for the evil actions of the devils even though
.
.
. bl e. 20 s ince
.
. non-concurrence ren d ers any goo d ac t ion
is
impossi

H

God is "not a debtor," He is not bound by any moral obligation.
That man is a "debtor" is Ockham's rather pithy explanation of
why a human being remains subject to moral obligations.
Unfortunately, Ockham does not explain the meaning of
"debtor" which often occurs in his argument that God cannot sin
and that a human agent can.

One probable conjecture would be

that "debtor" indicates a certain lack of freedom in acting.

Not

yet beatified, the viator is not free from the "servitude of
20 sent., II, q. 19, G-H; "Aliter potest dici et reddi
causa obstinationis malorum; et hoc supposito quod Deus concurrat
ad omncm actionem creaturae ad minus sicut causa partialis, tune
potest dici quod Deus concurrit cum voluntate creata ad causandum
actum odii et non vult concurrere cum angelo malo ad causandum
actum bonum, puta, dilectionem Dei; et quia sic concurrit ad
unum et non ad aliud, ideo potest dici obstinatus quia non potest
elicere aliquem actum bonum. Si dicas quod tune Deus peccat et
est malus quia non vult concurrere ad actum bonum. Respondeo,
nunquam peccat homo nisi quia tenetur facere quid non facit vel
quia fa:cit quid non debet facere; per ista sit homo debitor.
Deus autem nulli tenetur nee obligatur tanquam debitor, et ideo
non potest facere quid non debet facere, nee potest non facere
quid debet facere. 11 Also see Sent., IV, q. 3, q.
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guilt," "the servitude of misery," or the "servitude of punishment.1121

Perfect freedom, such as God possesses, does not imply
the ability to sin, 22 or the liability of guilt in His actions.

Ultimately, the limitation of man's freedom flows from his
ontological dependence.

The human agent owes his existence to

God so that the gift of being and life render man a "debtor."
In a similar manner, a man is socially dependent upon the civil
authority and spiritually dependent upon the church.
benefit establishes a corresponding duty:

Each

Omni benefactori est

21 sent., II, q. 19, R; "Ad aliud dico quod libertas accipitur quinque modis; uno modo ut opponitur servituti culpae,
secundo ut opponitur servituti miseriae, tertio ut opponitur
servituti penae, quarto ut opponitur coactioni, quinto modo ut
opponitur immutabilitati. Quantum ad primam, secundam et tertiam,
libertates, non est libertas in angelo malo, quia non est liber
respectu peccati nee respectu miseriae nee respectu penae ... 11
Ockham's statements about the lack of freedom or liberty in the
bad angels can be applied to viatores with the exception of Christ
and the mother of Christ. Cf. Sent._, I, d. 41, q. 1, G; Sent.,
III, q. 13, T. Also see Sent., I, d. 1, q. 6, (I,501); where
Ockham makes similar distinctions about the nature of "liberty,"
and shows that a rational creature does not have that liberty
which 11 opponi tur servi tu ti culpae vel servi tu ti penae. 11 .. Traditionally, the liberty from necessity, guilt and misery correspond to man's freedom according to nature, grace and glory in St.
Augustine and Peter Lombard. See St. Bonaventure, Sent., II~ d.
25, part 1, q. 1 (Vol. II, 594: Qpera Omnia; Quaracchi, 1885).
22 sent., IV, q. 14, E; "Ad primum istorum, concedo quod
(posse peccare) non est libertas nee pars libertatis, quia si
sic, tune cuicumque competeret libertas ei competeret posse peccare, et per consequens Deus posset peccare, et similiter beatus,
quod est falsum. Dico, igitur, quod libertas et posse peccare
se habent sicut superius et inferius, ita quod quicunque potest
peccare habet libertatem et non e contra. Et causa est, quia
potens peccare habet libertatem et contingentiam respectu illorum
actuum in quibus consistit peccatum, sed nee Deus nee beatus
habet libertatem respecu talium sed respectu aliorum in quibus
non est peccatum." Also see Sent., I, d. 10, q. 2, K.
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benefaciendum. 23

The common stem of the noun "debitor" (one who

owes something) and the verb "debet" (one ought to do something)
perhaps adds credibility to this conjecture.
In this question Ockham describes "sin" in the same manner in which he previously defined "evil," namely, as a violation
of one's obligation.

For a Christian agent within the present

dispensation there is no sharp distinction between acts done
evilly and acts done sinfully.

If a person violates his conscience, he thereby acts contrary to the divine precept. 24 The
divine commands establish valid moral laws for the human agent.
Within the ordained moral order, a person sins by producing a
morally wrong act and causes a meritorious act when producing a
perfectly virtuous act.

Strictly speaking, however, the terms

"sin"_ and "moral evil" have different connotations.

Guilt occurs

simultaneously with violation of one's conscience, but the eternal or temporal punishment signified by the term "si:d'does not. 25
23 This moral norm is often asserted by Ockham as known
evidently through experience. Cf. Sent., III, q. 12, H.
24 sent., III, q. 13, C; "Impossibile est quod aliquis
actus voluntatis elicitus contra conscientiam et contra dictamen
ration.is sive rectum sive erroneum sit virtuosus; patet de conscientia recta quia talis eliceretur contra preceptum divinum et
voluntatem divinam volentem divinam volentem talem actum elicere
conformiter rationi rectae. 11
25 Anita Garvens attempts to reduce Ockham's notion of
good and evil to "positive" good and evil, i.e., to what is commanded or prohibited by God. "Wesentlich filr das sittliche Handeln des Menschen ist nicht der Inhalt seines Tuns, sondern die
Anpassung an den gottlichen Willen und dessen Erfullung, der
seinerseits nicht an bestirnrnte reale sittliche Sachverhalte
gebunden ist." Franz. Studien, 21, p. 265. Garvens goes on to
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One more issue requires mention from question nineteen.
Ockham asserts that the "absolute being" of any act can be separated from the difformity and wickedness which might accompany
that act. 26 By "absolute being," Ockham seems to mean the
say that the only real meaning of "sin" is the punishment which
follows some human acts (pp. 360-371). It is undeniable that
some moral evil and good can be reduced to divine prohibitions
and commands. Ockham recognizes valid human and divine laws which
oblige the moral agent concerning things which are "nee bona sunt
nee mala, nisi quia sunt prohibita vel imperata a superiore cuius
est leges statuere." (Quodl., II, q. 14) But "positive" evil and
good is only part of the story. Ockham also recognizes acts which
are "natus esse bonus moraliter ex se"--these intrinsic goods will
be discussed shortly. Regarding Professor Garvens second point,
that sin means only the punishment which accrues to certain acts,
it is best to simply consider Ockham's own statements. 11 Ad aliud
dico quod Deus de potentia sua absoluta potest alicui infligere
penam sine culpa praecedente, sed illa pena tune non potest dici
punitio quia istud nomen cannotat peccatum praecedens; sicut enim
in brutis est pena sine peccato praevio. Tamen, de facto de potentia sua ordinata, Deus non infligit penam sine culpa praecedente
vel in punitio ut est in nobis vel in alio ut in Christo cui pena
fuit inflicta propter peccata nostra." Sent., II, q. 19, U. One
cannot argue validly, therefore, that "he sinned, thus he will be
punished necessarily" nor that "he is punished thus he must have
sin.'Yled. 11 Ockham removes the "freedom from misery and punishment"
from man's competence; the "freedom from guilt" remains subject
to the created will of viators. That God might choose not to punish a sinner does not mean he was not a sinner, i.e., guilty.
The basic mistake of identifying moral evil with "sin," or moral
good with "meritorious act, 11 is the oversight of Ockham's strong
assertion that a human agent can perform morally evil and morally
good acts ~ puris naturalibus," but no human agent can sin or
merit salvation"~ puris naturalibus." Human acts can be evil
or good by nature, but no human act by nature results in eternal
punishment or eternal reward.
26 Sent., II, q. 19, F; "Deus potest omne absolutum causare
sine omni alio quid non est idem cum illo absoluto; sed actus
odiendi Deum quantum ad esse absolutum in eo, non est idem cum
difformitate et malitia in actu, ergo, Deus potest causare quicquid absolutum est in actu odiendi Deum vel nolendi, non causando
aliquam difformitatem vel malitiam in actu, ergo etc ..• Item non
minus, posset separari difformitas ab odio Dei quam bonitas moralis a dilectione Dei; sed dilectio Dei in angelo beato posset
separari a bonitate morali et meritoria."
11
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positive nature of some act as actualizing the volitional potency
and inhering within the human soul.

The will, when it desires

some object, produces a volition which subsists within the soul
as an accidental form.

Each action, considered as a real quality

of the human soul, is metaphysically good.

The substance of any

action producible by the human agent can be separated from the
moral determinations of "evil" or "good."

Thus, if God were the

total cause of the act of hating God or loving God, that action
of hate or love would not be morally significant.

Again, if an

insane person were to elicit an act of hate for God, then the
"absolute being" of that hate would be without moral evil.

In-

variably, moral evil is the result of a voluntary and rational
cause which deliberately chooses to produce this effect contrary
to what ought to be produced.

Thus, the terms "evil" or "good"

never refer exclusively to what is done, i.e., the absolute
being of the effect, but necessarily include a reference to the
causes of that effect, i.e., a cause which is obliged not to produce or obliged to produc·e that effect. 27
2 7Ibid., P; "Ad aliud dico quod aliquis actus ab una
causa potest fieri bene, et si fiat ab alia (causa) non potest
fieri nisi male, et tota ratio est quia una causa obligatur ad
actum oppositum et alia non. Sic est in propositio, voluntas
creata obligatur ex praecepto divino ad diligendum Deum et ideo
stante illo precepto, non potest bene odire Deum nee causare actum odiendi, sed necessario male causat malitia moris, et hoc
quia obligatur ex precepto divino ad actum oppositum, nee stante
primo praecepto, potest sibi Deus oppositum precipere. Sed Deus
ad nullum actum causandum obligatur, ideo quemlibet actum absolutum posset sine omni malo culpae causare et ejus oppositum, et
ideo sicut posset causare totaliter actum diligendi sine bonitate
vel malitia morali, QUIA BONITAS MORALIS ET MALICIA CONNOTANT QUOD
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In book three of the Reportatio, question 10, Ockham
raises two issues; first, the origins of an act's evilness or
goodness, and secondly, the content of evil and good actions.
Two questions are formulated:

"From where does an act have its

goodness or evilness?" and "What does the goodness or wickedness
of an act add to the substance of a morally indifferent act?"
Pertaining to the first question, Ockham claims that the
evilness of an action comes from the same causes which produce
the substance of the act. 28 The "common object," the end, the
dictate of Right Reason, and the circumstances--together these
factors constitute the total object of volition.

As the object

of volition these factors establish the specific nature of the
will-act.

The fact that a moral agent produces some action while

consciously rejecting his duty, is reflected by the nature of
action produced.

Ockham criticizes Duns Scotus for teaching that

moral goodness is an "aspect (respectum) of conformity to all the
circumstances" added to the substance of an act. 29 According to
AGENS OBLIGATUR AD ILLUM ACTUM VEL EJUS OPPOSITUM; ita posset
totaliter causare actum odiendi Deum sine omni malitia morali
propter eandem causam, quia ad nullum actum causandum obligatur."
Notice that the text in capitals approximates the definition
given as conjecture by Professor Baudry. See above, note 16.
28 sent., III, q. 10, Q; "Si quaeras, Unde actus habet
bonitatem suam vel malitia? Dico quod ab eisdum a quibus habet
substantiam actus, quia ab objecto communi et omnibus circumstantiis tanquam a causis multis partialibus, quae omnes simul
positae faciunt unam causam totalem. 11
29 Ibid., P; "Ex istis patet quid bonitas vel malitia addit super substantiam actus, quia aliter est dicendum secundum
istam viam (Ockham) et aliter secundum viam Johannis. Nam
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Ockham, Scotus' view makes moral goodness or evil a "something"
which is extrinsic to the nature of voluntary acts.

Ockham, on

the other hand, teaches that the objects and circumstances of
the will-act are causes which partially cause the substance of
will-act.

Thus, "this substance of the act is this goodness of

the act and likewise, concerning a wicked act, this substance of
the act is this wickedness of the act."

Moral evil, therefore,

depends upon the same cause on which the substance of the act
depends.
Ockham's answer to his second question--what does the
goodness or wickedness of an act add to the substance of a morally indifferent act?--depends upon the answer just given to the
first question.

Moral goodness or evil adds nothing to an act

which. is distinct from the substance of that act.

"Evil" or

Johannes ponit quod substantia actus virtuosi et vitiosi posset
esse eadem, sed dicitur esse virtuosus propter conformitatem ad
circumstantias requisitas, quas non ponit esse objecta partialia
actus virtuosi et vitiosi. Ideo, per eum, bonitas addit super
substantiam actus respectum conformitatis ad omnes circumstanitas.
Quaere eum. Sed secundum istam viam, quae ponit quod omnes circumstanitae requisitae ad actum sunt causae immediatae partiales
necessario requisitae ad actum perfecte virtuosum, actus virtuosus et vitiosus se habent ad actum in communi sicut haec albedo
ad albedinem in communi. Et sicut haec albedo est de se haec et
non per aliquid extrinsecum sibi, ita actus virtuosus qui primo
est virtuosus et de se imputabilis est de se formaliter et intrinsece virtuosus; quia haec substantia actus est haec bonitas actus. Et similiter de actu vitioso, haec substantia actus est
haec militia actus, et ab istis duobus posset abstrahi conceptus
actus in communi, sicut ab haec albedine et ista, posset abstrah.i
conceptus albedinis. 11 Professor Oberman unfortunately attributes
the position of Scotus to Ockham when the Venerable Inceptor
actually claims that the substance of virtuous and wicked acts
are never identical. Harvard Theological Review, 53, p. 68.
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"good" is predicated intrinsically, i.e., of the nature, of
certain volitional acts.

Evilness or goodness is not a positive

entity or relationship added to the substance of intrinsically
moral actions.

But some actions, such as walking or eating or

reading, are morally indifferent; that is, some actions are not
11

de

~

imputabilis" or "de se formaliter et intrinsece" virtuous

or wicked.

If I walk to fulfill an obligation and out of love

for God, then the act of walking is extrinsically good.

If I

walk to avoid my moral duty, then the act of walking is extrinsically bad.

The moral status of indifferent acts is extrinsic--

"walking" can be good or evil depending on the intrinsic goodness
or evilness of the reason why an agent walks.

Actions which are

good or bad because they serve or execute an intrinsically good
or bad action, do not receive anything "absolute, positive or
relative (respectivum) distinct from that (indifferent) action. 1130
Ockham treats the difference between intrinsically and
extrinsically moral acts by means of different connotations.

The

principal denotion of "good" or "evil," when predicated intrinsically, is a substantive will-act.

The principle significance of

30 Ibid., Q; "Si autem quaeras, Quid addit bonitas actus
vel malitia super substantiam actus quid dicitur bonus saltem
denominatione quaedam extrinseca, puta, actus partis sensitivae
et similiter actus voluntatis. Dico quod nihil absolutum, positivum vel respectivum distinctum ab illo actu quod habet esse in
illo actu per quamcunque causam; sed tamen est bonitas illa nomen
vel conceptus connotativus significans principaliter illum actum
sic neutrum, connotans actum voluntatis perfecte virtuosum et
rectam rationem quibus conformiter elicitur. Ideo, denominatur
virtuosus talis actus denominatione extrinseca. 11 Also see Quodl ..
I, q. 20, where Ockham disputes Scotus' position on this issue. ·
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11

good" or "evil," when predicated extrinsically, is a morally

indifferent act which could be a voluntary or a nonvoluntary
act. 31

But when predicated intrinsically or extrinsically,

"good" and "evil" always connote the causes of the action which
is principally signified.

Thus, the objects and circumstances

of an action as apprehended rationally and the voluntary choice
of the total object are connoted by good or evil when predicated
intrinsically.

When predicated extrinsically, good or evil con-

note an intrinsically good or evil action as the cause of the
morally indifferent effect.

In either case, the moral values
attributed to certain acts connote the causes of the acts. 32 An

31 In contrast to St. Thomas, and in agreement with Duns
Scotus, Ockham is emphatic that voluntary acts can be morally
indifferent. See St. Thomas, Summ. Theol., I-II, q. 18, art. 9;
Scotus, Comm. Ox., II, d. 41, q. unica. Ockham argues that
voluntary acts can be morally indifferent, because the human
agent can spontaneously elicit some act. Ockham does not consider an act to be morally good or evil unless the agent deliberately and intentionally fulfills or violates his obligation. See
Sent., III, q. 10, 0 and Q.
32 The function of connotative terms within Ockham's philosophy is aptly expressed by E. A. Moody. 11 The frequent charge
that Ockham atomized the world by refusing to recognize relations
as real entities distinct from substances and qualities fails to
take accou..~t of the fact that the connotative terms relate the
individuals by implying factual conditions by which the objects
are tied together in an existential sense--something which cam1ot
be done by treating relations as entities distinct from their
relata and, in effect, as just another class of substances."
"William of Ockham, 11 The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. by Paul
Edwards, Vol. 5 (New York: Macmillan Co. and the Free Press,
1967), pp. 311-312. Ockham's treatment of moral evil and good
show the correctness of Professor Moody's observation. The moral
status of an action derives from the nexus or order of created
cause and effect; nothing besides this nexus is signified by the
term "good" or "evil," when predicated in a moral sense.
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effect of the volitional potency is real because of its causes;
a voluntary effect is really good or really evil because of the
same causes by which the effect exists.
To simply desire an object produces a morally indifferent act.

The actualization of the volitional power causes an

"absolute being"--a real effect within the will.

This will-act

is good in a metaphysical sense, but this "absolute being" is not
good or evil in a moral sense.

The moral terminology which des-

cribes the real effects of the created will always connotes the
causes of that voluntary effect.

Thus, Ockham denies that the

morality of an act is an addition to, or a subtraction from, the
"absolute being" of some action. 33 A change in the objects and
circumstances of a will-act changes the causes of a will-act and
33sent., III, q. 10, O; "Respondeo, quod idem numero
(actus) non potest esse primo indifferens et post intrinsece
bonus vel malus; et dicitur ille actus intrinsece bonus vel malus
cui primo convenit laus vel vituperium et cui primo est impredicamentabilis, quia ille actus voluntatis est indifferens qui
elicitur circa objectum conveniens tali actui sine, tamen, circumstantiis requisitis ad bonitatem vel malitiam actus--puta, si
diligam aliquem hominem non propter aliquern finem bonum vel malum,
nee secundum rectam rationem nee contra, nee loco nee tempore
determinato nee non, et ita de aliis circumstantiis virtuosis et
vitiosis--iste actus non esset bonus moraliter nee malus, sed
neuter et indifferens. Ad hoc, igitur, quod fiat bonus vel malus
oportet eum circumstionari circumstantiis virtuosis vel vitiosis;
puta, quod voluntas diligat illum hominem propter finem talem et
tempore determinato et sic de aliis. Sed sic diligendo, habet
actum aliud, sicut dictum est prius, ergo et aliud actum voluntatis. Cum circumstantiae non sint nisi objecta partialia actus
virtuosi, ad quorum variationem, variatur necessario actus; et
propter eandem causam, non potest aliquis actus voluntatis primo
esse virtuosus intrinsece et post vitiosus--idem dico actus numero--quia non potest esse mutatio nisi per mutationem circumstantiarum, puta, quia actus nunc est bene circumstantionatus et
post male, et hoc non potest esse sine mutatione actus. 11
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thereby, changes the nature of the will-act.

When Ockham asserts

that the moral goodness or evilness of an action, does not add
or subtract some ontological component or relationship to the
action, he does not imply that the nature of a morally good act
is identical with the nature of a morally evil act.

For example,

the act of loving God above all is morally good; the act of
loving God for personal gain or selfishly, is morally evil;
these acts of loving God are specifically different. 34 Evil and
good, in a moral sense, cannot be predicated of the same act.
One final question from the Reportatio, namely question
nine of Book IV, must be considered.

Ockham raises the question;

Whether grace and virtues are infused in any penitent through
the sacrament of penence?

In the course of his answer, Ockham

treats a related problem; What is mortal sin?

His answer to

this second question is pertinent to the discussion of moral
evil.
Ockham begins his description of "mortal sin" by analyzing
the grammatical or logical status of sin as a connotative rather
than an absolute term.

The term "mortal sin" has no "quid rei"

4
3 Ibid., N; "Respondeo, omnes circumstantiae actus voluntatis sunt objecta partialia illius actus, ita quod finis in
omni actu est ob,jectum principale sicut prius patuit, aliae circumstantiae sunt objecta secundaria partialia respectu illius
actus. Exemplum, si enim ad hoc, quod actus voluntatis quo aliquis vult orare Deum sit perfecte virtuosus requirantur de necessitate istae circumstantiae; quia velit orare propter honorern
Dei secundum rectum dictamen rationis in tempore statute, puta
die dominico, in loco determinate, puta in ecclesia; tune iste
actus sic virtuosus habet honorem Dei pro objecto principali,
actum orandi pro objecto comrnuni, rectam rationem, diem dominicum et ecclesiam pro objectis secundariis et partialibus.
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but only "quid nominis. 1135

Sin has no real definition (quid rei);

only absolute terms which stand for one thing and ref er wholly
and exclusively to that one thing have a real definition. 36
"Mortal sin" has a nominal definition (quid nominis) which explains the meaning of the connotative term "sin" by explaining
the multiple items signified by the term.

The nominal definition

of "mortal sin" is "some act of commission or omission because
of which one is obliged to eternal punishment. 11

That "sin" can

signify an act of commission or omission indicates a greater
precision on Ockham's part in describing moral evil.

In Ockham's

first study of "moral evil," he was satisfied to say that "evil
is nothing other than to do something while one is obliged to do
its opposite."

Now Ockham distinguishes between evil which re-

sults from "doing something" and from "not doing something."

The

distinction shows an appreciation of affirmative as well as negative obligations; and a greater sensitivity to the signification
and connotations of the term "evil.n
Ockham's reasons for claiming that "sin" is a connotative
term are a collective argument against considering evil as an
ontological entity or as some type of subsistent reality.

There

35sent., IV, q. 8-9, C; "Quantum ad primum dico quod
peccatum mortale non habet quid rei, sed tantum quid nominis quia
nihil unum reaJ.e dieit nee positivum nee privativum vel negativum; sed dieit multa non habentia aliquam unitatem, nee per se
nee per aecidens. Unde potest dici quod secundum quid nominis
est aliquem eommisisse aliquem aetum vel omisisse propter quern
obligatur ad penam eternam. 11
7.:6
:; Cf. Chap·ter I, Note 34.
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is no existent "sinfulness" which is distinct from other existents.

Sin is "not a being because it is not precisely some one

thing or simultaneously many things, but it is one name or concept signifying or meaning many things--it can even be called
'nothing 1 • 1137 Everything real and positive signified by the
term "sin" can be asserted without necessarily asserting an instance of sin.

God can perform immediately every action which

He usually performs through the causality of created agents, yet
God cannot sin.

"Mortal sin is not a real, positive 'something,'

nor a being of reason; nevertheless, according to its nominal
definition it includes many positive (beings), because it ineludes an act, and a potency, and a future punishment.

Thus,

that someone sins mortally is only to produce or to omit some
act through which one is ordered to eternal punishment. 1138
Ockham's analysis of "sin" cannot be simply equated with
his notion of moral evil.

Morally good or evil actions are not

37 sent., IV, q. 9, S; "Et ideo quando quaeritur, Quid est
peccatum?, dicendum est quod non habet quid rei sed tantum quid
nom1n1s. Ideo non debet concedi quod est ens reale nee rationis
sed bene in diffinitione ejus exprimente quid nominis ponuntur
multa realia et ideo sic potest concedi quod non est ens quia non
est aliqua res una praecise, nee multae res simul, sed est unum
nomen vel conceptus significans vel importans plures res--potest
etiam dici 'nihil,' quia omne positivum quid est in peccato posset poni per Deum, sicut per causam totalem in voluntate hominis
et tamen non dicitur peccatum."
38 Ibid., R; "Ad primum istorum dico quod peccatum mortale
non est aliquid positivum reale nee ens rationis; tamen secundum
suum quid nominis includit multa positiva, quia actum et potentiam
et pen.am futuram, quia aliquem peccare mortaliter non est aliud
nisi facere aliquem actum vel omittere propter quern ordinatur ad
penam aeternam. 11
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necessarily meritorious or damnable acts.

Ockham is careful to

defend the freedom of God to eternally reward or punish a creature's behavior. 39 On the other hand, the reasons which Ockham
offers for asserting that "sin" is a connotative and not an
absolute concept, also explain why "evil" and "good" are connotative concepts.
These four questions of the Reportatio contain the main
elements of Ockham's thought on moral evil.
seem to alter this initial analysis of evil.
Ockham's doctrine are clear.

Ockham does not
Certain facets of

First, he rejects any attempt to

substantize moral evil as a metaphysical entity (substance,
quality or relation).

Secondly, he rejects any attempt to con-

sider "evil" or "good" as absolute concepts which signify exclusively one thing, one privation or one relationship.

Thirdly,

the concept of "moral evil" signifies primarily the substance of
a voluntary act and secondarily the causes of that will-act.
Finally, he asserts that the concept of moral evil must connote
causes which recognize and contradict a moral obligation.

Insur-

mountable problems will arise if Ockham's logical analysis of
the concepts of "evil" and "good" are confused with his metaphysical treatment of these issues.

For example, moral evil is

39 rn paragraphs "c" and "s" of question 8--9, Ockham asserts that sin does not necessarily imply a future punishment,
nor does a punishment inflicted upon a creature by God imply a
previous sin. Nor is an eternal reward automatically the consequent of a morally good act. Sent., IV, q. 3, Q; "Si aliquis
d.iligeret Deum et faceret omnia opera llio accepta, potest eum
Deus annihilare sine aliqua injuria, ita sibi post talia opera
potest non dare vitam aeternam sed penam aeternam sine injuria."
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not other than the substance of certain will-acts ( ..• haec substantia actus est haec malitia
a substance nor an accident.

act~l;

and yet moral evil is not

Again, Ockham surely does not mean

that moral evil is a fantasy or unreal, and yet he asserts that
"sin"--a type of moral evil--can be called "nihil. 11
lems are false:

the~

Such prob-

result from confusing the distinct questions

of significance and the signified.
Two further points require mention before moving to
Ockham's doctrine of moral goodness.

First, the notion of moral

evil connotes the free and deliberate violation of one's obligation.

Ockham also expresses this connotation as "against the
40
dictate of Right Reason."
The "logical advantage" of the latter
40 sent., Prologue, q. 10 (I, 292-293); "Autem omnis talis
operatic possit dici praxis, videtur, qui.a omnis actio quae est
in potestate nostra posset esse virtuosa vel vitiosa; sed omnis
talis est praxis ... Ista autem praxis dividitur in praxim virtuosam et vitiosam, quia utraque istarum est in potestate nostra.
Praxis autem virtuosa posset sic describi: Praxis virtuosa est
operatic existens in potestate voluntatis, nata elici conformiter
rationi rectae ad hoc quod sit recta. Prima conditio patet, quia
nulla operatio quae non est existens in potestate voluntatis est
virtuosa sed magis naturalis. Secunda conditio patet secundum
Philosophum, VI Ethicorum, electo recta--et per consequens nee
aliqua operatio recta--non est sine recta ratione, quia non est
major ratio de una operatione quam de alia. Praxis autem vitiosa
est operatio existens in posteste voluntatis, nata elici difform-iter rationi rectae, vel conformiter rationi erroneae et falsae.
Prima conditio patet, quia aliter non esset imputabilis, quia
i.llud quod non est in potestate voluntatis mullo modo est imputabile. Secunda conditio patet, quia omne malum elicitum potest
esse dictatum non esse eliciendum." This text should disprove a
rather common charge that, for Ockham, no act is good or evil
"~ §_£ 11 , or "in se."
Cf. de Wulf, Histoire de la Philosophie
Medievale, p. 185; Austin Fagothey, Right and Reason: Ethics in
Theorz and Practice, 3rd ed. (St. Louis, c. V. Mosby Co., 1963),
p. 15 ; Stephen Tornay, Ockham, p. 75. Ockham is not adverse to
speaking about acts "natus esse bonus moraliter ~ ~" (Sent.,
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expression is its clarity.

"Obligation" is itself a connotative

term whose nominal definition involves diverse referents.

The

dictate of Right Reason, however, is a specific act which inheres
subjectively in the mind and whose natural function is to regulate or oblige the will's freedom.

What is against one's judg-

ment of Right Reason is thereby against one's moral obligation.
Secondly, the meaning of "sin" must be distinguished from that
of "evil."

The temporal, finite actions of man cannot possess

an inherent and necessary relationship to eternal punishment.
Sin connotes the disapproval of God--the extrinsic determination
that certain forbidden actions will be punished by damnation.
Ockham can talk about moral evil without speaking of sinful acts.
Ex puris naturalibus--through normal human powers--the agent might
violate his moral obligation and reject the dictate of Right
Reason.

"Sin" carries the added connotation that this moral

evil will be punished eternally.

3.

The Meaning of Moral Good

In both the Reportatio and the Quotlibetal Questions,
Ockham states that the "rectitude" or moral goodness of an act
is not distinct from the substance of that act. 41 The "rectitude"
III, q. 10, M); he can discuss moral good and evil without referring to the divine will (Sent., II, q. 19, P). What Ockham
does assert is that the "absolute being of any action which the
human will can produce is morally indifferent. Without a cause
which is subject to moral obligation and capable of recognizing
moral obligation, it is impossible to produce moral acts.
41 see Quodl., III, q. 14; Sent., III, q. 12, YY; "Unde
omnes istae ymaginationes quae dicunt quod rectitudo in actu

296
of an act is not some addition--either a positive or a relational
entity--to the substance of an act.

Rather, "what" the term

primarily signifies is the substance of some will-act and not
something distinct from that act.

After examining Ockham's

doctrine of moral evil, it is tempting to say that his conception
of moral good could be described as "a will-act which is produced
freely and in conformity to Right Reason."

The metaphysically

good is simply what is willable; every being is a possible object
42
of volition and is thus willable.
Moral good is what is willable according to Right Reason or according

~o

one's obligation.

Indeed, this description seems to be implied by Ockham throughout
the Commentary .2!! the "Sentences" and the Quotlibetal Questions
in spite of the fact that Ockham does not explicitly offer to
define "moral good."
The problem with Ockham's doctrine of moral goodness
stems from two texts in which he considers the nominal definition
of metaphysical goodness as "a being desirable according to
Right Reason. 1143 Clearly, the meaning of good, when used as a
addit aliquid supra actum absolutum vel respectivum, falsae sunt,
quia nihil aliud est quam ipsemet actus."
42 For Ockham's description of metaphysical good as "the
willable" or "that which can be desired by the will," see Sent.,
II~ q. 26, O; Sent., III, q. 13, S; Sent., I, d. 2, q. 1 (II,
23).
4 3sent., I, d. 2, q. 9 (II, 321); "Ideo dico quod passiones entis non sunt aliqua talis a parte rei, sed tantum sunt
quidam conceptus importantes illud idem et omnia illa quae importat conceptus entis, connotando aliquod ens determinatum in
aliquo. Et ideo ens debet poni in definitione indicante quid
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transcendental predicate, can be expressed without the connotation
44 The fact that every being is willable renders
of Right Reason.
every being "good" in a metaphysical sense.

How can Ockham con-

sider "a being desirable according to Right Reason" as a description of a "property of being" when his exposition elsewhere
strongly suggests that this definition applies to moral goodness?
A number of possible interpretations of these two texts
can be offered, but the ambiguity cannot be explained away.

First,

it can be said that every real thing expresses both the will of
God and a right reason of God. 45 Simply by the fact that something exists, it is willed by God and conformed to the right
reason of God.

Secondly, God could command that any being be

loved by the created will so that every being could be willed
according to the Right Reason of the creature.

Thirdly, Ockham

may consider these definitions--"good is a being desirable by the
nominis cuiuscunque passionis ipsius entis: ut si exprimatur
quid nominis boni, debet dici quod'bonum est ens appetibile a
voluntate' vel aliquid tale, vel 'bonum est ens appetibile secundum rectam rationem, ' vel aliqua talis oratio debet exprimi in
qua ponitur ens in recto et aliquid aliud in obliquo. Et eodem
modo bonitas debet dici 'entitas sic vel sic appetibilis a voluntate' vel aliquid consimile. 11 Also see Summ. Log., I, 10.
44 In fact, Ockham does define "good" as a transcendental
predicate without including the notion of Right Reason within
the definition. See Sent., I, d. 2, q. 1 (II, 23).
45 In Sent., I, d. 41, q. 1, A and K; Ockham asserts that
every volition of God is, by that fact, an act of right reason.
A distinction between acts of volition and reason, or a moral
requirement that acts of right reason precede acts of volition,
would destroy the simplicity of the divine person according to
Ockham's position. This text is quoted above, Chapter III, n. 36.
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will" and "good is a being desirable according to Right Reason"-as interchangeable because "good" in either a metaphysical and
a moral sense is connotative.

Neither use of the term signifies

something distinct from the being itself.

Ockham cautions

against considering the properties of being as "in some way
distinct from being. 1146 Just as Ockham criticizes Scotus for
teaching that moral goodness is an additio"n to a will-act (the
addition of suitable relationships), so Ockham rejects Scotus'
position that the concept of metaphysical goodness is an addition
to the concept of being.
In the context of a discussion of the "properties of
being," Ockham twice gives a definition of "good" as "a being
46 sent., I, d. 2, q. 9 (II, 321); "Ad rationes probantes
quod ens non dicitur quidditative de passionibus; dico quod procedunt ex falsa imaginatione. Imaginatur enim ac si passio esset
aliquid simplex a parte rei de quo non praedicatur ens quidditative, ita quod bonitas esset a parte rei aliquo modo distincta
ab entitate, et nee entitas includeret bonitatem nee esset formaliter bonitas, nee e converso. Et hoc simpliciter reputo falsurn,
quia nulla talis distinctio est ponenda in creaturis. 11
This assertion by Ockham answers Scotus' position on the
properties of being, which Ockham understands to be: "Secundo
dicunt 'quod ens non est univocurn dictum in quid de differentiis
ultimis nee de passionibus propriis entis' ... De passionibus entis probant idem dupliciter: 'Primo sic; Passio per se secundo
rnodo predicatur de subjecto, primo Posteriorurn; ergo subjecturn
ponitur in definitione passionis sicut additurn, ex eodem primo,
et septimo Metaphysica. Igitur ens in ratione suae passionis
cadit ut additurn' ... 11 Ibid., p. 297. See Allan B. Wolter's excellent study of Scotus'PQsition on the transcendentals. The
Transcendentals §:pd Thej_r Function in the Metaphysics of Duns
,.
Scotus (St. Bonaventure, New York: The Franciscan Institute, 1940),
pp. 119-127. See Scotus, Quodl., 18, n. Lt; where Scotus discusses
the difference between essential goodness (metaphysical good) and
secondary goodness (natural and moral good).
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desirable according to Right Reason."

De facto, or within the

present moral order, not every being is to be willed according
to Right Reason.

Acts of hate for God, theft, adultery--these

acts cannot be willed according to Right Reason "stante divino
praecepto."

Hence, it seems warranted to accept this definition

as a description of moral goodness.

When the context indicates

clearly that Ockham is considering moral goodness, Ockham often
approximates this definition--"a being willable according to
Right Reason."
1)

To worship strange Gods is evil. We will assert
that the intellect dictates that this is evil
because then it is really and apparently evil;
because only this do I call really and apparently
good or evil--what is judged by the intellect
good or evil.47

2)

If you ask, however, what does the goodness or
malice of an act add beyond the substance of an
act which is called good at least by a certain
extrinsic denomination? .•• Goodness is that
connotative term or concept signifying principally that act, thus indifferent, and connoting
a perfectly virtuous act of the will and Right
Reason, in conformity to which is is elicited. 4 8

3)

Thus, the rectitude of an action is not other
than the act itself which ought to be chosen
according to Right Reason.49

47 sent., III, q. 13, S; "Hoc solurn voco realiter apparenter bonurn vel malurn, quid judicatur ab intellectu bonurn vel
malurn, et si judicetur ab intellectu recto non errante esse tale,
tune nc:n solum est apparenter bonum. vel malurn sed realiter quia
sic dictat intellectus esse, sicut est in re. 11

48 Sent., III, q. 10, Q. See above, note 30.
49Quodl., III, q. 14; 11 • • • ideo rectitudo actus non est
aliud quam ipse actus qui debi te elici tur secundurn rectam ration-·
em. "
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4)

No act is morally good or virtuous unless the
act of willing determines for itself to follow
Right Reason or is caused by such volition;
for example, to will to honor the father or
continue the father's honor because I wish to
do what Right Reason dictates.50
The logical analysis of "good" reveals that it is a con-

notative concept.

"Goodness" means a nexus of volitional effect,

volitive cause and intellectual dictate.

The term "good" is

predicated correctly of a substantive will-act with reference to
its distinct causes, freedom and reason.

Separated from its

history or causes, the volition is separated from its moral
status.

The root meaning of this concept does not signify the

divine will either directly or indirectly.

If God's causality

is substituted for the created will in producing a finite volition, then the meaning of "moral good" is lost.

To be sure,

Ockham could define the good as the creature's obligation fulfillment or conformity to divine precepts.

But obligation and con-

formity must be dictated by Right Reason and executed freely
"because it is dictated by Right Reason."

Invariably,

therefore~

moral goodness means the substantive will-act with its free and
rational causes.
gives a shorthand definition of moral good and
evil as conformity to obligation or rejection of obligation. 51
Ocl~ham

50_Quod1., III, q. 14; 11 • • • nullus actus est inoraliter
bonus vel yj_rtuosus nisi sibi assistat actus volendi sequi rectam
rationem ve1 quia causatur a tali velle; puta, velle honorare
patrem vel continuare honorem quia volo quid recta ratio dictat. 11
5lE._g., Sent., II, q. 5, H; Sent., II, q. 19, P; Sent.,
IV, q. 9, S; Se~t., I, d. 47, q. 1, D.
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He often speaks about moral obligation, but we find no text in
which Ockham explicitly defines moral obligation.
that obligation is a type of necessity.

Ockham implies

The term "necessity" is

used advisedly since, strictly speaking, the will cannot be neeessitated by anything or anyone while producing an imputable
act.

But if the will is to act rightly, then it must execute

the dictates of Right Reason.

It is hypothetically necessary

for the will to conform to Right Reason in order to produce a
good action, although the will is not under any absolute necessity
to produce a good action.

Because recta ratio includes directives

which are divinely revealed and directives which are known naturally, it is clear that the will is subject to two types of
rule or obligation.

First, the will must produce certain acts

because those actions are conditionally necessary for salvation, 52
that is to say, certain acts are obligatory because God has
"posited" a reward or punishment regarding the performance of
such acts.

Ockham often mentions positive obligations which
imply a consequent reward or punishment; 53 but he never asserts
52 sent., I, d. 48, q. 1, H; "Ad secundurn dicendurn quod
non conformans se voluntati divinae pro loco et tempore pro quo
tenetur de necessitate salutis~ peccat mortaliter." Also see
Sent., Prologue, q. 10 (I, 299J; An Princeps, c. 7 (Manchester
ed., Vol. I, 257); Sent., IV, q. 3, T.
53 sent., IV, q. 3, E; "Peccatum actuale non dicit aliud
quam actum aliquem absolutum praeteritum per quern quis obligatur
ad penam ... similiter illa 'obligatio' non di.cit aliquid absolutum
in anima distinctum ab actu et habi tu nee respectum realem, quj_a
suus terminus non est. Igitur tantum respectum rationis si sit
aliquis respectus." Also see Sent., IV, q. 9, E; Sent., II,
q. 19, P; Sent., I, d. 42, q. 1, H; Sent., II, q. 5, H. This
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that the only basis of moral obligation is a divine command.5 4
Secondly, the will is obliged to follow the natural dictates of
Right Reason.

Ockham makes only cursory statements about natural

or non-positive obligations.

However, Ockham does assert that
"as if by nature" things are ordered to certain ends. 55 Consequently, the natural dictates of Right Reason are obligatory

or necessary as the condition for "all things being agreeably
ordered."

Thus, whether moral obligation is determined on the

basis of revealed evidence or natural evidence, it is the dictate
of Right Reason which recognizes the end as it ought to be attained and conveys this "ought" to the will.

Ockham's formal

quotation indicates that "obligation" is a co1motative term.
Obligation is not some absolute or individual being, nor is it
a real relation or respect. Consequently, "obligation" must
have a nominal definition (quid nominis). A positive obligation
or- good connotes the will of God accepting some action as rewardable.
5 4In fact, Ockham explicitly recognizes the presence of
obligations which are not derived from the divine commands.
"Quia semper peccat voluntas peccato commissionis quando elicit
aliquem actum ad cuius oppositum obligatur per praeceptum divinum vel ordinationem divinam vel alio modo obligatur ad oppositum et nunquam aliter peccat. 11 Sent., III, q. 13, M. Also see
Sent., III, q. 12, YY, in finem.
5 5sent., Prologue, q. 11 (I, 309); "Ad omnes auctoritates
respondeo quod procedunt de fine qui secundum rectam rationemsal tem ut in pluribus-debet intendi si omnia essent convenienter
ordinata, et ideo quasi ex natura sua habet quod sit ordinabilis
ad talem finem. Si tamen non actualiter intendatur, non est vere
et proprie causa finalis. 11 A non-Christian experiences moral
obligations and recognizes moral goods without accepting the
scriptural commands. See Sent., IV, q. 3, S; Sent., III, q. 10,
I, in which Ockham discusses the difference between non-Christian
and Christian virtues in terms of natural or supernatural ends,
or in terms of natural or revealed motives for certain types of
behavior.
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description of moral goodness as "a being willable according to
Right Reason," indicates the character of every actually good act
and every possibly good act, while remaining open to the positive
or evident determination of particular goods.
The logic of "good" depends upon Ockham's metaphysical
stance and reflects certain "authorities" whom Ockham accepts
regarding the nature of goodness.

Ockham holds that only substances and accidents are real beings. 56 Obviously, "good" does

not subsist as do trees and animals; nor is good a real accident
which inheres in a substance as do heat and whiteness. Goodness
does not add anything positive to a being. 57 "Good" is said or
predicated; it does not subsist in the extra-mental world.
56 Summ. Tot. Log., I, c. 49 (ed. Boehner, p. 141); "Praeter res absolutas, scilicet substantias et qualitate, nulla res
est imaginabilis." Also see Quodl., I, q. 18; Sent., I, d. 30,
q. 3, c.
57Quodl., III, q. 14; "Rectitudo actus non est qualitas
actus, nee accidens ejus, ergo est substantia actus.
Ad istam
quaestionem, dico quod nunquam actus et sua rectitude differunt,
quia omnis actus aut est rectus essentialiter aut per denominationem exrinsecam. Si primo modo tune substantia actus est sua
rectitudo, quid patet ex hoc, quia impossibile est quod talis
actus sit a voluntate creata nisi sit rectus, Si secundo modo,
tune iste actus dicitur rectus, quia causatur vel continuatur ab
actu essentialiter virutoso, ad cuius conformitatem dicitur actus
rectus. Sed propter talem causalitatem vel conformitatem, nihil
positivum recipuit actus exterior." Also see Quodl., I, q. 20;
and Sent., III, q. 10, Q. When Ockham asserts that"rectitudo"
is not a quality of an act, rather it is the substance of an
act, he means that "bonus" is predicated of the substance of an
action •. The goodness which inheres in an essentially good action is caused by the same acts which cause the substance of the
act; namely, an act of Right Reason and an act of the will. Ockham does not mean that "rectitudo" exists as an independent
thing as is clear in the following footnote.
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Because goodness is not an absolute or a positive entity, it
"inheres" in a thing by being predicated of it.

For example,

"truth" inheres in a proposition by being predi.cated of that
sentence.

The same statement--I am sitting--is true and false

at different times but in each case the statement itself is
exactly the same.

Likewise, the same physical action--going to

church--can be successively and extrinsically good and bad depending on the agent's intention.

The reason that "good" is a

connotative term rather than an absolute term, therefore, is the
metaphysical position that "goodness" is a mode of being and not
an entitative quality of being.

Moral goodness is a determina-

tion of being predicated because of the volitive and intellectual
causes of that being.

This determination asserts no entity be-

yond the real effect of the created will and Right Reason.
Ockham refers his notion of "good" to the precedents
within the thought of St. Augustine and Aristotle.

St. Augustine

maintained that every nature--whether created or uncreated--is
praiseworthy and good. 59 This is a Christian outlook, in which
58 sent., Prologue, q. 9 (I, 240); "Non potest dici secundo modo; quia nunquam potest causare conceptum rei nisi causet
notitiam rei. Sed non est causa notitiae, sicut probatum est,
ergo nee conceptus. Nee potest dici primo modo, quia non semper
passiones illae sunt res absolutae realiter distinctae, secundum
istos, quia 'creativum, 1 'verum,' 'bonum' et huiusmodi sunt passiones aliquorum, et tamen non sunt res ab eis distinctae. 11 See
also Sent., I, d. 2, q. 9 (II, 321), where Ockham makes the same
point in refuting the position of Duns Scotus.
59ouodl., VI, q. 2; "Ad argumentum principale, dico quod
'laudabile' accipitur multipiciter. Uno modo, pro omni natura
quae est bona sive sit creata sive increata. Sic loquitur
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the Infinite Being is the Supreme Good and consequently, all
finite beings share in the goodness of the First Cause.

The

transcendental or metaphysical definition of "good," therefore,
is authorized by Augustine.
connotation of "good. 1160

Aristotle speaks about the moral

Goodness can signify the means to the

unqualified, final end or it can signify an action within human
powers which deserves praise or blame.
In the Reportatio, Ockham divides the meaning of "good"
into; (a) an honest and delectable good, and (b) that which is
willable. 61 In this early work, Ockham is sensitive to the
various connotations of the word good.

Partially, Ockham's care-

fulness in avoiding equivocations about the term good results
from his notion of the will's freedom.

Ockham does not think

Augustinus, iii De Libero Arbitrio, dicit 'Si laudatur rationalis
creatura, quae facta est, nemo dubitat laudandum esse qui fecit. 111
Also see Sent., I, d. 17, q. 2, Q.
60

Quodl., VI, q. 2; "Alio modo dicitur cuius bonitas
ordinatur ad aliquem alium actum, et sic dicitur primo Ethicorum,
quod optimorum non est laus. Tertio modo dicitur ut opponitur
vituperabili, et sic est aliquod bonum existens in nostra potestate dignum retributione et laude. 11
61 sent., III, q. 13, S; 11 Ad tertium dico quod bonum accipitur dupliciter; uno modo ut dividitur in bonum honestum et
delectabile, alio modo bonum est idem quid volitum vel accipitur
pro omni illo quid est volibile. Et eodem modo malum accipitur
dupliciter ut opponitur bono primo modo dicto vel ut accipitur
pro aliquo quid est nolibile vel nolitum. Accipiendo bonum primo
modo et malum prout opponitur bono primo modo, sic dico quod
voluntas potest velle malum quid nee est bonum realiter nee apparenter, et potest nolle bonum quid nee est malum realiter nee
apparenter. Prima pars istius conclusionis pa.tet, quia aliter
sequeretur quod nee posset mereri nee demereri committendo circa
quidcunque objectum malum realiter et dictatum a recta ratione
esse tale."
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that the will must choose an object under the aspect of a good
(sub ratione boni).

A person always wills what is willable; but

the experience of moral guilt and wrong-doing shows that a person
can will something sub ratione mali.

Everything actual or pos-

sible can be willed; but not everything should be willed in a
given situation.

Metaphysical good asserts only that a being is

willable; that everything can be an object of the will's love.
Moral good and evil assert the will's love of objects dictated
or prescribed by Right Reason.
requires the capacity to

For Ockham, the will's freedom

deliberat~ly

and single-mindedly accept

or reject the directive of Right Reason, to fulfill or repudiate
its obligation.
The association between the divine will and moral good
involves four facets.

First, every moral use of human freedom

requires the co-efficiency of the First Cause.

Created good and

evil do not exist by necessity; if they obtain then God is coagent.

Secondly, the dictate of Right Reason must recognize the

moral force of divine commands to be objectively correct.

Know-

ing that God exists and prescribes some action is reason enough
for Right Reason to dictate that action.

Here those who claim

that Ockham makes divine precepts the meaning of moral good have
qualified support for their interpretation.

No natural criteria

of goodness should be preferred to a meaningful and "fulfillable"
divine command.

Right Reason cannot dictate contrary acts simul-

taneously but, on the basis of novel revelation, might dictate
contrary actions successively.

Thirdly, precluding any positive
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law and obligation to guide the exercise of human freedom, the
moral agent should direct his volition to the Greatest Good.

God

ought to be the final cause of moral behavior even though a
revealed mandate forbids the love of God.

Finally--and extrinsic

to the nature of morally good actions--God accepts some actions
as meritorious or con.duci ve to eternal life.

It must be empha-

sized that Ockham speaks of moral good as independent of meritori62
ousness;
moral good refers to the substance of created will-acts
while meritorious connotes the divine evaluation of those willacts.

Salvation and beatitude are free gifts of God but morality

62 sent., I, d. 17, q. 2, E; "Verumtamen, illum actum esse
meritorium non est in potestate naturae humanae, sive habeat
charitatem sive non habeat, sed est in libera Dei acceptatione;
ita quod sive charitas insit animae sive non insit et actu elicito adhuc, est in postestate Dei acceptare illum actum tanquam
meritorium vel non acceptare. 11 Also see Sent., I, d. 17, q. 1, Q.
It does not seem inconsistent with Ockham'S'""exposition of damnable or meritorious acts to maintain that God could impose eternal
punishment or eternal reward upon any act of man--even acts done
unconsciously or undeliberately. However, Ockham strongly suggests that only actions done voluntarily and knowingly are accepted by God as worthy of eternal pain or reward. See Quodl., VI,
q. l; Sent., I, d. 17, q. 11, C; Sent., IV, q. 8-9, Z, in finem.
Ockham implies that morally good orevil actions can be-Supernaturally meritorious or punishable. For example, a meri tor:Lous
action is a morally good action which is produced out of love
for God. "Nullus actus non meritorius-posset dici de novo (actu)
meritorius, quae non continuatur et causatur ex amore Dei. Similiter, nullus actus est moraliter bonus vel virtuosus nisi sibi
assistat actus volendi sequi rectam rationem vel quia causatur
a tali velle, puta, velle honorare patrem vel continuare honorem
quia volo facere quid recta ratio dictat." Quodl., III, q. 14.
Within the present moral order (stante divino precepto), charity
is a necessary condition or cause of meritorious action. But
actions which are morally good can be produced without charity.
t•In omni actu meritorio, caritas est causa efficiens partialis,
tamen virtus potest esse moralis sufficiens quantum ad moralitatem
naturalem, si habeat circumstantias debitas tali virtuti secundum
naturam, sicut philosophi fuerunt virtuosi sine omni caritate,
sed actwn meritorium non possunt habere sine caritate. 11 Sent.,
III, q. 10, I.

r
308
is within the normal competence of human nature.
Ockham separates the moral order from the economy of
salvation.

Since St. Augustine's doctrinal battle with Pelagius

the Scholastics commonly held that grace was required for moral
rectitude. 63 Ockham steps outside this tradition and was promptly
accused of Pelagianism. 64 Partly, his motives were to maintain
the created will's "freedom of opposites."

The will whose natural

powers were incapable of producing good or evil would not possess
freedom in Ockham's estimate.
will.

Another reason involves the divine

God's freedom and the contingent operation of His ordained

will prohibit discussion of moral goodness as necessarily productive of beatitude.

Ockham sees the possibility of a moral life
ending in total annihilation as well as salvation. 65 This vision

6 3cf. De Correptione et Gratia, II (P.L., 4L~, 917). St.
Thomas holds the same opinion in Summ. Theol., I-II, q. 109,
art. 2. D. Odon Lottin indicates how another "Nominalist," Peter
Abelard, was condemned at the Council of Sens for claiming that
free will was sufficient for moral goodness. Psychologie et
Morale ... , I, pp. 23-25.
64 see the studies of Gordon Leff, Bradwardine and the
Pela ains (Cambridge Studies in Medieval Life and Thought, New
Series 5: Cambridge, University Press, 1957), and Hieko A.
Oberman, Archbishop Thomas Bradwardine, A Fourteenth Century
Augustinian (Utrecht, 1957). The papal commission at Avignon
charged that this position "sapit heresim Pelagianam." See
Pelzer, Revue d'Histoire eccesiastigue, 18, p. 251. The assertion that moral good is within the natural powers of the human
will is not, however, endemic to "Nominalism." Gregory of Rimini
says: "Homo non potest absque speciali Dei auxilio facere aliquem
actum moralem non culpabilem, igitur homo non potest absque speciali auxilio Dei facere alig_uem actum morali ter born..lm." Sent. ,
II, d. 26-29, q. 1, art. 1 \Venice, 1522), f. 93v.
6 5sent., IV, q. 3, Q; 11 • • • sicut Deus creat creaturam
quamlibet exrnera voluntate sua, ita ex mera voluntate sua potest
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requires that morality carry its own exigencies.

Eternal life

cannot be offered as the inevitable consequent or ulterior motive
of moral behavior.

Rather, the will should fulfill the obligation

dictated by Right Reason precisely and exactly because it is
dictated by Right Reason.

Hence, Ockham announces the ironic

partnership of God's absolute power and the "birth of the lay
spirit" (G. de Lagarde), "a natural and rational ethic" (P. Vignaux), "the moral autonomy and freedom of man" (H. Oberman).

The

created will and Right Reason are the sufficient and essential
causes of moral good; meritorious actions require the causal
action of infused charity or divine acceptance.

The created love

for God above all is always morally good by nature, but never
.
d e na t ura. 66
meri' t orious
To be sure, there is an "ordained" harmony between the
order of morals and grace.

Those actions presently prescribed

by God in the Decalogue agree with the natural evidence available
to the Practical Intellect.

God's ordained will now rewards the
performance of moral actions done for God's sake. 67 "Grace builds
facere de creatura quicquid sibi placet. Sicut enim si aliquis
diligeret Deum et faceret omnia opera Deo accepta, potest eum
Deus annihilare sine aliqua injuria; its sibi post talia opera
potest non dare vitam aeternam sed penam aeternam sine injuria.
Et ratio est quia Deus nullius est debitor, et ideo quicquid
facit nobis ex mera gratia facit. Et ideo ex hoc ipso quod Deus
facit aliquid, juste factum est. Exemplum, Christus nunquam peccavit, et tamen fuit punitus gravissime usque ad mortem.u
66 Sent., I, d. 17, q. 1, K. See the valuable study of
Paul Vignaux, Justification et Predestination .•• , pp. 121-126.
67 sent., I, d. 17, q. 2, D; "Deus voluntarie et libere
acceptat b'Oi1Wii motum voluntatis tanquam meritorium quando elicitur
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on nature"--in the sense that the connotation of causative
charity or divine acceptance is added to the notion of "moral
good" to produce the concept of "meritorious."

But the agreement

between criteria of moral and meritorious activity is factual
rather than necessary.
It is somewhat difficult to reconcile this doctrine of
moral good with what Ockham said about the specific nature of
intrinsically good actions.

Moral goodness is defined by its

essential causes of will and Right Reason.

The concept is predi-

cated about a substantive will-act as dependent upon the will
freely conformed to the obligation enunciated and dictated by
Right Reason.

Ockham's prolonged debate with Duns Scotus means

to show that morally good actions are intrinsically (in se) and
specifically distinct from indifferent or evil actions.

Yet

Ockham also claims that God could produce, as immediate and total
cause, any action within the powers of man without thereby producing a moral action.

Not subject to any obligation, God could

perform those actions which would be evil and sinful for creatures
without acting evilly.
goes begging.

The coherence of these two assertions

If God cannot conform to a moral obligation since

He is nobody's "debtor," how could He singularly produce the same
specific nature of the creature's actions which are so conformed?
ab habente charitatem ..• 11 Also see Quodl., I, q. 20; and Sent.,
III, q. 12, K. The conceptual structure of moral good as connoting the causes of will and Right Reason, and of meritorious
good as connoting the will, Right Reason and charity as suggested
by Erich Hochstetter, Franz. Studien, 32, 11-12.
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If the created will and Right Reason produce volitions which are
intrinsically and essentially good, why must the term "good" connote causes which are separable and distinct from that volition?
We find no answers, only Ockham's concern to maintain: a) God's
capacity to produce directly every metaphysical entity which He
now produces through secondary causes, and b) the partial causesobjects of volition effect the metaphysical nature of that
volition.
One thing is clear.

This "structural" definition of moral

good gives the rational principles of morality a formal character.
As the notion of "moral good" connotes its essential cause.s, so
the various virtues signify volition conformed to prudence or
Right Reason concerning the passions.
'Virtuous' and 'wicked' are connotative names and
signify the act itself, not absolutely, but by connoting with this act the activity of the will and
prudence. And when something connoted is lacking,
such an act is not called 'virtuous. 1 68
The content of Ockham's virtue-terminology invariably includes
the essential causes of moral goodness--the created will and Right
Reason.

The principles formulated with this terminology, however,

68 sent., III, q. 13, F; 11 • • • 'virtuosum' et 'vitiosum'
sunt nomina connotativa et significant ipsum actum non absolute,
sed. connotando cum hoc acti vi tatem volunta·tis et prudentiae. Et
quando deficit aliquid connotatum non dicitur talis actus vi.rtuosus. 11 J. K. McDonnell, Religion and Ethics.~, 110-111+, 140-144,
comments that the "generic descriptions" which Ockham offers for
the virtues are not very useful in recognizing or observing specific instances of these virtues. While agreeing with this interpretation in general, we maintain that the basic or generic
significance of value terms is the created will and Right Reason,
not the divine will as Mr. McDonnell proposes.
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cannot distinguish

~

priori between honest and dishonest actions,

i.e., acts conformed and contrary to Right Reason's dictate.
The truth of these principles is secure against any novel legislation by God but their educative value is minimal.

That "hon-

est," "justice," "conformity to Right Reason," and "moral good"
are obligatory becomes a matter of definition.

Divine commands

to "do what is dishonest" or to "act contrary to Right Reason"
are possible as mental, verbal or written statements, but they
would be meaningless or logically contradictory.

A generic

definition of moral goodness allows for formal ethical principles
which organize the agent's deliberations.

It provides a stable

framework for morality with necessarily true directives.

At the

same time, this definition recognizes God's prerogative to affix
a negative or positive obligation to any simple action within
man's power.

CHAPTER VI
SOME CONCLUSIONS

An element of moral positivism seems to be endemic to
Christian ethics.

The recognition of moral laws, which are

established and validated by the free decisions of the Creator,
comes with a commitment to the truth of biblical revelation.
Scripture contains laws regarding actions neither good nor evil
in themselves such as the rites of circumcision and baptism.

The

Bible relates instances in which natural laws were either dispensed, clarified, determined or countermanded by God--depending
on whJch exigesis is accepted--such as the divine command that
Abraham kill his innocent son or that Osse marry an adulteress.
How to reconcile the prerogatives of the Creator within the moral
order with the exigencies of naturally known morality was one
facet of thr: Scholastic effort to relate faith and reason.

The

frontier between "positive" and "natural" law shifted often in
proportion to individual's estimates of the nature, stability
and extent of these various types of moral laws.
Within the development of Medieval Philosophy, the most
impressive aspect of

Ocl~ham's

ethic is the bold treatment of God's

omnipotence within the moral order.

Ihe possibility of divine

1

commands to kill, lie, steal and hate God is seriously raised by
OckhB.m.

Ockham' s speculation about God's absolute power to
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cormnand acts of fornication, adultery and "odium Dei" has received
the concentration of many scholars as the central feature of his
ethical system.

Consequently, Ockhamism has been considered as

an "extreme" position in the history of Scholastic ethical
theory--a "pure" system of divine voluntarism.
instance of divine positivism or voluntarism. 1

Perhaps the first

Yet we have Ockham's own opinion that moral doctrine ineludes more than divine commands.
One should know that moral doctrine has many parts,
of which one is positive and the other non-positive.
Human positive science is that which contains human
and divine laws which oblige someone to accomplish
or avoid those things which are neither good nor
evil unless because they are commanded or prohibited
by a superior capable of establishing and deciding
laws. Non-positive moral science is that which
directs human acts without any command of a superior; just as principles known per se or known through
experience direct thus, that namely, 'Everything
honest is to be done,' and 'Everything dishonest
is to be avoided,' etc., about which Aristotle
speaks in moral philosophy.2
The interpretive problem, therefore, is to determine how
Ockham reconciles his far-reaching conception of God's legislative
authority with the Aristotelian requirements for a moral science.

------------------------------

~-·.......

1 cf. Gordon Leff, Medieval Thought (Baltimore: Penguin
Books, 1958), p. 289; "Morality for the first time lay simply
with God's arbitrary decree; with God and His will synonymous
there 8ould be no way of judging right or wrong other than by
the decrees of His will." Also, A. P. d'Entreves, Natural Law.
An Histcr.ica~ SllrVIT (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1955'),p-:-69;
and Vernon J. Bourke, History of Ethics, Vol. I, p. 15~?.
".)

LQuodl., II, q. 14. See Introduction, note 9 . Hereafte:r,
texts quoted within the preceding chapters will be indicated by
chapter number (Roman numeral) and footnote number.
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The Venerable Inceptor admits diverse components within his
ethical theory.

Norms, determinants, evidence and values fit

into the general categories of either "positive" or "non-positive. 11

Our conclusions are brief; they mean to identify the

major features of each category and show their relationship.
The arguments for these conclusions rest mainly in the preceding
chapters.
Positive Elements
Norms.

The divine will and its contingent legislation

represents a circumstance of special importance to the created
moral agent. 3

After recognizing through faith the revealed word

of God in Scripture, the rational creature ought to conform to
the mandates therein.

Furthermore, men ought to affirm God's

freedom in establishing norms of behavior for His creatures.

In

particular and extraordinary cases, God might order actions which
are now inconsistent with natural and revealed general standards.
(Principal Objection)

God commanded the children of
Israel to plunder the Egyptians;
therefore, He commanded theft.
But theft is evil; therefore,
He commanded evil ...

(Ockham's Response)

To the first principal argument,
it is clear that to plunder the
Egyptians was not evil but good.
Thus, God did not command evil
by ordering them to rob the
Egyptians, nor did the children
of Israel sin by plundering--

3 III,

9.
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except those who robbed in the
wrong spirit by not obeying 4
precisely the divine command.
The claim was not uncommon within Scholasticism that God,
the creator of the world, could redistribute the goods of the
world.

The enlargement of God's moral authority occurs with

Ockham's unprecedented assertion that a divine command could
require hate for God.

Ockham sees no necessary connection or

formal repugnance between the Uncreated Cause and any created
effect.

God is a spectator, not a participant in the moral order.

Simple hate for God is not by nature evil or repellant to the
Creator:

insane persons or God Himself could cause this volition

without moral guilt.

The simple love for God is not by nature

good or conducive to happiness:
(i.e.,~

amore concupiscentiae).

people can love God selfishly
Ockham holds that every

simple act within the power of man's will (i.e., any volitive
effect specified by a single object) could be subject to a negative or affirmative obligation through divine law.

He demands

recognition of the complex objects and situational factors which
necessarily accompany volitions which are truly moral.

4 sent., I, d. 47, q. 1, A, G; 11 • • • praecepit filiis Israel
spoliare Egyptios; ergo, praecepit furturn. Sed furtum est malum;
ergo, praecepit malum ... Ad primum principale, patet quod spoliare Egyptios non fuit malum sed bonum. Et ideo Deus praecipiendo
spoliare Egyptios non praecepit malum nee filii Israel peccaverunt spoliando nisi illi qui malo animo non praecise obediendo
divino pracepto spoliaverunt."
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Valid moral laws must respect the capacities and possibilities of human nature and the norms of logical coherence.5
When expressed as directive propositions by the Practical Intellect, the divine commands must be conceptually consistent and
signify something "do-able."
reduce to one.

What

These minimal requirements perhaps

cannot be done voluntarily cannot be a

matter of obligation or morality.

This primary standard of

validity for moral laws pertains to both the positive and nonpositive variety.

An additional criterion must be applied to

purely positive norms:

every simple action subject to a positive

positive obligation must be "do-able" while respecting the source
of that obligation.

Positive laws presuppose the authority of

the legislator; certain actions are valued because they are commantled by "a superior capable of establishing and deciding laws."
The fulfillment of positive obligations requires the proper
intention or motivation towards a principle of obligation which
is distinct from the nature of the action commanded.
unique problem arises.
hate Him?

Here a

What if God commanded the creature to

The simple hate for God is within the power of the

created will and thus Ockham admits in principle that this action
could be subject to a positive obligation.

But in this one case

the motive for obedience would be "formally repugnant" to the
obedient act; one would be obliged to hate God because of love
for God.

Everything other than God could be loved or hated by

5111, 15; and III, 53.
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the created will for God's sake without any formal or psychological contradiction. 6

Hence, while Ockham extends the realm of

positive law to every act within the created will's power, the
hate of God cannot be done virtuously.

In this case, the meta-

physical or natural possibilities of the human will are not coextensive with its moral possibilities. 7
Scholasticism was largely the endeavor of theologians.
Ockham no less than St. Thomas or Duns Scotus considered himself
first and foremost a theologian.

Vitalized by belief in God as

the Greatest Good and the Ultimate End, his moral theory dwells
on the peculiarities of Christian behavior.

Scripture contains

certain mandates and rather than explicate the natural evidence
and rational warrant for these revealed directives, Ockham is
satisfied to say they express God's will for men.

As Father

6 sent., III, q. 12, YY-AAA; "Si quaeras utrum conversio
ad Deum actu caritativo et aversio ab Eo actu odiendi Eum opponitur formaliter. Dicendum est quod sic, quia d:Lligere Deum supra
011111.:La et odire Deum sunt actus contrarii.
Si quaeras de conversione ad Deurn actu caritativo et conversione actu quo diligitur
creatura quam Deus non vult diligi, puta actum fornicandi. Sic
non repugnant illi naturali ter et formali ter .inter se, sed compatiuntur se in eodem quantum est ex natura actuum. Sed solum
repugnant per causam extrinsecam, puta per Deum ordinantem talem
creaturam nullo modo a. voluntate creatura diligi .•. Si lex
statuta removeretur, jam isti actus diligendi compaterentur se
in eodem." Also see Sent., II, q. 19, F.
11
II
' ~·
. , q. 14 , 0 c khram cJetines
mora ] .s 11 a.s "human
acts which are controlled by the vd.11 absolutely;" or in a strict

7I n

Q uo d-l.. ,

sense as "acts subject to the power of will according to the
natural dictate of reason and ac8ording to the other circumstances." Cf. Introduction, note 9 . God's moral authority is as
extensive as the first meaning. But hate for God cannot be
elici.ted within the strict sense of moral activity.
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Philotheus Boehner indicates, 8 Ockham envisions morality within
the context of interpersonal relationships rather than rule by
impersonal nature.

The possibility of changes in the content of

moral obligation is Scripturally demanded (e.g., the case of
Abraham and Osee) and promotes the fundamental motive to please
God when used pedagogically.

Ockham never teaches that all moral

norms derive their validity "ex praecepto superioris:"

there are

many universal directives whose validity is not relative to divine
decree.

Perfect virtue requires, however, that Christian agents

value every created thing--even moral rules--as means to the
Uncreated Good.
Values.

According to Ockham, some actions are morally

good only because God commands them.

This can be understood

about rites such as baptism, or particular duties such as Abraham
refeived.

Ockham appreciates the (remote) possibility that God

might attach an obligation to performing any simple action within
the agent's power--except the act of hating or disobeying God.

•ro love God above all is intrinsically and necessarily good in
spite of changing circumstances or divine commands to the contrary.

As corollary, Ockham proposes that no physical or mental

act, and no simple or non-complex act of volition, has a proper
goodness or evilness by its nature.
8 collected Articles ... , p. 153; "Ockham bases his ethics
on one Personal principle, on God who is most powerful, most good
and most wise and most just."
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This description of the positive norms and values in
Ockham's ethical doctrine is one side of the coin.

Ockham thinks

these positions can fit within the framework of an Aristotelian
moral science.

Concern for the divine prerogatives is a constant

polarity of Ockham's moral teaching.

The positive or voluntaris-

tic features of his doctrine raise serious doubts for many critics
that Ockham could consistently maintain any demonstrative and
rationally based knowledge about the moral order.

The burden of

proof rests with those who claim that the divine will is not
Ockham's last word in ethics. 9
Non-Positive Elements
Norms.

A novel understanding of "recta ratio" supports

Ockham's claim of a "scientific" ethic.

Right reason can desig-

nate any true directive proposition--this is its traditional
significance.

But Ockham also means by Right Reason a non-

propositional act of the intellect--a simple act of assent to
the apprehended directive or "right reason."

Not a proposition

itself, Right Reason cannot stand in logical contradiction to
any directive.

Practical assent or Right Reason is the psycho-

logical mechanism which renders the consideration of behavioral
9various commentators have suggested that moral positivisn is not an accurate classification of Ockham's moral doctrine,
but without indicating how positivism and rationalism are related.
Cf'. Helmar ~runghens, Ockham im Lichte der neueren Forschung
(Berlin, Hamburg; Lutherisches Verlagshaus, 1968), p. 253; Paul
Vignaux, "Nom.inalism," D.T.C., 11, c. 771; and Othmar Suk, n~rhe
Connection of virtues According to Ockham," Franciscan Studies
10 (1950), pp. 29-30.
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ends as normative for volition.

To assent that "this is to be

done" conveys an obligation or imperative beyond the assessment
of truth.

Regardless of the objective truth of a moral direc-

tive, the will is not obliged until the intellect recognizes or
assents to its truth.

This un-traditional sense of "recta ratio"

is either included within the meaning of necessary moral rules
or is presupposed by them.

Inevitably, Right Reason and volitive

freedom produce moral activity; these aspects of human nature
become the basic moral "facts" upon which moral science is based.
Certain principles of morality organize deliberation
about one's duty.

These principles are known per seas neces-

sarily true independent of any will-act, human or divine, Ockham mentions:

Everything honest is to be done.

Everything dis-

honest is to be avoided, The will ought to be conformed to Right
Reason, All blameworthy evil is to be avoided. 10 These and
other universal norms 11 structure moral decisions and connect
all virtuous actions as common principles.

The truth of these

directives is known by means of the constitutive concepts.

It

would be possible, but logically contradictory and unfulfillable,
for God to command, "Act contrary to Right Reason" or "Do what
is dishonest."

The very meaning of Right Reason and honesty

indicates an obligation of conformity and performance for the
crea.ted will.

It remains true that the will ought to conform

lOI 11."t"f'O
. d UC t·ion, note 9 .

11 Iv, 23.
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to Right Reason however one's positive obligations change through
divine command.

The natural function of Right Reason involves

the determination and dictation of one's obligation.

Whether

natural evidence or divine commands warrant the judgment that
"this ought to be done," the assent of Right Reason is the
standard of virtuous will-acts.

Ockham reasons that it would be

impossible for moral agents to conform to rules about which they
are (inculpably) ignorant.

Believing that God is the Greatest

Good who commands this particular act, Right Reason assents
naturally and automatically that "this is to be done."

Not

believing in God, the judgments of the Practical Intellect remain
autonomous and authoritative even while rejecting God's positive
laws.
Ockham's redefinition of "recta ratio" stands in harmony
with God's legislative authority; at the same time it explains
why Ockhamism could foster a "lay spirit" and division between
_theological and natural ethics.

The dictate of Right Reason

carries a moral exigency; the agent should voluntarily conform
to the intellect's dictate "because it is dictated. 1112

It pro-

vides Ockham with a solution for the perplexing problem of the
evidence and experiential foundation for moral values.

Assent

to a direc-cive proposition has the natural function of recognizing, affirming and dictating an obligation.
practical truth asserts a personal duty.
12 II

'

83

'

84.

.

The judgment of

In constructing moral
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laws with this conception of "recta ratio," Ockham asserts only
a fact, but a psychological fact whose natural function is to
establish a norm for volition.
The non-positive rules of morality which are necessarily
true signify only the structure or framework of moral activity.
Science concerns the universal for Ockham as well as for Aristotle; the Venerable Inceptor locates universality in the signification of concepts and words rather than in extra-mental things.
Hence, the principles of demonstrative knowledge about ethics
concern concepts.

These principles are formally or analytically

true; the constitutive concepts are connected necessarily by the
verb "ought" because one term of the proposition invariably
connotes or signifies the obliging dictate of Right Reason.

The

rationally n,ecessary rules of morality signify the essential
causes of moral activity--narnely, the Will as conformed to Right
Reason's assent.

Certain principles explicitly assert the

"ethical order" of causes, e.g., The will ought to conform itself
to Hight Reason; others designate implicitly the causality of
human freedom and Practical Intellect, e.g., Everything honest
is to be done.

Such directives offer generic descriptions of

human moral response.

They cannot divide the range of possible

volitions into .§. priori categories of "conform.Ed to Right Reason"
or "contrary to Right Reason."

Asserting only the structure of

mora.1 behav:Lor, they cannot contradict any positive content or
determination of right and wrong.
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Values.

Ockham's basic description of moral good is

"that which can be willed and loved according to Right Reason. 111 3
This meaning can absorb any "positive goods" since the will of
God is respected by the "honest use of reason."

Ockham is em-

phatic that actual moral value inheres in, or is predicated of,
the created will.

Subject to no obligation, the divine agent

never produces a moral value when operating as total cause.

As

legislator, God might attach positive obligations to certain
actions but the causes and consequently the meaning of "moral
good" involves the created will and intellectual dictate.
It is necessary to distinguish between moral and meritorious good in Ockham's thought.

Morality is within man's natural

powers, salvation or merit is not.
by

th~

Some actions are motivated

infused habit of charity and acceptable to God; but no

created effect necessitates the divine will to grant eternal life.
Reward or punishment is extrinsic to the nature of human acts.
The love of God above all is morally good by nature but not conducive to beatitude by nature.

Too often, commentators have

described Ockham's doctrine of "meritorious" (and extrinsic) good
as his final word in value theory.

But Ockham clearly holds that

moraJ good and evil are intrinsically different by nature, and
specJ.:fice.lly different in predication.
theory

<-lr8

the positions:

Characteristic of Ockham's

a) that the simple nature of every

human action is morally indifferent, and b) that actions called

13v. 47, 48, 49, 50, 68.
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good have a complex nature deriving from the various circumstances
and objects which are corporately dictated by Right Reason.

These

positions enable Ockham to distinguish fact and value; they also
allow for God's prerogative to attach a positive obligation to
every simple act (except hate for God) producible by men.

* * * * * * * * * * *
Ockham has no ethical system which can be classified as
voluntarism, positivism, rationalism, subjectivism or formalism.
These categories are all accurate to a degree and, for that
reason, imprecise.

Human knowledge about morals possesses no

formal or systematic unity based upon a single subject, a specific type of evidence or one common principle.

Our knowledge is

simply a collection of logically compatible propositions which
deal directly or indirectly with human operations.

Based upon

different sources of evidence, Ockham divides moral doctrine
into the general classes of positive and non-positive.

The har-

mony between these parts is not organic; it is simply the absence
of mutual contradiction.
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